Court Orders House to be Demolished or Relocated
April 26, 2011 — April 26, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Decision Affirmed in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision by the trial court in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate. In the trial case, Central Arkansas Foundation Homes (CAFH) sought payment for a home built for Choate, while Choate alleged that the builders committed multiple construction defects including using the wrong foundation materials and positioning the house in the wrong direction.
After the house was built, CAFH contacted Choate regarding payment, however, Choate alleged that the finished product did not match the contract. “ After CAFH completed construction, it obtained permanent home financing for Choate and tried to contact her to close the transaction. Choate did not respond until October 2005, when she sent CAFH a list of alleged construction defects, including that the house was facing in the wrong direction; that it was not built on a slab; and that the fireplace, garbage disposal, driveway, and storage area were missing. CAFH replied to Choate in writing, telling her that she had until January 6, 2006, to close on the house or CAFH would sell it. The correspondence enclosed worksheets showing that the amount Choate would owe at closing exceeded $94,000, which included interest that had accrued on the as-yet unpaid construction loan.”
Initially, the court found in favor of CAFH. “On April 18, 2007, Choate’s attorney withdrew from representing her. Soon thereafter, CAFH’s attorney asked the court to set a final hearing on the case. The attorney purportedly sent Choate a letter by regular mail on May 15, 2007, advising her that the case was set for trial on July 9, 2007. Choate, however, did not appear. CAFH did appear, and its general manager, John Oldner, testified to events leading up to the case and the amount of damages claimed. According to Oldner, the interest on the construction loan had accrued to the point that CAFH now sought $104,965.88 from Choate. The court found in favor of CAFH and entered judgment for that amount, plus attorney fees, on July 18, 2007. The court ruled that CAFH could sell the house and either remit any excess to Choate or look to Choate for the deficiency if the sales price did not cover the judgment.”
However, Choate successfully argued that she did not receive notice of the trial. A new trial was ordered, and the outcome was quite different. “On June 6, 2008, the circuit court entered judgment for Choate, ruling that the house was not in substantial compliance with the parties’ contract and that the contract should be rescinded. The court found that the house suffered from numerous construction defects, that the contract contemplated a slab rather than a concrete-pier foundation, and that CAFH ignored Choate’s complaints that the house was facing the wrong way. The judgment directed CAFH to hold Choate harmless on the construction loan, to deed Choate’s two acres back to her, and to remove the house from Choate’s property.”
The Court of Appeals “found that Choate would be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of the septic systems and utility lines that CAFH installed on her land. The court therefore awarded $5340 to CAFH as a quantum-meruit recovery for the value of that work. CAFH contends that the award is not sufficient, but we see no clear error.” In the end, the Court of Appeals provided this reason for declining to reverse the trial court’s decision: “The court in this case apparently concluded that the house constructed by CAFH was so fundamentally at odds with Choate’s contractual expectations that she was not unjustly enriched and should simply be, as nearly as possible, returned to the status quo ante. Accordingly, the court ordered the house removed from her property and permitted CAFH to either relocate the house or salvage the house’s materials and unused appliances. We decline to reverse the court’s weighing of the equities in this manner.”
Read the court’s decision…
Contractor Underpaid Workers, Pocketed the Difference
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Property Casualty 360 reports that the owner of a construction company in California’s Bay Area has been arraigned in San Francisco Superior Court. The fifty-seven felony counts include charges of payroll theft and insurance fraud.
San Francisco District Attorney, George Gascon is quoted as saying that Doherty’s actions “hurts the honest businesses that were unable to successfully compete for these projects which the defendant was able to underbid and win as a result of this scheme.”
Frances Ann Doherty, owner of Doherty Painting & Construction has been charged with submitting false documentation as to what wages she paid her workers. It is alleged that over three years she pocketed $600,000. Additionally, she is charged with underpaying her insurer by more than $100,000 by submitting to them the fake payroll information.
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Homebuilding Still on the Rise
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The National Association of Home Builders reports that spending on private homes was up three percent in October 2012, bringing it to a four-year high. This was part of a trend in which fourteen of the last fifteen months have seen increases in spending on residential construction. Likewise, multifamily residences have seen thirteen months of increased spending, putting it 82% higher than its low, two years ago. ¬?In addition to new homes, remodeling is also up, reaching its highest point in five years.
