Virginia Chinese Drywall and pollution exclusion
May 27, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. The Overlook, LLC, No. 4:10cv69 (E.D. Va. May 13, 2011), homeowner Edmonds sued insured developer/general contractor Overlook seeking damages resulting from defective Chinese drywall installed in Edmonds’ home. Overlook’s CGL insurer Nationwide defended Overlook under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action. The federal district trial court granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Driver’s Death May Be Due to Construction Defect
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A man driving a rental truck collided with a parking ramp at the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, leading to his death when the ramp broke and crushed the cab of the truck. One expert said that the ramp should have been built to withstand the impact. Tim Galarnyk told Fox News that the building feature didn’t’ even bear weight, describing it as “a cosmetic facial panel.” Nevertheless, in a contest with a truck he said the ramp portion should “peel it like a tin can before it takes the concrete element down.”
The Mall of American is not commenting on the accident.
Read the full story…
Nevada District Court Dismisses Case in Construction Defect Coverage Suit
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United States District Court of Nevada has dismissed a case filed by Maryland Casualty Company against National Fire & Marine Insurance Company. This case follows a case in which National was sued over “200 causes of action arising out of 193 separate insurance coverage disputes related to 75 different insureds and 163 unrelated construction defect or Chapter 40 proceedings across seven states.” The judge in this initial case severed the plaintiffs, as he found that allowing joinder “would make this case impossible to manage.” In this particular instance, National seeks to have the claims made by Maryland Casualty dismissed.
Maryland Casualty alleged that for insurance policies issued to 38 companies, National was obligated to defend the insured. National was, according to the plaintiff, named as defendants in 72 unrelated lawsuits to which National disclaimed coverage. However, the court found that Maryland Casualty failed “to provide enough detail regarding the relevant property damage, policies, claims, and time periods.” The court found that Maryland failed to “state a claim upoin which relief can be granted.
The court also found that “the Complaint lacks any well-pled allegations from which the Court could conclude the Plaintiff has standing since the Complaint is devoid of information about the specific policies at issue.
The court did allow Maryland Casualty up to September 3, 2012 in which to file an amended complaint.
Read the court’s decision…
Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury” or “property damage” be caused by an “occurrence” and that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury“ or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivan’s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing , including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
Florida Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Homeowners Unaware of Construction Defects and Lack of Permits
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Florida Court of Appeals has ruled that a homeowner is not liable for defects in unpermitted alterations, reversing a lower court’s decision in Jensen v. Bailey. The Jensens sold their house to the Baileys. During the sale, the Jensens filled out a property disclosure statement, checking “no” to a question about “any improvement or additions to the property, whether by your or by others that have been constructed in violation of building codes or without necessary permits.”
After moving in, the Baileys discovered several problems with the home. One involved a defective sewer connection leading to repeated backups. The Baileys also found problems with remodeling the Jensens had done in the kitchen, master bath, and bedroom. The remodeling work was not done with required permits nor was it up to code.
The court noted that an earlier case, Johnson v. Davis, established four criteria: “the seller of a home must have knowledge of a defect in the property; the defect must materially affect the value of the property; the defect must not be readily observable and must be unknown to the buyer; and the buyer must establish that the seller failed to disclose the defect to the buyer.” The court found that the first of these criteria was crucial to determining the case.
In the Johnson ruling, the then Chief Justice dissented, fearing that the courts “would ultimately construe Johnson’s requirement of actual knowledge to permit a finding of liability based on constructive knowledge,” quoting Justice Boyd, “a rule of constructive knowledge will develop based on the reasoning that if the seller did not know of the defect, he should have known about it before attempting to sell the property.” The Appeals Court concluded that the lower court hit this point in ruling on Jensen v. Bailey.
Citing other Florida cases, the court noted that the Johnson rule does require “proof of the seller’s actual knowledge of the defect.” The court cited a case in which it was concluded that the seller “should have known” that there was circumstantial evidence was that the seller did know about the defects, as the seller had been involved in the construction of the home.
In the case of the Jensens, the lower court concluded that they did not know that the work was defective, nor did they know that they were obligated to obtain permits for it. The Appeals Court found this one fact sufficient to reverse the decision and remand the case to the lower court for a final judgment in favor of the Jensens.
