The King of Construction Defect Scams
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Echoing Businessweek, the Las Vegas Sun agrees that the Nevada HOA scandal is the “king of all Vegas real estate scams,” and says that the Nevada legislatures should take action. The Sun notes that the case involves only 12 out of 2,356 HOAs in Southern Nevada.
To date, 25 people have plead guilty in the case. At the center were an attorney and contractor who allegedly referred work to each other. To enable this, they assembled a wider conspiracy of people who enriched by the process. In the words of the Sun, those involved “upended the concept of a ‘common interest’ community.”
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Restitution Unlikely in Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The San Francisco Chronicle reports that the money lost in the Las Vegas HOA fraud cause is probably not recoverable. Victims of the scam have asked the court for restitution, but Judge Lloyd George doubts any of the money will be found, saying “the money is not available, it would appear.”
One Vistana board members not part of the conspiracy told reporters that the $8 million construction defect settlement never went for needed repairs. “Within six months that money was gone,” said Bruce Wallace, a retired Air Force colonel. After the construction defect account was depleted to $450,000, two board members disappeared with the funds.
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HOA Has No Claim to Extend Statute of Limitations in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 20, 2011 in the case of Arundel Homeowners Association v. Arundel Green Partners, a construction defect case involving a condominium conversion in San Francisco. Eight years after the Notice of Completion was filed, the homeowners association filed a lawsuit alleging a number of construction defects, including “defective cabinets, waterproofing membranes, wall-cladding, plumbing, electrical wiring, roofing (including slope, drainage and flashings), fire-rated ceilings, and chimney flues.” Three years of settlement negotiations followed.
Negotiations ended in the eleventh year with the homeowners association filing a lawsuit. Arundel Green argued that the suit should be thrown out as California’s ten-year statute of limitations had passed. The court granted judgment to Arundel Green.
The homeowners then filed for a new trial and to amend its complaint, arguing that the statute of limitations should not apply due to the doctrine of equitable estoppel as Arundel Green’s actions had lead them to believe the issues could be solved without a lawsuit. “The HOA claimed that it was not until after the statute of limitations ran that the HOA realized Arundel Green would not keep its promises; and after this realization, the HOA promptly brought its lawsuit.” The trial court denied the homeowners association’s motions, which the homeowners association appealed.
In reviewing the case, the Appeals Court compared Arundel to an earlier California Supreme Court case, Lantzy. (The homeowners also cited Lantzy as the basis of their appeal.) In Lantzy, the California Supreme Court set up a four-part test as to whether estoppel could be applied. The court applied these tests and found, as was the case in Lantzy, that there were no grounds for estoppel.
In Arundel, the court noted that “there are simply no allegations that Arundel Green made any affirmative statement or promise that would lull the HOA into a reasonable belief that its claims would be resolved without filing a lawsuit.” The court also cited Lesko v. Superior Court which included a recommendation that the plaintiffs “send a stipulation?Ķextending time.” This did not happen and the court upheld the dismissal.
Read the court’s decision…
Repair of Part May Necessitate Replacement of Whole
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Judge Gleuda E. Edmonds, a magistrate judge in the United States District Court of Arizona issued a ruling in Guadiana v. State Farm on January 25, 2012. Judge Edmonds recommended a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Ms. Guandiana’s home had water damage due to pluming leaks in September 2004. She was informed that polybutylene pluming in her house could not be repaired in parts “it must be completely replaced.” She had had the plumbing replaced. State Farm denied her claim, arguing that “the tear-out provision did not cover the cost of accessing and replacing those pipes that were not leaking.”
In September 2007, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss. The court rejected this motion, stating that “If Guadiana can establish as a matter of fact that the system that caused the covered loss included all the pipes in her house and it was necessary to replace all the pipes to repair that system, State Farm is obligated to pay the tear-out costs necessary to replace all the pipes, even those not leaking.”
In March 2009, State Farm filed for summary judgment, which the court granted. State Farm argued that “the tear-out provision only applied to ‘repair’ and not ‘replace’ the system that caused the covered leak.” As for the rest of the piping, State Farm argued that “the policy does not cover defective materials.”
