Yellow Brass Fittings Play a Crucial Role in Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes Hawaii, et al. is a “class action filed by homeowners who allege that their homes have a construction defect. They allege that their plumbing systems include brass fittings susceptible to corrosion and likely to cause leaks. They bring this action against the developer of their homes and the manufacturers of the brass fittings.”
Zurn, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective brass fittings, sought a dismissal, or if that could not be achieved, then “a more definite statement, of five of the six claims.” Zurn moved for summary judgment on the sixth claim, or alternately sought “summary judgment on one of the five claims it” sought to dismiss.” The court granted in part the motion, and denied the motion for summary judgment.
The developer, Castle & Cooke, sought dismissal of the First Amended Complaint stating “that Plaintiffs have not complied with Hawaii’s Contractor Repair Act, chapter 672E of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which requires, among other things, a plaintiff to give a contractor the results of any testing done before filing an action against that contractor.” The court couldn’t determine “certain facts essential to ruling” on Castle & Cooke’s motion, and therefore denied the motion, but ordered Plaintiffs to submit requested material by the stated deadline.
The Baker v Castle & Cooke case began with the Plaintiffs claim that the use of yellow brass fittings can lead to construction defects. They allege that “yellow brass is particularly susceptible to dezincification, a corrosion process in which zinc leaches into potable water that comes into contact with the brass. According to Plaintiffs, as the brass corrodes, it becomes porous and mechanically weak. Plaintiffs further allege that the PEX systems in the putative class members’ homes have begun to, or are about to, leak water into the walls, ceilings, and floors of their homes. Plaintiffs allege that the leakage will cause water damage and mold growth, exposing the occupants to toxins.”
In response to the plaintiffs’ claims, Zurn argued “because their yellow brass fittings have not failed to date, Plaintiffs fail to allege, and have no evidence showing, that they have suffered any actual injury.” Plaintiffs replied, “even if the fittings have not failed as of today, failure in the future is inevitable.”
However, the court stated, “whether Plaintiffs have suffered any injury, or whether Plaintiffs are attempting to proceed based solely on future injury, implicates Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action, as well as whether this case is ripe for adjudication.” The court has requested the parties to submit “supplemental briefing on whether this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In supplemental briefs, Zurn argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs lack standing, and Castle & Cooke argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe.”
The court continues to discuss the problem of standing: “To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate three things. First, the plaintiff must suffer an "injury-in-fact," which means that there must be a concrete and particularized "invasion of a legally protected interest" and the invasion is actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action. Third, a favorable decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id. It is the first element (injury-in-fact) that is in issue here.”
The court found that the plaintiffs do have standing: “Even if the court could not rely on the allegations that the pipes will soon leak, the court would conclude that, for standing purposes, Plaintiffs have a sufficient injury-in-fact in the form of their alleged economic loss.” In a hearing, Plaintiffs argued that their homes had decreased in value.
The court also denied Castle & Cooke’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of ripeness, stating “the same reasons Plaintiffs satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing purposes, they satisfy the constitutional ripeness requirement.”
Plaintiffs asserted six counts against Zurn. Zurn, in response, made a motion to dismiss counts VIII, IX, X, XII, and XIII. The court granted Zurn’s motion for Counts VIII, IX, and X only: “Counts VIII (product liability), IX (negligence), and X (strict liability) sound in tort. Zurn argues that, because Plaintiffs allege no injury other than to the PEX systems and the yellow brass fittings themselves, the economic loss rule bars their tort claims. The court agrees.”
The court disagreed with Zurn’s motion regarding Count XII: “Count XII asserts that Zurn has breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Zurn argues that Count XII is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege an injury. The court disagrees.”
Zurn’s motion regarding Count XIII was also denied: “Count XIII asserts that Zurn violated section 480-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes.” Furthermore, “Plaintiffs allege that Zurn ‘engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices when [it] designed, manufactured and sold Yellow Brass Fittings.’ Zurn argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under section 480-2(a) because their claims are barred by the statute of limitations and they do not adequately allege reliance or a cognizable injury. The court disagrees.”
The court denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts XI and XII.