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South Carolina “occurrence” and allocation
September 1, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., No. 26909 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2011), insured Crossman was the developer and general contractor of several condominium projects constructed by Crossman’s subcontractors over multiple years. After completion, Crossman was sued by homeowners alleging negligent construction of exterior components resulting in moisture penetration property damage to non-defective components occurring during multiple years. Crossman settled the underlying lawsuit and then filed suit against its CGL insurers to recover the settlement amount. Crossman settled with all of the insurers except for Harleysville. Crossman and Harleysville stipulated that the only coverage issue was whether there was an “occurrence.” The trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Crossman, determining that there was an “occurrence.” The trial court also ruled that Harleysville was liable for the entire settlement amount without offset for the amounts paid by the other insurers.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Homeowners Must Comply with Arbitration over Construction Defects
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has upheld a decision by the Superior Court of Kern County that homeowners must comply with arbitration procedures in their construction defect claim. The California Court of Appeals ruled on December 14 in the case of Baeza v. Superior Court of Kern County, denying the plaintiff’s petition that the trial court vacate its order.
The plaintiffs in the case are homeowners in various developments built by Castle & Cook. The homes were sold with a contract that provided for “nonadversarial prelitigation procedures, including mediation, and judicial reference.” The homeowners made defect claims and argued that Castle & Cooke failed to comply with statutory disclosure requirements and that some of the contracts violate related statutes.
The appeals court found that there was no ground for appeal of the lower court’s order to continue with prelitigation procedures. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not seek a review of the mediation until a judgment was issued, but that then the issue would be moot. The court felt that there were issues presented that needed clarification, and so they reviewed this case. This was cleared for publication.
The court considered the intent of the legislature in passing the Right to Repair Act, noting that “under the statutory scheme, the builder has the option of contracting for an alternative nonadversarial prelitigation procedure,” as established in Chapter 4. The court noted that Chapter 4 “contains no specifics regarding what provisions the alternative nonadversarial contractual provisions may or must include.”
The plaintiffs contended that the builder was in violation of the standards set out in Section 912, however the court responded that these sections set out one set of procedures, but they concluded that “if the Legislature had intended the section 912 disclosure provisions…it could have made the requirements applicable to all builders by locating them in a section outside Chapter 4.”
Read the court’s decision…
Court Sends Construction Defect Case from Kansas to Missouri
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United State Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has ruled in Mid-Continent Casualty Company v. The Village at Deer Creek Homeowners Association. The prior case was heard by the United States District Court for the District of Kansas. In this appeal, Mid-Continent sought a declaratory judgement. The Village at Deer Creek Homeowners Association moved to dismiss, and the district court had granted this, giving jurisdiction to the Missouri state courts.
The homeowners association had sued Greater Midwest Builders, Ltd., who had constructed the subdivision, in the Kansas state courts. The suit ended with a verdict against Greater Midwest for more than $7 million. The association and other plaintiffs in that case filed for equitable garnishment against State Auto, Mid-Continent, and Greater Midwest. State Auto removed the garnishment action to federal court in Missouri. Mid-Continent moved to sever the actions against it and transfer the case to the District of Kansas.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal in the Western District of Missouri. A second garnishment action followed in which Mid-Continent was named as an additional plaintiff. State Auto again removed to the Western District of Missouri, while Mid-Continent moved to sever and transfer to the District of Kansas. The Kansas court granted the association’s motion to dismiss.
In the appeal, Mid-Continent sought a declaratory judgment. This was denied by the appeals court. The district court “concluded that the Missouri courts were better situated to provide complete relief to all parties involved in the coverage dispute.” The appeals court affirmed the association’s movement to dismiss. Mid-Continent’s motion was denied as moot.
Read the court's decision…
Connecticut Gets Medieval All Over Construction Defects
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Hartford Courant reports that Connecticut is trying a very old tactic in a construction defect suit. The law library building at the University of Connecticut suffered from leaks which have now been repaired. The state waited twelve years after was complete to file lawsuit, despite that Connecticut has a six-year statute of limitations on construction defect claims. Connecticut claims that the statute of limitations does apply to the state.
The state is arguing that a legal principle from the thirteenth century allows it to go along with its suit. As befits a medieval part of common law, the principle is called “nullum tempus occurrit regi,” or “time does not run against the king.” In 1874, the American Law Register said that nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae “has been adopted in every one of the United States” and “is now firmly established law.”
In the case of Connecticut, Connecticut Solicitor General Gregory D’Auria said that “the statute of limitations does not apply to the state.” He also noted that “the state did not ‘wait’ to file the lawsuit. The lawsuit was filed only after all other options and remedies were exhausted.”
