Arizona Supreme Court Confirms Eight-Year Limit on Construction Defect Lawsuits
July 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Acting on the case of Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled that Arizona’s eight-year statute of repose applies. The case was referred to the court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had asked for a clarification of Arizona law. The case focused on three questions:
1. Does the filing of a motion for class certification in an Arizona court toll the statute of limitations for individuals, who are included within the class, to file individual causes of action involving the same defendants and the same subject matter?2. If so, does this class-action tolling doctrine apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-552?3. If the doctrine applies to statutes of repose, and specifically § 12-552, may a court weigh the equities of the case in determining whether, and to what extent, an action is tolled?
The litigation at hand has a lengthy history, starting with a case referred to as “Hoffman” in 2003. The Albano plaintiffs were not able to join in Hoffman, and they filed their own lawsuit in 2006. An additional lawsuit was filed by the Albano plaintiffs in 2007. The courts decided that the Albano plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the statute of repose was the appropriate standard for this case. They noted that “the eight-year statute of repose period began to run on November 6, 1997, the date of the Town of Gilbert’s final inspection. Albano II was filed on November 5, 2007.”
The court found that the plaintiffs had waited too long for start their suit. As a result, they found it unnecessary to answer the first or third questions. Justice A. John Pelander of the Arizona Supreme Court wrote the opinion, dated June 30, 2011.
Read the court’s decision…
The Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury or “property damage” be caused by an occurrence and that the “bodily injury or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivanrsquo;s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing, including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm
March 8, 2011 — March 8, 2011, Colorado Construction Litigation
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that the “owned property exclusion” applied to bar coverage for claims of property damage. See Panico v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2011 WL 322830 (10th Cir. 2011). In Panico, the plaintiffs sold property in Aspen, Colorado to the Taylors, who sued the Panicos upon discovering the property was not as represented. After refusing to defend, the Panicos sued State Farm for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the Taylors’ claims were not covered under the Panicos insurance policies and granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. Panico built the house on the property as well as several additions to the house. As the Taylors lived in Florida, they primarily relied on their real estate agent and an inspector to ensure the property was acceptable. According to their complaint, the Taylors discovered that the house was “virtually uninhabitable due to serious design and construction defects, mold, rodents, and drainage problems.” Id. at *1. In their complaint, the Taylors asserted three claims for relief against the Panicos based upon misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment about the condition of the property.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Home Sales Still Low, But Enough to Spur Homebuilders
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Although new home sales are still fifty percent below the average over the last forty years, the housing rebound has sent stock of homebuilders up 53 percent this year, during the same period, the S&P 500 rose only 12 percent. The San Francisco Chronicle reports that from 2005 through 2011, homebuilder stocks trailed the S&P 500.
The growth isn’t limited to homebuilders alone. Building suppliers are also seeing a growth in sales, with profits for companies that make gypsum wallboard, cabinetry, plumbing products, and other items used in home building.
Homebuilders have also been able to raise prices. Standard Pacific Corp of Irvine, California has raised prices and cut incentives. Nevertheless, the buyers still come. PulteGroup and D.R. Horton are also raising prices.
Read the full story…
SB800 Cases Approach the Courts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
California’s Right to Repair Law turns ten this year and cases under the statute are finally coming to trial, as John V. O’Meara of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara writes for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Mr. O’Meara notes that SB800 eliminated “the traditional definitions of construction defect,” replacing them with “functionality standards.” He argues that these standards are not uniform: “some standards require damage and others do not.” He also wonders what terms like “significant cracks,” “intended water” and “materially comply” mean in a court.
Mr. O’Meara states that “defendants in construction defect cases have a right to know the standards that apply to a case, the definitions that will be presented to the jury, and the burden of proof that attaches.”
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No “Special Relationship” in Oregon Construction Defect Claim
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Writing on his firm’s blog, Justin Stark discusses recent changes in construction defect claims in Oregon where, as he points out, “courts in Oregon have been lowering legal hurdles that construction defect plaintiffs must overcome in bringing their cases.” He cites a case in which water damage was discovered more than six years after construction was complete. The owners claimed breach of contract and negligence. The trial court found for the contractor, who argued “that there was no ‘special relationship’ with the owners that could support the negligence claim.”
This was overturned on appeal, with the court concluding that if there was a violation of the building code, then the negligence claim could stand. This was appealed to the Oregon Supreme court which concluded that “neither a special relationship nor a statutory standard of care, such as the building code, is necessary to bring a negligence claim here.”