Castle & Cooke sought to dismiss “Plaintiffs’ claims against it under section 672E-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which provides for dismissal when claimants fail to comply with chapter 672E.” There was some discussion regarding the test results. Apparently, the plaintiffs had failed to provide a written notice of claim at least 90 days before filing the action. However, it is unclear if the Plaintiffs have since complied with the requirements of the chapter. “The court has received no supplemental information from either party about whether any test results from another case have been turned over or whether those materials are subject to a confidentiality agreement. The record at this point does not establish noncompliance with the requirement in chapter 672E to provide such information. The court therefore denies the motion to dismiss.”
In summary, “Zurn’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Count VIII, Count IX, and Count X. Zurn’s motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ other claims. Zurn’s request for a more definite statement and its summary judgment motion are denied. Plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended Complaint no later than May 21, 2012.” Furthermore, “the court denies Castle & Cooke’s motion, but directs Plaintiffs to file, within two weeks, either a certificate of compliance with section 672E-3(c), or an explanation as to why they have not complied. Castle & Cooke may submit a response within two weeks of Plaintiffs’ submission. Each party’s submission is limited to 1000 words.”
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Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.
The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”
Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”
The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.
Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.
The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.
The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”
The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.
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Reference to "Man Made" Movement of Earth Corrects Ambiguity
December 20, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
In Pioneer Tower Owners Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 12 NY3d 302 (2009), the New York Court of Appeals found an "earth movement" exclusion was ambiguous when applied to an excavation. The court now considered whether a similar exclusion, expressly made applicable to "man made" movement of earth, eliminated the ambiguity when loss was created by excavation. Bentoria Holdings, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 2012 N.Y. LEXIS 3087 (N.Y. Oct. 25, 2012).
Plaintiff's building suffered cracks due to an excavation being conducted on the lot next door. A claim was submitted to Travelers, plaintiff's insurer. Travelers rejected the claim, relying on the earth movement exclusion.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Damage During Roof Repairs Account for Three Occurrences
August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Southgate Gardens Condominium had buildings damaged by Hurricane Wilma in 2005. See Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Basedeo, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 11864 (11th Cir. June 12, 2012). First State Development Corporation was hired by Southgate to do repairs.
On November 1, 2005, First State completed tarping on the buildings. Thereafter, on November 11, 2005, First State contracted with Southgate to remove and replace the roofs of the Southgate Buildings.
The tarps placed by First State were inadequate and allowed water to enter the unit of Wayne Basdeo and cause damage. Further, when it attached the tarps, First State caused holes to be made in the roofs of buildings, leading to additional damage. First State also left open the mansards (a type of roof which has two slopes on all all sides, but with the lower slope steeper that the upper one). Finally, the peeled-back condition of the roofing allowed rain to enter.
Basdeo filed a claim with Mid-Continent.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Not Occurrences, Says Hawaii Court
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Some insurers in Hawaii have made it clear that they will be covering construction defects, despite a court ruling concluding that defects are not occurrences, under Hawaii law. The case, heard by Hawaii’s Intermediate Court of Appeals found that “breach-of-contract claims based on allegations of shoddy performance are not covered under CGL policies and that tort-based claims derivative of such breach of contract claims also are not covered.”
Writing in Business Insider, Michael Bradford notes that the case, Group Builders Inc. and Tradewind Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Admiral Insurance Co., involved improperly installed insulation at the Hilton Hawaiian Village’s Kalia Tower. Hilton was forced to close 21 floors due to extensive mold in guest rooms. Although the court did recognize this property damage, they did not feel it triggered insurance coverage, noting that if disputes over the quality of work were covered, CGL policies would become professional liability policies or performance bonds.
One critic of the decision, Warren C. Perkins, the risk manager at Boh Bros. Construction of New Orleans, noted that under the decision, “it doesn’t matter what the policy says and there is no need to investigate the policy wording.”
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No Coverage for Counterclaim Alleging Construction Defects Pled as Breach of Contract
September 13, 2012 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Colorado Court of Appeals considered whether counterclaims against the insured for alleged faulty construction work were based in contract or constituted allegations of an "accident" under the policy. TCD, Inc. v. Am. Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1231964 (Colo. Ct. App. April 12, 2012).
