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    Construction Expert Witness Builders Information
    Banks, Alabama

    Alabama Builders Right To Repair Current Law Summary:

    Current Law Summary: Although there is case law precedent for right to repair, Title 6 Article 13A states action must be commenced within 2 years after cause and not more than 13 years after completion of construction.


    Construction Expert Witness Contractors Licensing
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    Commercial and Residential Contractors License Required.


    Construction Expert Witness Contractors Building Industry
    Association Directory
    Home Builders Association of Gr Calhoun Cty
    Local # 0108
    PO Box 2549
    Anniston, AL 36202


    Home Builders Association of St Clair Co
    Local # 0195
    PO Box 543
    Pell City, AL 35125


    Walker County Home Builders Association
    Local # 0190
    PO Box 3101 200 18th Street East
    Jasper, AL 35502
    http://www.walkercountyhomebuilders.org

    Associated Home Builders of Greater Birmingham
    Local # 0116
    5000 Grantswood Road Ste 240
    Irondale, AL 35210
    http://www.birminghambuilder.com

    Blount County Home Builders Association
    Local # 0104
    PO Box 571
    Oneonta, AL 35121


    Home Builders Association of Northwest Alabama
    Local # 0168
    PO Box 308
    Winfield, AL 35594


    Greater Gadsden Home Builders Association
    Local # 0144
    524 Broad St Ste 1
    Gadsden, AL 35901
    http://www.gghba.com


    Construction Expert Witness News and Information
    For Banks Alabama

    Tampa Condo Owners Allege Defects

    Eleventh Circuit Asks Georgia Supreme Court if Construction Defects Are Caused by an "Occurrence"

    Read Her Lips: “No New Buildings”

    Virginia Chinese Drywall “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” and number of “occurrences”

    Colorado “occurrence”

    Sometimes It’s Okay to Destroy Evidence

    No Coverage for Construction Defects Under Alabama Law

    Flooded Courtroom May be Due to Construction Defect

    No Coverage for Negligent Misrepresentation without Allegations of “Bodily Injury” or “Property Damage”

    Arbitration Clause Not Binding on Association in Construction Defect Claim

    Construction Defect Bill Introduced in California

    Hawaii State Senate Requires CGL Carriers to Submit Premium Information To State Legislature

    JDi Data Introduces Mobile App for Litigation Cost Allocation

    Residential Construction: Shrinking Now, Growing Later?

    Amerisure Case to be Heard by Texas Supreme Court

    Exclusions Bar Coverage for Damage Caused by Chinese Drywall

    Construction Suit Ends with Just an Apology

    Arizona Homeowners Must Give Notice of Construction Defect Claims

    Judge Kobayashi Determines No Coverage for Construction Defect Claim

    Virginia Chinese Drywall and pollution exclusion

    No-Show Contractor Can’t Hide from Construction Defect Claim

    Construction Spending Dropped in July

    Construction Defects Are Occurrences, Says South Carolina High Court

    Quarter Four a Good One for Luxury Homebuilder

    Manhattan Developer Breaks Ground on $520 Million Project

    Cabinetmaker Exceeds Expectations as Conditions Improve

    Appropriation Bill Cuts Military Construction Spending

    2011 Worst Year Ever for Home Sales

    Equipment Costs? It’s a Steal!

    Home Repair Firms Sued for Fraud

    Nevada Construction Defect Lawyers Dead in Possible Suicides

    Fire Reveals Defects, Appeals Court Affirms Judgment against Builder

    Follow Up on Continental Western v. Shay Construction

    Nevada Supreme Court Reverses Decision against Grader in Drainage Case

    OSHA Extends Delay of Residential Construction Fall Protection Requirements

    Des Moines Home Builders Building for Habitat for Humanity

    Legislatures Shouldn’t Try to Do the Courts’ Job

    Florida Chinese drywall, pollution exclusion, “your work” exclusion, and “sistership” exclusion.

    Product Exclusion: The Big Reason Behind The Delay of LEED 2012

    Mark Van Wonterghem To Serve as Senior Forensic Consultant in the Sacramento Offices of Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.

    There is No Non-Delegable Duty on the Part of Residential Builders in Colorado

    Judge Concludes Drywall Manufacturer Sold in Florida

    Insurance Company Prevails in “Chinese Drywall” Case

    No Coverage For Construction Defects When Complaint Alleges Contractual Damages

    Hovnanian Sees Second-Quarter Profit, Points to Recovery

    Construction Defects Are Occurrences, Says Georgia Supreme Court

    Insurer Must Cover Construction Defects Claims under Actual Injury Rule

    Renovation Contractors: Be Careful How You Disclose Your Projects

    Hawaii Building Codes to Stay in State Control

    The Complete and Accepted Work Doctrine and Construction Defects

    “Other Insurance” and Indemnity Provisions Determine Which Insurer Must Cover

    More Charges in Las Vegas HOA Scandal

    Safety Officials Investigating Death From Fall

    Statute of Limitations Upheld in Construction Defect Case

    Construction Delayed by Discovery of Bones

    Insurer Not Liable for Construction Defect Revealed by Woodpecker

    Court Clarifies Sequence in California’s SB800

    Businesspeople to Nevada: Revoke the Construction Defect Laws

    California Posts Nation’s Largest Gain in Construction Jobs

    Construction Defects Lead to Demolition of Seattle’s 25-story McGuire Apartments Building

    Loose Bolts Led to Sagging Roof in Construction Defect Claim

    Homeowner may pursue negligence claim for construction defect, Oregon Supreme Court holds

    The King of Construction Defect Scams

    In Colorado, Repair Vendors Can Bring First-Party Bad Faith Actions For Amounts Owed From an Insurer

    Excess Carrier Successfully Appeals Primary Insurer’s Summary Judgment Award

    AFL-CIO Joins in $10 Billion Infrastructure Plan

    Condo Buyers Seek to Void Sale over Construction Defect Lawsuit

    Court Sends Construction Defect Case from Kansas to Missouri

    Massachusetts Couple Seek to Recuse Judge in Construction Defect Case

    Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill

    Condominium Exclusion Bars Coverage for Construction Defect

    Policyholder Fails to Build Adequate Record to Support Bad Faith Claim

    Australian Group Seeks Stronger Codes to Combat Dangerous Defects

    Instant Hotel Tower, But Is It Safe?

