Judge Kobayashi Determines No Coverage for Construction Defect Claim
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Judge Kobayashi of the U.S. District Court, District of Hawaii, largely followed earlier precedent established by Judge Mollway in finding no coverage for construction defect claims. See Evanston v. Nagano, 2012 WL 3800320 (D. Hawaii Aug. 31, 2012).
Evanston issued several liability policies to the insured contractor from 2002 and 2011. The insured entered a contract to build a residence in Honolulu. The homeowners were not happy with their home after the work was completed. They filed suit, alleging that the project was delayed and the construction was "riddled with defects." The complaint included claims for breach of contract and breach of warranties. Negligence was not alleged. Evanston defended, but under a reservation of rights.
Evanston filed suit for a declaratory judgment and moved for summary judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
South Carolina Legislature Defines "Occurrence" To Include Property Damage Arising From Faulty Workmanship
May 26, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
On May 17, 2011, South Carolina passed legislation to combat the restrictive interpretation of what constitutes an "occurrence" under CGL policies. S.C. Code Ann. sec. 38-61-70.
The legislation reversed a decision by the state's Supreme Court issued earlier this year. See Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 W.L. 93716 (S.C. Jan. 7, 2011). Crossman had overruled an earlier decision by the South Carolina Supreme Court that holding that defective construction was an “occurrence.” Crossman, however, reversed course, holding that damages resulting from faulty workmanship were the “natural and probable cause” of the faulty work and, as such, did not qualify as an “occurrence.”
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Wine without Cheese? (Why a construction contract needs an order of precedence clause)(Law Note)
August 11, 2011 — Melissa Brumback
For today’s law note, I’m addressing a comment that came to me last week from Dave O’Hern of Miller O’Hern Construction. Dave writes:
I am a general contractor doing a fuel tank replacement project for our county. In the specifications there is a spec for a UL 142 tank, on the plans the spec references UL 2085 ? a much more expensive tank. My subcontractor bid the UL 142 tank. The specifications state that the specs and plans are on the same level of precedence.
The county wants me to furnish the more expensive tank without compensation citing the clause that states the plans and specs are complementary and what is called for by one is binding as if called by all and the most stringent requirement will apply.
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Texas res judicata and co-insurer defense costs contribution
March 23, 2011 — Original story by CDCoverage.com, March 23, 2011
In Truck Ins. Exchange v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., No. 03-08-00526-CV (Tex. App. 3d Aug. 27, 2010), insured contractor DCI was sued by the project owner seeking damages for defective construction. DCI tendered its defense to its CGL insurers Truck and Mid-Continent. Truck agreed to defend while Mid-Continent denied a defense. While the underlying suit was pending, Mid-Continent sued DCI, but not Truck, and obtained a judicial declaration of no duty to defend or indemnify DCI in the underlying suit. After settling the underlying suit, Truck sued Mid-Continent seeking contribution towards defense costs and indemnity payments. The state trial court entered summary judgment for Mid-Continent. The intermediate appellate court affirmed.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Arbitration Clause Not Binding on Association in Construction Defect Claim
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Determining that a community’s CC&Rs do not form an agreement to arbitrate, the California Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of the Superior Court inVerano Condo. Homeowners the Ass’n v. La Cima Dev., LLC (Cal. App., 2012). La Cima purchased an apartment complex in December 2004, which they converted into condominiums. In the process, La Cima created the CC&Rs, under which the Verano Condominium Homeowners Association came into being. One section of the CC&Rs included arbitration clauses. Additionally, the purchase agreements for individual condominium units also contained arbitration clauses. Subsequently, the owners became aware of construction defect both in units and in the common areas. The Association sued La Cima both in its own interest and on behalf of its members. La Cima moved to compel arbitration, which was denied by the trial court. La Cima appealed.
The court concluded that “CC&Rs are insufficient to form an agreement to arbitrate between La Cima and the Association.” The court noted that “no evidence exists to show the Association consented to the terms of the CC&Rs, either explicitly or implicitly.”
The court agreed with La Cima that the arbitration agreement applied to those owners who had purchased their units directly from La Cima. Moreover, as the conversion to condominiums involved interstate commerce, in part because a Delaware company was selling condominiums located in California, the court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied, and as such “even a state constitutional standard, such as the the jury waiver provision requirements of the California Constitution, cannot be used to circumvent the FAA in the face of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement.”
