Delaware “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6)
June 10, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Baldo, No. 09-338 (D. Del. June 2, 2011), claimants condominium association and unit owners sued project developer Rehoboth and general contractor Capano seeking damages because of moisture penetration property damage to common elements and individual units resulting from construction defects. Rehoboth and Capano filed a third party complaint against insured property manager Baldo alleging that, if Rehoboth and Capano were liable to claimants, Baldo was also liable because of Baldo’s failure to properly manage, maintain, and repair the property
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Differing Rulings On Construction Defect Claims Leave Unanswered Questions For Builders, and Construction Practice Groups. Impact to CGL Carriers, General Contractors, Builders Remains Unclear
March 7, 2011 — March 7, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
In the past year a number of state and federal courts have rendered a number of conflicting decisions that promise to alter or perhaps shift entirely the paradigm, of how builders manage risk.
According to a report today by Dave Lenckus in Property Casualty 360 “Nine state and federal courts and one state legislature over the past year have addressed whether a construction defect a defective product or faulty workmanship is fortuitous and therefore an occurrence under the commercial general liability insurance policy. Four jurisdictions determined it is; three said no; two ruled that a construction defect that causes consequential damage to property other than the work product is an occurrence; and one federal court contributed its conflicting case law that has developed in Oregon since its high court ruled in 2000 that a construction defect is not an occurrence”.
The article strongly suggests that in the absence of a clear consensus over what the recent rulings mean for builders and contractors coverage disputes will intensify and continue to proliferate.
Doing this on a state-by-state basis has caused a lot of confusion among buyers and sellers, said Jeffrey A. Segall, a Tampa-based senior vice president and the Florida Construction Practice leader at Willis of Florida, a unit of Willis Group Holdings.
Read Full Story...
Ambitious Building Plans in Boston
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Although most are unlikely to change the Boston skyline, there are several large projects on the drawing boards. The site BostInnovation covered ten of them in a recent post. Downtown Boston will be the site of several of these large projects, including three towers to be added to the Christian Science Plaza, a 404-unit residential tower in the Theater District, and perhaps the largest of these projects, a 47-story tower to be built over Copley Plaza, which will tower over the adjacent buildings. None of the planned buildings will challenge the Hancock Tower’s 60 stories.
Read the full story…
General Contractor/Developer May Not Rely on the Homeowner Protection Act to Avoid a Waiver of Consequential Damages in an AIA Contract
August 4, 2011 — Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Recently, in Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC v. Zero Energy, LLC, et al., Case No. 10CV1094, Boulder County District Court Judge Ingrid S. Bakke entered a ruling and order on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Determination of Question of Law Pursuant to C.R.C.P. 56(h) on Issue of Damages. The Order found that the Plaintiff was not a homeowner intended to be protected by the Homeowner Protection Act (the “HPA”) and thus could not pursue its claims for consequential damages against Defendant.
By way of background, on June 18, 2008, Plaintiff Caribou Ridge Homes, LLC (“Caribou”) entered into a Standard Form Agreement Between Owner and Contractor AIA Document A114-2001 (the “Contract”) with Defendant Zero Energy, LLC (“Zero Energy”). Plaintiff hired Zero Energy to serve as a general contractor for the construction of a single-family home in the Caribou Ridge subdivision in Nederland, Colorado. A provision in the contract contained a mutual waiver of consequential damages (“Waiver”).
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Coverage for Construction Defects Barred by Business Risk Exclusions
September 1, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Although the court determined there was an occurrence, coverage was excluded by the business risk exclusions. See Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Shay Constr. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82839 (D. Colo. July 28, 2011).
White was the general contractor on the project. White had three subcontracts with Shay to provide framing, siding, and related work on the project. Shay was insured under a CGL policy issued by Continental Western.