Stark notes that “many forms of construction contract incorporate the phrase ‘workmanlike,’ which implicates the ‘common law standard of care’ in negligence law.
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Discovery Ordered in Nevada Construction Defect Lawsuit
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Gemstone LVS was sued by the Manhattan Homeowners Association in Las Vegas, after which Chartis Specialty Insurance informed Gemstone that they “had no duty to defend or indemnify Gemstone under the Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy.” Gemstone “asserts that at the time the Policy was purchased, it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage for a construction defect lawsuit” and now seeks discovery “to prove Chartis’ bad faith purpose in drafting an illusory Policy.”
The opinion notes that “the Court conducted a preliminary peek at the pending motion for partial summary judgment and finds that Chartis has not made the strong showing necessary to support the requested stay.” Further, the court notes that “when ambiguity in the language of a policy exists, the court may consider not only the language of the policy but also the ‘intent of the parties, the subject matter of the policy, and the circumstances surrounding its issuance.’” The court concludes that “this type of discovery is relevant to understanding the intent of the parties, more specifically, whether it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage given the construction defect lawsuit.”
Accordingly, the court denied Chartis’ motion for stay of discovery and established a schedule for discovery, expert designations, rebuttal expert designations, and other matters related to the trial.
Read the court’s decision…
Yellow Brass Fittings Play a Crucial Role in Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes Hawaii, et al. is a “class action filed by homeowners who allege that their homes have a construction defect. They allege that their plumbing systems include brass fittings susceptible to corrosion and likely to cause leaks. They bring this action against the developer of their homes and the manufacturers of the brass fittings.”
Zurn, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective brass fittings, sought a dismissal, or if that could not be achieved, then “a more definite statement, of five of the six claims.” Zurn moved for summary judgment on the sixth claim, or alternately sought “summary judgment on one of the five claims it” sought to dismiss.” The court granted in part the motion, and denied the motion for summary judgment.
The developer, Castle & Cooke, sought dismissal of the First Amended Complaint stating “that Plaintiffs have not complied with Hawaii’s Contractor Repair Act, chapter 672E of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which requires, among other things, a plaintiff to give a contractor the results of any testing done before filing an action against that contractor.” The court couldn’t determine “certain facts essential to ruling” on Castle & Cooke’s motion, and therefore denied the motion, but ordered Plaintiffs to submit requested material by the stated deadline.
The Baker v Castle & Cooke case began with the Plaintiffs claim that the use of yellow brass fittings can lead to construction defects. They allege that “yellow brass is particularly susceptible to dezincification, a corrosion process in which zinc leaches into potable water that comes into contact with the brass. According to Plaintiffs, as the brass corrodes, it becomes porous and mechanically weak. Plaintiffs further allege that the PEX systems in the putative class members’ homes have begun to, or are about to, leak water into the walls, ceilings, and floors of their homes. Plaintiffs allege that the leakage will cause water damage and mold growth, exposing the occupants to toxins.”
In response to the plaintiffs’ claims, Zurn argued “because their yellow brass fittings have not failed to date, Plaintiffs fail to allege, and have no evidence showing, that they have suffered any actual injury.” Plaintiffs replied, “even if the fittings have not failed as of today, failure in the future is inevitable.”
However, the court stated, “whether Plaintiffs have suffered any injury, or whether Plaintiffs are attempting to proceed based solely on future injury, implicates Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action, as well as whether this case is ripe for adjudication.” The court has requested the parties to submit “supplemental briefing on whether this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In supplemental briefs, Zurn argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs lack standing, and Castle & Cooke argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe.”
The court continues to discuss the problem of standing: “To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate three things. First, the plaintiff must suffer an "injury-in-fact," which means that there must be a concrete and particularized "invasion of a legally protected interest" and the invasion is actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action. Third, a favorable decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id. It is the first element (injury-in-fact) that is in issue here.”
The court found that the plaintiffs do have standing: “Even if the court could not rely on the allegations that the pipes will soon leak, the court would conclude that, for standing purposes, Plaintiffs have a sufficient injury-in-fact in the form of their alleged economic loss.” In a hearing, Plaintiffs argued that their homes had decreased in value.
The court also denied Castle & Cooke’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of ripeness, stating “the same reasons Plaintiffs satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing purposes, they satisfy the constitutional ripeness requirement.”
