Counterpoint: Washington Supreme Court to Rule on Resulting Losses in Insurance Disputes
September 1, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
This is the fourth installment of posts on Vision One v. Philadelphia Indemnity, a Washington Supreme Court case touching on Washington construction and insurance law. After Williams v. Athletic Field got so much coverage, I wished that I had provided a forum for argument on Builders Counsel. While we await that opinion from the Supreme Court, I decided to let a few good writers have at Vision One here on the blog. Last week, attorney Chris Carr weighed in. Today, insurance expert David Thayer returns to give his final impression. David provided an initial peak at the case earlier this year. Thanks to both Chris and David for contributing to the debate.
In August 2011 the Washington Supreme Court will rule on a pair of joined cases that involve critical insurance coverage issues. The outcome of the ruling will impact a large swath of policyholders in Washington State including builders, developers, and homeowners to name a few.
The cases are Vision One vs. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance and Sprague vs. Safeco. The Vision one case comes from Division Two of the Appellate Court which overturned a lower court decision in favor the plaintiff, Vision One. Division Two decided that the collapse of a concrete pour during the course of construction did not constitute a resulting loss due to faulty workmanship. They further went on to redefine efficient proximate cause in a way that is harmful to policyholders by broadening rather than narrowing the meaning of exclusionary language in Philadelphia’s Builders Risk Policy.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Florida trigger
August 4, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Siena Home Corp., No. 5:08-CV-385-Oc-10GJK (M.D. Fla. July 8, 2011), insured residential real estate developer Siena was sued by homeowners seeking damages for moisture penetration property damage resulting from exterior wall construction defects. Siena’s CGL insurer Mid-Continent filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment of no duty to defend or indemnify in part on the basis that the alleged “property damage” did not manifest during the Mid-Continent policy period.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Lockton Expands Construction and Design Team
July 19, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Lockton Companies, LLC, the largest privately held independent insurance broker, has announced that it is expanding its construction and design team with the hiring of Karen Erger and Tom Miller.
Ms. Erger will provide professional liability practice management, loss prevention, contract and complex claims management consulting services to Lockton's architectural, engineering and construction clients in her role as Vice President, Director of Practice Management. Her background includes construction litigation at a leading construction law firm, professional liability claims defense and claims consulting for major professional liability underwriters.
Miller joins Lockton as a Senior Vice President within the Design and Construction Unit. His role will be dedicated to serving the needs of engineering, architecture and construction firms performing services around the globe. He has spent more than 15 years concentrating on professional liability for design professionals and contractors in multiple roles. He previously managed the professional liability underwriting of one of the largest construction insurers and has developed numerous manuscript insurance products as well as focused on strategic planning to enhance business unit opportunities.
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Although Property Damage Arises From An Occurrence, Coverage Barred By Business Risk Exclusions
July 8, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The homeowners hired the insured to raise the structure of their home twenty-four inches above the flood zone. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58985 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011). When the insured’s crew returned from lunch one day, they found the house had fallen from hydraulic jacks being used to raise the structure a few inches at a time. There was substantial damage to the entire structure.
The homeowners sued, asserting several claims, including negligence and breach of contract. The complaint alleged the homeowners entered a contract with the insured to raise their structure while maintaining its integrity. However, the insured failed to use proper equipment, which caused the house to fall and be completely destroyed.
The insured tendered the claim to its insurer, Lafayette Insurance Company. Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed suit for a declaratory judgment. Lafayette’s subsequent motion for summary judgment contended there was no “occurrence” alleged in the underlying complaint and, even if there was, the business risk exclusions barred coverage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Court Clarifies Sequence in California’s SB800
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
As California’s Right-To-Repair law, SB800, nears its ninth birthday, it has remained “largely untested in the legal system” as noted by Megan MacNee of Wood, Smith, Henning & Berman LLP on the site RealEstateRama. She writes that some homeowners have requested documents prior to filing a claim, which she describes as an attempt to “game the system,” and “analogous to requiring a party to litigation to comply with discovery before a complaint is filed.”
The court determined that homeowners may not request documents from the builder until they have actually filed a claim. The court noted that SB800 lacks any clear indication that homeowners may request documents before filing a claim (and also does not indicate that a builder would have to provide documents in these circumstances). The court concluded that the section that sets up the prelitigation procedures occurs before they section on documents discovery.¬? “Because the document request is part of the prelitigation procedure, and the prelitigation procedure does not begin until the homeowner has served notice of a claim, it follows that there can be no prelitigation obligation to produce documents under section 912, subdivision (a) unless the homeowner has commenced the prelitigation procedure by serving notice of a claim.”
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Changes To Indemnification Statute Are Here! Say Hello To Defense Duties
June 19, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
A months back, I discussed the passage of SHB 1559. The law changes the existing statutory indemnification regulation to include the costs of defense and to rid contracts of unfair indemnification for someone else’s sole negligence. The law went into effect last week!