However, the court also held that there was “no agreement in the CC&Rs between La Cima and owners who did not purchase units directly from La Cima,” adding that “no meeting of the minds between La Cima and these later purchasers and their successors occurred.” The court did not believe that “the Legislature intended that CC&Rs would be used to provide continuing and irrevocable contractual development or role as a representative of the owners of the development.”
The purpose of the CC&Rs, according to the court are to “protect owners from one another and permit enforcement of its terms by the Association.” The court stated that “La Cima relinquished its interests in the land by selling its property and may not assert any rights under the CC&Rs following the transfer of its ownership interest.
In its conclusion, the court determined that claims must be organized in three classes. The claims the association made against La Cima for defects in the common area “are not subject to any valid agreement to arbitrate.” The second category are those owners who did not purchase their units directly from La Cima. Here, also, the court found that the units “are similarly not subject to a valid arbitration agreement.”
The third category, however, was “owners who purchased units directly from La Cima.” The court held that these arbitration agreements were valid, and if the claims were to be taken up by the association, the association could only submit these claims to arbitration. The lower court was instructed to separate these claims, as here La Cima’s motion could be granted.
Read the court’s decision…
Plaintiff Not Entitled to Further Damages over Defective Decking
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District has rejected an appeal from the successful plaintiff of a construction defect case in Evilsizor v. Calaveras Lumber Company. John Evilsizor hired Scott Hunton to remove and replace the deck at the rear of his home. Subsequently, the deck, which had been constructed with a product called SmartDeck, a product of the subsequently bankrupt US Plastic Lumber, exhibited problems. Hunton made some repairs. Calaveras Lumber offered replacement decking if Evilsizor would pay the difference in price. Mr. Evilsizor hired another contractor to replace the decking and then sued for lost use and compensation for the amount he paid the second contractor. Replacing the deck a second time cost Mr. Evilsizor $113,065.44.
During the trial, the defendant conceded that the planking was defective. It has been recalled by the manufacturer. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from a construction and building codes consultant, Lonne Haughton, however the trial court found that Mr. Haughton did not have sufficient expertise in wood-plastic composite materials. Further, Haughton had been a California contractor for only three years, and though he claimed a college degree, this was “‘a distance learning diploma’ that required no in-class work.” The appeals court upheld the decision that Mr. Haughton was not qualified to testify as an expert about wood-plastic materials.
The court also upheld the trial court’s exclusion of two pieces of evidence. One was a list of SmartDeck sales. However, the witness asked about it was not able “to testify who prepared it or confirm that it had been prepared by a Cascade employee.” Further, “the fact defendant bought and sold SmartDeck was not disputed.” The other was an e-mail in which US Plastics said they had “some bad product in the field.” This e-mail went to Westmark & Associates, and the plaintiff did not establish that it was ever sent to the defendant.
Though the defense has suggested an award of $18,000 plus loss-of-use damages for one year and an additional $4,000 if the jury believed that leftover material from the front deck was used in the rear. As the plaintiff requested $100 per month of loss of use, this would have totaled $34,000. The jury awarded the cost of the decking, $6,275,82. The court cites earlier decision that the amount of the award is “a question of fact to be determined by the jury.”
In conclusion, Mr. Evilsizor was not only unable to receive a larger award, but the court ruled that he must pay the defendant’s cost on appeal.
Read the court's decision…
Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration.
The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this.
PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint.
Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.”
The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.”
As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision.
Read the court’s decision…
Subcontractor Not Liable for Defending Contractor in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled on January 9, 2012 in Hensel Phelps Construction Company v. Urata & Sons Cement, upholding the judgment of the lower court.
Hensel Phelps was the general contractor for a high-rise in Sacramento. They were sued by the owners of the building after problems were discovered in the concrete slabs of the building’s parking garage. Instead of welded steel wire mesh, the slabs had been constructed with fiber mesh. Hensel Phelps filed a cross-complaint against Urata Cement, the subcontractor that had performed the cement work. Urata refused to defend Hensel Phelps. The owners’ case was subsequently dismissed due to the statute of limitations.
Although the original case was over, Hensel Phelps continued in their claims against Urata. “Urata argued that a handwritten interlineation required Hensel Phelps to prove Urata was at fault for the injury alleged in the building owners’ complaint before Urata was obliged to defend Hensel Phelps in that action.”