Connecticut also argued that “nullus tempus occurrit regi” applied in another construction defect case at the York Correctional Institution. The judge in that case ruled in December 2008 to let the case proceed. But in the library case, Judge William T. Cremins ruled in February 2009 that the statute of limitations should apply to the state as well. Both cases have been appealed, with the library case moving more quickly toward the Connecticut Supreme Court.
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Insurer Must Cover Construction Defects Claims under Actual Injury Rule
March 1, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the insured need not prove the exact dates physical damage occurred in order to trigger defense and indemnity coverage. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes, LLC v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10027 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
In 1999, the insured built a home. He was insured under a CGL policy issued by Great American from November 9, 1998 to November 9, 2000. Thereafter, the insured held a CGL policy issued by Mid-Continent from November 9, 2000 to September 18, 2002.
After construction was completed, the insured sold the house to the buyer in May 2000. After moving in, the buyer found numerous construction defects in the home, including water entering cracks in the home, and sinking and sagging of parts of the house. The buyer sued the insured, who sought coverage under the two policies. When the insurers refused to defend the underlying suit, the insured sued for a declaratory judgment.
The underlying case went to arbitration and an award of $2.4 million was granted to the buyer. The insured assigned to the buyer his claims against the insurers.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
SB800 Cases Approach the Courts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
California’s Right to Repair Law turns ten this year and cases under the statute are finally coming to trial, as John V. O’Meara of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara writes for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Mr. O’Meara notes that SB800 eliminated “the traditional definitions of construction defect,” replacing them with “functionality standards.” He argues that these standards are not uniform: “some standards require damage and others do not.” He also wonders what terms like “significant cracks,” “intended water” and “materially comply” mean in a court.
Mr. O’Meara states that “defendants in construction defect cases have a right to know the standards that apply to a case, the definitions that will be presented to the jury, and the burden of proof that attaches.”
Read the full story…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Construction Jobs Expected to Rise in Post-Hurricane Rebuilding
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Businessweek reports that construction jobs and materials will see increased demand as property owners in New York and New Jersey rebuild after hurricane Sandy. Tom Jeffery, of Irvine, California-based CoreLogic, a real estate information service, noted that “a high percent of damaged properties are going to be repaired.” Experts estimate property damage to total anywhere from $7 billion to $40 billion.
It is also estimated that about 739,000 properties in the area are underwater in the way that has nothing to do with flooding, with negative equity of 25 percent or more. Many of these homeowners are likely to walk away from their mortgages.
Ken Simonson, chief economist of the Associated General Contractors of America, expects “localized spikes in construction employment throughout November and the winter.” Martin Connor, the chief financial officer of Toll Brothers, expects to see more a rise in labor costs than in materials.
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Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage
August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision finding no coverage due to exclusions from the all-risk policy for losses related to mold, rot and condensation. Koskovich v. Am Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 581 (Minn. Ct. App. June 25, 2012).
In 1978, the insureds purchased a home that was built in 1904. From 1991 to 1995, they remodeled, which included rotating the house 45 degrees, removing a wing and adding a new section. Polypropylene vapor barriers were installed, with pinholes for ventilation.
In 2008, water was observed on an interior floor. An investigation revealed that the sheathing under the siding and the house's framing were wet and rotten, requiring removal and replacement of the siding and studs. Repairs were made and a claim was submitted to American Family Mutual Insurance Company.
American's structural engineer inspected and determined that moisture was likely caused by condensation of water vapor where the vapor barrier was held tight to the sheathing and by inward water migration from wet siding during rainy periods through the vapor-barrier perforations. The structural engineer opined that, although the home's framing was deteriorated and structurally compromised, it did not appear as though the home was in imminent danger of collapse.
American denied coverage.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Federal District Court Predicts Florida Will Adopt Injury In Fact Trigger
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida was confronted with determining whether Florida would follow the manifestation or injury in fact trigger in Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Contravest Constr. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104502 (D. Fla. June 5, 2012).
The homeowner's association sued the insureds for alleged negligent construction and development of individual dwelling units and common areas of their condominium. Due to this negligence, severe damage was caused by water intrusion. The Association's members only became aware of the defects through the retention of construction experts.
The insured had CGL coverage with Axis, with policies issued from 2003 to 2007. Coverage was denied for the periods 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. Axis provided a defense under the policies issued for 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, but under a reservation of rights. Axis sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because the damage manifested before its policy periods.
