Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Construction Law Alert: A Specialty License May Not Be Required If Work Covered By Another License
March 7, 2011 — By
Steve Cvitanovic of
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.Contractors should always be sure that they understand the licensing in any Subcontract or Prime Contract before entering into any agreement. However, on March 3, 2011, in the case of Pacific Casson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros., Inc. 2011 Cal.App.Lexis 236, the Court of Appeal determined that if a specialty license is subsumed within another license, the specialty license may not be required.
Bernards entered into a subcontract with Pacific to excavate, backfill, grade and provide geotechnical design parameters for a hospital. The Prime Contract required the bidder to maintain a Class C-12 specialty earthwork license. However, Pacific only held a Class A general engineering license which it turns out was suspended during the performance of the work. Pacific sued Bernards for nonpayment of $544,567, but the lawsuit was dismissed because the trial court found that Pacific (1) lacked a C-12 license, and (2) Pacific’s Class A license was suspended for failure to pay an unrelated judgment. Pacific was also ordered to disgorge $206,437 in prior payments.
The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded. The Court of Appeal agreed with Pacific and held that a C-12 specialty license was not required despite the Prime Contract. The Court of Appeal found that the C-12 specialty license would have been “superfluous” since it was fully encompassed within the Class A requirements. However, the Court of Appeal also remanded the case for further
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Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
Can Negligent Contractors Shift Blame in South Carolina?
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Clay Olson looks back to a 1991 Carolina case, Nelson v. Concrete Supply Company. The court concluded in that case that “a plaintiff in South Carolina may recover only if his/her negligence does not exceed that of the defendant’s and amount of plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in proportion to amount of his or her negligence; if there is more than one defendant, plaintiff’s negligence shall be compared to combined negligence of all defendants.” In 2005, he reports, as part of tort reform in South Carolina, the legislature further addressed this.
He then suggests a possible outcome of this is that negligent contractors may be able to shift some of the blame (and cost of the settlement) to other defendants who may not be to blame. He offers a scenario in which a contractor is sued for construction defects and a jury has to allocate responsibility for indivisible damage. “A jury need only find the two subcontractors to have each contributed 15% of the indivisible damage.” He adds in another 15% for claims against the architect. Minor blame is given to the manufacturers, and suddenly the negligent contractor is paying less than 50% of the total settlement.
He notes that the previous system in place also had its problems, but notes that this one may not be “fair and equitable.”
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School District Marks End of Construction Project by Hiring Lawyers
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A school district in northeastern Pennsylvania has retained legal services as they approach the end of a construction project. The Mid Valley School Board cited concerns about the project’s budget, but Randy Parry, Superintendent of Mid Valley schools referenced “possible litigation at the end of the project.” Mr. Parry told the Scranton Times Tribune that construction delays could be a reason for litigation.
In addition to approving an additional $20,000 for legal representation, the board also approved $21,579 for additional project costs.
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The Year 2010 In Review: Design And Construction Defects Litigation
February 25, 2011 — Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen Lauderdale -
Construction & Infrastructure Law Blog - February 25, 2011
This article is the first in a series summarizing construction law developments for 2010
1. Centex Homes v. Financial Pacific Life Insurance Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1995 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
After settling numerous homeowners’ construction defect claims — and more than ten years after the homes were substantially completed — a home developer brought suit against one of the concrete fabrication subcontractors for the development seeking indemnity for amounts paid to the homeowners, as well as for damages for breach of the subcontractor’s duties to procure specific insurance and to defend the developer against the homeowners’ claims. The subcontractor brought a motion for summary adjudication on the ground the developer’s claims were barred by the ten year statute of repose contained in Code of Civil Procedure Section 337.15.
The District Court agreed the developer’s claim for indemnity was barred by Section 337.15. And it held that because the damages recoverable for breach of the subcontractor’s duty to purchase insurance are identical to the damages recoverable through the developer’s indemnity claim, the breach of duty to procure insurance claim also was time-barred. The District Court, however, allowed the claim for breach of the duty to defend to proceed. The categories of losses associated with such a claim (attorneys’ fees and other defense costs) are distinct from the damages recoverable through claims governed by Section 337.15 (latent deficiency in the design and construction of the homes and injury to property arising out of the latent deficiencies).