The lower court concluded that Urata would have been obligated to defend Hensel Phelps if the owners’ lawsuit had alleged that the damage was due to the subcontractor’s work or if evidence at trial established this. The lower court found neither of these true. Instead, the use of the fiber mesh was a design issue and “that decision was outside the scope of the subcontractor’s work.”
During the trial, Hensel Phelps conceded that Urata was not at fault. The appeals court could find no reading of the contract that would cause Urata to be obligated to defend Hensel Phelps, calling Hensel Phelps’s reading of the contact as “grammatically infeasible.”
Judges Nicholson, Raye, and Butz upheld the decision of the lower court and awarded costs on appeal to Urata.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Demand Unsteady, Gains in Some Regions
June 29, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Associated General Contractors of America reported Tuesday, June 28 that construction employment increased in 120 of the 337 metropolitan areas surveyed between May 2010 and May 2011.
‘While construction employment has stopped plunging, any sign of a recovery remains spotty at best,” said Ken Simonson, the association’s chief economist. ‘The close to even split between areas adding and losing jobs is a reminder that for every market doing well, there is another market that is still hurting.”
The largest number of jobs created was in the Dallas, Texas region, with 5,600 new jobs, a five percent increase. The northern Massachusetts/southern New Hampshire region near Haverhill saw the greatest percentage increase, although that twenty-two percent increase represents only 800 new jobs. The Chicago, Illiinois area added 4,600 jobs, a four percent increase.
Other regions were not so lucky. The Atlanta, Georgia area saw a loss of 7,400 jobs, an eight percent loss. Las Vegas also lost 7,400 jobs, which there represented a sixteen percent decline. The New York City area lost 6,700 jobs, a six percent reduction. The Riverside, California area lost 5,300 jobs, a nine percent loss.
Stephen E. Sandherr, the association’s chief executive officer, blamed a combination of regulation and budget squeezes. "Some in Washington never met a regulation they didn’t like and others never found a penny they didn’t want to pinch. Together that makes for a bad way to boost employment and a great way to stifle the private sector and neglect critical economic infrastructure.”
Read the full story…
Retaining Wall Contractor Not Responsible for Building Damage
July 20, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled on July 8 in the case of Rollander Enterprises, Inc. v. H.C. Nutting Co. Judge Baily wrote the opinion affirming the decision of the trial court.
The case involved an unfinished condominium complex, the Slopes of Greendale, in Greendale, Indiana. Rollander is a real estate development company incorporated in Ohio. One of the issues in the case was whether the case should be settled in the Indiana courts or be tried in Ohio. The project was owned by a special purpose entity limited liability corporation incorporated in Indiana.
Rollander hired Nutting to determine the geological composition of the site. Nutting’s report described the site as “a medium plastic clay containing pieces of shale and limestone.” The court summarized this as corresponding with “slope instability and landslides.” Rollander then hired Nutting to design the retaining walls, which were constructed by Scherziner Drilling.
After cracking was discovered on State Route 1, the walls were discovered to be inadequate. More dirt was brought in and a system of tie-backs was designed to anchor the walls. Not only were the tie-backs unsightly, local officials would not approve the complex for occupancy. Further, the failure of the wall below one building lead to damage of that building.
The court concluded that since almost all events occurred in Indiana, they rejected Rollander’s contention that the case should be tried in Ohio. Further, the court notes “the last event making Nutting potentially liable on both claims was an injury that occurred in Indiana and consequently, under the lex loci delicti analysis, Indiana law applies.”
Nor did the court find that Nutting was responsible for the damage to the rest of the project, citing an Indiana Supreme Court ruling, that “there is no liability in tort to the owner of a major construction project for pure economic loss caused unintentionally by contractors, subcontractors, engineers, design professionals, or others engaged in the project with whom the project owner, whether or not technically in privity of contract, is connected through a network or chain of contracts.”
The court concluded:
Because Rollander was in contractual privity with Nutting, and Indy was connected to Nutting through a chain of contracts and no exception applies, the economic loss rule precludes their recovery in tort. Damage to Building B was not damage to "other property," and the negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss rule is inapplicable on these facts. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by entering judgment on the evidence in favor of Nutting on the Appellants' negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims.
Read the court’s decision…
Changes To Indemnification Statute Are Here! Say Hello To Defense Duties
June 19, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
A months back, I discussed the passage of SHB 1559. The law changes the existing statutory indemnification regulation to include the costs of defense and to rid contracts of unfair indemnification for someone else’s sole negligence. The law went into effect last week!