    Does the New Jersey Right-To-Repair Law Omit Too Many Construction Defects?

    Court finds subcontractor responsible for defending claim

    Ohio Casualty’s and Beazer’s Motions were Granted in Part, and Denied in Part

    Minnesota Starts Wide-Ranging Registration of Contractors

    Contractor Sues License Board

    US Courts in Nevada Busy with Yellow Brass

    Hovnanian Increases Construction Defect Reserves for 2012

    Lien Claimant’s Right to Execute against Bond Upheld in Court of Appeals

    2011 West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar – Recap

    Preparing for Trial on a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 895, et seq.

    Destruction of Construction Defect Evidence Leads to Sanctions against Plaintiff

    Michigan Supreme Court Concludes No Statute of Repose on Breach of Contract

    Contractor Sues Supplier over Defective Products

    Yellow Brass Fittings Play a Crucial Role in Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes

    Insurer Able to Refuse Coverage for Failed Retaining Wall

    Ohio Adopts Energy-Efficient Building Code
    Corporate Profile

    BANKS ALABAMA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
    DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

    The Banks, Alabama Construction Expert Witness Group at BHA, leverages from the experience gained through more than 5,500 construction related expert witness designations encompassing a wide spectrum of construction related disputes. Leveraging from this considerable body of experience, BHA provides construction related trial support and expert services to Banks' most recognized construction litigation practitioners, commercial general liability carriers, owners, construction practice groups, as well as a variety of state and local government agencies.

    Construction Expert Witness News & Info
    Banks, Alabama

    After $15 Million Settlement, Association Gets $7.7 Million From Additional Subcontractor

    November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The stucco subcontractor for a condominium complex did not join in with the other defendants in a settlement of more than $15 million, preferring to take the case to a jury trial. That jury has found the stucco installer liable for $7.7 million to make repairs. Mark Wiechnik of Herrick Feinstein LLP wrote about the case on the Lexology web site. Mr. Wiechnik notes that the jury was shown “samples of rotted wood taken from the property as well as numerous pictures of damage resulting from the various defects.”

    Read the full story…


    Preparing for Trial on a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 895, et seq.

    May 10, 2012 — Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP

    In 2002, the California Legislature enacted the Right to Repair Act (hereinafter “SB-800”), as codified in Title VII of the Civil Code. As set forth in Civil Code section 895, et seq., SB-800 established a set of standards for residential construction, and provides a statutory protocol to address alleged violations of those standards. SB-800 applies to all new single family homes sold after January 1, 2003, and it created its own cause of action governed completely by its own terms, in that in order to state a cause of action under SB-800, a plaintiff may only allege a violation of the Act. (Civ. Code, § 938.) Under Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944, the Legislature made it clear that it intended to create a single cause of action for construction defects in homes that fall under the purview of SB-800. By passing SB-800, the Legislature eliminated multiple and often redundant or conflicting causes of action, burdens of proof, statutes of limitations, and types of damages that were common in construction defect actions prior to the enactment of the same.

    Civil Code section 895, et seq. has significantly changed the landscape of construction defect lawsuits. Yet, for years, the only attention given to the statutes focused solely on the codified pre-litigation process that requires plaintiffs and builders to meet and confer regarding defects and attempt a process to repair the alleged defects before litigation is pursued. A major impediment to the implementation of the pre-litigation procedures has often been that the statutes specifically state that the information obtained during the pre-litigation process is admissible at trial. Hence, through use of the pre-litigation process, plaintiffs’ counsel can engage in a builder funded fishing expedition and later use the information obtained to advance their litigation goals. As such, many builders have chosen to opt out of codified pre-litigation process altogether, an option which the builder can elect within their Purchase and Sale Agreements.

    Recently, counsel for builders throughout California have turned their attention to the “exclusive remedy” aspect of SB-800 by seeking, often successfully, to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Civil Code section 943 states:

    Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. (Civ. Code, § 943.)  

    The question remains: what is the benefit of requiring plaintiffs to trim down their complaint and eliminate their tried and true common law causes of action, and requiring them to pursue only a single cause of action for violation of SB800?

    The construction standards enumerated within SB-800 include fifty-plus functionality standards. On their face, any benefit to pursuing a construction defect action under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800 initially appears trivial at best, in light of the fact that a jury may be very confused with the complexity of the functionality standards set forth within the Civil Code. Nevertheless, Title VII of the Civil Code actually contains numerous provisions that builders can utilize to their benefit throughout the process of construction defect litigation, including during preparation for trial.