Plaintiffs asserted six counts against Zurn. Zurn, in response, made a motion to dismiss counts VIII, IX, X, XII, and XIII. The court granted Zurn’s motion for Counts VIII, IX, and X only: “Counts VIII (product liability), IX (negligence), and X (strict liability) sound in tort. Zurn argues that, because Plaintiffs allege no injury other than to the PEX systems and the yellow brass fittings themselves, the economic loss rule bars their tort claims. The court agrees.”
The court disagreed with Zurn’s motion regarding Count XII: “Count XII asserts that Zurn has breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Zurn argues that Count XII is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege an injury. The court disagrees.”
Zurn’s motion regarding Count XIII was also denied: “Count XIII asserts that Zurn violated section 480-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes.” Furthermore, “Plaintiffs allege that Zurn ‘engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices when [it] designed, manufactured and sold Yellow Brass Fittings.’ Zurn argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under section 480-2(a) because their claims are barred by the statute of limitations and they do not adequately allege reliance or a cognizable injury. The court disagrees.”
The court denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts XI and XII.
Castle & Cooke sought to dismiss “Plaintiffs’ claims against it under section 672E-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which provides for dismissal when claimants fail to comply with chapter 672E.” There was some discussion regarding the test results. Apparently, the plaintiffs had failed to provide a written notice of claim at least 90 days before filing the action. However, it is unclear if the Plaintiffs have since complied with the requirements of the chapter. “The court has received no supplemental information from either party about whether any test results from another case have been turned over or whether those materials are subject to a confidentiality agreement. The record at this point does not establish noncompliance with the requirement in chapter 672E to provide such information. The court therefore denies the motion to dismiss.”
In summary, “Zurn’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Count VIII, Count IX, and Count X. Zurn’s motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ other claims. Zurn’s request for a more definite statement and its summary judgment motion are denied. Plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended Complaint no later than May 21, 2012.” Furthermore, “the court denies Castle & Cooke’s motion, but directs Plaintiffs to file, within two weeks, either a certificate of compliance with section 672E-3(c), or an explanation as to why they have not complied. Castle & Cooke may submit a response within two weeks of Plaintiffs’ submission. Each party’s submission is limited to 1000 words.”
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Case Alert: Appellate Court Confirms Engineer’s Duty to Defend Developer Arises Upon Tender of Indemnity Claim
January 27, 2010 — By
Steven M. Cvitanovic,
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP, January 27, 2010
In the recent case of UDC-Universal Development, L.P. v. CH2M Hill, 2010 Cal.App.LEXIS 47 (filed January 15, 2010), the Sixth District Court of Appeal provided a stunning illustration of the far-reaching effects of the California Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541. In Crawford, the Court held the duty to defend under an indemnity agreement arose upon the mere tender of defense of a claim covered by the indemnity.
In the UDC case, CH2M Hill provided engineering and environmental planning services to developer UDC on a project that ultimately wound up in a construction defect lawsuit by the homeowners association ( HOA ). UDC tendered its defense to CH2M Hill, the tender was rejected, and UDC filed a cross-complaint for negligence, breach of contract and indemnity against CH2M Hill and others. After the HOA’s construction defect claims were settled, UDC proceeded to trial against CH2M Hill. The jury found in favor of CH2M Hill on the claims for negligence and breach of contract. At the request of the parties prior to trial, the trial court ruled on the application of the indemnity agreement in light of Crawford and, in so doing, found that the defense obligation arose upon the tender and that CH2M Hill breached that duty despite the jury finding in favor of CH2M Hill.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the defense obligation arose as soon as the defense was tendered and did not depend on the outcome of the litigation, and that the HOA’s general description of the defects along with an allegation that Doe engineers were negligent triggered the duty to defend.
Although this case did not expand the crushing impact of Crawford’s holding, it is
Read the full story...
Brown Paint Doesn’t Cover Up Construction Defects
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a decision that describes the case as illustrating “the perils that real estate brokers and their agents assume when acting as a dual listing agent to both the buyers and sellers of the same house,” the California Court of Appeals has issued a decision in William L. Lyon & Associates v. The Superior Court of Placer County. Lyon & Associates sought summary judgment to dismiss the claims of the Henleys who bought a home in a transaction where a Lyon agent represented both sides.
The prior owners of the home, the Costas, had used a Lyon agent in purchasing their home. When they later sought to sell it, that agent “became aware of some of the house’s defects and problems.” In response, the Costas sought the help of another agent, Connie Gidal, also of Lyons & Associates. Photos taken in the presence of Ms. Gidal show defects of the paint and stucco. The Costas also took the step of painting the house dark brown. During the sale process, “rain caused many of the painted-over defects to reappear.” The Costas “purchased more dark brown paint and covered up the newly visible damage prior to inspection by the Henleys.”