Two of Shay’s subcontractors furnished materials, labor and equipment to Shay. These subcontractors filed suit in state court alleging they had not been compensated for the work and materials. White and Shay were named as defendants. White cross claimed against Shay, alleging Shay had breached its obligations under the subcontracts. Several allegations sounded in contract. Other allegations, however, contended Shay had performed defective work and had damaged the work of other trades in correcting deficiencies in its own performance.
Shay sought coverage under Continental Western’s policy. Continental Western filed suit for a declaratory judgment and moved for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Builder Cannot Receive Setoff in Construction Defect Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has dismissed an appeal in a San Diego construction defect case. In Smith v. Walters Group, Christopher and Maud Smith sued The Walters Group, a real estate developer, and Galen C. Pavelko, Inc, the builder of their home. Walters had bought five lots and hired Pavelko to build houses on them, selling one of these homes to the Smiths. “After moving in, the Smiths noticed a strong and obnoxious odor permeating the house.” The Smiths sued but were ordered to arbitrate instead, pursuant to a clause in the purchase contract. The Smiths were awarded $1.5 million at arbitration.
Walters requested that the arbitration remain open to determine if Walters was entitled to a setoff for settlements from defendants not involved in the arbitration. During this time, Pavelko made a settlement with the Smiths, which the court found was in good faith. At the same time, the arbitrator “reached the opposite conclusion.” The arbitrator concluded that “only settlements made ‘in good faith before verdict or judgment’ qualified for setoff.”
Walters moved that the trial court “‘correct’ the award,” but the trial court declined to do so and confirmed the award. In the appeal, Walters raised the issue of “whether Pavelko’s settlement occurred ‘before verdict or judgment.’” The appeals court dismissed the appeal, noting that “Walters would not be entitled to a $500,000 setoff if we reversed the trial court’s order determining the Smith-Pavelko settlement was made in good faith because Pavelko’s $500,000 payment was expressly conditioned on such an order.” They add that “were we to reverse the trial court’s order, Pavelko would have no obligation to pay the Smiths the $500,000.” This would then “deprive Walters of the corresponding statutory right to a setoff.”
Read the court’s decision…
Loss Caused by Seepage of Water Not Covered
July 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The anti-concurrent clause in a homeowner’s policy barred coverage for damage caused by hidden seepage. Boazova v. Safety Ins. Co., 2012 Mass. LEXIS 462 (Mass. May 29, 2012).
The insured had a concrete patio built along the rear wall of her house at a grade higher than the home’s foundation. Years later, severe deterioration was discovered in the floor joists, wall studs and other parts of the home. The insured held a homeowner’s policy with Safety. An inspector hired by Safety determined the deterioration was caused by the placement of the concrete patio slab adjacent to the wall of the house, allowing water to seep onto the top of the foundation.
Safety denied coverage because the damage was caused by a combination of surface water, deterioration, settling and improper construction of the concrete patio.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
More Charges in Las Vegas HOA Construction Defect Scam
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
VegasInc.com reports that U.S. District Judge James Mahan has unsealed fourteen more criminal cases in the ongoing Las Vegas HOA corruption probe. One of the fourteen is Lisa Kim, whose Platinum Community Services managed communities in which Nancy Quon and Leon Benzer were involved.
Two attorneys were also named. Brian Jones had previously been named in civil litigation as working to rig HOA elections in favor of the straw buyers. Jeanne Winkler had done legal work for one of the communities and for the developer before her disbarment.
Eight of the names released were of alleged straw buyers. These individuals are said to have bought fractional shares of homes so they could stand for election on the HOA boards. One of the individuals named, Arnold Meyers, had sued the Jasmine Homeowners Association, claiming that their HOA elections were tainted. Myers claimed that homeowners received postcards stating that he did not own his condo. His suit was dropped after two homeowners claimed that their names had been forged on Meyer’s affidavits.
Read the full story…
Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury” or “property damage” be caused by an “occurrence” and that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury“ or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivan’s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing , including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
Subcontractor Not Liable for Defending Contractor in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled on January 9, 2012 in Hensel Phelps Construction Company v. Urata & Sons Cement, upholding the judgment of the lower court.