    First and foremost, counsel for builders can assert numerous affirmative defenses that will be beneficial if the matter proceeds to trial. These affirmative defenses, as codified in Civil Code section 945.5, include mitigation, in whole or in part, for damages caused by: an unforeseen act of nature; a homeowner’s failure to allow reasonable and timely access for inspections and repair under the pre-litigation procedures; the homeowner’s failure to follow the builder’s recommendations and commonly accepted homeowner maintenance obligations; ordinary wear and tear; misuse; abuse; or neglect. Builders should include these affirmative defenses within their responsive pleadings and as trial approaches, prepare appropriate motions in limine and request special jury instructions regarding the same. As frustrated builders and their attorneys are well aware, many construction defect suits result from a homeowner’s failure to properly maintain their property in a manner that is consistent with normal maintenance procedures and guidelines. Furthermore, within the ten year statute of limitations for most defects, ordinary wear and tear is often attributable to numerous deficiencies alleged by plaintiffs. The affirmative defense for a homeowner’s failure to allow inspections and repairs is also vital, as plaintiffs’ counsel may encourage a homeowner to forego the repair and seek monetary damages, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to ultimately obtain their share of attorney’s fees. Therefore, the SB-800 statutes provide the builder with recourse and distinctive mitigation defenses that were previously and confusingly mixed into tort and contract related defenses. These affirmative defenses can also be utilized by counsel during the cross-examination of plaintiff homeowners and expert witnesses. Defense counsel should fully grasp these defenses and utilize them as defense themes throughout litigation.

    As a plaintiff is limited to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800, if defense counsel has failed to properly eliminate excessive tort and contract causes of action prior to trial, a motion for summary adjudication, or at the very least, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be brought to limit the introduction of evidence outside of a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Practical judges are always looking for ways to streamline and expedite trials, and they are currently ruling that SB-800 is the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs. In fact, plaintiffs’ firms in SB-800 matters are now voluntarily limiting their complaints to this one cause of action.

    Special jury instructions can also be crafted to limit a jury’s computation of damages pursuant to Civil Codesection 944, which provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:

    If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts, the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards, the reasonable cost of removing and replacing any improper repair by the builder, reasonable relocation and storage expenses, lost business income if the home was used as a principal place of a business licensed to be operated from the home, reasonable investigative costs for each established violation, and all other costs or fees recoverable by contract or statute. (Civ. Code, § 944.) [Emphasis added.]

    Civil Code section 944 specifically prohibits recovery for damages outside the scope of its explicit language as it states “the homeowner is only entitled to ... damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title....” [Emphasis added.] The statute ultimately provides a “reasonableness” standard for the computation of damages that did not exist when computing damages on traditional common law tort and contract claims. Therefore, defense counsel should prepare special jury instructions to limit evidence of damages introduced at trial to the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards, and to exclude any evidence of damages beyond the reasonableness standard. Defense counsel should seize the opportunity to utilize the theme of “reasonableness” when attacking plaintiffs’ allegations and plaintiffs’ proposed repair methodology throughout the discovery process and at trial.

    Defense counsel may also prepare a motion in limine or special jury instruction regarding the limitation of evidence regarding defects that did not cause resultant damage. Civil Code section 897 states:

    Intent of Standards

    The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civ. Code, § 897.) [Emphasis added.]

    Defense counsel can argue that the introduction of any evidence supporting a claim for construction-related deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, or for deficiencies where no damage has occurred is prohibited and must be excluded at trial. This requirement of resultant damages is familiar as the general rule was previously established in Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, in which the California Supreme Court held that there is no tort recovery for construction defects that have not actually caused property damage. The legislature effectively codified this rule within Civil Code section 897.

    A motion in limine can also be crafted to limit expert testimony to the standards enumerated in Civil Code section 896, and to deficiencies that caused damage pursuant to Civil Code 897. The motion in limine can be based upon Civil Code section 943 and the fact that claims for defects in homes which were sold after January 1, 2003 may only be pursued under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. As such, expert testimony should be controlled by the standards set forth in Civil Code section 896. Furthermore, throughout a construction defect matter, defense counsel should ensure that their experts are well versed with the standards and that they can provide testimony that utilizes the same. Defense counsel’s knowledge of the standards will also be helpful during the cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.

    If, despite the efforts of defense counsel, the complaint still has numerous causes of action, or if only some homes fall under the purview of SB-800 while others do not, defense counsel can utilize a motion to bifurcate trial. The motion’s basis is that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 will require the introduction of evidence regarding the violations of the fifty-plus standards, and the tort and contract-based claims would also require the introduction of a wide range of evidence to prove each cause of action. For example, in order to prove the tort causes of action, plaintiffs must prove elements such as: duty, breach, proximate and actual causation, and that the builder placed the homes into the stream of commerce. (See Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63; Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227.) On the contract causes of action, plaintiffs must prove the existence of a valid written contract for the sale of the home, including proof regarding the existence of basic contractual elements such as offer, acceptance, and consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1624 subd. (a); Roth v. Malson (1997) 67 Cal.App.4th 552, 557.) Defense counsel can argue that exposing the jury to elements that may or may not be applicable to all of the homes in the action will complicate and confuse the jury. Thus, concurrently exposing the jury to the SB-800 claims and the non-SB-800 claims will necessitate undue consumption of time, and create the substantial danger of undue prejudice of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.

    One of the most important and relevant features of the SB-800 statutes is that they include shortened statutes of limitation as to certain enumerated defects. The codified statutes of limitations apply from the date of “close of escrow,” and are much more definitive than statutes of limitations regarding tort and contract claims. Therefore, they can be utilized within a motion for summary adjudication in cases where only one or a few defects are alleged. For example, under Civil Code section 896, et seq., there is a five year limitation on paint (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(1)); a four year limitation on plumbing fixtures (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (e)); a three year limitation on landscaping (Civ. Code § 896, subd. (g)(12)); and a one year limitation on irrigation systems and drainage (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(7)). The non-SB-800 claims are subject to a four year statute of limitation for patent defects and a ten year statute of limitation for latent defects. (See Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1, 337.15.) The contrast between the statute of limitations for the SB-800 claims and non-SB-800 claims can complicate a matter at trial, further establishing the necessity to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Hence, defense counsel should also utilize a motion to bifurcate the statute of limitations issues from the issue of liability if a question of fact exists. If successful on the motion to bifurcate, plaintiff’s counsel will be barred from the introducing evidence at trial regarding a defect where the statute of limitations has run.