Read the court’s decision…
Quarter Four a Good One for Luxury Homebuilder
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Toll Brothers has announced that their fourth-quarter net income is $2.35 per share, which they attribute in part to an income tax benefit. Their revenue, at $632.8 million, easily exceeded analysts’ projections of $565.1 million. Additionally, their number of signed contracts jumped seventy percent while their cancellation rate dropped nearly half to 4.9 percent.
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Faulty Workmanship Causing Damage to Other Property Covered as Construction Defect
September 30, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
In yet another recent construction defect case, the Illinois Court of Appeal found for coverage. See Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Larsen, Inc., 2011 Ill. App. Ct. LEXIS 872 (Ill. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011).
Weather-Tite, Inc. hired Larson as a subcontractor to apply sealant to windows installed by Weather-Tite in a condominium building. The windows subsequently leaked and caused water damage. The homeowner’s association sued Weather-Tite for breach of express and implied warranties. Weather-Tite filed a third-party complaint against Larsen alleging that, if it was liable to the association for breach of warranty, Larsen was liable for contribution as a joint tortfeasor. Weather-Tite and Larsen both tendered defenses to Milwaukee Insurance. The tenders were denied and Milwaukee Insurance filed suit to determine rights under the policy.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by all parties. The trial court granted Milwaukee Insurance’s summary judgment motion as to Weather-Tite, but granted Larsen’s cross-motion against Milwaukee Insurance.
On appeal, the appellate court considered whether the underlying pleadings alleged facts demonstrating "property damage" resulting from an "occurrence" within the terms of the policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
The Hidden Dangers of Construction Defect Litigation
March 28, 2012 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
David M. McLain, writing at Colorado Construction Litigation, has an interesting blog post republishing his article in Common Interests magazine, the monthly periodical of the Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Community Associations Institute. In his article, he touches on a number of pitfalls in construction defect litigation, including the potential conflicts of interests facing HOAs. He also considers the problems homeowners can face, including both “strong-arm tactics” taken by attorneys to compel homeowners to join the lawsuit, or situations in which the interests of the HOA do not match those of the homeowners. He writes:
There is also a conflict of interest with individual owners who attempt to opt out of the case. This can lead to shocking strong-arm tactics on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys. In one instance, a plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to an individual homeowner that stated that as a 1/58th owner of the common elements, if he refused to go along with the suit, and there was ultimately a finding in favor of the HOA which was in any way limited by his refusal to participate, he would be personally liable for 1/58th of the HOA’s total damages. In another instance, a different plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to a homeowner who wanted the builder to perform warranty repairs, informing the owner that if he let the builder perform any repairs, the attorney would bill the HOA according to the fee agreement entered by the HOA board (without knowledge or consent of non-board members) and that the HOA would assess the homeowner for that expense. These are just two examples of conflicts which may arise between the HOA board and individual homeowners when the HOA pursues CD cases.
Another example of a conflict which will arise as a result of CD litigation occurs post-settlement. When an HOA settles for less than 100% of the amount necessary to fund all repairs outlined by its experts, plus attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, there will obviously be a shortfall in the amount necessary to fix the development. The HOA board must then choose to impose a special assessment to cover the shortfall or to make some, but not all, of the repairs outlined by its experts. In choosing the latter, the conflict arises with respect to which homes get fixed and which do not. In this situation, the HOA board has acted as the attorney-in-fact for the individual owners by bringing claims on their behalf, and has compromised those claims without their knowledge or consent.
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Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com.
Certificate of Merit to Sue Architects or Engineers Bill Proposed
May 3, 2011 — May 3, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
North Carolina may become the twelfth state to require a Certificate of Merit to sue an architect or engineer. If North Carolina Senate Bill 435 (SB435) passes, then plaintiffs when filing a complaint will need to also attach an affidavit of a third-party licensed professional engineer or architect stating that the case has merit.
SB435 is a short two pages in its current form. The bill states that the “third-party licensed professional engineer or licensed architect shall (i) be competent to testify and hold the same professional license and practice in the same area of practice as the defendant design professional and (ii) offer testimony based upon knowledge, skill, experience, education, training, and practice. The affidavit shall specifically state for each theory of recovery for which damages are sought, the negligence, if any, or other action, error, or omission of the design professional in providing the professional service, including any error or omission in providing advice, judgment, opinion, or a similar professional skill claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim. The third-party licensed professional engineer or licensed architect shall be licensed in this State and actively engaged in the practice of engineering or architecture respectively.”
A few of the amendments allude to disciplining design professionals who certify civil actions that are without merit. The bill has been referred to the Committee on Judiciary I.