For coverage to exist, "property damage" must have "occurred" during Axis' policy period.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Ensuing Losses From Faulty Workmanship Must be Covered
May 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Coverage for damages resulting from faulty workmanship in the construction of an apartment complex was at issue in The Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44535 (N.D. Fla. March 30, 2012).
The owner of the apartments, Bartram, had primary coverage and three layers of excess coverage. Each contract excluded loss from faulty workmanship. The policies provided, however, "if loss or damage by a Covered Cause of Loss results, we will pay for that resulting loss or damage."
Bartram contended water intrusion occurred because of faulty workmanship, which caused damage to the buildings’ exterior and interior finishes, wood sheathing, framing, balcony systems, drywall ceilings and stucco walls. This damage was separate from the work needed to simply fix the faulty workmanship. Therefore, Bartram argued, the ensuing losses that resulted from the water intrusion was covered.
The insurer argued the ensuing loss exception was not applicable if the ensuing loss was directly related to the original excluded loss.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Nevada Court Adopts Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine
February 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Although the Nevada Supreme Court adopted the efficient proximate cause doctrine, it determined it did not apply to salvage coverage under an all-risk policy for a rain-damaged building. Fourth Street Place, LLC v. The Travelers Indemn. Co., 2011 Nev LEXIS 114 (Nev. Dec. 29, 2011).
Fourth Street owned an office building which was insured by an all-risk policy issued by Travelers. Fourth Street hired Above It All Roofing to repair the roof of the office building. Above It All removed the waterproof membrane on the roof and prepared to replace the membrane the following week. Over the weekend, however, substantial rain hit. On Sunday, Above It All returned to cover the exposed portions of the roof with tarps, but wind later blew the tarps away. The building suffered significant interior damage as it continued to be exposed to the rain.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
After Katrina Came Homes that Could Withstand Isaac
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana adopted its first uniform building code. Under the new standards, homes are better able to withstand the winds generated by hurricanes. The owner of one home said that during Hurricane Isaac, “there’s no shaking of the building itself, there’s no sign of a storm except for the rain.”
WWWLTV reports that the new standards require home to be able to withstand 130 mile per hour winds. They also must follow FEMA guidelines for elevation. Build Now, a non-profit organization, is seeking to build green homes that meet the new standards. Their executive director said “we’re building higher. We’re building stronger. We’re building greener.”
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Yellow Brass Fittings Play a Crucial Role in Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes Hawaii, et al. is a “class action filed by homeowners who allege that their homes have a construction defect. They allege that their plumbing systems include brass fittings susceptible to corrosion and likely to cause leaks. They bring this action against the developer of their homes and the manufacturers of the brass fittings.”
Zurn, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective brass fittings, sought a dismissal, or if that could not be achieved, then “a more definite statement, of five of the six claims.” Zurn moved for summary judgment on the sixth claim, or alternately sought “summary judgment on one of the five claims it” sought to dismiss.” The court granted in part the motion, and denied the motion for summary judgment.
The developer, Castle & Cooke, sought dismissal of the First Amended Complaint stating “that Plaintiffs have not complied with Hawaii’s Contractor Repair Act, chapter 672E of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which requires, among other things, a plaintiff to give a contractor the results of any testing done before filing an action against that contractor.” The court couldn’t determine “certain facts essential to ruling” on Castle & Cooke’s motion, and therefore denied the motion, but ordered Plaintiffs to submit requested material by the stated deadline.
The Baker v Castle & Cooke case began with the Plaintiffs claim that the use of yellow brass fittings can lead to construction defects. They allege that “yellow brass is particularly susceptible to dezincification, a corrosion process in which zinc leaches into potable water that comes into contact with the brass. According to Plaintiffs, as the brass corrodes, it becomes porous and mechanically weak. Plaintiffs further allege that the PEX systems in the putative class members’ homes have begun to, or are about to, leak water into the walls, ceilings, and floors of their homes. Plaintiffs allege that the leakage will cause water damage and mold growth, exposing the occupants to toxins.”
In response to the plaintiffs’ claims, Zurn argued “because their yellow brass fittings have not failed to date, Plaintiffs fail to allege, and have no evidence showing, that they have suffered any actual injury.” Plaintiffs replied, “even if the fittings have not failed as of today, failure in the future is inevitable.”
However, the court stated, “whether Plaintiffs have suffered any injury, or whether Plaintiffs are attempting to proceed based solely on future injury, implicates Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action, as well as whether this case is ripe for adjudication.” The court has requested the parties to submit “supplemental briefing on whether this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In supplemental briefs, Zurn argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs lack standing, and Castle & Cooke argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe.”