With the damage concealed, the Henleys bought the home in May 2006. The agreement with Lyons & Associates noted that “a dual agent is obligated to disclose known facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property to both parties.” Escrow closed on May 9, 2006. The contract with the broker included a two-year limit on the time to bring legal action.
The Henleys moved in during June 2006, and “began to discover construction defects that had been concealed by the Costas.” In addition to the painted-over stucco problems, the Henleys found that the Costas had “installed quartzite stone overlays on the backyard steps in a manner that caused water intrusion on the house’s stucco walls.”
In May 2009, the Henleys sued the Costas, Ron McKim Construction, Lyons & Associates, and Ms. Gidal. Their complaint alleged that Lyons & Associates had committed breach of contact, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent nondisclosure in connection with the construction defects. The Costas named Lyons in a cross complaint. Lyons moved for summary judgments on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations had expired before the complaint and cross-complaint were filed. Both the Henleys and the Costas opposed this claim. The court denied the motion and Lyons appealed.
The appeals court upheld the denial, noting that the both California Supreme Court decision and later action by the legislature compels real estate brokers and salespersons “to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale.” The court noted that under California law, brokers have responsibilities to both sellers and buyers. The section of law cited by Lyons applies to seller’s agents. The court rejected the contention by Lyons that they were “cooperating brokers.” The Henleys were “not constrained by the two-year statute of limitations.”
Lyons contended that even if California’s statute did not apply, there was a contractual limit of two years. The court also rejected this, agreeing with the Henleys that “the two-year limitation period must be extended by the discovery rule.”
The court noted that “Lyon & Associates may not reap the benefit of a shortened contractual limitation period when its own alleged malfeasance contributed to the delay in the discovery of the buyer’s injury.” The court found that the Henleys could proceed with their breach of contract claim, because, “when a breach of contract is committed in secret, such as the intentional nondisclosure of a real estate broker regarding a previously visible construction defect, the contractual limitations period is properly held subject to the discovery rule.” The court felt that the interpretation favored by the California Association of Realtors would “halve the applicable statute of limitations period.”
In addition to rejecting Lyon request for summary judgment on the claims made by the Henleys, the court also rejected the request of summary judgment on the claims made by the Costas, concluding that neither claim is time-barred. Costs were awarded to both the Henleys and Costas.
Read the court’s decision…
Louisiana Politicians Struggle on Construction Bills, Hospital Redevelopment
June 16, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Louisiana politicians are still working on a compromise in the state’s construction budget, as reported in the Times-Picayune. Rob Marrianneax, the chair of the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee, removed a $45 million request from Governor Bobby Jindal and added $4 million for projects that Jindal vetoed last year.
Two senators have formed competing plans to fund redevelopment construction for New Orleans’s Methodist Hospital. Mitch Landrieu, the mayor of New Orleans, hoped for $30 million dollars in state bonds. Senator Cynthia Willard-Lewis proposed an amendment that would supply $1.6 million, while Senator J.P. Morrell has an amendment that would supply $4 million.
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Mark Van Wonterghem To Serve as Senior Forensic Consultant in the Sacramento Offices of Bert L. Howe & Associates, Inc.
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Sacramento, CA — Bert L. Howe and Associates, Inc., is pleased to announce that Mark Van Wonterghem - General Contractor, has joined the firm as Senior Forensic Consultant. Mark will be responsible for leading the firm’s expansion in the newly formed Sacramento headquarters.
His focus will continue to be working with construction practice groups and claims professionals in the Sacramento and Bay Area markets. He will utilize the resources of the Construction Experts Group at Bert L. Howe & Associates in furthering the litigation support needs attendant to the firm’s Northern California clientele.
Mr. Van Wonterghem possesses extensive consulting and testimony experience. Through 32 years of experience in the construction industry he leverages extensive practical experience with multiple trades including concrete foundations, walls and flatwork, structural wood and steel framing, finish carpentry, drywall, lath & plaster/stucco, window & door installations, deck coating systems, metal and membrane flashings and above/below grade waterproofing. This trade experience encompasses both the commercial and residential construction sectors and has been vital in his ability to provide concise explanation of construction industry standards, as well as trade-specific standards of care.