The developer, Frisco Gateway Center, LLC, contracted with TCD, the general contractor, to construct a building. TCD, in turn, subcontracted with Petra Roofing to install the roof. The subcontract required Petra to "indemnify, hold harmless, and defend" TCD against claims arising out of resulting from the performance of Petra's work on the project. Petra was also required to name TCD as an additional insured on its CGL policy.
After a dispute arose between TCD and Gateway regarding payment and performance on the project, TCD sued Gateway and other parties seeking payment. Gateway counterclaimed against TCD for breach of contract and negligence. TCD demanded coverage from Petra's insurer, but coverage was denied.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Not a RICO Case, Says Court
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of North Carolina has rejected an attempt by a homeowner to restart her construction defect claim by turning it into a RICO lawsuit. Linda Sharp, the plaintiff in the case of Sharp v. Town of Kitty Hawk, attempted to amend a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and argued that her case belonged in the federal courts.
Ms. Sharp sued in November, 2010 claiming construction defects. She sued in federal court, although the court noted that as she and most of the defendants are citizens of North Carolina, the state court would have been the appropriate jurisdiction. Further, the court noted that one federal claim Sharp made was dismissed with prejudice, leaving only the state law claims. These the court dismissed without prejudice, declining to exercise jurisdiction over North Carolina law.
After the dismissal, Ms. Sharp attempted to amend her complaint after the deadline. To do so, according to the court, she would be required to obtain consent from defendants or leave of the court. She did neither.
In his opinion, Judge W. Earl Britt rejected her motion for leave to amend. He also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The clerk was directed to close the case.
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Bound by Group Builders, Federal District Court Finds No Occurrence
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The homeowners sued their contractor, alleging the contractor had defectively constructed and failed to complete their home.  State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Vogelgesang, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72618 (D. Haw. July 6, 2011). The homeowners' complaint pled, among other things, damage caused by breach of contract and negligence. State Farm agreed to defend under a reservation of rights.
State Farm filed suit in federal court for declaratory relief. Judge Mollway granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment. Relying on the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeal's decision in Group Builders, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 123 Haw. 142, 231 P.3d 67 (Haw. Ct. App. 2010), Judge Mollway determined that the claims asserted in the underlying litigation arose from the contractor's alleged breach of contract.  Group Builders held that breach of contract claims based on allegations of shoddy performance were not covered under CGL policies.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Godfather Charged with Insurance Fraud
July 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Texas-based Godfather Construction is a recipient of a fraud suit from the Cook County state attorney’s office. The firm incorporated in Illinois in April 2010, moving there to do business after storms damaged homes in the Chicago suburbs, according to a report in the Chicago Tribune. The state attorney alleges that Godfather brought unlicensed out-of-state workers and the work they performed was “incomplete or shoddy.” Godfather is claimed to have received about $60,000 from Illinois homeowners. The prosecutors are seeking restitution for Godfather’s clients and seek to forbid the firm from doing business in Illinois.
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Hilton Grand Vacations Defect Trial Delayed
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A settlement agreement between Conti Electric and Westgate Resorts has lead to a delay in starting the trial over construction defect claims and billing disputes over Hilton Grand Vacations a time share tower in Las Vegas. According to the Las Vegas Review-Journal, the dispute includes claims of $23.3 million owed to the general contractor against which the developer has placed $30 million in construction defect claims.
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Supreme Court of Oregon Affirms Decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al.
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
After reviewing the decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al., the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that a tort claim for property damage arising from construction defects may exist even when the homeowner and the builder are in a contractual relationship.
When the case was initially filed, the plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that one, the claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations and two, no special relationship (such as one between a doctor and patient) existed. The court agreed with the defendants. However, the Court of Appeals while affirming the trial court’s decision on breach of contract reversed the decision on negligence. The Court of Appeals stated that an administrative or statute rule could establish a standard of care independent from the contract.