In December 2011, Ms. Guadiana filed for summary judgment, asking the court to determine that “the policy ‘covers tear-out costs necessary to adequately repair the plumbing system, even if an adequate repair requires replacing all or part of the system.”
In her ruling, Judge Edmonds noted that Ms. Guadiana’s claim is that “the water damage is a covered loss and she is entitled to tear-out costs necessary to repair the pluming system that caused that covered loss.” She rejected State Farm’s claim that it was not obligated to replace presumably defective pipes. Further, she rejected State Farm’s argument that they were only responsible for the leaking portion, noting “Guadiana intends to prove at trial that this is an unusual case where repair of her plumbing system requires replacement of all the PB plumbing.”
Judge Edmonds concluded by directing the District Court to interpret the tear out issue as “the tear-out provision in State Farm’s policy requires State Farm to pay all tear-out costs necessary to repair the plumbing system (that caused the covered loss) even if repair of the system requires accessing more than the leaking portion of the system.”
Read the court’s decision…
Loose Bolts Led to Sagging Roof in Construction Defect Claim
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Though the sagging roof is neither leaking nor a safety hazard, the town of Waynesville, North Carolina is suing the builder of its new fire station, as reported in the Smoky Mountain News. The engineers who examined the roof found a substantial number of loose bolts in the roof trusses. Additionally, the trusses themselves have become bent.
Tom Galloway, Waynesville’s Town Manager said “it needs to be remedied and fixed.” He said that the builder, Construction Logic, “never indicated a willingness to fix the roof.” The town is seeking the cost of repair, which Galloway estimated could be $400,000, and an additional $30,000 in damages. The suit states that Construction Logic failed to follow the plan specifications for the roof.
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Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
Read the court’s decision…
Tenth Circuit Finds Insurer Must Defend Unintentional Faulty Workmanship
December 9, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit found a duty to defend construction defect claims where the faulty workmanship was unintentional. Greystone Const. Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22053 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011). A prior post [here] discussed the Tenth Circuit’s certified question to the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter, a request that was rejected by the Colorado court.
In two underlying cases, Greystone was sued by the homeowner for damage caused to the foundation by soil expansion. In both cases, the actual construction was performed by subcontractors. Further, in neither case was the damage intended or anticipated. Nevertheless, National Union refused to defend, contending property damage resulting from faulty construction was not an occurrence.
Relying on a Colorado Court of Appeals case, General Security Indemn. Co. of Arizona v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), the district court granted summary judgment to National Union.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first considered whether Colorado legislation enacted to overturn General Security could be applied retroactively. The statute, section 13-20-808, provided courts "shall presume that the work of a construction professional that results in property damage, including damage to the work itself or other work, is an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the insured."
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Insurance Policy Provides No Coverage For Slab Collapse in Vision One
August 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
This post will examine whether Division Two of the Washington Court of Appeals properly reversed and remanded several lower court decisions in the case of Vision One LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance. In short, and from the perspective of an appellate attorney, the court of appeals got the decision right. Given the rules of contract interpretation and causation in tort claims, there was really no other way the court could have ruled. I understand that from a contractor’s perspective and insurance perspective, the decision seems odd. But from a purely legal standpoint, the decision is well-reasoned and well-supported. Let me explain.
Background
First, here are the facts in a nutshell. Vision One is a construction company that undertook to construct a condo complex in Tacoma. Vision then contracted with D&D Concrete to pour a concrete slab for a section of the foundation. To shore the concrete slab, D&D further contracted Berg Equipment to provide necessary equipment to stabilize the structure. Well, something down the line went wrong. The shoring failed and the slab collapsed, causing a great deal of damage.
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Read the court’s decision…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Florida: No Implied Warranties for Neighborhood Improvements
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A new law in Florida ends suits from homeowners associations from suing over damages from off-site improvements on the basis of implied warranties. Rob Samouch, writing for the Naples Daily News quotes House Biill 1013: “There is no cause of action in law or equity available to a purchaser of a home or to a homeowners’ association based upon the doctrine or theory of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability or habitability for damages to off-site improvements." The off-site improvements are defined as: "The street, road, driveway, sidewalk, drainage, utilities, or any other improvement or structure that is not located on or under the lot on which a new home is constructed.”