    Defense counsel should also seek to simplify the construction standards for the jury. Ultimately, by drafting jury instructions and a special verdict form that is easy to navigate, counsel can promote an easy interpretation of the standards enumerated within the Civil Code. The best route for drafting a special verdict form is to draft it as a check-list, similar to a traditional real estate walk-through check-list. By incorporating the shortened statutes of limitations into the special verdict form, defense counsel can effectively frame the case for the jury. The special verdict form should also allow the jury to easily eliminate any claim for damages that is mitigated, in whole or in part, through the codified affirmative defenses. Defense counsel should also consider drafting a trial brief that effectively and simplistically provides the trial court judge with an understanding of the specific defects before the court, and simultaneously notes which Civil Code standards are implicated and the scope of the same. If the trial judge is not well versed in construction defect litigation, defense counsel should be all the more careful in breaking down the parameters and limitations codified within SB-800 for the court.

    The strategies outlined within this article are only a few tactics that can be utilized to defend a construction defect suit. Depending on the defect allegations within any particular case, defense counsel should become intimately familiar with Title VII of the Civil Code and use all aspects of the same to their advantage. If not, plaintiffs’ counsel will have the advantage during “court-house step” settlement discussions and at trial.

    Printed courtesy of Samir R. Patel, Esq. of Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com.


    Insurer Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Construction Defect Claims

    February 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    The insurer unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, contending it had no obligation to defend two related underlying construction defect cases. Amerisure Ins. Co. v. R.L.Lantana Boatyard, Ltd., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2466 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2012).

    An engineering report noted design construction defects and deficiencies in visible, physical improvements at The Moorings at Lantana Condominium. In two lawsuits, The Moorings sued the developer, R.L. Lantana Boatyard ("RLLB"), and the contractor, Current Builders of Florida.

    Current Builders was insured by Amerisure. RLLB was named as an additional insured under the Amerisure policy.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    Supreme Court of New York Denies Motion in all but One Cause of Action in Kikirov v. 355 Realty Assoc., et al.

    April 28, 2011 — April 28, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal

    In the construction defect suit Kikirov v. 355 Realty Associates, LLC, et al., the Supreme Court of the State of New York granted a dismissal of the plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, but denied the defendants’ motion in all other respects. The plaintiff alleged breach of contract, among other claims. “355 Realty was the sponsor of 355 Kings Highway Condominium, a condominium project located at 355 Kings Highway, in Brooklyn, New York. The condominium units were allegedly marketed as ‘ultra luxury condos,’ and a ‘Manhattan style condominium building,’ which would be the ‘epitome of luxury and quality.’ The construction of the six-story 28 unit residential condominium building began in approximately November 2003. […] Plaintiff entered into a purchase agreement, dated December 21, 2005, with 355 Realty (which was executed on behalf of 355 Realty by Michael Marino, as its member) for the purchase of Unit 2G in the building.”

    The plaintiff alleged that construction defects emerged soon after moving into the unit: “After taking occupancy of his condominium unit, plaintiff allegedly experienced serious leakage and moisture problems in his unit, which caused a dangerous mold condition to develop, in addition to causing actual damage to the structural elements of his unit. According to plaintiff, the walls, moldings, and wood floors of his unit are constantly wet and moist, and there is severe buckling of the wood floors. Plaintiff claims that these problems have caused his unit to be uninhabitable. Plaintiff alleges that he has been forced to remove all of his personal belongings from his unit and has been unable to occupy his unit.”

    According to the plaintiff, Foremost attempted to repair the defects, but only made the situation worse: “Specifically, plaintiff asserts that Foremost’s contractors opened his walls to remove the stained drywall, but never corrected the cause of the leaks, destroyed the walls, and never properly taped and painted the sheet rock. Plaintiff alleges that Foremost repaired the openings in a defective manner. Plaintiff also claims that his floor was repaired at that time by a subcontractor hired by Foremost, but the basic structural problem was never resolved and the leaks continued, compromising the beams and causing the mold conditions, in addition to all of the physical damage present in the unit. On or about July 16, 2009, plaintiff allegedly sent a notice of the defects to 355 Realty and to the managing agent designated by the condominium board, by certified mail, return receipt requested. Plaintiff asserts that defendants have failed and refused to repair and remedy the defective condition, and that the damage is extensive and requires major structural repairs.”

    The plaintiff filed suit on May 4, 2010, and the original complaint asserted eight causes of action. “By decision and order dated September 13, 2010, the court granted a motion by defendants to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing, his third cause of action for breach of implied warranties, his fifth cause of action for negligence as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his seventh cause of action for negligence as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ, and his eighth cause of action for violations of General Business Law § 349 and § 350, and granted plaintiff leave to replead his first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, his fourth cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and his sixth cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ.”

    The plaintiff amended their complaint on October 18, 2010, and “has repleaded these three causes of action by asserting a first cause of action for breach of contract as against 355 Realty, Michael Marino, Anthony Piscione, Ahron Hersh, and Toby Hersh, a second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, and a third cause of action for breach of contract as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ. In addition, plaintiff, in his amended complaint, has added a fourth cause of action for fraud.”