Check back to my recent article on the changes set forth in the new law. The amendments to RCW 4.24.115 will broaden the existing law and clarify what types of indemnification are unenforceable. In short, an “up the chain” contractor (such as a general contractor) cannot expect to pass 100% of the defense and indemnification obligations downward if it is partially liable.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
One World Trade Center Due to Be America’s Tallest and World’s Priciest
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
As One World Trade Center rises, so does the price tag. After construction delays and cost overruns, the cost of the building at the site of the September 11 attacks has risen to $3.8 billion. Part of the expense of the skyscraper is the heavily reinforced base of the building. The elevator shafts are also heavily reinforced, all part of guarding against future terrorist attacks.
In comparison, the world’s tallest tower, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, cost only $1.5 billion, less than half the cost of One World Trade Center. As a result, the Port Authority does not see the building as being profitable in near future. In order to fund it, the agency is raising tolls on bridge and tunnel traffic.
Currently, about the half the unfinished building is leased. Construction is expected to conclude in 2013.
Read the full story…
Policyholder Fails to Build Adequate Record to Support Bad Faith Claim
May 19, 2011 — May 19, 2011 -
Tred R. Eyerly,
Insurance Law HawaiiThe importance of careful preparation and documentation was the take away lesson in a Texas bad faith case, C.K. Lee v. Catlin Specialty Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19145 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 28, 2011).
C.K. Lee owned a commercial shopping center in Houston. Catlin issued a commercial property policy to Lee. On September 12, 2008, Hurricane Ike hit and caused substantial property damage throughout the Texas Gulf Coast area. On September 24, 2008, Lee submitted a claim for damage to the roof of his shopping center to Catlin.
Catlin hired Engle Martin to represent its interests in adjusting the claim. Engle Martin eventually adjusted over 200 Ike-related claims for Catlin.
In November 2008, Engle Martin and Emergency Services Inc., retained by Lee, inspected Lee’s property. Engle Martin observed evidence of roof repairs that had apparently been made both before and after Hurricane Ike. Engle Martin decided it was necessary to use an infrared scan of the roof to help identify which damages, if any, were attributable to wind and which, if any, were attributable to sub par, prior repairs or natural deterioration.
Engle Martin retained Project, Time & Cost (PT&C) to conduct the infrared inspection. PT&C’s inspection determined there was no wind-related damage to the roof and no breaches or openings created by wind. Instead, the roof had exceeded its life expectancy and was in need of replacement due to normal wear and weathering. Consequently, Catlin decided that the damage to Lee’s roof was not caused by winds from Hurricane Ike.
Meanwhile, Lee’s contractor, Emergency Services, prepared a report estimating that the total cost of repairing the roof would be $871,187. Engle Martin’s estimate for repair of the roof was $22,864.
Lee filed suit for breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. Catlin moved for summary judgment on all claims but breach of contract, arguing that because there was a bona fide dispute concerning the cause of the damages and whether they were covered under the policy, there was no evidence of bad faith or violations of the Texas Insurance Code.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Five Years of Great Legal Blogging at Insurance Law Hawaii
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Our congratulations to Tred Eyerly who has been blogging at Insurance Law Hawaii for five years now. Over the years, he has posted more than five hundred posts and has provided us all with fascinating insights into the laws on insurance coverage. He describes his blog as “a commentary on insurance coverage issues in Hawaii and beyond.” We are grateful that the “beyond” has just in the last few weeks included Colorado, Illinois, Washington, Minnesota, and Rhode Island (about as far from the island of Hawaii as you can get).
You can read his blog at Insurance Law Hawaii.
The Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury or “property damage” be caused by an occurrence and that the “bodily injury or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivanrsquo;s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing, including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
Insurer’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Earth Movement Exclusion Denied
October 28, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
After carefully dissecting the earth movement exclusion, the court denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. High Street Lofts Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109043 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2011).
The City of Boulder performed road repair work near High Street’s property, some of which involved the use of a vibrating compactor to compact and set the roadbed. High Street noticed damage to its building, such as cracks in walls, sloping of floors and separations of porches from the building itself. High Street contacted the City of Boulder, who forwarded the complaint to its contractor, Concrete Express, Inc.
High Street also filed a claim with its business insurer, American Family, who denied the claim. American Family relied on an opinion letter by High Street’s engineer. The letter indicated that the damage was the result of "soil consolidation/settlement," in response to the construction activities. Based on this letter American Family concluded the claim was excluded under the policy’s earth movement exclusion.
High Street sued American Family, who moved for summary judgment.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…
Pier Fire Started by Welders
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Welders working on Pier 29 in San Francisco were preparing the building for the America’s Cup sailing race. Instead, they accidentally caused $2.4 million in damages. Mindy Talmadge, a fire department spokesperson, attributed the fire to crews welding a latter to a wall. According to Talmadge, a spark entered a crack in the concrete wall and “the wood on the building underneath was really dry.” It took firefighters more than two hours to extinguish the blaze.
Read the full story…
Are Construction Defects Covered by Your General Liability Policy?
