Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.
The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.
But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.
The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.
The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.
In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.
Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
Read the court’s decision…
Residential Construction Down in San Diego
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
While new home construction is on the rise in some parts of the country, San Diego has seen a fall, comparing the first seven months of 2012 with the first seven months of 2011, dropping nine percent, according to an article in the San Diego Business Journal. The news isn’t all bad, since although July residential construction dropped sharply, nonresidential construction increased thirty-six percent.
Read the full story…
Denver Court Rules that Condo Owners Must Follow Arbitration Agreement
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Prior to initiating a construction defect lawsuit, the Glass House Residential Association voted to invalidate the arbitration agreement that had been written into its declaration and bylaws by the developer and general contractor. After the association started their construction defect claims, the developer and general contractor argued that the case must go to arbitration, as the arbitration clause contained a provision that it could not be altered without the agreement of the developer and general contractor.
The Denver District Court has ruled against that association, determining that the res triction was not in violation of Colorado condominium law. And, as a post from Polsinelli Shughart PC on JDSupra notes, the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act encourages the use of arbitration procedures to settle disputes. The CCIOA does prohibit “certain restrictions on the homeowners association’s ability to amend the condominium declarations,” however, preserving an arbitration agreement is not one of them.
Read the full story…
Coverage Exists Under Ensuing Loss Provision
July 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Finding coverage under the ensuing loss provision, the Washington Supreme Court overruled a Court of Appeals decision we previously reported here. Vision One, LLC v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 276 P.3d 300 (Wash. 2012).
Vision developed a condominium project. Before concrete was poured, a subcontractor supplied the shoring to temporarily support the poured concrete slabs. After the shoring installation was completed, concrete was poured on the first floor. When the pouring was finished, the shoring gave way. The framing, rebar and newly poured concrete came crashing down onto the the lower level parking area, where the wet concrete eventually hardened. It took several weeks to clean up the debris and repair the damage.
Vision had a builders’ risk policy with Philadelphia. The policy excluded losses caused by or resulting from deficient design or faulty workmanship. Collapse, however, was not listed as an excluded event. Further, the exclusion for faulty workmanship contained a resulting loss clause providing that "if loss or damage by a Covered Cause of Loss results, [Philadelphia] will pay for the loss or damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss."
Philadelphia denied coverage under the faulty workmanship exclusion.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
New Jersey Court Rules on Statue of Repose Case
May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A three-judge panel issued a per curium ruling on May 23 in Fairview Heights Condo. v. Investors (N.J. Super., 2011), a case which the members of a condominium board argued: “that the judge erred by: 1) dismissing plaintiff’s claims against RLI based upon the statute of repose; 2) dismissing the breach of fiduciary duty claims against the Luppinos based upon a lack of expert opinion; 3) barring the testimony of Gonzalez; and 4) barring the May 23, 1989 job site report.” The court rejected all claims from the condominium board.
The court found that the building must be unsafe for the statute of repose to apply. They noted, “the judge made no findings on whether the water seepage, or the property damage caused by such seepage, in any way rendered the building, or any of the units, unsafe.” Further, “without a specific finding on the question of whether the defects had rendered the building ‘unsafe,’ defendants were not entitled to the benefit of the ten-year statute of repose.“
On the second point, the court also upheld the lower court’s findings regarding the management company:
“The report submitted by Berman establishes that the EIFS product was defective in its design and would therefore have failed from the outset. The defects in that product were, according to Berman, not prone to repair or other mitigation. Therefore, even if defendants did not appropriately inspect or repair the EIFS, their failure to do so would have had no impact on the long-term performance of the EIFS exterior cladding. As plaintiff failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on these questions, the judge properly granted summary judgment to the Luppinos on plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty claim.”
On the final two points, the judges noted “plaintiff maintains that the judge committed reversible error when he excluded the Gonzalez certification and the 1989 job site report prepared by Raymond Brzuchalski.” They saw “no abuse of discretion related to the exclusion of the Gonzalez certification, and reject plaintiff’s arguments to the contrary.” Of the job site report, they found, “no abuse of discretion in the judge's finding that the Brzuchalski 1989 job site report did not satisfy the requirements of N.J.R.E.803(c)(6).”