    The defendants, on the other hand, “argue that each of the four causes of action alleged by plaintiff in his amended complaint fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and that plaintiff’s amended complaint must be dismissed pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7). Defendants also cite to CPLR 3211 (a) (1), and (5), asserting that dismissal is also required based upon documentary evidence and the Statute of Limitations contained in the limited warranty.” The defendants’ motion to dismiss the first cause of action, breach of contract against 355 Realty, was denied: “While defendants dispute that the alleged defects are actually structural in nature, plaintiff’s allegations as to their structural nature are sufficient, at this juncture, to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss. Thus, dismissal of plaintiff’s first cause of action must be denied.”

    Next, the court reviewed the second cause of action, which was breach of statutory warranties: “Defendants’ motion also seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s second cause of action for breach of statutory warranties, which alleges that, under applicable law, including General Business Law § 777-a, et seq., the sponsor warranted to purchasers of units that the units would be constructed in a skillful, careful, and workmanlike manner, consistent with proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices, and free of material latent, design, and structural defects. Defendants argue that General Business Law § 777-a, known as the housing merchant implied warranty, is inapplicable to this case because it is limited to the construction of a ‘new home,’ defined in General Business Law § 777 (5) as ‘any single family house or for-sale unit in a multi-unit residential structure of five stories or less.’ As noted above, the building in which plaintiff’s condominium unit is located is a six-story building.”

    The motion to dismiss the second cause of action is denied. The court provided this reasoning: “the full text of the offering plan has not been provided, the court is unable to examine the entire written agreement so as to determine the purpose of the inclusion of the text of General Business Law § 777.”

    In the third cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “a breach of contract claim as against Vision, Foremost, and MMJ based upon their contract with 355 Realty, pursuant to which they agreed to be the general contractors/construction managers for the condominium, to undertake oversight responsibility for the design and construction of the condominium, to prepare and/or review drawings, plans, and specifications for the condominium, and to otherwise manage and oversee the project. Plaintiff alleges that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ breached their contractual obligations in that the condominium units were improperly and inadequately designed and constructed, and completed in an incompetent and unworkmanlike manner, with material design and construction defects.”

    The motion to dismiss the third cause of action was denied as well: “Plaintiff alleges, in his amended complaint, that Vision, Foremost, and MMJ have acknowledged notice of the defects and have not denied that they are responsible for providing a warranty to plaintiff. Plaintiff also refers to this warranty, in his amended complaint, by noting that paragraph 16 of the purchase agreement stated that the ‘[s]eller shall not be liable to . . . the [p]urchaser for any matter as to which an assignable warranty . . . has been assigned . . . to [p]urchaser and in such case the sole recourse of such . . . [p]urchaser . . . shall be against the warrantor . . . except that in the event a contractor or subcontractor is financially unable or refuses to perform its warranty . . . [s]eller shall not be excused from its obligations enumerated in the [offering p]lan under Rights and Obligations of Sponsor.’ Consequently, the court finds that dismissal of plaintiff’s third cause of action as against Foremost and MMJ must also be denied.”

    In the fourth cause of action, the plaintiff alleges “that defendants made false statements and representations orally, in advertisements, and in the purchase agreement, that the condominium was properly and adequately designed and constructed and completed in a competent and workmanlike manner, in accordance with the condominium plans and specifications and proper design, engineering, and construction standards and practices consistent with applicable standards for a first class, luxury condominium in Brooklyn.”

    The court dismissed the fourth cause of action stating, “it must be dismissed because it is duplicative of his first cause of action for breach of contract.” Therefore, “defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s amended complaint is granted to the extent that it seeks dismissal of plaintiff’s fourth cause of action, and it is denied in all other respects.”

    Read the court’s decision…

    “Details Matter” is the Foundation in a Texas Construction Defect Suit

    March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The Court of Appeals of Texas has ruled in the case of Barzoukas v. Foundation Design. Mr. Barzoukas contracted with Heights Development to build a house. He subsequently sued Heights Developments and “numerous other defendants who participated in the construction of his house.” Barzoukas eventually settled with all but two defendants, one who went bankrupt and Foundation Design, the defendant in this case. In the earlier phase, Barzoukas made claims of “negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, fraudulent inducement, conspiracy, and exemplary damages in connection with the foundation.”

    Foundation Design had been hired to install 15-foot piers to support the foundation. The engineer of record, Larry Smith, sent a letter to Heights Development noting that they had encountered hard clay stone when drilling. Smith changed the specifications to 12-foot piers. Initially, the City of Houston called a halt to work on the home when an inspector concluded that the piers were too shallow. Heights Development later convinced the city to allow work to continue. Subsequently, experts concluded that the piers were too shallow.

    Foundation Design filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court granted this, “without specifying the basis for its ruling.” Barzoukas contends the court was in error. Foundation Design contends that “Barzoukas failed to proffer competent evidence establishing that their conduct proximately caused damages.” Further, they did not feel that Smith’s letter gave “rise to viable claims for fraud and fraudulent inducement.”

    One problem the court had was a lack of evidence. The court noted that “the purported subcontract is entirely missing” in the pleadings. The court has no contract between Bazourkas and Heights Development, nor one between Heights Development and either Foundation Design or Smith. The court underscored the importance of this, writing, “details matter.” They found that “the details are largely missing here.” Without the contract, the court found it impossible to determine if “Smith or an entity related to him agreed to indemnify Heights Development for damages arising from Smith’s negligent performance.”

    As the material facts are in dispute, the appeals court found that there were no grounds for a summary judgment in the case. “Pointing to the existence of a contract between Heights Development and Barzoukas, or to the existence of a subcontract, is the beginning of the analysis ? not the end.”

    Foundation Design and Smith also claimed that Barzoukas’s expert did not proffer competent evidence and that the expert’s opinions were conclusory. The trial court did not rule on these claims and the appeals court has rejected them.