Check back to my recent article on the changes set forth in the new law. The amendments to RCW 4.24.115 will broaden the existing law and clarify what types of indemnification are unenforceable. In short, an “up the chain” contractor (such as a general contractor) cannot expect to pass 100% of the defense and indemnification obligations downward if it is partially liable.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Construction Defects Not Occurrences under Ohio Law
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Concluding the “claims of defective construction or workmanship brought by a property owners are not claims for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ under a commercial general liability policy,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled in Westfield Insurance Co. v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc. In the underlying case, Custom Agri Systems, Inc. built a grain bin as a subcontractor to Younglove Construction, LLC. Younglove had been contracted by PSD Development, which withheld payment, claiming it had suffered damages due to defects in Custom Agri System’s work. Younglove filed a complaint against Custom Agri, which filed complaints against its subcontractors. Custom Agri also requested that its insurer, Westfield Insurance Company, defend and indemnify it. Westfield claimed that it had no such duty. The Ohio Supreme Court concurred.
The decision notes that “Custom was being sued under two general theories: defective construction and consequential damages resulting from the defective construction.” Westfield argued that none of the claims were “for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence” and therefore none of the claims were covered under the CGL policy.” Further, Westfield argued that “even if the claims were for property damage caused by an occurrence, they were removed from coverage by an exclusion in the policy.”
The case was filed in the US District Court which issued a summary judgment for Westfield. The plaintiff appealed and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the questions to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The court noted that “all of the claims against which Westfield is being asked to defect and indemnify Custom relate to Custom’s work itself.” And so, the court concluded that they “must decide whether Custom’s alleged defective construction of and workmanship on the steel grain bin constitute property damage caused by an ‘occurrence.’” However, the court noted that under the terms of the insurance contract, an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” and the court noted that the “natural and commonly accepted meaning” of “accident” is something “unexpected, as well as unintended.”
The Ohio Supreme Court also looked at court decisions in other places, and found that in many similar cases, courts have concluded that construction defects are not occurrences.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Pfeifer argues that “if the defective construction is accidental, it constitutes an ‘occurrence’ under a CGL policy.” Justice Pfeifer characterized the majority’s definition of “accidental” as “broad, covering unexpected, unintentional happenings.”
Read the court’s decision…
Exclusions Bar Coverage for Damage Caused by Chinese Drywall
July 5, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly,
Insurance Law HawaiiThe insured homeowners were unsuccessful in arguing around the policy's exclusions when seeking coverage for damage caused by Chinese drywall. Ross v. C. Adams. Constr. & Design, L.L.C., 2011 La. App. LEXIS 769 (La. Ct. App. June 14, 2011).
Before the insureds purchased and moved into their home, it was renovated. After moving in, the insures discovered foreign gypsum drywall, or Chinese drywall. The insureds submitted a claim to Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. In an investigation, the insurer confirmed the presence of Chinese drywall and damage to the metal surfaces caused by corrosion. Louisiana Citizens refused coverage and the insureds sued. The trial court denied the insured's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Louisiana Citizens.
The court of appeal affirmed. Initially, the court determined the insureds sustained a direct physical loss. The inherent qualities of the Chinese drywall created a physical loss to the home and required that the drywall be removed and replaced.
Four exclusions, however, barred coverage. First, damages due to faulty or defective materials were excluded from coverage. The Chinese drywall emitted high levels of sulfuric gas which caused the damage to the insured's plumbing, electrical wiring and metal components.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Fifth Circuit Asks Texas Supreme Court to Clarify Construction Defect Decision
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fifth Circuit Court has withdrawn its decision in Ewing Construction Company v. Amerisure Insurance Company, pending clarification from the Texas Supreme Court of its decision in Gilbert Texas Construction, L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London. The Fifth Circuit had applied the Gilbert case in determining that a contractual liability exclusion barred coverage for faulty workmanship. The Insurance Journal reports that this decision was both applauded and criticized, with a concern noted that “an insurer would now have its pick of either the ‘your work’ exclusion or the contractual liability exclusion without the exception for subcontracted work.”
The Fifth Circuit is now asking the Texas Supreme Court two questions to clarify Gilbert, which Brian S. Martin and Suzanne M. Patrick see as a sign that the Court has realized that it overly expanded the scope of the earlier ruling. A response is expected from the Texas Supreme Court by spring 2013.