Read the court’s decision
Ohio Adopts Energy-Efficient Building Code
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a compromise between environmental groups, who were looking for stricter standards, and homebuilders, who were trying to contain building costs, the state of Ohio has adopted buildings codes that will increase the energy efficiency of new homes. The estimated costs are about $1,100 with estimated annual savings of $230. According to Corey Roblee of the International Code Council, “It’s something needed in the state of Ohio.”
The Ohio Home Builders Association opposed a proposal to adopt the guidelines of the International Code Council. Builders will be able to either follow the ICC guidelines or they can use the Ohio guidelines to meet the same energy efficiency. Vincent Squillace, the executive vice president of the OHBA, said, “We came up with an equivalent code that’s more strict but is about $2,000 cheaper per home to implement than the original code.”
The new code will require that at least 75% of lighting must be high efficiency, increases the degree of insulation, and specifies more efficient windows, among other changes.
Read the full story…
Construction on the Rise in Washington Town
June 16, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Kitsap Sun reports that Gig Harbor, a town in the area near Tacoma, Washington, has had a 60% increase in building permit applications as compared to 2010. May, 2011 had as many permits issued for single-family residences in Gig Harbor as were issued for all of 2010. Additionally, a Safeway shopping center on Point Fosdick is described by Dick Bower, Gig Harbor Building and Fire Safety Director, as “a huge project and it’s going to bring in quite a bit of revenue.” He called the increase in building “economic recovery at the grassroots level.”
Bower said that the building officials in other towns have also seen upswings in construction. He anticipates more activity in the future.
Read the full story…
Colorado “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6) “that particular part”
August 11, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Shay Construction, Inc., No. 10-cv-02126 (D. Col. July 28. 2011), general contractor Milender White subcontracted with insured Shay for framing work.  Shay in turn subcontracted some of its work to others. When Shay?s subcontractors filed suit against Shay and Milender White seeking payment for their work, Milender White cross-claimed against Shay for breach of contract alleging that,Milender White notified Shay during construction that some of Shay?s work was defective and that when Shay repaired its defective work, it damaged work performed by others. Shay’s CGL insurer Continental Western filed suit against Milender White and Shay seeking a judicial declaration of no coverage. The federal district trial court granted Continental Western?s motion for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Faulty Workmanship may be an Occurrence in Indiana CGL Policies
April 7, 2011 — April 7, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of whether construction defects can be an occurrence in Commercial General Liabilities (CGL) policies continues to find mixed answers. The United States District Court in Indiana denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case of General Casualty Insurance v. Compton Construction Co., Inc. and Mary Ann Zubak stating that faulty workmanship can be an occurrence in CGL policies.
Judge Theresa L. Springmann cited Sheehan Construction Co., et al. v. Continental Casualty Co., et al. for her decision, ”The Indiana Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, which had been granted in favor of the insurer in Sheehan, holding that faulty workmanship can constitute an ‘accident’ under a CGL policy, which means any damage would have been caused by an ‘occurrence’ triggering the insurance policy’s coverage provisions. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that, under identically-worded policy exclusion terms that are at issue in this case, defective subcontractor work could provide the basis for a claim under a CGL policy.”
As we reported on April 1st, South Carolina’s legislature is currently working on bill S-431 that would change the wording of CGL policies in their state to include construction defects. Ray Farmer, Southwest region vice president of the American Insurance Association spoke out against the bill. “CGL policies were never meant to cover faulty workmanship by the contractor,” he said. “The bill’s supplementary and erroneous liability provisions will only serve to unnecessarily impact construction costs in South Carolina.”
Read the Opinion and order...
Read the court’s ruling...
Read the American Insurance Association statement...
Construction Workers Unearth Bones
June 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
While digging for a new steam line at Eastern Michigan University, workers unearthed some old bones. Experts have yet to determine if the bones are human or animal, however Walter Kraft, the EMU vice president of communications, noted that a handle also unearthed might have come from a casket. Cindy Heflin, reporting in AnnArbor.com notes that until 1900 a Catholic cemetery was located in the area. Although the bodies were relocated, these may have been left behind.