Mr. Samouch notes that “there are no statutory warrant rights in homeowner associations of fitness and merchantability or habitability like there is for condominium associations.” He predicts that the Florida legislature will have to address this issue “once new homeowners start screaming and yelling to them about their shoddy infrastructure for which they have no legal remedy.”
The bill took effect on July 1, 2012 and applies to “all cases accruing before, pending on, or filed after July 1, 2012.”
Read the full story…
Plans Go High Tech
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
One construction executive described it as “the wave of the future.” What is it? Accessing building plans on an iPad. According to an article in MacWorld, several companies are now offering solutions to distribute and update construction plans on iPads. Changes to plans and notes can be distributed quickly through cloud computing.
Alan Dillon, a senior superintendent at DPR Construction told MacWorld, “I can take my iPad into the field and have my whole set of drawings.” He described a set of drawings for a large construction project as “five or six inches thick.” Danielle Douthet, of Level 10 Construction said it “can help everyone be on the same page more quickly, and make sure that everybody is working off the most current set of documents.”
And it’s not just building plans. Other firms offer building management applications designed to be taken into the field on mobile devices.
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General Contractors Must Plan to Limit Liability for Subcontractor Injury
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog
It takes more than a hard hat, but safety checks, a good policy and a smart contract might save you some problems.If you are a general contractor, you will want to pay close attention to this article. A new Washington appellate decision showcases a general contractor’s liability to subcontractors who are injured on the job, when security barriers fail. But can a general limit this liability? Will its contract help?
In Wrought Corporation, Inc., Appellant V. Mario Interiano (quick note: this opinion is unpublished, but we are here to talk about an issue that was not determined on appeal – WISHA compliance), a subcontractor was injured when a security barrier failed and he fell into an elevator shaft.
A jury awarded a $1.56 million verdict against the general contractor, and the court of appeals affirmed on the basis that the general contractor has a non-delegable duty to ensure compliance with the Washington Industrial Safety and Health Act of 1973, codified under RCW 49.17 (WISHA).
Read the full story… Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Anti-Concurrent Causation Clause Bars Coverage for Landslide and Water Leak
June 19, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The insured unsuccessfully attempted to get around the policy’s anti-concurrent causation clause by arguing a covered cause of loss was a contributing factor. See Stor/Gard, Inc. v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63217 (D. Mass. May 4, 2012).
A building at the insured’s storage facility was damaged when heavy rain caused a mass of soil to slide down a slope, causing soil and a retaining wall to fall on the building. The accident caused a partial collapse of the building. The insurer hired two soil engineers, each of whom concluded that a landslide caused the accident. The reports also noted, however, that a leak from the property’s drainage system resulted in a very small percentage of water infiltrating the ground.
The insurer denied coverage based upon an exclusion for landslides.
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 — April 25, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
Read the trial court’s decision…
Contract Not So Clear in South Carolina Construction Defect Case
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has reversed a partial summary judgment issued by one of the lower courts in the case of The Retreat at Edisto Co-Owners Association v. The Retreat at Edisto. The underlying issues of the case deal with a construction defect complaint.
The lower court had concluded “Developer’s ‘First Amendment’ to the Master Deed required the Developer to satisfy the provision in the paragraph labeled ‘Master Deed Amendment or Phase II’ as a condition precedent to its election to proceed with the development of Phase II.”
The appeals court found that “the language of the First Amendment to the Master Deed is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” The court additionally concluded that the “Developer presented the requisite scintilla of evidence on the question of its intent in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact. As the material facts were in dispute, the appeals court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Read the court’s decision…
Micropiles for bad soil: a Tarheel victory
March 14, 2011 — Original article by by Melissa Brumback on March 14, 2011
Despite foundation challenges, construction is almost complete on the expansion at University of North Carolina’s Kenan stadium. The project started with a deep foundation system from design-build contractor GeoStructures. Known as the Carolina Student-Athlete Center for Excellence, the addition was built on a parcel with a knotty mix of fill soils, subsurface boulders and varying depths to rock. To achieve uniform foundation support, GeoStructures designed a Micropile system (also known as a Mini pile system) which could be drilled into the variable ground conditions.
