Architect Not Responsible for Injuries to Guests
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals has ruled, with one dissent, that the architectural firm that designed a home was not responsible to the injuries caused to guests when a balcony collapsed. Judge David Puryear wrote the majority opinion in Black + Vernooy Architects v. Smith.
Black + Vernooy designed a vacation home for Robert and Kathy Maxfield in 2000. The Maxfields hired a general contractor to build the home. The general contractor hired a subcontractor to build a balcony; however, the subcontractor did not follow the architect’s design in building the balcony.
A year after the house was completed; the Maxfields were visited by Lou Ann Smith and Karen Gravely. The balcony collapsed under the two women. Ms. Gravely suffered a broken finger, a crushed toe, and bruises. Ms. Smith was rendered a paraplegic as a result of the fall. They sued the Maxfields, the general contractor, and the architects for negligence. The Maxfields and the general contractor settled. A jury found that the architects held 10% of the responsibility. The architects appealed the judgment of the district court.
The Appeals Court reversed this judgment, noting that “there has been no allegation that the Architects negligently designed the balcony or that the Architects actually created the defects at issue.” Further, “the Smiths allege that the defect was caused by the construction practices of the contractor and subcontractor when the balcony was not built in accordance with the design plans of the Architects.”
The court found that even though the architects had a duty “to endeavor to guard against defects and deficiencies in the construction of the home and to generally ascertain whether the home was being built in compliance with the construction plans,” this duty did not extend to third parties.
Read the court’s decision…
Home Builder Doesn’t See Long Impact from Hurricane
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
No one needs to tell Toll Brothers about the impact of Hurricane Sandy. The Wall Street Journal reports that the home building company lost power as a result of the storm. Martin Connor, the company’s CFO, told the Journal that he did not expect the hurricane to have a big effect on sales. Luckily for the company, many of its large projects are either sufficiently completed to provide shelter or too early in the process to be affected by the storm. “This type of weather event has limited impact on the market. It may move settlements later, and may defer people a weekend or two until they go out shopping. But it doesn’t have a long impact.”
Read the full story…
Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury” or “property damage” be caused by an “occurrence” and that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury” or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury“ or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivan’s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing , including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
Construction Demand Unsteady, Gains in Some Regions
June 29, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Associated General Contractors of America reported Tuesday, June 28 that construction employment increased in 120 of the 337 metropolitan areas surveyed between May 2010 and May 2011.
‘While construction employment has stopped plunging, any sign of a recovery remains spotty at best,” said Ken Simonson, the association’s chief economist. ‘The close to even split between areas adding and losing jobs is a reminder that for every market doing well, there is another market that is still hurting.”
The largest number of jobs created was in the Dallas, Texas region, with 5,600 new jobs, a five percent increase. The northern Massachusetts/southern New Hampshire region near Haverhill saw the greatest percentage increase, although that twenty-two percent increase represents only 800 new jobs. The Chicago, Illiinois area added 4,600 jobs, a four percent increase.
Other regions were not so lucky. The Atlanta, Georgia area saw a loss of 7,400 jobs, an eight percent loss. Las Vegas also lost 7,400 jobs, which there represented a sixteen percent decline. The New York City area lost 6,700 jobs, a six percent reduction. The Riverside, California area lost 5,300 jobs, a nine percent loss.
Stephen E. Sandherr, the association’s chief executive officer, blamed a combination of regulation and budget squeezes. "Some in Washington never met a regulation they didn’t like and others never found a penny they didn’t want to pinch. Together that makes for a bad way to boost employment and a great way to stifle the private sector and neglect critical economic infrastructure.”
Read the full story…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Ohio Adopts Energy-Efficient Building Code
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a compromise between environmental groups, who were looking for stricter standards, and homebuilders, who were trying to contain building costs, the state of Ohio has adopted buildings codes that will increase the energy efficiency of new homes. The estimated costs are about $1,100 with estimated annual savings of $230. According to Corey Roblee of the International Code Council, “It’s something needed in the state of Ohio.”
The Ohio Home Builders Association opposed a proposal to adopt the guidelines of the International Code Council. Builders will be able to either follow the ICC guidelines or they can use the Ohio guidelines to meet the same energy efficiency. Vincent Squillace, the executive vice president of the OHBA, said, “We came up with an equivalent code that’s more strict but is about $2,000 cheaper per home to implement than the original code.”
The new code will require that at least 75% of lighting must be high efficiency, increases the degree of insulation, and specifies more efficient windows, among other changes.