The Oregon Supreme Court gave an example of cases where a tort claim could exist when a contract is present: “If an individual and a contractor enter into a contract to build a house, which provides that the contractor will install only copper pipe, but the contractor installs PVC pipe instead (assuming both kinds of pipe comply with the building code and the use of either would be consistent with the standard of care expected of contractors), that failure would be a breach of contract only. […] If the failure to install the copper pipe caused a reduction in the value of the house, the plaintiff would be able to recover that amount in an action for breach of contract. […] On the other hand, if the contractor installed the PVC pipe in a defective manner and those pipes therefore leaked, causing property damage to the house, the homeowner would have claims in both contract and tort. […] In those circumstances, the obligation to install copper instead of PVC pipe is purely contractual; the manner of installing the pipe, however, implicates both contract and tort because of the foreseeable risk of property damage that can result from improperly installed pipes.”
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Appeals Court Upholds Decision by Referee in Trial Court for Antagan v Shea Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the case Antangan v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership (Cal. App., 2012), Plaintiffs appealed “an order vacating a judgment and entering a modified judgment in their construction defect action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership,” while the Defendant, Shea Homes Limited Partnership (Shea Homes) appealed “an order of the judicial referee denying its motion to strike and tax costs.”
On the Antagon issue, the appeals court concluded that “the trial court did not err by vacating and modifying its judgment so that the cost of referee’s fees would be equally divided by the parties and consistent with a prior stipulation they filed in court.”
On the Shea Homes issue, the appeals court concluded: “1) the judicial referee did not err by ruling that plaintiffs’ offers to compromise (§ 998) were validly served on Shea Homes’ counsel, 2) the offers substantially complied with statutory requirements, 3) the offers were not required to be apportioned, and 4) the referee’s award of $5,000 as costs for a person assisting plaintiffs’ counsel was not an abuse of discretion.” The appeals court affirmed the judgment.
Here is a brief history of the trial case: “Plaintiffs Chito Antangan, Jimmy Alcova and other homeowners brought an action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership for damages alleging that the properties they purchased from these ‘developer defendants’ were defective. Plaintiffs claimed numerous construction defects required them ‘to incur expenses’ for ‘restoration and repairs’ and the value of their homes had been diminished.”
In response, Shea Homes filed a motion for an order to appoint a judicial referee. The motion was granted and it was ruled that “a referee would ‘try all issues’ and ‘report a statement of decision to this court.’”
On May 10, 2010 the judicial referee (Thompson) “awarded plaintiffs damages and various costs, and ruled that ‘Shea Homes shall bear all of the Referee’s fees.’” The latter ruling would become a matter for contention later on.
In July of 2010, the plaintiffs “sought, among other things, $54,409.90 for expert fees, and $14,812.50 for the services of Melissa Fox for ‘exhibit preparation & trial presentation.’ Shea Homes filed a motion to strike and/or tax costs claiming: 1) Fox was a paralegal, 2) plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees, and 3) the fees for Fox’s services were an indirect and improper method to obtain attorney’s fees. The referee disagreed and awarded $5,000 for Fox’s services. The referee also ruled that plaintiffs had properly served valid offers to compromise (§ 998) on Shea Homes’ counsel in 2009. He said those offers to defendants in the case at that time did not have to be apportioned.”
“Antangan contends the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment, which ordered Shea Homes to pay all the referee’s fees. We disagree.”
Antagon contended that the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment regarding Shea Homes paying the referee’s fees. The appeals court disagreed: “A trial court has inherent authority to vacate or correct a judgment that is void on its face, incorrect, or entered by mistake. (§ 473; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998),67 Cal.App.4th 1228; Olivera
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Construction Case Alert: Appellate Court Confirms Engineer’s Duty to Defend Developer Arises Upon Tender of Indemnity Claim
January 27, 2010 — By
Steven M. Cvitanovic,
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP, January 27, 2010
In the recent case of UDC-Universal Development, L.P. v. CH2M Hill, 2010 Cal.App.LEXIS 47 (filed January 15, 2010), the Sixth District Court of Appeal provided a stunning illustration of the far-reaching effects of the California Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541. In Crawford, the Court held the duty to defend under an indemnity agreement arose upon the mere tender of defense of a claim covered by the indemnity.