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl law.com.
New Web Site Tracks Settled Construction Defect Claims
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Peter Lissner, a former Nevada homebuilder, has created a new site to help track homes that have been involved in construction defect litigation. His site, housefaxreview.com, collections documentation about homes where claims of construction defects have been made. He told The Builders Magazine concerns about “the number of homes that have been served notices, received compensation, yet the homes weren’t repaired.” On the site, the creator is identified as “a family owned builder.” According to the site, “the builder had no claims until the neighborhood reached the statutory claims limit 10 years.”
Lissner also claims that in many cases, after settling construction defect lawsuits, the homeowners sell to subsequent buyers without disclosing the lawsuit or their failure to repair. “Who is going to let the new homeowner know about the issue?” he asks.
Documents on the site are priced according to their relevance. Lissner notes that those who provide documents to the site will receive free access.
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Insurer’s Motion for Summary Judgment Based on Earth Movement Exclusion Denied
October 28, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
After carefully dissecting the earth movement exclusion, the court denied the insurer’s motion for summary judgment. High Street Lofts Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109043 (D. Colo. Sept. 26, 2011).
The City of Boulder performed road repair work near High Street’s property, some of which involved the use of a vibrating compactor to compact and set the roadbed. High Street noticed damage to its building, such as cracks in walls, sloping of floors and separations of porches from the building itself. High Street contacted the City of Boulder, who forwarded the complaint to its contractor, Concrete Express, Inc.
High Street also filed a claim with its business insurer, American Family, who denied the claim. American Family relied on an opinion letter by High Street’s engineer. The letter indicated that the damage was the result of "soil consolidation/settlement," in response to the construction activities. Based on this letter American Family concluded the claim was excluded under the policy’s earth movement exclusion.
High Street sued American Family, who moved for summary judgment.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Defective Drains Covered Despite Water Intrusion Exclusion
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Washington State has granted a summary judgment in Hiller v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. The Hillers bought a new home in Wenatchee, Washington and insured it with an “all risk” policy from Allstate. Subsequently, Mr. Hiller discovered that the carpet in the basement was saturated with water. Hiller notified Allstate who requested that he determine the source of the water intrusion. Hiller poured water into a downspout drain and found this caused water to leak into the home’s basement.
Further investigation with the homes original excavation contractor revealed that “the end of the drain pipe was partially blocked by rocks and had been wrapped with fabric landscaping material.” Additionally, “a ‘T’ pipe installed at the foot of the drain was directing water toward the house’s concrete foundation.” Allstate denied the claim “under the policy’s surface water, subsurface water, inherent vice, and latent defect exlusions.” After the denial, Hiller “discovered that the foundation had not been treated with waterproof sealant and that several concrete form pins were still in place.”
The court noted that “there is no genuine dispute about the cause of the claimed loss.” This left the court concluding that “the only relevant question for the purposes of the instant cross-motions for summary judgment is whether a loss caused by defective construction is covered under the Hillers’ ‘all risk’ insurance policy.” Under Washington’s “efficient proximate cause” rule, “where an insured risk itself sets into operation a chain of causation in which the last step may have en an excepted risk, the excepted risk will not defeat recovery.” The court found that a loss caused by defective construction is in fact covered under the policy, noting that “the policy does not contain an exclusion for defective construction.”
The court concluded that the defective drain was not an inherent vice, as it “cannot properly be characterized as defects ‘inherent [in the] nature of the commodity which will cause it to deteriorate with a lapse of time.” Nor was it a latent defect, “one that could not have been discovered by inspection.” The court concluded that “both of the construction defects at issue could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection.”
With these facts determined, the court found for the Hillers.
Read the court»s decision…