Read the full story…
Surveyors Statute Trumps Construction Defect Claim in Tennessee
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued an opinion in the case of Dale v. B&J Enters. (Tenn. App., 2012), affirming the ruling of the Chancery Court for Knox County. The homeowners purchased properties in Knoxville, Tennessee in 2007 and 2008. Subsequently, according to the complaint, they found “significant sink holes and depressions throughout the subdivision.” The plaintiffs determined that a previous developer in 2004 had been aware of the sink holes. The Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, upon giving approval, made requirements that included that sink holes, even if they were filled, had to be designated on the site plans. The developer did not indicate these locations on the final plans. The plaintiffs made claims of “failure to disclose, misrepresentation, misrepresentation by concealment, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.” They filed their suit in June 2009.
The defendants in the initial case, argued that they did not create the final plat, the site plan indicating the features and lot lines. This had been the work of the previous developer. In September, 2009, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to include the previous developer and its engineering firm. The engineering firm disavowed any responsibility. The developer noted that the surveyor, Benchmark Associates, had “failed to properly include the sink holes and/or depressions on the final plat.” In June, 2010, the plaintiffs added Benchmark.
Benchmark argued that the plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed, as Tennessee has a four-year statute of limitations on claims against surveyors. The final plat was recorded on May 19, 2006, and the plaintiff filed their claims against Benchmark on June 16, 2010, slightly less than a month over four years. The plaintiffs argued that “the real issue [was] the tortious misrepresentation by Benchmark.” The Chancery Court found for Benchmark.
On appeal, the plaintiffs raised three issues. They argued that the trial court applied the wrong section of the law, and should have applied the section applying to construction and not surveyors. They also argued that the timeliness of the claim should be based on when the defects were discovered. The also raised the question of whether the laws concerning surveyors bar claims for misrepresentation. The appeals court upheld the decision of the Chancery Court.
For the plaintiff’s first claim, although the statute addressing deficiencies in construction mentions surveying, an earlier court ruling found that the legislature had removed a reference to surveyors in one part of the statute, but failed to do so in the second part. The earlier court had concluded that the “obvious intent of the legislature was to place all limits on actions against surveyors into the new statute.” As the applicable statute states that “any such action not instituted within this four (4) year period shall be forever barred,” the court held that the plaintiffs’ claims must be time barred. Further, as the intent of the legislature was determined to “place all limits on actions against surveyors into one statute,” the court felt that it could not apply the Consumer Protection Act.
Read the court’s decision…
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm
March 8, 2011 — March 8, 2011, Colorado Construction Litigation
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that the “owned property exclusion” applied to bar coverage for claims of property damage. See Panico v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2011 WL 322830 (10th Cir. 2011). In Panico, the plaintiffs sold property in Aspen, Colorado to the Taylors, who sued the Panicos upon discovering the property was not as represented. After refusing to defend, the Panicos sued State Farm for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the Taylors’ claims were not covered under the Panicos insurance policies and granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. Panico built the house on the property as well as several additions to the house. As the Taylors lived in Florida, they primarily relied on their real estate agent and an inspector to ensure the property was acceptable. According to their complaint, the Taylors discovered that the house was “virtually uninhabitable due to serious design and construction defects, mold, rodents, and drainage problems.” Id. at *1. In their complaint, the Taylors asserted three claims for relief against the Panicos based upon misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment about the condition of the property.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Ohio Court Finds No Coverage for Construction Defect Claims
March 1, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Charles and Valerie Myers hired Perry Miller to build their home. Myers v. United Ohio Ins. Co., 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 287 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012). After completion of the home, Miller was again hired to construct an addition which included a full basement, staircases, bathroom, bedroom, hallway and garage.
After the addition was completed, one of the basement walls began to crack and bow. Miller began to make repairs, but eventually stopped working on the project. Other contractors were hired to make repairs, but further problems developed. A second basement wall began to bow and crack, allowing water into the basement. The wall eventually had to be replaced. Subsequently, the roof over the addition began to leak in five or six places before the drywall could be painted. The leaks caused water stains on the drywall and cause it to separate and tear. It was discovered the roof needed to be replaced.