Read the full story…
Nevada Senate Rejects Construction Defect Bill
June 7, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Las Vegas Sun reports that Assembly Bill 401, the construction defect bill, lost in a vote of 9 to 12. The measure extended the time for construction defect suits to be filed, awarded legal costs only to successful plaintiffs, and set a definition of construction defects. Two Democrats joined the Republicans in the Senate in defeating the bill.
Read the full story…
North Carolina Exclusion j(6) “That Particular Part”
February 10, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dove, 714 S.E.2d 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), claimant Murphy-Brown hired insured Dove to repair a broken elevator belt in a grain elevator in Murphy-Brown’s feed mill. The elevator was inside a metal duct and, to access the broken belt, Dove had to cut out a section of the duct. After replacing the belt, Dove welded the metal section back to the duct. Immediately after Dove completed the welding, dust inside the duct ignited, causing an explosion in the elevator, resulting in property damage to the elevator and other property. Murphy-Brown sued Dove for negligence seeking damages for the repair and replacement of the elevator, repair and replacement of the other property, increased grain handling costs during the repairs, and loss of use.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Celebrities Lose Case in Construction Defect Arbitration
May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff
An arbitration panel has ruled that problems with the Idaho home of actors Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson were not due to construction defects but rather to “poor design and bad architectural advice.” The couple had settled with the architectural firm, Lake Flato of San Antonio, Texas for $900,000 and was subsequently seeking $3 million from Storey Construction of Ketchum, Idaho.
Problems with the couple’s home “included leaking roofs, inadequate drainage, fireplaces that did not vent properly and an inadequate air-conditioning system. In 2003, sliding snow from the roof damaged kitchen windows and roof components.”
The arbitration panel, according to the report in the Idaho Mountain Express and Guide, noted that “Hanks and Wilson were responsible for the full $167,623 cost of arbitration, but further denied a Storey Construction counterclaim that alleged Hanks and Wilson filed their claim out of malice.”
Read the full story…
Eleventh Circuit Asks Georgia Supreme Court if Construction Defects Are Caused by an "Occurrence"
December 20, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Eleventh Circuit certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court, asking whether property damage can constitute an "occurrence" under a CGL policy where its effects are not felt on "other property." HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co. v. Morrison Homes, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. Ct. LEXIS 23813 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012).
The general contractor, Taylor Morrison Services, Inc., was covered by a CGL policy issued by Gerling. The policy excluded "expected or intended injury," contractual liability," and business risk exclusions. Morrison was sued by homeowners in a class action suit. Morrison had allegedly omitted four inches of gravel required beneath the base of the concrete foundations by the Uniform Building Code. Thereafter, the houses sustained water intrusion, cracks in the floors and driveways, and warped and buckling flooring.
Gerling defended, but sued Morrison for a declaratory judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Preparing for Trial on a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 895, et seq.
May 10, 2012 — Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP
In 2002, the California Legislature enacted the Right to Repair Act (hereinafter “SB-800”), as codified in Title VII of the Civil Code. As set forth in Civil Code section 895, et seq., SB-800 established a set of standards for residential construction, and provides a statutory protocol to address alleged violations of those standards. SB-800 applies to all new single family homes sold after January 1, 2003, and it created its own cause of action governed completely by its own terms, in that in order to state a cause of action under SB-800, a plaintiff may only allege a violation of the Act. (Civ. Code, § 938.) Under Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944, the Legislature made it clear that it intended to create a single cause of action for construction defects in homes that fall under the purview of SB-800. By passing SB-800, the Legislature eliminated multiple and often redundant or conflicting causes of action, burdens of proof, statutes of limitations, and types of damages that were common in construction defect actions prior to the enactment of the same.