While North Carolina is considering enacting a Certificate of Merit law, eleven other states already require one, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. Christopher D. Montez, a partner with Thomas, Feldman & Wilshusen, LLP, has written a useful summary for each state’s certificate of merit scheme.
Read the text of SB435
Track the progress of SB435
Read more from Christopher D. Montez’s article on Thomas, Feldman & Wilshusen, LLP site
Granting Stay, Federal Court Reviews Construction Defect Coverage in Hawaii
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The federal district court ultimately stayed a construction defect case, but offered comments on the current status of coverage disputes for such defects in Hawaii. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Simpson Mfg. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128481(D. Haw. Nov. 7, 2011).
National Union filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Simpson Manufacturing Company in four actions pending in the Hawaii state courts. The state court actions concerned allegedly defective hurricane strap tie hold downs that were manufactured and sold by Simpson. The hurricane ties allegedly began to prematurely corrode and rust, causing cracking, spalling and other damage to homes.
National Union contended the underlying allegations did not constitute "property damage" caused by an "occurrence," as defined in the policies.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Claims Under Colorado Defect Action Reform Act Count as Suits
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals has affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Melssen v. Auto-Owners Insurance. The Melssens built a custom home for the Holleys, during which time the Melssens retained a comprehensive general liability policy from Auto-Owners, which “obligated Auto-Owerns to defend the Melssens with respect to any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘property damage’ during the policy period.” Soon after the house was constructed, cracks developed in the drywall, then outside stucco and basement slab. The Holleys contended that “approximately $300,000 of damages to the Holleys’ property was caused by the Melssens’ engineering and construction defects” and filed a claim under the Colorado Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA). The Melssens “demanded Auto-Owners defend and indemnify the Melssens and forwared Auto-Owners the notice of claim.”
Although the Melssens notified Auto-Owners in June 2008, it was not until October 2008 that Auto-Owners denied coverage stating that the claims were sustained outside the policy period. The Melssens filed an action against Auto-Owners. At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the Melssens awarding them damages, to which the trial court added costs and attorney fees.
On appeal, Auto-Owners contended that the trial court erred in allowing the Melssens to argue that the CDARA notice of claim “was the functional equivalent of a complaint commencing a suit.” The appeals court found that “the CDARA notice of claim process constituted an alternative dispute resolution proceeding under the policy.” The court agreed that jury should not have been asked to determine if a CDARA action is a “suit,” but as the jury found for the Melssens, the concluding it “constituted harmless error.” Further, the court found that an action under the CDARA satisfied the definition of a “suit.”
The court found for the Melssens, affirming the lower court’s decision and remanding the case to the lower court for the awarding of appeals costs to the Melssens.
Read the court’s decision…
BHA Expands Construction Experts Group
October 28, 2011 — Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc. - Corporate Offices
Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc., one of the nation’s leading construction forensics firms is pleased to announce the expansion of the company’s civil and structural engineering capabilities.
JERRY M. MILES, PE - Mr. Miles has been a licensed civil engineer in California since 1987 and has served as the lead civil engineer on many projects in several states. His experience includes contract administration services as the owner’s representative on a variety of projects including mastered planned communities, residential subdivisions, shopping centers and multi-family residential projects. He has also been involved in providing water quality management plans and storm water pollution prevention plans. Mr. Miles has also served on the Town of Apple Valley’s Building Department Dispute Resolution Board.
His more than 26 years of engineering experience includes geotechnical evaluations, structural design of wood-framed, masonry, and concrete tilt-up buildings, small and large subdivision engineering construction/improvements plans, hydrology/hydraulic reports and design, forensic investigation and expert witness testimony. Mr. Miles has qualified as an expert in numerous jurisdictions and Federal court. He has been called upon to provide deposition testimony on more than twenty-five occasions and has successfully testified at arbitration and trial. Click here to view Mr. Miles’ Current CV.
MATTHEW J. STIEFEL, PE - With a background that spans a multitude of design and new construction projects to catastrophic claims analysis, Mr. Stiefel brings a unique set of credentials and experience to the construction experts group at Bert L. Howe & Associates. Mr. Stiefel has more than 13 years’ experience in civil, structural, and geotechnical engineering; providing design and construction consulting services on a variety of projects that include multi-family and single family dwellings, commercial buildings, transportation facilities, industrial facilities, storm drain channels, water and wastewater pipelines. His engineering experience encompasses multiple disciplines of civil engineering including geotechnical design and evaluation, foundation design, structural design of wood-framed buildings, preparation of grading plans and site drainage analysis. He has provided cause and origin analysis for insurance adjusters on many residential and commercial sites related to issues involving moisture intrusion and mold, foundation movement, site drainage, soil movement, wind damage, and other various losses. Click here to view Mr. Stiefel’s Current CV.