The Myers sued Miller and his insurer, United Ohio Insurance Company. The trial court ruled that the policy did not provide coverage for faulty workmanship, but did provide coverage for consequential damages caused by repeated exposure to the elements. United Ohio conceded liability in the amount of $2,000 to repair water damage to the drywall. United Ohio was also found liable for $51,576, which included $31,000 to repair the roof and ceiling and $18,576 to replace the basement wall.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Spending Dropped in July
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Bloomberg News reports that after four months of gains in construction spending, July saw a drop of 0.9 percent, wiping out June’s gain of 0.4 percent. Despite the overall decline in spending, there was an increase of 1.5 percent in expenditure on building new single-family homes and 2.8 percent on multifamily residential construction.
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Contract Not So Clear in South Carolina Construction Defect Case
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has reversed a partial summary judgment issued by one of the lower courts in the case of The Retreat at Edisto Co-Owners Association v. The Retreat at Edisto. The underlying issues of the case deal with a construction defect complaint.
The lower court had concluded “Developer’s ‘First Amendment’ to the Master Deed required the Developer to satisfy the provision in the paragraph labeled ‘Master Deed Amendment or Phase II’ as a condition precedent to its election to proceed with the development of Phase II.”
The appeals court found that “the language of the First Amendment to the Master Deed is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” The court additionally concluded that the “Developer presented the requisite scintilla of evidence on the question of its intent in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact. As the material facts were in dispute, the appeals court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
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Summary Judgment in Construction Defect Case Cannot Be Overturned While Facts Are Still in Contention in Related Cases
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Alabama Court of Civil Appeals has dismissed an appeal of a summary judgment in the case Bella Investments, Inc. v. Multi Family Services, Inc. MFS was hired by Bella to be the general contractor for a hotel in Gardendale, Alabama. MFS hired various subcontractors, including the architect for the project. After completion of the hotel in April, 2006, Bella made requests for MFS to repair cracked floor tiles.
In August, 2008, Bella sued MFS, the architect, and various fictitiously named defendants. Subsequently, Bella amended its complaint, naming some of the fictitiously named defendants.
MFS in turn claimed that Bella’s claims were void under the statute of limitations and that Bella was in beach of contact by failing to pay MFS the full amount owed. MFS moved for summary judgment under the statute of limitations, which was granted by the court.
Bella requested that the court “alter, amend, or vacate its summary judgment order.” When this was denied, Bella appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, which transferred the appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals. The Court of Appeals refused to vacate the summary judgment as claims that form part of the case against MFS are also part of Bella’s claims against the other defendants. For this reason, the court upheld the summary judgment.
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Legislatures Shouldn’t Try to Do the Courts’ Job
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
David Thamann, writing in Property Casualty 360, argues that current actions by legislatures on insurance coverage amount to “legislative interference or overreach.” He notes that under current Colorado law, “a court shall presume that the work of a construction professional that results in property damage — including damage to the work itself or other work — is an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the insured.” He argues that here legislators are stepping into the role of the courts. “Insureds and insurers are not always going to be pleased with a court ruling, but that is the system we have.”
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Homeowner Has No Grounds to Avoid Mechanics Lien
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has rejected a motion by a homeowner in a dispute with the contractor who built an extension to his home. In McCracken v. Pirvulete, Mr. McCracken filed a mechanics lien after Mr. Pirvulete failed to complete payment. The matter went to trial with a series of exhibits that showed “the contractual relationship was strained and the parties disagreed over performance and payment.” As a result of the trial, the court awarded Mr. McCracken, the contractor, $1,922.22.
Mr. Pirvulete appealed, contending that the court had not allowed his daughter to act as a translator, that the court had failed to give him sufficient time to present his case, that the mechanics lien should have been dismissed, and several other claims, all before a formal judgment was issued. After the court formalized its judgment and rejected the appeal, Mr. Pirvulete appealed again.
The appeals court found that Mr. Pirvulete did not provide an adequate record for review. The court dismissed Mr. Pirvulete’s claims. The court notes that Mr. Pirvulete claimed that a request for a discovery period was denied, however, he has provided neither the request nor the denial. The trial court has no record of either.
Nor was there a record of a request that Mr. Pirvulete’s daughter provide translation. The court notes, “so far as we can glean from the record provided, the Register of Actions states, ‘Trial to proceed without Romanian Interpreter for Defendant; Daughter present to interpret if needed.’” Additionally, the court found that “there has been no showing that his facility with the English language is or was impaired in any way or that there was any portion of any proceeding, which he did not understand.”