Civil Code section 895, et seq. has significantly changed the landscape of construction defect lawsuits. Yet, for years, the only attention given to the statutes focused solely on the codified pre-litigation process that requires plaintiffs and builders to meet and confer regarding defects and attempt a process to repair the alleged defects before litigation is pursued. A major impediment to the implementation of the pre-litigation procedures has often been that the statutes specifically state that the information obtained during the pre-litigation process is admissible at trial. Hence, through use of the pre-litigation process, plaintiffs’ counsel can engage in a builder funded fishing expedition and later use the information obtained to advance their litigation goals. As such, many builders have chosen to opt out of codified pre-litigation process altogether, an option which the builder can elect within their Purchase and Sale Agreements.
Recently, counsel for builders throughout California have turned their attention to the “exclusive remedy” aspect of SB-800 by seeking, often successfully, to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. (Civ. Code, § 943.) Â
The question remains: what is the benefit of requiring plaintiffs to trim down their complaint and eliminate their tried and true common law causes of action, and requiring them to pursue only a single cause of action for violation of SB800?
The construction standards enumerated within SB-800 include fifty-plus functionality standards. On their face, any benefit to pursuing a construction defect action under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800 initially appears trivial at best, in light of the fact that a jury may be very confused with the complexity of the functionality standards set forth within the Civil Code. Nevertheless, Title VII of the Civil Code actually contains numerous provisions that builders can utilize to their benefit throughout the process of construction defect litigation, including during preparation for trial.
First and foremost, counsel for builders can assert numerous affirmative defenses that will be beneficial if the matter proceeds to trial. These affirmative defenses, as codified in Civil Code section 945.5, include mitigation, in whole or in part, for damages caused by: an unforeseen act of nature; a homeowner’s failure to allow reasonable and timely access for inspections and repair under the pre-litigation procedures; the homeowner’s failure to follow the builder’s recommendations and commonly accepted homeowner maintenance obligations; ordinary wear and tear; misuse; abuse; or neglect. Builders should include these affirmative defenses within their responsive pleadings and as trial approaches, prepare appropriate motions in limine and request special jury instructions regarding the same. As frustrated builders and their attorneys are well aware, many construction defect suits result from a homeowner’s failure to properly maintain their property in a manner that is consistent with normal maintenance procedures and guidelines. Furthermore, within the ten year statute of limitations for most defects, ordinary wear and tear is often attributable to numerous deficiencies alleged by plaintiffs. The affirmative defense for a homeowner’s failure to allow inspections and repairs is also vital, as plaintiffs’ counsel may encourage a homeowner to forego the repair and seek monetary damages, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to ultimately obtain their share of attorney’s fees. Therefore, the SB-800 statutes provide the builder with recourse and distinctive mitigation defenses that were previously and confusingly mixed into tort and contract related defenses. These affirmative defenses can also be utilized by counsel during the cross-examination of plaintiff homeowners and expert witnesses. Defense counsel should fully grasp these defenses and utilize them as defense themes throughout litigation.
As a plaintiff is limited to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800, if defense counsel has failed to properly eliminate excessive tort and contract causes of action prior to trial, a motion for summary adjudication, or at the very least, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be brought to limit the introduction of evidence outside of a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Practical judges are always looking for ways to streamline and expedite trials, and they are currently ruling that SB-800 is the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs. In fact, plaintiffs’ firms in SB-800 matters are now voluntarily limiting their complaints to this one cause of action.
Special jury instructions can also be crafted to limit a jury’s computation of damages pursuant to Civil Codesection 944, which provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts, the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards, the reasonable cost of removing and replacing any improper repair by the builder, reasonable relocation and storage expenses, lost business income if the home was used as a principal place of a business licensed to be operated from the home, reasonable investigative costs for each established violation, and all other costs or fees recoverable by contract or statute. (Civ. Code, § 944.) [Emphasis added.]
Civil Code section 944 specifically prohibits recovery for damages outside the scope of its explicit language as it states “the homeowner is only entitled to ... damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title....” [Emphasis added.] The statute ultimately provides a “reasonableness” standard for the computation of damages that did not exist when computing damages on traditional common law tort and contract claims. Therefore, defense counsel should prepare special jury instructions to limit evidence of damages introduced at trial to the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards, and to exclude any evidence of damages beyond the reasonableness standard. Defense counsel should seize the opportunity to utilize the theme of “reasonableness” when attacking plaintiffs’ allegations and plaintiffs’ proposed repair methodology throughout the discovery process and at trial.