Read the full story…
HOA Has No Claim to Extend Statute of Limitations in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 20, 2011 in the case of Arundel Homeowners Association v. Arundel Green Partners, a construction defect case involving a condominium conversion in San Francisco. Eight years after the Notice of Completion was filed, the homeowners association filed a lawsuit alleging a number of construction defects, including “defective cabinets, waterproofing membranes, wall-cladding, plumbing, electrical wiring, roofing (including slope, drainage and flashings), fire-rated ceilings, and chimney flues.” Three years of settlement negotiations followed.
Negotiations ended in the eleventh year with the homeowners association filing a lawsuit. Arundel Green argued that the suit should be thrown out as California’s ten-year statute of limitations had passed. The court granted judgment to Arundel Green.
The homeowners then filed for a new trial and to amend its complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply due to the doctrine of equitable estoppel as Arundel Green’s actions had lead them to believe the issues could be solved without a lawsuit. “The HOA claimed that it was not until after the statute of limitations ran that the HOA realized Arundel Green would not keep its promises; and after this realization, the HOA promptly brought its lawsuit.” The trial court denied the homeowners association’s motions, which the homeowners association appealed.
In reviewing the case, the Appeals Court compared Arundel to an earlier California Supreme Court case, Lantzy. (The homeowners also cited Lantzy as the basis of their appeal.) In Lantzy, the California Supreme Court set up a four-part test as to whether estoppel could be applied. The court applied these tests and found, as was the case in Lantzy, that there were no grounds for estoppel.
In Arundel, the court noted that “there are simply no allegations that Arundel Green made any affirmative statement or promise that would lull the HOA into a reasonable belief that its claims would be resolved without filing a lawsuit.” The court also cited Lesko v. Superior Court which included a recommendation that the plaintiffs “send a stipulation?Ķextending time.” This did not happen and the court upheld the dismissal.
Read the court’s decision…
Application of Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine Supports Coverage
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Relying on the efficient proximate cause doctrine, the court determined coverage potentially existed for damage caused by water. Union Sav. Bank v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134398 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 21, 2011).
The Tods purchased property that was mortgaged by Union Savings. The Tods obtained a Landlords Policy for the property from Allstate. When the Tods were in default on their loan, Union Savings notified them that foreclosure proceedings would commence. Union Savings sent an appraiser to the property who discovered water in the basement. Water and electricity to the building were off. Union Savings notified Allstate and later filed a formal claim under the mortgagee clause in the Landlords Policy. This clause stated, "A covered loss will be payable to the mortgagees named on the policy declaration. . . ."
Allstate denied coverage, citing exclusions for water damage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Time to Repair Nevada’s Construction Defect Laws?
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Builders Magazine writes that during the previous session of the Nevada legislature, reforms sought by the building industry were stopped by the Speaker of the Nevada Assembly. The new session brings a new speaker and new hope for construction defect reform in Nevada.
Pat Hickey, a member of the Assembly and a small business owner told The Builders Magazine that “we need to apply pressure on the legislators to fix the law.” He also recommended that people “go to Governor Sandoval and ask for his help.” Builders seeks legislation that will include right to repair and it should “define construction defect in such a way that it allows for a fair process.”
Read the full story…
Construction Defect Exception Does Not Lift Bar in Payment Dispute
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of appeals of Oregon has affirmed the ruling of a lower court, agreeing that ORS 701.131(1) bars John Pincetich from pursuing a payment dispute against his clients, Thomas and Frances Nolan. The Nolans hired Mr. Pincetich to build a home, during which time Mr. Pinchtich lost his license due to a lapse in liability insurance. Mr. Pincetich was reinstated after reestablishing insurance.
After the house was concluded, a dispute over payment arose. The Nolans claimed that Mr. Pincetich was unable to bring an action against them as ORS 701.131(1)(b) specifies that the contractor must hold a license “continuously while performing the work for which compensation is sought.” As there were fourteen days in which Mr. Pincetich did not hold a license, the trial court concluded that this law did not apply.
Mr. Pincetich claimed that in hiring him, the defendants became residential developers. Mr. Pincetich argued that developers are exempted under ORS 701.121(2)(C), but this was rejected by the trial court. This formed the basis of his appeal. The appeals court concluded that the exception he cited was motivated to “further benefit consumers by providing authority for unlicensed contractors to pursue third-party claims in construction-defect cases.” The court concluded that Mr. Pincetich’s reasoning would “allow unlicensed contractors to do the very thing that the claims bar is intended to prevent them from doing.”
Read the court’s decision…