Mr. Van Wonterghem has broad experience with all types of building construction ranging from concrete and steel commercial construction to high-end custom residential construction.
In connection with the Construction Experts Group at BHA, Mr. Van Wonterghem provides construction consulting and litigation support services to a wide variety of recognized construction claims professionals, owners, and publicly traded builders.
The firm’s Sacramento offices are located at the Gateway Oaks III office complex, 2520 Venture Oaks Way, Suite 435, Sacramento, CA 95833. Mr. Van Wonterghem can be reached via e mail at mvanwonterghem@berthowe.com or at (800) 783-1822.
Construction Workers Face Dangers on the Job
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
OSHA calculates that for each 33,000 active construction workers, one will die on the job each year, making their risk over the course of their careers at one out of every 200 workers. This puts it many times over OSHA’s definition of “significant risk” of 1 death per 1,000 workers over the course of their careers. According to an article in People’s World, “the main risk of death is from falls.”
At a talk at the American Public Health Association’s meeting, one expert noted that “construction workers make up 6 percent to 8 percent of all workers, but account for 20 percent of all deaths on the job every year.”
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Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill
May 10, 2012 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr., Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A potentially important legislative bill has been introduced in waning days of the 2012 legislative session, which would change many of the commercial practices that prevail in the construction industry. Senate Bill 12-181 applies to all building and construction contracts and would prohibit any contract provision that requires a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to waive their lien in advance of payment. It also would ban any “choice of law” provisions that make a Colorado-based construction contract subject to enforcement only in another state, or under the laws of another state.
The bill also seeks to change many existing commercial practices between contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions, or whether these requirements are simply “gap filling” provisions that pertain if there are no written contract terms specified on these issues. The proposed statute would mandate payment to subcontractors and material suppliers due within seven days in the absence of a dispute about the work or materials being billed. After this seven day period, the bill would require the payment of interest at the rate of 1.5% monthly (18% annually). In any later suit for payment, the creditor would also be able to collect reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, non-payment to a subcontractor or supplier who is later found to be entitled to prompt payment would excuse the subcontractor or supplier, and its surety bond provider, from any further performance under the contract.
It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions. However, it is clear that the bill provides some leeway for change orders, as long as there is (1) negotiation in good faith between the parties concerning the changed scope of work, and (2) a 50% payment of a subcontractor’s costs by the changing party within 30 days of the change order work being done. Additionally, the bill provides for retainage, but in an amount of no more than 5%.
The bill is presently set for hearing before the Colorado Senate Committee on Business, Labor, and Technology Committee on May 2, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Mann can be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com.
Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured
June 14, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog
I just came across a case that I think truly paints the insurance dilemma for contractors. Thanks to this recent Illinois case, I don’t have to make up any factual scenarios—so kudos to Attorney Robert Boylan for posting it.
In reading over my RSS feeds this weekend, I noticed a great writeup on long-time blogger Josh Glazov’s Construction Law Today. Attorney Robert Boylan’s post describes a recent Illinois case where a general contractor was denied its additional insured status on a second-tier subcontractor’s insurance. The reason for the denial: the general contractor failed to procure an agreement in writing with the second-tier subcontractor, requiring it to be listed as an additional insured.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Florida Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Homeowners Unaware of Construction Defects and Lack of Permits
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Florida Court of Appeals has ruled that a homeowner is not liable for defects in unpermitted alterations, reversing a lower court’s decision in Jensen v. Bailey. The Jensens sold their house to the Baileys. During the sale, the Jensens filled out a property disclosure statement, checking “no” to a question about “any improvement or additions to the property, whether by your or by others that have been constructed in violation of building codes or without necessary permits.”
After moving in, the Baileys discovered several problems with the home. One involved a defective sewer connection leading to repeated backups. The Baileys also found problems with remodeling the Jensens had done in the kitchen, master bath, and bedroom. The remodeling work was not done with required permits nor was it up to code.
The court noted that an earlier case, Johnson v. Davis, established four criteria: “the seller of a home must have knowledge of a defect in the property; the defect must materially affect the value of the property; the defect must not be readily observable and must be unknown to the buyer; and the buyer must establish that the seller failed to disclose the defect to the buyer.” The court found that the first of these criteria was crucial to determining the case.