Hensel Phelps was the general contractor for a high-rise in Sacramento. They were sued by the owners of the building after problems were discovered in the concrete slabs of the building’s parking garage. Instead of welded steel wire mesh, the slabs had been constructed with fiber mesh. Hensel Phelps filed a cross-complaint against Urata Cement, the subcontractor that had performed the cement work. Urata refused to defend Hensel Phelps. The owners’ case was subsequently dismissed due to the statute of limitations.
Although the original case was over, Hensel Phelps continued in their claims against Urata. “Urata argued that a handwritten interlineation required Hensel Phelps to prove Urata was at fault for the injury alleged in the building owners’ complaint before Urata was obliged to defend Hensel Phelps in that action.”
The lower court concluded that Urata would have been obligated to defend Hensel Phelps if the owners’ lawsuit had alleged that the damage was due to the subcontractor’s work or if evidence at trial established this. The lower court found neither of these true. Instead, the use of the fiber mesh was a design issue and “that decision was outside the scope of the subcontractor’s work.”
During the trial, Hensel Phelps conceded that Urata was not at fault. The appeals court could find no reading of the contract that would cause Urata to be obligated to defend Hensel Phelps, calling Hensel Phelps’s reading of the contact as “grammatically infeasible.”
Judges Nicholson, Raye, and Butz upheld the decision of the lower court and awarded costs on appeal to Urata.
Read the court’s decision…
Condo Owners Allege Construction Defects
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Last November, mold problems were discovered at the Siena Condominiums in Montclair, New Jersey, which had been described by their developers as “an enclave of luxury in an urban village setting.” The owners have filed a lawsuit against Pinnacle Companies, Kohl Parnters, and Herod Development, seeking “compensatory damages, interest, reasonable attorney’s fee and costs, and for such other, further, and different relief as the Court may deem just and proper.”
According to the article on Baristanet.com, an engineering report commissioned by the condominium association revealed many problems, including improperly installed windows and siding. The developers commissioned two engineering reports themselves and found evidence of water pounding on the roof. Despite these reports and repeated promises, no repairs have been made.
Read the full story…
Negligent Misrepresentation in Sale of Building Altered without Permits
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has ruled in the case Wyle v. Lees. The Leeses owned a two-unit apartment building in North Conway, New Hampshire. They hired a contractor to add a third, larger apartment, including a two-car garage. The Leeses and their contractor submitted a building permit application. They were informed that site plan review was required. After receiving approval on the site plan, construction started. At no point did they obtain a building permit and the construction was never inspected. The Leeses subsequently added more space to the unit, reducing parking spaces below the minimum required. Again, they did not obtain a building permit.
In 2007, three years after all these changes were complete, the Leeses sold their building to Mr. Wyle. To the question “are you aware of any modifications or repairs made without the necessary permits?” they answered “no.” About six weeks after closing, Wyle “received a letter from the town code enforcement officer regarding the legality of the removal of a garage door from the new unit.” A subsequent inspection revealed “numerous building and life safety code violations.”
Mr. Wyle brought a claim against the Leeses for negligent misrepresentation. The defendants filed a motion “seeking to preclude economic loss damages.” At a two-day bench trial, Mr. Wyle won. The Leeses appealed.
The appeals court found that “the defendants negligently misrepresented that the premises were licensed for immediate occupancy and that the defendants had obtained all necessary permits,” and thus upheld the lower court’s finding of negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court also rejected the Leeses’ argument that damages must be apportioned on all parties, including “the plaintiff himself, the plaintiff’s building inspector, and the defendant’s contractor,” finding a lack of “adequate evidence.”
The Leeses further argued that they were unaware that modifications and repairs were accomplished without the required permits. The appeals court noted that “the trial court found that both the conditional approval and final approval for the site plan stated that a building permit and a certificate of occupancy were required prior to any use.” The court concluded that the Leeses “knew or should have known of the falsity of their representation.”
The appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court.
Read the court’s decision…
Environment Decision May Expand Construction Defect Claims
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Could a California Supreme Court decision on environmental claims have an effect on construction defect cases? Jonathan B. Sokol, a lawyer at Greenberg Glusker argues just that in a post on his firm’s blog. He notes that the California Supreme Court has held that “the ‘all sums” method of allocation applies in California” and that “an insurer cannot limit its liability to just the amount of loss that occurred in its particular policy period.” While his focus is on environmental cases, he says that “the decision could also potentially expand the scope of coverage for construction defect claims and other claims involving continuous and progressive property damage and bodily injury.
Read the full story…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
In Re Golba: The Knaubs v. Golba and Rollison, Debtors
June 19, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio
Now comes another cautionary tale for builders and developers, especially those using single purpose business entities to handle individual construction projects. The United States Bankruptcy Court in Denver, Colorado, through the Honorable Michael Romero, provided an order regarding plaintiffs’ problems with a home they purchased from an entity controlled or represented by defendants. Plaintiffs, Kelvin and Holly Knaub (the “Knaubs”) filed adversary proceedings against debtor Robert Golba in his bankruptcy proceeding and against debtor Greg Rollison in his separate bankruptcy proceeding. The adversary proceedings were partially consolidated to proceed in parallel but not substantively.
The Knaubs purchased a home from Gemm Homes (“Gemm”) in May 2003. Problems stemming from the foundation caused the Knaubs to seek an explanation and ultimately a solution from Gemm and then from Avalon Homes (“Avalon”), which the Knaubs claim is just a continuation of Gemm. Through their complaint, the Knaubs seek relief for 1) damages caused by fraudulent representations and false pretenses under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s misrepresentation that Gemm and Rollison were not involved in Avalon; 2) damages caused by actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s and Rollison’s alleged conspiracy fraudulently to convey the assets of Gemm to the Avalon entities; and 3) damages caused by breach of fiduciary duty under § 523(a)(4), alleging Gemm was an insolvent company which owed a fiduciary duty to its creditors, and alleging Golba participated in transferring Gemm’s assets to Avalon for no consideration. In the Golba action, the third claim for relief was dismissed.
The facts of the case are important and somewhat convoluted. In an effort to make the cases clear, the evidence, allegations, and facts will be laid out in detail below. The Knaubs’ house was purchased from Gemm and soon after both Gemm and Rollison had an engineering company perform an analysis which discovered the foundation was not laid on stable ground.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Limitations of Liability in Subcontractors’ Contracts May Not Be Enforceable in Colorado to Limit Claims by Construction Professionals.
October 23, 2012 — Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
The Colorado Homeowner Protection Act of 2007 (“HPA”), codified at C.R.S. § 13-20-806(7), specifically voids express waivers of, or limitations on, a residential property owner’s ability to enforce any rights, remedies, and damages provided by law in a construction defect case. Practically speaking, this means that limitation of liability provisions in contracts between construction professionals and residential homeowners are void and will not be enforced in Colorado. The HPA can extend even further, however, to subcontractors on residential projects, as seen in a recent District Court ruling.
The HPA was tested in Thacker v. Gallery Homes, et al., v. Terracon Consultants, Inc., et al., Larimer County District Court Case No. 2007CV1195. Gallery Homes hired Terracon to provide geotechnical and structural engineering services at the Colony Ridge subdivision in Loveland, Colorado. Terracon performed work for Gallery Homes under three separate contracts, each of which included a provision limiting Terracon’s total liability to Gallery Homes.