    Finally, Barzoukas made a claim that the trial court should not have rejected his argument of fraud and fraudulent inducement. Here, however, the appeals court upheld the decision of the lower court. “Barzoukas did not present evidence supporting an inference that Smith or Foundation Design made a purposeful misrepresentation.

    The court remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration. One member of the panel, Judge Charles Seymore, upheld the entire decision of the trial court. He dissented with the majority, finding that the economic loss rule foreclosed the claim of negligence.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Insurer’s Discovery Requests Ruled to be Overbroad in Construction Defect Suit

    October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The US District Court has ruled in the case of D.R. Horton Los Angeles Holding Co. Inc. v. American Safety Indemnity, Co. D.R. Horton was involved in a real estate development project. Its subcontractor, Ebensteiner Co., was insured by ASIC and named D.R. Horton as an additional insured and third-party beneficiary. D.R. Horton, in response to legal complaints and cross-complaints, filed for coverage from ASIC under the Ebensteiner policy. This was refused by ASIC. ASIC claimed that “there is no potential coverage for Ebensteiner as a Named Insurer and/or D.R. Horton as an Additional Insured.” They stated that “the requirements for coverage are not satisfied.”

    The case same to trial with the deadline for discovery set at March 1, 2011. ASIC stated they were seeking the developer’s “job file” for the Canyon Gate project. D.R. Horton claimed that ASIC’s discovery request was overbroad and that it would be “unduly burdensome for it to produce all documents responsive to the overbroad requests.”

    D.R. Horton did agree to produce several categories of documents, which included:

    “(1) final building inspection sign-offs for the homes that are the subject of the underlying litigation;(2) an updated homeowner matrix for the underlying actions; (3) the concrete subcontractor files; (4) the daily field logs for D.R. Horton’s on-site employee during Ebensteiner’s work; (5) documents relating to concrete work, including documents for concrete suppliers; (6) documents relating to compacting testing; (7) documents relating to grading; and (8) D.R. Horton’s request for proposal for grading”

    The court found that the requests from ASIC were overbroad, noting that the language of the ASIC Request for Production of Documents (RFP) 3-5 would include “subcontractor files for plumbing, electric, flooring, etc. - none of these being at issue in the case.” The court denied the ASIC’s motion to compel further documents.

    The court also found fault with ASIC’s RFPs 6 and 7. Here, D.R. Horton claimed the language was written so broadly it would require the production of sales information and, again, subcontractors not relevant to the case.

    Further, the court found that RFPs 8, 10, 11, and 13 were also overbroad. RFP 8 covered all subcontractors. D.R. Horton replied that they had earlier complied with the documents covered in RFPs 10 and 11. The court concurred. RFP 13 was denied as it went beyond the scope of admissible evidence, even including attorney-client communication.

    The court denied all of ASIC’s attempts to compel further discovery.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Ceiling Collapse Attributed to Construction Defect

    May 19, 2011 — May 16, 2011 - CDJ Staff

    WSMV, Nashville reports that the ceiling collapse in a Franklin, Tennessee Kohl’s was attributed to a construction defect by fire officials. The officials noted that the ceiling was renovated at the time. No injuries were reported.

    The report notes that “inspectors were supposed to look at the renovations next week, but fire officials said that will have to be delayed until another time.”

    Read the full story…


    Yellow Brass Fittings Play a Crucial Role in Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes

    May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes Hawaii, et al. is a “class action filed by homeowners who allege that their homes have a construction defect. They allege that their plumbing systems include brass fittings susceptible to corrosion and likely to cause leaks. They bring this action against the developer of their homes and the manufacturers of the brass fittings.”

    Zurn, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective brass fittings, sought a dismissal, or if that could not be achieved, then “a more definite statement, of five of the six claims.” Zurn moved for summary judgment on the sixth claim, or alternately sought “summary judgment on one of the five claims it” sought to dismiss.” The court granted in part the motion, and denied the motion for summary judgment.

    The developer, Castle & Cooke, sought dismissal of the First Amended Complaint stating “that Plaintiffs have not complied with Hawaii’s Contractor Repair Act, chapter 672E of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which requires, among other things, a plaintiff to give a contractor the results of any testing done before filing an action against that contractor.” The court couldn’t determine “certain facts essential to ruling” on Castle & Cooke’s motion, and therefore denied the motion, but ordered Plaintiffs to submit requested material by the stated deadline.

    The Baker v Castle & Cooke case began with the Plaintiffs claim that the use of yellow brass fittings can lead to construction defects. They allege that “yellow brass is particularly susceptible to dezincification, a corrosion process in which zinc leaches into potable water that comes into contact with the brass. According to Plaintiffs, as the brass corrodes, it becomes porous and mechanically weak. Plaintiffs further allege that the PEX systems in the putative class members’ homes have begun to, or are about to, leak water into the walls, ceilings, and floors of their homes. Plaintiffs allege that the leakage will cause water damage and mold growth, exposing the occupants to toxins.”

    In response to the plaintiffs’ claims, Zurn argued “because their yellow brass fittings have not failed to date, Plaintiffs fail to allege, and have no evidence showing, that they have suffered any actual injury.” Plaintiffs replied, “even if the fittings have not failed as of today, failure in the future is inevitable.”

    However, the court stated, “whether Plaintiffs have suffered any injury, or whether Plaintiffs are attempting to proceed based solely on future injury, implicates Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action, as well as whether this case is ripe for adjudication.” The court has requested the parties to submit “supplemental briefing on whether this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In supplemental briefs, Zurn argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs lack standing, and Castle & Cooke argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe.”

    The court continues to discuss the problem of standing: “To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate three things. First, the plaintiff must suffer an "injury-in-fact," which means that there must be a concrete and particularized "invasion of a legally protected interest" and the invasion is actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action. Third, a favorable decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id. It is the first element (injury-in-fact) that is in issue here.”