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Construction firms are finding that their insurers are denying construction defect claims and the courts are siding with the insurers, according to Kelly M. Gindele, writing in the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Ms. Gindele notes that when construction defect claims are not covered, firms can end up with “multi-million dollar claims” that it has to pay “out of its own pocket.” She notes that in Kentucky and Ohio, if “the insured’s work causes an unforeseen and unintended event to occur?Ķthere is not occurrence under the policy.” Further, if there is an occurrence, the court will “look for an exception to coverage.”
She also notes that contractors may not hold sufficient coverage, either by limiting the amounts or the time. She notes that while “insurers generally try to limit coverage for defect claims to one year,” that “construction defects may not be found in a year’s time.”
Ms. Ginele recommends that contractors “hire an insurance company with extensive experience in this field” and “independent legal counsel with insurance knowledge,” to avoid finding themselves “with limited or even no coverage when it needs it most.”
Read the full story…
The Colorado Court of Appeals Rules that a Statutory Notice of Claim Triggers an Insurer’s Duty to Defend.
October 23, 2012 — David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
Gene and Diane Melssen d/b/a Melssen Construction (“Melssen”) built a custom home for the Holleys, during which period of time Melssen retained a CGL insurance coverage from Auto Owners Insurance Company. Soon after completion of the house, the Holleys noticed cracks in the drywall and, eventually, large cracks developed in the exterior stucco and basement slab. Thereafter, the Holleys contacted Melssen, the structural engineer, an attorney, and Auto-Owners, which assigned a claims adjuster to investigate the claim.
In April 2008, the Holleys sent Melssen a statutory notice of claim pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-20-803.5 (“NOC”). In this NOC, the Holleys claimed approximately $300,000 in damages related to design and construction defects. The Holleys also provided a list of claimed damages and estimated repairs, accompanied by two reports from the Holleys’ consultant regarding the claimed design and construction defects. In June 2008, Melssen tendered the defense and indemnity of the claim to Auto-Owners. While Auto-Owners did not deny the claim at that time, it did not inspect the property or otherwise adjust the claim. Thereafter, in October 2008, Auto-Owners sent Melssen a letter denying coverage on the basis that the damage occurred outside of the applicable policy period.
Ultimately, Melssen settled the claims against it for $140,000.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Construction Defects Not Occurrences under Ohio Law
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Concluding the “claims of defective construction or workmanship brought by a property owners are not claims for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ under a commercial general liability policy,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled in Westfield Insurance Co. v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc. In the underlying case, Custom Agri Systems, Inc. built a grain bin as a subcontractor to Younglove Construction, LLC. Younglove had been contracted by PSD Development, which withheld payment, claiming it had suffered damages due to defects in Custom Agri System’s work. Younglove filed a complaint against Custom Agri, which filed complaints against its subcontractors. Custom Agri also requested that its insurer, Westfield Insurance Company, defend and indemnify it. Westfield claimed that it had no such duty. The Ohio Supreme Court concurred.
The decision notes that “Custom was being sued under two general theories: defective construction and consequential damages resulting from the defective construction.” Westfield argued that none of the claims were “for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence” and therefore none of the claims were covered under the CGL policy.” Further, Westfield argued that “even if the claims were for property damage caused by an occurrence, they were removed from coverage by an exclusion in the policy.”
The case was filed in the US District Court which issued a summary judgment for Westfield. The plaintiff appealed and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the questions to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The court noted that “all of the claims against which Westfield is being asked to defect and indemnify Custom relate to Custom’s work itself.” And so, the court concluded that they “must decide whether Custom’s alleged defective construction of and workmanship on the steel grain bin constitute property damage caused by an ‘occurrence.’” However, the court noted that under the terms of the insurance contract, an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” and the court noted that the “natural and commonly accepted meaning” of “accident” is something “unexpected, as well as unintended.”
The Ohio Supreme Court also looked at court decisions in other places, and found that in many similar cases, courts have concluded that construction defects are not occurrences.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Pfeifer argues that “if the defective construction is accidental, it constitutes an ‘occurrence’ under a CGL policy.” Justice Pfeifer characterized the majority’s definition of “accidental” as “broad, covering unexpected, unintentional happenings.”
Read the court’s decision…
Don MacGregor To Speak at 2011 West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar
January 1, 2011 — February 08, 2011 CDJ Staff
“Challenges for Experts in Construction Defect Claims and Litigation” will be held Thursday May 13, 2011 between 1:30 and 3:00 PM at this year’s West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar. Among the various topics covered will be of Right to Repair/Opportunity to Repair statutes, improper testing methodologies, new challenges where a case involves a Wrap Policy, OCIPS, CCIPS, and other owner controlled insurance programs, as well as the need for realistic testing protocols for the party the expert is retained to represent.
During the presentation Mr. MacGregor will be working in connection with a group of construction and design experts each of which have extensive experience with construction defect and claims related litigation. This particular session is expected to attract a standing-room only crowd, drawing in excess of 1700 attendees.
The West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar is the largest seminar of its type. This year’s event is scheduled for will take place on May 12 and 13, 2011, at The Disneyland Hotel and Resort. For more information regarding the years event please visit http://www.westcoastcasualty.com/dyncat.cfm?catid=3322
http://www.westcoastcasualty.com/dyncat.cfm?catid=3322