After the project was completed, two homeowners filed suit against Gallery Homes for alleged construction defects involving movement of their basement floor systems and foundations and damage to porches, patios, garages, and driveways. Gallery Homes sued Terracon as a third-party defendant, and Terracon sought to enforce its limitation of liability provisions via a partial summary judgment motion.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Heidi J. Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com
Ohio Casualty’s and Beazer’s Motions were Granted in Part, and Denied in Part
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Trinity Homes LLC and Beazer Homes Investments LLC has reached the summary judgment stage. The remaining plaintiffs are Trinity Homes LLC (Trinity) and Beazer Homes Investments LLC (Beazer), and the only defendant remaining is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio Casualty). “Ohio Casualty has filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #409) on all claims against it, and Trinity and Beazer have filed a cross-motion seeking partial summary judgment (Dkt. #431) in their favor.” Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and Beazer’s motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The court’s ruling presented a bit of background on the companies involved in the litigation: “Trinity is an Indiana limited liability company with its principal place of business in Indiana and is one of several construction related companies owned by Beazer, which is a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Delaware having its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Beazer’s predecessor, Beazer Homes Investment Corporation, acquired the stock of Crossman Communities, Inc. in 2002. Crossman and its subsidiary owned all interests in Trinity. Beazer and Trinity are in the business of residential real estate development and construction.”
Furthermore, “Ohio Casualty’s home office is in Ohio, where it is incorporated. It sells insurance policies to commercial entities such as Plaintiffs. It purchased a book of business from Great American Insurance Company, a subsidiary of which had sold commercial general liability policies (‘CGL’) and umbrella liability policies to Trinity, covering the period of time between May 1, 1994 through May 1, 1999. For ease of reference, we will refer to these policies as the Ohio Casualty policies. Trinity sold and acted as a general contractor for the construction of new homes in Central Indiana throughout the period of time in which the Ohio Casualty policies were in place.”
The court disagreed with almost every argument put forth by Ohio Casualty. However, they did concede “that Ohio Casualty is obligated to indemnify Trinity only for damages arising during its policy periods for pro rata liability as opposed to several and indivisible, by reason of its having limited its indemnity obligation to ‘those sums’ that Trinity becomes liable to pay for property damage which ‘occurs during the policy period.’”
Finally, the court ruled that “Ohio Casualty Company’s Motion For Summary Judgment (Dkt. #409) is GRANTED IN PART, that is, to the extent that Beazer is not an insured under the Ohio Casualty insurance policies, but the motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
The court further ruled that “Trinity and Beazer’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #431) is GRANTED IN PART, that is: (1) Trinity is an insured under the Ohio Casualty CGL and umbrella policies in effect for the time period from May 1, 1994 to May 1, 1999; (2) the claims at issue in the Underlying Lawsuits are "property damage" claims resulting from an "occurrence" and are therefore within the policy coverage provided under the Ohio Casualty Policy; and (3) none of the exclusions in the Ohio Casualty Policy bars coverage. Trinity and Beazer’s Motion is DENIED in all other respects. Moreover, material questions of fact remain with respect to whether payments made to the 54 homeowners, who were part of the putative class in the underlying Colon class action but were not included in the certified settlement class, were voluntary payments and as such do not qualify for indemnification. Material questions of fact also preclude a summary ruling on the issue of whether Ohio Casualty is estopped from raising their voluntary nature as a defense to indemnity.”
Read the court’s decision…
Housing Market on Way to Recovery
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Bloomberg News reports that new home purchases neared a two-year high, with July sales being the strongest since April 2010. Economists polled by Bloomberg expected an annual pace of 380,000 sales, the current levels are at 373,000. Strongest sales gains were in the Northeast, with a 20 percent jump. The Midwest and Western regions had small gains, and the South saw a drop of 4.9 percent. As the Northeast’s home prices are highest and the South’s the lowest, the pattern of sales lead to a sharp increase in median sales price.
Meanwhile, existing stocks of homes continued to deplete, reaching a record low of 38,000 completed homes on the market. In response, builders are constructing new homes at a pace not seen since April 2010, accord to the Commerce Department.
Read the full story…