Construction Upturn in Silicon Valley
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Work resumed after nearly three years on an office tower in Santa Clara, according to the San Jose Mercury News. Work had stalled on the building due to the economy, but now the developer is planning a second five-story building on the site. Other dormant projects in the area are also getting restarted. Santa Clara County saw the addition of 1,800 construction jobs in June.
A spokesperson for the Operating Engineers Local 3 in Alameda told the paper, “two years ago we had five thousand folks on the out-of-work list. It’s now down to about 1,700.”
Read the full story…
Boyfriend Pleads Guilty in Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam Suicide
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
One of the odder twists of the Las Vegas construction defect scandal was the charge that Nancy Quon’s boyfriend helped her in an initial suicide attempt. Quon, implicated by not charged in the case of taking control of homeowner boards in order to profit from construction defect settlements. William Webb was alleged to have bought the drug GBH in order to allow Quon, his girlfriend, to commit suicide. Ms. Quon later overdosed on a combination of alcohol and prescription drugs.
In addition to pleading guilty to the drug charges, Webb also made a plea bargain with prosecutors in which he did not admit guilt in an insurance fraud charge, but acknowledged that prosecutors would likely be successful at obtaining a conviction. Webb will be sentenced February 7 and is expected to receive a sentence of six years imprisonment.
Read the full story…
Bar to Raise on Green Standard
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Next June, members of the U.S. Green Building Council will be voting on changes to the LEED green building standard. “The bar is getting raised,” said Navad Malin of BuildingGreen, a consulting and publishing firm, in an article in USA Today. Under the proposed guidelines, builders would have to project energy and water use for five years as part of the certification process. However, if the occupants aren’t as green as the builders anticipated, the buildings will not lose their certification.
The new rules will include higher energy standards, award points for avoiding potentially hazardous materials, and even determine what kind of plumbing items can be used.
Read the full story…
Follow Up on Continental Western v. Shay Construction
March 28, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Colorado Construction Litigation
Writing in Construction Law Colorado, Brady Iandiorio revisits the case Continental Western v. Shay Construction. He promises to continue to follow cases dealing with Colorado HB 10-1394.
Recently the Court ruled on two Motions to Reconsider filed by Defendants Milender White and Shay Construction.
Procedurally, the Motions to Reconsider were ruled on by the Honorable William J. Martinez, because the day after the motions were filed the action was reassigned to Judge Martinez. In the short analysis of the Motion to Reconsider, the court leaned on Judge Walker D. Miller’s ruling on the summary judgment and his analysis of the (j)(5) and (j)(6) exclusions.
As a quick refresher regarding the grant of summary judgment, Judge Miller agreed with Continental Western’s argument that the asserted claims were excluded under the “damage to property” exclusion. The policy’s exclusions state: “(j) Damage to Property . . . (5) that particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations; or (6) that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it.” Judge Miller found that both exclusions (j)(5) and (6) applied to both Shay’s allegedly defective work.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com.
Retaining Wall Contractor Not Responsible for Building Damage
July 20, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled on July 8 in the case of Rollander Enterprises, Inc. v. H.C. Nutting Co. Judge Baily wrote the opinion affirming the decision of the trial court.
The case involved an unfinished condominium complex, the Slopes of Greendale, in Greendale, Indiana. Rollander is a real estate development company incorporated in Ohio. One of the issues in the case was whether the case should be settled in the Indiana courts or be tried in Ohio. The project was owned by a special purpose entity limited liability corporation incorporated in Indiana.
Rollander hired Nutting to determine the geological composition of the site. Nutting’s report described the site as “a medium plastic clay containing pieces of shale and limestone.” The court summarized this as corresponding with “slope instability and landslides.” Rollander then hired Nutting to design the retaining walls, which were constructed by Scherziner Drilling.
After cracking was discovered on State Route 1, the walls were discovered to be inadequate. More dirt was brought in and a system of tie-backs was designed to anchor the walls. Not only were the tie-backs unsightly, local officials would not approve the complex for occupancy. Further, the failure of the wall below one building lead to damage of that building.
The court concluded that since almost all events occurred in Indiana, they rejected Rollander’s contention that the case should be tried in Ohio. Further, the court notes “the last event making Nutting potentially liable on both claims was an injury that occurred in Indiana and consequently, under the lex loci delicti analysis, Indiana law applies.”
Nor did the court find that Nutting was responsible for the damage to the rest of the project, citing an Indiana Supreme Court ruling, that “there is no liability in tort to the owner of a major construction project for pure economic loss caused unintentionally by contractors, subcontractors, engineers, design professionals, or others engaged in the project with whom the project owner, whether or not technically in privity of contract, is connected through a network or chain of contracts.”