Further, the appeals court found there were no grounds for a new trial, despite Mr. Pirvulete’s filings. The court concluded, “The owner has failed to provide a record adequate for review of most, if not all, of the claims of error. Some issues are not cognizable because they relate to entirely separate proceedings, and not the trial below. To the limited extent that the claims are examinable, the owner has made no showing of error.” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court against Mr. Pirvulete.
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Senate Committee Approves Military Construction Funds
June 29, 2011 — CDJ Staff
With a decrease in funding, as compared to the House bill, the Military Construction and Veteran’s Affairs subcommittee of the Senate moved on a $72 billion construction bill. The House version had approved an additional half billion dollars in funding. Senator Tim Johnson, Democrat of South Carolina, said that he expected easy reconciliation with the House version. The Senate bill will move to the full Senate Appropriations Committee on June 30.
The bill, S 1255, includes funding for construction and remodeling of military housing, as well as construction and remodeling of base facilities.
Read the full story… Read S1255
Construction Defect Claim Did Not Harm Homeowner, Court Rules
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has ruled in Creswell v. Estate of Howe, a case in which a woman bought a home and then sued the seller’s estate, both sets of real estate agents, and the homeowner’s association over construction defects. A district court ruled against her, granting summary judgment to the other parties.
After buying a townhome “as is,” Catherine Creswell claims to have shared a thought with her agent that the homeowners association was, in the words of her agent, “trying to hide something.” Later, Creswell found that a few days before her closing, the board had discussed problems with “roofs, siding and soundproofing of the townhomes.” The court noted that “it was clear from the documents that appellant [Creswell] received that the association had known about various construction defects for many years, some of which affected [her] unit.”
Creswell initially sued the estate, the man who negotiated the sale for his mother’s estate, the real estate companies and the agents involved, the homeowners association, and four board members. Later she sued for punitive damages, dropped a claim for interference with contractual relations, and dismissed her claims against the individual board members. The court dismissed all of Creswell’s claims awarding costs to those she sued.
The appeals court has affirmed the decision of lower court, noting that Creswell “did not provide us with any argument why the district court erred in dismissing her unjust-enrichment, breach of contract, or rescission claims against the various respondents.” Nor did she provide evidence to support her claims of “breach of duty, fraud, and violation of consumer protection statutes.”
The court noted that Creswell could not sue the homeowners association over the construction defects because she “failed to prove that she was damaged by the association’s nondisclosure.” The court noted that “there are no damages in this case,” as Creswell “was never assessed for any repairs, she had not paid anything out-of-pocket for repairs, and she has presented no evidence that the value of her individual unit has declined because of the alleged undisclosed construction defects.”
The court granted the other parties motion to dismiss and denied Creswell’s motion to supplement the record. Costs were awarded to the respondents.
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District Court’s Ruling Affirmed in TCD v American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the case, TCD, Inc. v American Family Mutual Insurance Company, the district court’s summary judgment was in favor of the defendant. In response, the Plaintiff, TCD, appealed “on the ground that the insurance company had no duty to defend TCD under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy.” The appeals court affirmed the decision.
The appeals ruling provides a brief history of the case: “This case arises out of a construction project in Frisco, Colorado. The developer, Frisco Gateway Center, LLC (Gateway), entered into a contract with TCD, the general contractor, to construct a building. TCD entered into a subcontract with Petra Roofing and Remodeling Company (Petra) to install the roof on the building. The subcontract required Petra to "indemnify, hold harmless, and defend" TCD against claims arising out of or resulting from the performance of Petra’s work on the project. The subcontract also required Petra to name TCD as an additional insured on its CGL policy in connection with Petra’s work under the subcontract.”
Furthermore, “TCD initiated this case against Petra and the insurance company, asserting claims for declaratory judgment, breach of insurance contract, breach of contract, and negligence. The district court entered a default judgment against Petra, and both the remaining parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the entirety of the action, in favor of the insurance company, concluding that the counterclaims asserted by Gateway against TCD did not give rise to an obligation to defend or indemnify under the CGL policy.”
The appeals court rejected each contention made by TCD in turn. First, “TCD contend[ed] that Gateway’s counterclaims constitute[d] an allegation of ‘property damage,’ which is covered under the CGL policy.” The appeals court disagreed. Next, “TCD argue[d] that [the court] should broaden or extend the complaint rule, also called the ‘four corners’ rule, and allow it to offer evidence outside of the counterclaims to determine the insurance company’s duty to defend in this case.” The appeals court was not persuaded by TCD’s argument.
The judgment was affirmed. Judge Roman and Judge Miller concur.
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