In the Johnson ruling, the then Chief Justice dissented, fearing that the courts “would ultimately construe Johnson’s requirement of actual knowledge to permit a finding of liability based on constructive knowledge,” quoting Justice Boyd, “a rule of constructive knowledge will develop based on the reasoning that if the seller did not know of the defect, he should have known about it before attempting to sell the property.” The Appeals Court concluded that the lower court hit this point in ruling on Jensen v. Bailey.
Citing other Florida cases, the court noted that the Johnson rule does require “proof of the seller’s actual knowledge of the defect.” The court cited a case in which it was concluded that the seller “should have known” that there was circumstantial evidence was that the seller did know about the defects, as the seller had been involved in the construction of the home.
In the case of the Jensens, the lower court concluded that they did not know that the work was defective, nor did they know that they were obligated to obtain permits for it. The Appeals Court found this one fact sufficient to reverse the decision and remand the case to the lower court for a final judgment in favor of the Jensens.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Law Client Alert: California Is One Step Closer to Prohibiting Type I Indemnity Agreements In Private Commercial Projects
June 15, 2011 — Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP
On June 1, 2011 by majority vote, the California Senate passed Senate Bill 474, which would amend Civil Code section 2782, and add Civil Code section 2782.05. The passage of this new law is a critical development for real estate developers, general contractors and subcontractors because it will affect how these projects are insured and how disputes are resolved.
Civil Code section 2782 was amended in 2007 to prohibit Type I indemnity agreements for residential projects only. Since 2007, various trade associations and labor unions have lobbied to expand those very same restrictions to other projects. These new provisions apply to contracts, entered into after January 1, 2013, that are not for residential projects, and that are not executed by a public entity. The revisions provide that any provision in a contract purporting to indemnify, hold harmless, and defend another for their negligence or other fault is against public policy and void. These provisions cannot be waived.
A provision in a contract requiring additional insured coverage is also void and unenforceable to the extent it would be prohibited under the new law. Moreover, the new law does not apply to wrap-up insurance policies or programs, or a cause of action for breach of contract or warranty that exists independently of the indemnity obligation.
The practical impact of this new law is that greater participation in wrap-up insurance programs will likely result. While many wrap-up programs suffer from problems such as insufficient limits, and disputes about funding the self-insured retention, the incentive for the developer or general contractor to utilize wrap-up insurance will be greater than ever before because they will no longer be able to spread the risk of the litigation to the trades and the trade carriers.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Steve Cvitanovic of Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP.
The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Rules on Greystone
November 18, 2011 — Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
On November 1, 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the certified question of whether property damage caused by a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship is an “occurrence” for purposes of a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 09-1412 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011), the Tenth Circuit determined that because damage to property caused by poor workmanship is generally neither expected nor intended, it may qualify under Colorado law as an occurrence and liability coverage should apply. Id. at 2.
The short history of the Greystone case is as follows. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2009), two contractors and one of their insurers brought an action against a second insurer after the second insurer refused to fund the contractors’ defense in construction defect actions brought by separate homeowners. Id. at 1215. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, relying on General Sec. Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), granted summary judgment in favor of the second insurer on the basis that the homeowners’ complaints did not allege accidents that would trigger covered occurrences under the second insurer’s policies. Id. at 1220. Notably, the Greystone, General Security, and other similar decisions prompted the Colorado General Assembly to enact C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which was designed to provide guidance for courts interpreting perceived coverage conflicts between insurance policy provisions and exclusions. The statute requires courts to construe insurance policies to favor coverage if reasonably and objectively possible. C.R.S. § 13-20-808(5).
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by determining whether C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which defines the term “accident” for purposes of Colorado insurance law, would have a retroactive effect, and thereby settle the question before the court. The Tenth Circuit gave consideration to several Colorado district court orders issued since the enactment of C.R.S. § 13-20-808 which have suggested that the statute does not apply retroactively, including Martinez v. Mike Wells Constr., No. 09cv227 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Mar. 1, 2011), and Colo. Pool. Sys., Inv. V. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 09cv836 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Oct. 4, 2010). The Tenth Circuit also attempted to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent behind the term “all insurance policies currently in existence...” Greystone, No. 09-1412, at 12. The Tenth Circuit determined that the General Assembly would have more clearly stated its intentions for the term if it was supposed to apply retroactively to expired policies, rather than those still running. Id. at 12-13. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit decided that C.R.S. § 13-20-808 did not apply retroactively, but noted that “the retrospective application of the statute is not necessarily unconstitutional.” Id. at 9, 11-14. As such, the Tenth Circuit advised that it was required to decide the question presented in the appeal under the principles of Colorado insurance law. Id. at 15.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com