The court concluded:
Because Rollander was in contractual privity with Nutting, and Indy was connected to Nutting through a chain of contracts and no exception applies, the economic loss rule precludes their recovery in tort. Damage to Building B was not damage to "other property," and the negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss rule is inapplicable on these facts. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by entering judgment on the evidence in favor of Nutting on the Appellants' negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims.
Read the court’s decision…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Mark Van Wonterghem To Serve as Senior Forensic Consultant in the Sacramento Offices of Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Sacramento, CA — Bert L. Howe and Associates, Inc., is pleased to announce that Mark Van Wonterghem - General Contractor, has joined the firm as Senior Forensic Consultant. Mark will be responsible for leading the firm’s expansion in the newly formed Sacramento headquarters.
His focus will continue to be working with construction practice groups and claims professionals in the Sacramento and Bay Area markets. He will utilize the resources of the Construction Experts Group at Bert L. Howe & Associates in furthering the litigation support needs attendant to the firm’s Northern California clientele.
Mr. Van Wonterghem possesses extensive consulting and testimony experience. Through 32 years of experience in the construction industry he leverages extensive practical experience with multiple trades including concrete foundations, walls and flatwork, structural wood and steel framing, finish carpentry, drywall, lath & plaster/stucco, window & door installations, deck coating systems, metal and membrane flashings and above/below grade waterproofing. This trade experience encompasses both the commercial and residential construction sectors and has been vital in his ability to provide concise explanation of construction industry standards, as well as trade-specific standards of care.
Mr. Van Wonterghem has broad experience with all types of building construction ranging from concrete and steel commercial construction to high-end custom residential construction.
In connection with the Construction Experts Group at BHA, Mr. Van Wonterghem provides construction consulting and litigation support services to a wide variety of recognized construction claims professionals, owners, and publicly traded builders.
The firm’s Sacramento offices are located at the Gateway Oaks III office complex, 2520 Venture Oaks Way, Suite 435, Sacramento, CA 95833. Mr. Van Wonterghem can be reached via e mail at mvanwonterghem@berthowe.com or at (800) 783-1822.
Home Sales Still Low, But Enough to Spur Homebuilders
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Although new home sales are still fifty percent below the average over the last forty years, the housing rebound has sent stock of homebuilders up 53 percent this year, during the same period, the S&P 500 rose only 12 percent. The San Francisco Chronicle reports that from 2005 through 2011, homebuilder stocks trailed the S&P 500.
The growth isn’t limited to homebuilders alone. Building suppliers are also seeing a growth in sales, with profits for companies that make gypsum wallboard, cabinetry, plumbing products, and other items used in home building.
Homebuilders have also been able to raise prices. Standard Pacific Corp of Irvine, California has raised prices and cut incentives. Nevertheless, the buyers still come. PulteGroup and D.R. Horton are also raising prices.
Read the full story…
Construction Defects in Home a Breach of Contract
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has ruled in Leno v. K & L Homes, affirming the verdict of the lower court. K & L Homes argued that district court had erred in several ways, including by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, denying a request for inspection, and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during jury viewing.
The Lenos purchased a home constructed by K & L Homes, after which they alleged they found cracks, unevenness, and shifting, which they attributed to improper construction. They claimed negligence on the part of K & L Homes. K & L Homes responded that the Lenos were responsible for damage to the home. The Lenos dropped their negligence claim, arguing breach of contract and implied warranties.
Before the trial, after the discovery period had passed, K & L Homes requested to inspect the home. This was rejected by the court. Kelly Moldenhauer, the owner of K & L Homes sought to testify about his observations during the jury’s viewing of the house. The court denied this too. The jury found that K & L was in breach of contract and awarded damages to the Lenos.
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that K & L Homes gave “warranties that the home had been built according to local building codes and laws, and that the house was fit for its particular purpose as a residence.” The court found that a defective home breached this warranty. Further, the home violated an implied warranty of fitness.
The district court had denied K & L’s request to inspect the home, as the discovery period had ended and it would not give the Lenos time to do further discovery of their own. At the time of the request, there was only twenty-two days before the trial. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not an abuse of discretion of the part of the district court.
The Lenos had requested that Moldenhauer’s testimony not be permitted, as it would “have the same effect as if the court had granted K & L Homes’ pretrial request for inspection.” K & L Homes agreed to this in court, replying, “okay.”
The decision affirms the judgment of the district court and the damages awarded to the Lenos by the jury.
Read the court’s decision…
Contractor Manslaughter? Safety Shortcuts Are Not Worth It
August 11, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
It’s been a while since I discussed the importance of safety. But, a recent article on ENR.com compelled this brief article. Don’t shortcut safety — you could be facing serious criminal repercussions.