    The court found that the plaintiffs do have standing: “Even if the court could not rely on the allegations that the pipes will soon leak, the court would conclude that, for standing purposes, Plaintiffs have a sufficient injury-in-fact in the form of their alleged economic loss.” In a hearing, Plaintiffs argued that their homes had decreased in value.

    The court also denied Castle & Cooke’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of ripeness, stating “the same reasons Plaintiffs satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing purposes, they satisfy the constitutional ripeness requirement.”

    Plaintiffs asserted six counts against Zurn. Zurn, in response, made a motion to dismiss counts VIII, IX, X, XII, and XIII. The court granted Zurn’s motion for Counts VIII, IX, and X only: “Counts VIII (product liability), IX (negligence), and X (strict liability) sound in tort. Zurn argues that, because Plaintiffs allege no injury other than to the PEX systems and the yellow brass fittings themselves, the economic loss rule bars their tort claims. The court agrees.”

    The court disagreed with Zurn’s motion regarding Count XII: “Count XII asserts that Zurn has breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Zurn argues that Count XII is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege an injury. The court disagrees.”

    Zurn’s motion regarding Count XIII was also denied: “Count XIII asserts that Zurn violated section 480-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes.” Furthermore, “Plaintiffs allege that Zurn ‘engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices when [it] designed, manufactured and sold Yellow Brass Fittings.’ Zurn argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under section 480-2(a) because their claims are barred by the statute of limitations and they do not adequately allege reliance or a cognizable injury. The court disagrees.”

    The court denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts XI and XII.

    Castle & Cooke sought to dismiss “Plaintiffs’ claims against it under section 672E-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which provides for dismissal when claimants fail to comply with chapter 672E.” There was some discussion regarding the test results. Apparently, the plaintiffs had failed to provide a written notice of claim at least 90 days before filing the action. However, it is unclear if the Plaintiffs have since complied with the requirements of the chapter. “The court has received no supplemental information from either party about whether any test results from another case have been turned over or whether those materials are subject to a confidentiality agreement. The record at this point does not establish noncompliance with the requirement in chapter 672E to provide such information. The court therefore denies the motion to dismiss.”

    In summary, “Zurn’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Count VIII, Count IX, and Count X. Zurn’s motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ other claims. Zurn’s request for a more definite statement and its summary judgment motion are denied. Plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended Complaint no later than May 21, 2012.” Furthermore, “the court denies Castle & Cooke’s motion, but directs Plaintiffs to file, within two weeks, either a certificate of compliance with section 672E-3(c), or an explanation as to why they have not complied. Castle & Cooke may submit a response within two weeks of Plaintiffs’ submission. Each party’s submission is limited to 1000 words.”

    Read the court’s decision…


    The Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?

    March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011

    The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury or “property damage” be caused by an occurrence and that the “bodily injury or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.

    In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivanrsquo;s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing, including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.

    Read the full story...

    Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com


    Irene May Benefit Construction Industry

    September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    Noting that while it wasn’t the $15 billion disaster some predicted, Hurricane Irene still caused quite a bit of damage on its path up the Eastern Seaboard. Martha White, reporting for MSNBC cites Kinetc Analysis Corp. with an estimate of $7 billion in damage. Carl Van Horn, a professor of public policy at Rutgers University expected an initial decline in construction jobs, due to projects delayed due to the storm’s arrival, but he said, “a few weeks later, employment picks up as people rebuild.”

    Kinetic says that one unknown is how much of the damage is insured. They expect only $3 billion of damage will be covered by insurance. This would likely put a drag on consumer spending, as homeowners would have to dig into their own pockets to pay for repairs, according to Karl Smith, associate professor of economics and government at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

    Read the full story…


    Construction Defect Journal Seeks Article Submissions Regarding SB800 and Other Builders Right to Repair Laws

    October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    As we approach the tenth anniversary of the passage and signing of SB800, California’s right-to-repair law, we’d like to hear your reactions to the law, your experiences with it, and your thoughts on it and right-to-repair laws in other states.

    We invite you to submit articles either reacting to SB800 or on other matters relevant to construction defect and claims issues. You can promote your firm’s capabilities and get valuable exposure through the publication of your articles. Construction Defect Journal is widely read by our highly targeted audience of decision makers, construction attorneys, builders, owners, and claims professionals.

    Articles may contain relevant images, your firm’s name, and links to your corporate website or third parties and can be submitted through e-mail to submitstory@constructiondefectjournal.com. Please remember to include your contact information if you would like it to be published with your content. If you are submitting photos or PDF documents with your article, please send them as e-mail attachments. Items submitted are assumed to be cleared for publishing upon receipt by CDJ.

    Normally articles are published in full, although we reserve the right to edit content for space purposes. All articles submitted are considered for publication. For additional questions please contact editor@constructiondefectjournal.com.


    Construction Defect Lawsuit Stayed by SB800

    September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The California Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of the lower court and has stayed, instead of dismissed, a claim of construction defects. A group of Victorville homeowners sued their homebuilder, K. Hovnanian Communities on a claim of construction defects. Hovnanian argued that under the procedures set forth in SB800, the suit should be dismissed, and that the claims should undergo arbitration. The trial agreed, dismissing the claims of 82 plaintiffs under a first motion, and then granted a second motion to dismiss, which affected a further 21 plaintiffs. The homeowners appealed.

    The Court noted that “the parties disagree about the standard of review,” with the Court determining that as the facts were not in dispute, they would use “an independent standard of review.”