In the UDC case, CH2M Hill provided engineering and environmental planning services to developer UDC on a project that ultimately wound up in a construction defect lawsuit by the homeowners association ( HOA ). UDC tendered its defense to CH2M Hill, the tender was rejected, and UDC filed a cross-complaint for negligence, breach of contract and indemnity against CH2M Hill and others. After the HOA’s construction defect claims were settled, UDC proceeded to trial against CH2M Hill. The jury found in favor of CH2M Hill on the claims for negligence and breach of contract. At the request of the parties prior to trial, the trial court ruled on the application of the indemnity agreement in light of Crawford and, in so doing, found that the defense obligation arose upon the tender and that CH2M Hill breached that duty despite the jury finding in favor of CH2M Hill.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the defense obligation arose as soon as the defense was tendered and did not depend on the outcome of the litigation, and that the HOA’s general description of the defects along with an allegation that Doe engineers were negligent triggered the duty to defend.
Although this case did not expand the crushing impact of Crawford’s holding, it is
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Construction Defect Journal Marks First Anniversary
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
November 2011 marked the first anniversary of the Construction Defect Journal. During the first year our staff and contributors in the insurance and legal communities have compiled several hundred articles of interest to the construction defect and claims community.
Each of these articles are maintained in the CDJ archives, and are accessible at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/archives.html. Each story in the archives is listed in the order it was posted to the archives. Each story in the archives opens up in its own page, so you can easily locate topics and articles of interest.
If you’re new to Construction Defect Journal, or just want peruse past articles, please take a moment to visit the CDJ Archives page. Also please feel encouraged to submit your firm’s articles or legal publications of interest to the CD community at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/submitStory.html.
When is a Construction Project truly “Complete”? That depends. (law note)
August 2, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina
Long-time readers of the blog may remember my earlier post on substantial completion. However, in looking over my blog stats to see what search terms lead people here, it looks like this is hot topic. The blog searches came in two general categories:
1. Those searching strictly for a definition of substantial completion. Some examples:
- What does “substantial completion” mean?
- when does a building achieve substantial completion
- contracts “substantial completion”
- substantial completion undefined
- when is a project substantially complete
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
A Loud Boom, But No Serious Injuries in World Trade Center Accident
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Wall Street Journal reports that nearly twenty tons of steel fell forty stories at the World Trade Center site on February 16. One person was checked by medical personnel. One person who works in the Financial District said it was “almost like thunder.” Frank Pensabene, one of the ironworkers on the site said that after “loud boom,” “all hell broke loose.” The steel beams and cables fell onto a flatbed truck, which was not occupied at the time.
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Contractors Admit Involvement in Kickbacks
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Two New Jersey contractors have pleaded guilty to charges that they made false representations for a government contract in a case related to kickbacks for construction work done in two school districts. New Jersey is recommending that the two men, Martin Starr and Stephen Gallagher, will each pay $50,000 in penalties, serve up to a year in jail, and be unable to accept public contracts for five years.
Last month, another individual in the case, Kenneth Disko, who had been the engineer for the school district, pleaded guilty on a similar charge. In addition to a $50,000 penalty, he will be serving three to five years in prison. A fourth conspirator, Robert Berman, the former business administrator for one of the school districts, has to pay a $13,000 fine and cooperate with the investigation. He is also barred from public employment in New Jersey and has been terminated from his position.
Starr admitted to preparing fictitious quotes which appeared to be from other contractors in order that his firm would seem to be the lowest bidder. Gallagher helped in preparing the fictitious bids and also provided cash kickbacks to Disko.
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Official Tried to Influence Judge against Shortchanged Subcontractor
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A contractor testified in the trial of former Cuyahoga County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora. According to Fox 8 in Cleveland, Ohio, Sean Newman, the president of Letter Perfect testified that his company was a subcontractor on the reconstruction of the locker rooms at the Cleveland Browns Stadium. Newman said his company was paid only $400,000 of their $650,000 bid. When Letter Perfect sued the contractor, D.A.S. Construction, Dimora called the judge to influence her to rule in favor of D.A.S.
The judge in the earlier case, Bridgett McCafferty, has been found guilty of lying to the FBI during their investigation and is serving a 14-month prison sentence.
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