Couple Sues Attorney over Construction Defect Case, Loses
June 10, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled against a couple who sued their lawyer, after they were unhappy with the results of a construction defect case. Craig and Jeanne Petrik sued Mahaffey and Associates for legal malpractice and breach of contract. Their lawyer, Douglas L. Mahaffey, had settled their case for $400,000. The Petricks claimed Mahaffey did not have the authority make an offer to compromise.
In the original case, Mahaffey held back the $400,000 awarded in the settlement until he and the Petricks came to terms on how much of that was owed to Mahaffey. The lower court concluded that the Petricks were due $146,323,18. The jury did not agree with the Petrik’s claim that conditions had been met in which Mahaffey would not be charging them costs.
Judges O’Leary and Ikola wrote the opinion, with the third judge on the panel, Judge Bedworth offering a dissent only on their view of the cost waiver clause.
Read the court’s opinion
Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration.
The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this.
PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint.
Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.”
The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.”
As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision.
Read the court’s decision…
Texas “your work” exclusion
January 6, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech, L.L.C., No. 10-20499 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011), claimant Ergon hired insured Cat Tech to perform service on a reactor at Ergon’s refinery. During a start-up of the reactor after Cat Tech had completed its work, the reactor suffered damage. Cat Tech performed additional service and repairs. However, again upon start-up of the reactor, it suffered additional damage. Ergon hired another contractor to repair the reactor. Ergon initiated arbitration proceedings against Cat Tech. Cat Tech’s CGL insurer American Home defended Cat Tech against the Ergon arbitration under a reservation of rights.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Faulty Workmanship may be an Occurrence in Indiana CGL Policies
April 7, 2011 — April 7, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of whether construction defects can be an occurrence in Commercial General Liabilities (CGL) policies continues to find mixed answers. The United States District Court in Indiana denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case of General Casualty Insurance v. Compton Construction Co., Inc. and Mary Ann Zubak stating that faulty workmanship can be an occurrence in CGL policies.
Judge Theresa L. Springmann cited Sheehan Construction Co., et al. v. Continental Casualty Co., et al. for her decision, ”The Indiana Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, which had been granted in favor of the insurer in Sheehan, holding that faulty workmanship can constitute an ‘accident’ under a CGL policy, which means any damage would have been caused by an ‘occurrence’ triggering the insurance policy’s coverage provisions. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that, under identically-worded policy exclusion terms that are at issue in this case, defective subcontractor work could provide the basis for a claim under a CGL policy.”
As we reported on April 1st, South Carolina’s legislature is currently working on bill S-431 that would change the wording of CGL policies in their state to include construction defects. Ray Farmer, Southwest region vice president of the American Insurance Association spoke out against the bill. “CGL policies were never meant to cover faulty workmanship by the contractor,” he said. “The bill’s supplementary and erroneous liability provisions will only serve to unnecessarily impact construction costs in South Carolina.”
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Nevada Bill Aims to Reduce Legal Fees For Construction Defect Practitioners
March 21, 2011 — March 21, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
Assemblyman Ira Hansen and twelve additional members of Nevada’s Assembly are sponsoring Assembly Bill 285. AB 285 Revises provisions governing an award of attorney’s fees in causes of action for constructional defects. Existing law generally provides that a claimant may recover reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the claimant’s damages in a cause of action for constructional defects. (NRS 40.655)
This bill removes this provision and instead authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party involved in such a cause of action if an independent basis for the award exists pursuant to existing law which authorizes a court to award attorney’s fees in certain circumstances, or Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees by an offeree who rejects an offer and subsequently fails to obtain a more favorable judgment.
In an AP report published in Business Week it is suggested that the target objective of legislators centers on what it refers to as Nevada’s "Rampant construction defect lawsuits".
According to Business Week "The suits bring in hundreds of millions of dollars for lawyers and have put construction companies out of business. Hansen says fewer construction firms mean higher prices for Nevada consumers."
Click Here To Read Full Text and Revisions of Assembly Bill 285