Defense counsel may also prepare a motion in limine or special jury instruction regarding the limitation of evidence regarding defects that did not cause resultant damage. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civ. Code, § 897.) [Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel can argue that the introduction of any evidence supporting a claim for construction-related deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, or for deficiencies where no damage has occurred is prohibited and must be excluded at trial. This requirement of resultant damages is familiar as the general rule was previously established in Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, in which the California Supreme Court held that there is no tort recovery for construction defects that have not actually caused property damage. The legislature effectively codified this rule within Civil Code section 897.
A motion in limine can also be crafted to limit expert testimony to the standards enumerated in Civil Code section 896, and to deficiencies that caused damage pursuant to Civil Code 897. The motion in limine can be based upon Civil Code section 943 and the fact that claims for defects in homes which were sold after January 1, 2003 may only be pursued under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. As such, expert testimony should be controlled by the standards set forth in Civil Code section 896. Furthermore, throughout a construction defect matter, defense counsel should ensure that their experts are well versed with the standards and that they can provide testimony that utilizes the same. Defense counsel’s knowledge of the standards will also be helpful during the cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
If, despite the efforts of defense counsel, the complaint still has numerous causes of action, or if only some homes fall under the purview of SB-800 while others do not, defense counsel can utilize a motion to bifurcate trial. The motion’s basis is that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 will require the introduction of evidence regarding the violations of the fifty-plus standards, and the tort and contract-based claims would also require the introduction of a wide range of evidence to prove each cause of action. For example, in order to prove the tort causes of action, plaintiffs must prove elements such as: duty, breach, proximate and actual causation, and that the builder placed the homes into the stream of commerce. (See Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63; Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227.) On the contract causes of action, plaintiffs must prove the existence of a valid written contract for the sale of the home, including proof regarding the existence of basic contractual elements such as offer, acceptance, and consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1624 subd. (a); Roth v. Malson (1997) 67 Cal.App.4th 552, 557.) Defense counsel can argue that exposing the jury to elements that may or may not be applicable to all of the homes in the action will complicate and confuse the jury. Thus, concurrently exposing the jury to the SB-800 claims and the non-SB-800 claims will necessitate undue consumption of time, and create the substantial danger of undue prejudice of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
One of the most important and relevant features of the SB-800 statutes is that they include shortened statutes of limitation as to certain enumerated defects. The codified statutes of limitations apply from the date of “close of escrow,” and are much more definitive than statutes of limitations regarding tort and contract claims. Therefore, they can be utilized within a motion for summary adjudication in cases where only one or a few defects are alleged. For example, under Civil Code section 896, et seq., there is a five year limitation on paint (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(1)); a four year limitation on plumbing fixtures (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (e)); a three year limitation on landscaping (Civ. Code § 896, subd. (g)(12)); and a one year limitation on irrigation systems and drainage (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(7)). The non-SB-800 claims are subject to a four year statute of limitation for patent defects and a ten year statute of limitation for latent defects. (See Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1, 337.15.) The contrast between the statute of limitations for the SB-800 claims and non-SB-800 claims can complicate a matter at trial, further establishing the necessity to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Hence, defense counsel should also utilize a motion to bifurcate the statute of limitations issues from the issue of liability if a question of fact exists. If successful on the motion to bifurcate, plaintiff’s counsel will be barred from the introducing evidence at trial regarding a defect where the statute of limitations has run.
Defense counsel should also seek to simplify the construction standards for the jury. Ultimately, by drafting jury instructions and a special verdict form that is easy to navigate, counsel can promote an easy interpretation of the standards enumerated within the Civil Code. The best route for drafting a special verdict form is to draft it as a check-list, similar to a traditional real estate walk-through check-list. By incorporating the shortened statutes of limitations into the special verdict form, defense counsel can effectively frame the case for the jury. The special verdict form should also allow the jury to easily eliminate any claim for damages that is mitigated, in whole or in part, through the codified affirmative defenses. Defense counsel should also consider drafting a trial brief that effectively and simplistically provides the trial court judge with an understanding of the specific defects before the court, and simultaneously notes which Civil Code standards are implicated and the scope of the same. If the trial judge is not well versed in construction defect litigation, defense counsel should be all the more careful in breaking down the parameters and limitations codified within SB-800 for the court.