A New York crane company owner and one of his employees are each facing a second-degree manslaughter charge for the death of two construction workers.  The charges stem from the collapse of a crane in New York City. The district attorney determined that the crane owner cut a few corners to reduce its operation costs, significantly sacrificing safety.
Another example was the 2010 trial of another New York crane operator who was charged with manslaughter. In that case, the criminal charges failed to stick, but an administrative judge found that the contractor used a damaged sling to support the steel collar binding the tower-crane mast to the 18th floor of a high-rise building being constructed. The company also used four slings instead of the eight, as specified by the crane manufacturer; improperly attached the slings and failed to pad or soften them.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
No Coverage Under Ensuing Loss Provision
September 9, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Construction Law Hawaii
The cost of removing and replacing cracked flanges to prevent future leakage was not covered as an ensuing loss under a builder’s risk policy in RK Mechanical, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Casualty Co. of Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83958 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2011).
The insured, RK Mechanical Inc., was a subcontractor hired to install plumbing for a residential construction project. RK was an additional insured on the general contractor’s policy with Travelers. RK installed approximately 170 CPVC flanges on the project. Subsequently, two of the flanges cracked, allowing water to overflow and causing water damage to the project. Travelers was notified of the flange failure and resulting water damage.
RK subsequently removed and replaced the two cracked flanges and began water remediation. Travelers paid for the cost of the water damage due to the cracked flanges.
RK then examined all of the flanges installed in the project and discovered many were cracked and/or showed signs of potential failure. RK removed and replaced the cracked flanges. RK tendered a claim and demand for indemnity to Travelers for these repair costs. Travelers denied the claim. RK then sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Granting Stay, Federal Court Reviews Construction Defect Coverage in Hawaii
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The federal district court ultimately stayed a construction defect case, but offered comments on the current status of coverage disputes for such defects in Hawaii. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Simpson Mfg. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128481(D. Haw. Nov. 7, 2011).
National Union filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Simpson Manufacturing Company in four actions pending in the Hawaii state courts. The state court actions concerned allegedly defective hurricane strap tie hold downs that were manufactured and sold by Simpson. The hurricane ties allegedly began to prematurely corrode and rust, causing cracking, spalling and other damage to homes.
National Union contended the underlying allegations did not constitute "property damage" caused by an "occurrence," as defined in the policies.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Association May Not Make Claim Against Builder in Vermont Construction Defect Case
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Vermont Supreme Court issued a ruling on September 28 on Long Trail House Condominium Association. The case was heard by a panel of two Supreme Court justices, Marilyn Skoglund and Brian Burgess, and three justices specially assigned for the case, Kupersmith, Davenport, and Johnson. The decision came down with a 3-2 split; Judges Kupersmith and Johnson joining in a dissent.
In the underlying case, Stratton Corporation entered into an agreement with Engelberth Construction in which Engelberth would supply “recommendations on construction feasibility, consultation as to the selection of materials and equipment, assistance with zoning requirements and permits, and cooperation with the ‘design team’ to provide valuable engineering services.” Engelberth was not responsible to determine that the drawings and specifications were in accordance with the law and building codes, nor were they responsible “for the design team’s designs, errors, or omissions.”
Subsequent to the agreement was a construction project which culminated in the incorporation of the Long Trail House Condominium Association. The condominium owners initiated a lawsuit over alleged defects. Stratton, Intrawest, and the association settled claims for $7,025,00 with Stratton and Intrawest both pursuing claims against Engelberth. This case is still unsettled.
The association progressed on remediation, which cost about $1,500,00 more than was provided by the settlement, and so the association also sued Engelberth. In this case, the court granted a summary judgment to Engelberth, concluding that negligence claim was barred both “by the economic loss rule and that the absence of contractual privity was fatal to the warranty claims.”
The court upheld both determinations of the lower court. The court noted that “the economic loss rule ‘prohibits recovery in tort for purely economic losses’” and that “in tort law, duties are imposed by law to protect the public from harm.” A negligence claim could only be supported with evidence of “some accompanying physical harm, which does not include economic loss.”
The association made the claim that the economic loss rule applies only when there is a contractual relationship between the two parties. The court rejected this argument, citing a reference that “economic interests are protected, if at all, by contract principles, rather than tort principles.”
Nor did the court find it persuasive that a “professional services” exception to the economic loss doctrine applied, noting that the court has rejected this notion in two prior cases. The noted that the association’s losses were purely economic, and their inability to settle those claims with Engelberth did not mean that they had not means of settling them, as they were able to settle these very claims with Stratton and Intrawest.