2. UDC — Universal Development v. CH2M Hill, 181 Cal. App. 4th 10 (6th Dist. Jan. 2010)
Indemnification clauses in construction agreements often state that one party to the agreement — the “indemnitor” — will defend and indemnify the other party from particular types of claims. Of course, having a contract right to a defense is not the same as actually receiving a defense. Any indemnitor attempting to avoid paying for defense costs can simply deny the tender of defense with the hope that when the underlying claim is resolved the defense obligations will be forgotten. In the past, when parties entitled to a defense — the “indemnitees” — had long memories and pressed to recover defense costs, indemnitors attempted to justify denying the tender by claiming their defense obligations coincided with their indemnity obligations and neither arose until a final determination was made that the underlying claim was one for which indemnity was owed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen Lauderdale, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP. Ms. Matson can be contacted at cmatson@sheppardmullin.com, Mr. Hamersmith can be contacted at hhamersmith@sheppardmullin.com, and Ms. Lauderdale can be contacted at hlauderdale@sheppardmullin.com.
No Coverage For Damage Caused by Chinese Drywall
October 28, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The pollution exclusion barred coverage for alleged property damage and bodily injury in Evanston Ins. Co. v. Harbor Walk Dev., LLC, No. 2:10cv312 (E.D. Va. Sept. 9, 2011).
Homeowners sued the insured, Harbor Walk, in three lawsuits, alleging the Chinese drywall installed in their homes emitted sulfides and other noxious gases. This caused corrosion and damage to the air-conditioning and ventilation units, refrigeration coils, copper tubing, faucets, metal surfaces, electrical appliances and other personal items. The homeowners also alleged the compounds emitted by the drywall caused bodily injury, such as allergic reactions, headaches, etc.
Harbor Walk’s insurer, Evanston, filed for a declaratory judgment that the pollution exclusion precluded coverage.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Ensuing Loss Found Ambiguous, Allowing Coverage
August 16, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The court determined the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous and found coverage for the home owners in Platek v. Town of Hamburg, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5371 (N.Y. App. Div. July 6, 2012).
The burst of a water main caused water damage to the insureds' basement. Allstate disclaimed coverage under exclusion 4 for losses caused by "[w]ater . . . on or below the surface of the ground, regardless of its source . . . [,] includ[ing] water . . . which exerts pressure on or flows, seeps or leaks through any part of the residence premises."
Another policy provision covered "sudden and accidental direct physical loss caused by fire, explosion or theft resulting from item []. . . 4 . . . ." Plaintiffs argued that this exception applied because their claimed loss was caused by an "explosion" of the water main.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Ceiling Collapse Attributed to Construction Defect
May 19, 2011 — May 16, 2011 - CDJ Staff
WSMV, Nashville reports that the ceiling collapse in a Franklin, Tennessee Kohl’s was attributed to a construction defect by fire officials. The officials noted that the ceiling was renovated at the time. No injuries were reported.
The report notes that “inspectors were supposed to look at the renovations next week, but fire officials said that will have to be delayed until another time.”
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Alabama “occurrence” and subcontractor work exception to the “your completed work” exclusion
November 18, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Town & Country Property, LLC v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. 1100009 (Ala. Oct. 21, 2010), property owner Town & Country contracted with insured general contractor Jones-Williams for the construction of a car dealership. All of the construction work was performed by Jones-Williams subcontractors. After completion, Town & Country sued Jones-Williams for defective construction. Jones-Williams’ CGL insurer Amerisure defended. The case was tried and a judgment was entered against Jones-Williams in favor of Town & Country. After Amerisure denied any obligation to pay the judgment, Town & Country sued Amerisure in a statutory direct action.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com.
Florida Construction Defect Case Settled for $3 Million
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Runaway Beach Club Condominium Association of Kissimmee, Florida has settled its construction defect claims against the parties involved in the construction and development of the buildings. The association claimed that defective roofs and improperly installed windows had lead to leaks and associated damages. A trial date had been set, but parties involved were able to reach this settlement instead.
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Ninety-Day Extension Denied to KB Home in Construction Defect Insurance Claim
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A magistrate judge has denied a request by KB Home Nevada to extend the time for service an additional ninety days. KB claims that St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company has failed to defend them in a construction defect claim. However, the judge did grant KB an additional twenty days to effectuate service, noting that the request for additional time may be renewed.
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Construction Job Opening Rise in October
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
There was a significant increase in the number of open construction jobs during October, according to a report for the National Association of Home Builders. Working from preliminary data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the NAHB said that the number of open positions reached “levels and rates last seen in 2007.” As the data is still preliminary, the NAHB noted that the conclusions should be taken with caution.
While there was a spike in job openings, the hiring of people to fill these positions hasn’t caught up with it, and there was a small decline in hires. But to return to the good news, there was also a drop in layoffs in that same period.
Through October, about 8,000 people have been hired in the construction sector. The NAHB notes that this does not correspond with the recent increases with home construction. They suggest that “it may be the case that startups in the home building and remodeling sectors are being missed by the establishment survey.” Another possibility they raise is that already-employed construction workers are simply working more hours.