    Reviewing the relevant statues, the Court concluded that the terms of the limited warranty set out the pre-litigation procedure, noting that “plaintiffs admit they did not comply with the limited warranty because they challenge its validity and enforceability.” The Court concluded that “plaintiffs’ action was premature.”

    The Court further noted that “a civil action will not be filed until after the contractual procedures have been followed.” Until these procedures have been followed, the Court said that they “decline to resolve issues about validity and enforceability.” However, as these issues could arise after the limited warranty procedures, the court stayed, rather than dismissed the claims.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured

    June 14, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog

    I just came across a case that I think truly paints the insurance dilemma for contractors. Thanks to this recent Illinois case, I don’t have to make up any factual scenarios—so kudos to Attorney Robert Boylan for posting it.

    In reading over my RSS feeds this weekend, I noticed a great writeup on long-time blogger Josh Glazov’s Construction Law Today. Attorney Robert Boylan’s post describes a recent Illinois case where a general contractor was denied its additional insured status on a second-tier subcontractor’s insurance. The reason for the denial: the general contractor failed to procure an agreement in writing with the second-tier subcontractor, requiring it to be listed as an additional insured.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    Certificate of Merit to Sue Architects or Engineers Bill Proposed

    May 3, 2011 — May 3, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal

    North Carolina may become the twelfth state to require a Certificate of Merit to sue an architect or engineer. If North Carolina Senate Bill 435 (SB435) passes, then plaintiffs when filing a complaint will need to also attach an affidavit of a third-party licensed professional engineer or architect stating that the case has merit.

    SB435 is a short two pages in its current form. The bill states that the “third-party licensed professional engineer or licensed architect shall (i) be competent to testify and hold the same professional license and practice in the same area of practice as the defendant design professional and (ii) offer testimony based upon knowledge, skill, experience, education, training, and practice. The affidavit shall specifically state for each theory of recovery for which damages are sought, the negligence, if any, or other action, error, or omission of the design professional in providing the professional service, including any error or omission in providing advice, judgment, opinion, or a similar professional skill claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim. The third-party licensed professional engineer or licensed architect shall be licensed in this State and actively engaged in the practice of engineering or architecture respectively.”

    A few of the amendments allude to disciplining design professionals who certify civil actions that are without merit. The bill has been referred to the Committee on Judiciary I.

    While North Carolina is considering enacting a Certificate of Merit law, eleven other states already require one, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. Christopher D. Montez, a partner with Thomas, Feldman & Wilshusen, LLP, has written a useful summary for each state’s certificate of merit scheme.

    Read the text of SB435

    Track the progress of SB435

    Read more from Christopher D. Montez’s article on Thomas, Feldman & Wilshusen, LLP site


    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

    California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

    The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

    SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

    Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

    Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

    The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4

    This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5

    2005 AMENDMENT

    The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

    What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

    This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

    It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

    In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

    2007 AMENDMENT

    The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

    Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

    Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

    It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

    Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

    2008 AMENDMENT

    The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

    Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

    It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

    The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

    Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

    Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

    And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

    Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

    This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

    Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

    2011 AMENDMENT

    Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

    As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

    The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7

    The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

    CONCLUSION

    The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

    1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
    2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
    3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
    4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
    5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
    6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
    7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

    Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.


    Eighth Circuit Remands to Determine Applicability of Collapse Exclusion

    January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    The Eighth Circuit determined a jury instruction regarding the applicability of the "all-risk" policy’s exclusion for "collapse" was inadequate. See KAAPA Ethanol, LLC v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22158 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011).

    KAAPA had nine large, cylindrical, stainless steel tanks fabricated at its location. Soon after operations began in 2003, some of the tanks experienced unusual movement and began to shift. A geotechnical engineer found "silty clay" had been used for infill instead of compacted granular fill called for in engineering drawings. A year long plan to repair all nine tanks was implemented.

    Affiliated’s "all-risk" policy excluded damage caused by faulty workmanship. It also excluded damage caused by settling or cracking. The settling exclusion went on to provide, "This exclusion will not apply to loss or damage resulting from collapse of: a building or structure; or material part of a building or structure." Affiliated denied coverage because of the faulty workmanship and settling exclusions.

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    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    Eleventh Circuit Asks Georgia Supreme Court if Construction Defects Are Caused by an "Occurrence"

    December 20, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    The Eleventh Circuit certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court, asking whether property damage can constitute an "occurrence" under a CGL policy where its effects are not felt on "other property." HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co. v. Morrison Homes, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. Ct. LEXIS 23813 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012).

    The general contractor, Taylor Morrison Services, Inc., was covered by a CGL policy issued by Gerling.  The policy excluded "expected or intended injury," contractual liability," and business risk exclusions. Morrison was sued by homeowners in a class action suit. Morrison had allegedly omitted four inches of gravel required beneath the base of the concrete foundations by the Uniform Building Code. Thereafter, the houses sustained water intrusion, cracks in the floors and driveways, and warped and buckling flooring.

    Gerling defended, but sued Morrison for a declaratory judgment.

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    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    All Risk Policy Only Covers Repair to Portion of Dock That Sustains Damage

    January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    A portion of a dock on Lack Michigan operated by the Ports of Indiana suffered visible damage. See Ports of Indiana v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130979 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2011). Lexington Insurance Company insured the port. Lexington agreed that a portion of the dock was damaged and paid $1.2 million for repairs. A dispute arose, however, over whether additional sections of the dock were damaged and whether the damage was the result of more than one "occurrence."

    An expert report opined that a significant drop creating record lows in the water level of Lake Michigan in 2007 caused damage to the dock. Lexington maintained that only 128 feet of the dock was damaged; other portions of the dock did not sustain "direct physical loss or damage."

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    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com