The association also raised claims of an implied warranty, resting on the construction contract between Engelberth and Stratton. This was also rejected by the court, noting that Vermont “case law plainly contemplates the existence of contractual privity before a breach of implied warranty claim can be raised.” The court noted that there was neither a contract nor a sale between Engelberth and the association, and thus there were no grounds for an implied warranty. The court concluded that “the Association’s warranty remedy lies against the entity that sold it the condominium units and implicitly warranted through the sale that the units were built in a good and workmanlike manner and that they were suitable for habitation.”
Read the court’s decision …
Nevada Budget Remains at Impasse over Construction Defect Law
June 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Negotiations for the Nevada state budget have stalled over proposals to amend the state’s construction defect laws. Assembly Republicans had offered changes to the law to make it friendlier to contractors; however, after a state Supreme Court ruling that the state could not move a local government entity’s funds into state coffers, pressure has increased on the governor to lift the expiration dates of taxes approved in 2009.
The Reno Gazette-Journal quotes John Madole, a construction industry lobbyist, “We agree with them that you have to address the issue of the attorney fees, and for all practical purposes, they are automatically awarded when anybody brings any kind of suit.”
Speaker of the Assembly, John Oceguera, a Democrat, has proposed a bill that “makes it absolutely crystal clear that the only time you get attorney's fees is if you're the prevailing party.”
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Construction on the Rise in Washington Town
June 16, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Kitsap Sun reports that Gig Harbor, a town in the area near Tacoma, Washington, has had a 60% increase in building permit applications as compared to 2010. May, 2011 had as many permits issued for single-family residences in Gig Harbor as were issued for all of 2010. Additionally, a Safeway shopping center on Point Fosdick is described by Dick Bower, Gig Harbor Building and Fire Safety Director, as “a huge project and it’s going to bring in quite a bit of revenue.” He called the increase in building “economic recovery at the grassroots level.”
Bower said that the building officials in other towns have also seen upswings in construction. He anticipates more activity in the future.
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Texas res judicata and co-insurer defense costs contribution
March 23, 2011 — Original story by CDCoverage.com, March 23, 2011
In Truck Ins. Exchange v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., No. 03-08-00526-CV (Tex. App. 3d Aug. 27, 2010), insured contractor DCI was sued by the project owner seeking damages for defective construction. DCI tendered its defense to its CGL insurers Truck and Mid-Continent. Truck agreed to defend while Mid-Continent denied a defense. While the underlying suit was pending, Mid-Continent sued DCI, but not Truck, and obtained a judicial declaration of no duty to defend or indemnify DCI in the underlying suit. After settling the underlying suit, Truck sued Mid-Continent seeking contribution towards defense costs and indemnity payments. The state trial court entered summary judgment for Mid-Continent. The intermediate appellate court affirmed.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Tucson Officials to Discuss Construction Defect Claim
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The mayor of Tucson, Arizona and the city council scheduled a meeting on June 26, 2012 in order to consult with the city’s attorneys concerning possible construction defect litigation involving the Martin Luther King, Jr. apartment building in that city. The memorandum was authored by Richard Miranda, the Tucson city manager.
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Underpowered AC Not a Construction Defect
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
After buying a home in Louisiana, Mike Gines determined that the home’s air conditioning unit was insufficient to maintain an appropriate temperature. He contacted the home builder, D.R. Horton, Inc., which worked with the air conditioning installer, Reliant Heating & Air Conditioning, in order to repair the system. When the problems persisted, Gines filed a class action petition against Horton and Reliant in state court. Horton and Reliant moved the case to the federal courts, whereupon Gines asserted the defendants were in violation of the Louisiana New Home Warranty Act (NHWA). Horton stated that the claim under the NHWA was invalid, because Gines had not alleged actual physical damage to his home.
The district court granted Horton’s motion to dismiss. Gines sought a reversal from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and sought to have two questions of state law addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The district court ruled that the NHWA was the “sole remedy under Louisiana law for a purchaser of a new home with construction defects. Gines argued that court erred in this, but also conceded that this was the conclusion of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Further, Gines argued that a provision in the NHWA that allows the inclusion of construction defects that do not cause damage was satisfied by paragraph 6 of the contract. The court noted that Gines did not attach a copy of the contract to either the original or amended complaint, and so the court does not need to address these claims. However, the court cautioned that if a copy had been included, they still would have rejected the claim, as “the cited language does not indicate a waiver of the physical damage requirement.” They also note that “paragraph 13 of the contract shows that Gines was aware to the absence of any such waiver in the contract.”
The court concludes that “the moral of this story is that in order to avoid the harsh result that has obtained here, the buyer of a newly constructed home in Louisiana should seek to obtain in the contract of sale an express waiver of the actual damage requirement of the NHWA.” The appeals court affirmed the decision of the circuit court and denied the application to certify questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Read the court’s decision…