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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
Read the court’s decision…
Florida trigger
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In Johnson-Graham-Malone, Inc. v. Austwood Enterprises, Inc., No. 16-2009-CA-005750-XXXX-MA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Duval County, April 29, 2011), insured JGM was the general contractor for an apartment project completed in 1998. In 2007, the project owner sued JGM seeking damages for defective construction resulting in moisture penetration property damage. JGM tendered its defense to Amerisure. Amerisure denied a defense. JGM defended and settled the underlying suit and then filed suit against Amerisure seeking recovery of defense and settlement costs. The trial court granted JGM’s motion for partial summary judgment. The court first addressed Amerisure’s duty to defend. Applying Florida law, the court held that, although the underlying complaint alleged that the property damage was not discovered until after expiration of the Amerisure policies
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
No Third-Quarter Gain for Construction
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Associated Builders and Contractors released their analysis of construction work under contract and found that there was no increase in construction backlog from the second quarter of 2011. There was still improvement, however, over 2010, as the third quarter backlog is 16.3 percent higher than that of a year ago.
The current backlog is 8.1 months, which according to Anirban Basu, the chief economist of the ABC, “is consistent with flat construction spending.” He noted that less than 8 months indicated a decline.
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Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage
December 9, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Water intrusion caused by a construction defect was not covered under the all risk policy’s ensuing loss provision. See Friedberg v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123582 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2011).
Extensive water damage was discovered in the insureds’ home when a small hole in the exterior wall was being repaired. Chubb’s adjuster and an expert found water intrusion causing rot, mold, and damage to the home’s wood framing and insulation. Chubb denied coverage because water intruded through the roof and wall, resulting in gradual deterioration. The insureds filed suit.
The policy excluded coverage for construction defects, but insured "ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies."
The court agreed there was a prima facie case for coverage because the home suffered a physical loss.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Was Jury Right in Negligent Construction Case?
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Yes, said the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Pope v. Heritage Communities, Inc. Heritage Communities developed Riverwalk, a community in South Carolina. During the earlier trial, HCI “conceded that construction defects existed at Riverwalk, and repairs needed to be made.” The trial court found that the construction was negligent, awarding the property owners association $4.25 million in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive damages, with the class of owners awarded $250,000 in actual damages and $750,000 in punitive damages. HCI appealed on nine issues. All were rejected by the appeals court.
The court rejected HCI’s claim that the judge’s instruction to the jury suggested to the jury that “the court had already determined that Appellants were willful, wanton, and reckless.” But here, the appeals court found “no reversible error.”
The general contractor for Riverwalk was BuildStar. Off-site management and sale were managed by Heritage Riverwalk, Inc., which also owned title to the property. Both these companies were owned by Heritage Communities, Inc. During the trial, an HCI employee testified that “the three corporations shared the same officers, directors, office, and telephone number.” The trial court found that the three entities were amalgamated. This was upheld by the appeals court.
Nor did the appeals agree with the HCI that the trial court had improperly certified a class. The owners were seen as properly constituting a class. Further, the court held that the property owners’ losses were properly included by the trial court. HCI objected at trial to the inclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures, however, as they did not object that it was inadmissible, the issue could not be addressed at appeal.
HCI argued on appeal that the trial court should not have allowed evidence of defects at other HCI developments. The appeals court noted that “the construction defects at the other HCI developments were substantially similar to those experienced by Riverwalk.”
The court additionally found that the negligence claims, the estimated damages (since full damage could not be determined until all defective wood was removed), and the award of punitive damages were all properly applied.
Read the court’s decision…
In Colorado, Primary Insurers are Necessary Parties in Declaratory Judgment Actions
December 9, 2011 — Heather M. Anderson, Colorado Construction Litigation
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado recently ruled that primary insurers are necessary parties, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, in a declaratory judgment action being pursued by an excess carrier. See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. LNC Communities II, LLC, 2011 WL 5548955 (D. Colo. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 is almost identical to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and pertains to the joinder of persons needed for “just adjudication.” The Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”) sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the defendants (collectively referred to as “Lennar Companies”) with regard to the underlying lawsuit brought by The Falls at Legend Trail Owners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”). Id. at *2. In its lawsuit, the HOA alleged Lennar Companies were liable for construction defects at The Falls at Legend Trail residential development.
Lennar Companies held two primary insurance policies, one issued by OneBeacon Insurance Company f/k/a General Accident Insurance Company (“General Accident”) and the other issued by American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“American Safety”). Lennar Companies also carried excess policies issued by ICSOP and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“Ohio Casualty”).
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com