The court continues to discuss the problem of standing: “To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate three things. First, the plaintiff must suffer an "injury-in-fact," which means that there must be a concrete and particularized "invasion of a legally protected interest" and the invasion is actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action. Third, a favorable decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id. It is the first element (injury-in-fact) that is in issue here.”
The court found that the plaintiffs do have standing: “Even if the court could not rely on the allegations that the pipes will soon leak, the court would conclude that, for standing purposes, Plaintiffs have a sufficient injury-in-fact in the form of their alleged economic loss.” In a hearing, Plaintiffs argued that their homes had decreased in value.
The court also denied Castle & Cooke’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of ripeness, stating “the same reasons Plaintiffs satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing purposes, they satisfy the constitutional ripeness requirement.”
Plaintiffs asserted six counts against Zurn. Zurn, in response, made a motion to dismiss counts VIII, IX, X, XII, and XIII. The court granted Zurn’s motion for Counts VIII, IX, and X only: “Counts VIII (product liability), IX (negligence), and X (strict liability) sound in tort. Zurn argues that, because Plaintiffs allege no injury other than to the PEX systems and the yellow brass fittings themselves, the economic loss rule bars their tort claims. The court agrees.”
The court disagreed with Zurn’s motion regarding Count XII: “Count XII asserts that Zurn has breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Zurn argues that Count XII is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege an injury. The court disagrees.”
Zurn’s motion regarding Count XIII was also denied: “Count XIII asserts that Zurn violated section 480-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes.” Furthermore, “Plaintiffs allege that Zurn ‘engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices when [it] designed, manufactured and sold Yellow Brass Fittings.’ Zurn argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under section 480-2(a) because their claims are barred by the statute of limitations and they do not adequately allege reliance or a cognizable injury. The court disagrees.”
The court denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts XI and XII.
Castle & Cooke sought to dismiss “Plaintiffs’ claims against it under section 672E-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which provides for dismissal when claimants fail to comply with chapter 672E.” There was some discussion regarding the test results. Apparently, the plaintiffs had failed to provide a written notice of claim at least 90 days before filing the action. However, it is unclear if the Plaintiffs have since complied with the requirements of the chapter. “The court has received no supplemental information from either party about whether any test results from another case have been turned over or whether those materials are subject to a confidentiality agreement. The record at this point does not establish noncompliance with the requirement in chapter 672E to provide such information. The court therefore denies the motion to dismiss.”
In summary, “Zurn’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Count VIII, Count IX, and Count X. Zurn’s motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ other claims. Zurn’s request for a more definite statement and its summary judgment motion are denied. Plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended Complaint no later than May 21, 2012.” Furthermore, “the court denies Castle & Cooke’s motion, but directs Plaintiffs to file, within two weeks, either a certificate of compliance with section 672E-3(c), or an explanation as to why they have not complied. Castle & Cooke may submit a response within two weeks of Plaintiffs’ submission. Each party’s submission is limited to 1000 words.”
Read the court’s decision…
Insurance Company Prevails in “Chinese Drywall” Case
June 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Louisiana Court of Appeals rejected an appeal to reverse a summary judgment granted to Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Terrence and Rhonda Ross contracted for a remodel of their home in which Chinese-made drywall was used. When the drywall emitted harmful gasses, the Rosses filed a claim under their insurance policy. This claim was rejected under four exclusions: for faulty materials, latent defect, loss by corrosion, and loss by pollution. After the claim was denied, the Rosses sued Louisiana Citizens.
In April 2010, the lower court granted a summary judgment, followed by a May, 2010 order dismissing the Rosses’ claims against Louisiana Citizens. The Rosses appealed this decision. In the court’s review, they agreed with Louisiana Citizens and the lower court on all counts. Although the Rosses maintained that the drywall was not defective (as it still functioned as drywall), the court ruled that its emission of sulfuric gases was a defect. Further, as it was in place for two years before this became evident, it was also a latent defect. Damage to the Rosses’ home consisted of corrosion damage caused by the pollutants in the drywall.
The Rosses made an additional claim that since their policy covered smoke damage, this should be covered, as the harm was done by sulfuric gases. The court noted that the contract specifies “fumes or vapors from a boiler, furnace, or related equipment,” none of which apply in this case.
Read the court’s decision