The strategies outlined within this article are only a few tactics that can be utilized to defend a construction defect suit. Depending on the defect allegations within any particular case, defense counsel should become intimately familiar with Title VII of the Civil Code and use all aspects of the same to their advantage. If not, plaintiffs’ counsel will have the advantage during “court-house step” settlement discussions and at trial.
Printed courtesy of Samir R. Patel, Esq. of Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com.
Landmark San Diego Hotel Settles Defects Suit for $6.4 Million
March 4, 2011 — April 4, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
After five years of legal battles, the condo owners of the El Cortez Hotel building in downtown San Diego settled for $6.4 million, as reported by The San Diego Union-Tribune on March 28, 2011. The Homeowners Association will net just over $3 million from the settlement.
The litigation may have had an adverse effect on the value of the condos within the El Cortez Hotel building. According to an article by Kelly Bennett of Voice of San Diego, “Many condos in the building originally sold for more than $600,000. Currently, the three units on the market are asking for just more than $200,000, the U-T said.”
Andrew Berman, the owners’ attorney, told The San Diego Union-Tribune that the five years of litigation included six lawsuits, 200 depositions, and multiple construction tests.
Read the full story... (San Diego Union Tribune)
Read the full story... (Voice of San Diego)
Defective Drains Covered Despite Water Intrusion Exclusion
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Washington State has granted a summary judgment in Hiller v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. The Hillers bought a new home in Wenatchee, Washington and insured it with an “all risk” policy from Allstate. Subsequently, Mr. Hiller discovered that the carpet in the basement was saturated with water. Hiller notified Allstate who requested that he determine the source of the water intrusion. Hiller poured water into a downspout drain and found this caused water to leak into the home’s basement.
Further investigation with the homes original excavation contractor revealed that “the end of the drain pipe was partially blocked by rocks and had been wrapped with fabric landscaping material.” Additionally, “a ‘T’ pipe installed at the foot of the drain was directing water toward the house’s concrete foundation.” Allstate denied the claim “under the policy’s surface water, subsurface water, inherent vice, and latent defect exlusions.” After the denial, Hiller “discovered that the foundation had not been treated with waterproof sealant and that several concrete form pins were still in place.”
The court noted that “there is no genuine dispute about the cause of the claimed loss.” This left the court concluding that “the only relevant question for the purposes of the instant cross-motions for summary judgment is whether a loss caused by defective construction is covered under the Hillers’ ‘all risk’ insurance policy.” Under Washington’s “efficient proximate cause” rule, “where an insured risk itself sets into operation a chain of causation in which the last step may have en an excepted risk, the excepted risk will not defeat recovery.” The court found that a loss caused by defective construction is in fact covered under the policy, noting that “the policy does not contain an exclusion for defective construction.”
The court concluded that the defective drain was not an inherent vice, as it “cannot properly be characterized as defects ‘inherent [in the] nature of the commodity which will cause it to deteriorate with a lapse of time.” Nor was it a latent defect, “one that could not have been discovered by inspection.” The court concluded that “both of the construction defects at issue could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection.”
With these facts determined, the court found for the Hillers.
Read the court»s decision…
Liability policy covers negligent construction: GA high court
October 31, 2010 — Original article by
Michael Bradford in Business Insurance
ATLANTA—Negligent construction that results in damage to surrounding property constitutes an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy, the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled.
In a 6-1 opinion Monday in
American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Hathaway Development Co. Inc., the Georgia high court upheld a lower court ruling that the general contractor’s claim for damage caused by a subcontractor’s faulty plumbing work was covered.
The ruling on construction defects is the latest in number of such cases across the United States
Read Full Story...
Reprinted courtesy of Michael Bradford of Business Insurance.