No Coverage for Property Damage That is Limited to Work Completed by Subcontractor
April 25, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Construction Law Hawaii
The issue before the 11th Circuit was whether, under Florida law, a general contractor had coverage for a property damage claim limited to the defective work performed by a subcontractor, and not affecting any other portion of the project. The court found no coverage in Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co. v. Auchter Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 5412 (11th Cir. March 15, 2012).
Amelia Island Company contracted with Auchter Company, a general contractor, for construction of an inn and conference room. Auchter subcontracted with Register Contracting Company to install the Inn’s roof. Pursuant to the Florida Building Code, installation of the roof required that it be able to withstand 110 m.p.h. winds.
Register completed installing the roof tiles in January 1998. Beginning in 2002, the tiles began dislodging from the roof. During the 2004 hurricane season, three hurricanes caused more tiles to come off the roof. Some of these tiles hit other tiles, cracking them.
In 2006, the parties went to arbitration over the costs of repairs for the roof.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Who Is To Blame For Defective — And Still LEED Certified — Courthouse Square?
September 1, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Remember Courthouse Square? I sure do. We have talked about the closed and evacuated LEED certified building a couple of times here on Builders Counsel. Well, it’s back in the news. This time building professionals are pointing fingers — but there is some talk about a fix. Still, its LEED certification remains.
If you read my past articles about Courthouse Square, you can get caught up on this mess. The short of it is that Salem, Oregon had the five-story government building and bus mall completed in 2000 for $34 Million. It was awarded LEED certification during the USGBC’s infancy. Last year, it became public that the building had significantly defective concrete and design. The Salem-Keizer Transit District worked with the City of Salem to shut the building down, and it has not been occupied since.
Last fall, Courthouse Square failed thorough forensic testing leading to a lengthy bout with a number of insurers. The contractors and designers had been hauled into court, but the Transit District was able to settle with the architect and contractors. The only remaining party involved in the lawsuit appears to be the engineering firm, Century West Engineering. Most expert reports have pinned the responsibility for the poor design and materials on Century West’s shoulders.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Late Filing Contractor Barred from Involving Subcontractors in Construction Defect Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals looked at that state’s Construction Defect Action Reform Act in determining if a general contractor could add subcontractors as third-party defendants to a construction defect lawsuit. Shaw Construction, LLC was the general contraction of the Roslyn Court condominium complex, and was sued by the homeowners’ association in a construction defect case. United Builder Services was the drywall subcontractor on the project. MB Roofing had installed roofs, gutters, and downspouts. The certificate of occupancy for the last building was issued on March 10, 2004. The project architect certified completion of all known remaining architectural items in June, 2004.
The HOA filed a claim against the developers of the property on January, 21, 2009. A week later, the HOA amended its complaint to add Shaw, the general contractor. Shaw did not file its answer and third-party complaint until March 29, 2010, sending its notice of claim under the CDARA on March 30.
The subcontractors claimed that the six-year statute of limitations had ended twenty days prior. Shaw claimed that the statute of limitations ran until six years after the architect’s certification, or that the HOA’s suit had tolled all claims.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the subcontractors, determining that “substantial completion occurs ‘when an improvement to real property achieves a degree of completion at which the owner can conveniently utilize the improvement of the purpose it was intended.’”
The appeals court noted that “Shaw correctly points out that the CDARA does not define ‘substantial completion.’” The court argued that Shaw’s interpretation went against the history and intent of the measure. “Historically, a construction professional who received a complaint responded by ‘cross-nam[ing] or add[ing] everybody and anybody who had a part to play in the construction chain.’” The court concluded that the intent of the act was to prevent unnamed subcontractors from being tolled.
The court further rejected Shaw’s reliance on the date of the architect’s certification as the time of “substantial completion,” instead agreeing with the trial court that “the architect’s letter on which Shaw relies certified total completion.”
The appeals court upheld the trial court’s determination that the statute of limitation began to run no later than March 10, 2004 and that Shaw’s complaint of March 29, 2010 was therefore barred. The summary judgment was upheld.
Read the court’s decision…
No Duty to Indemnify When Discovery Shows Faulty Workmanship Damages Insured’s Own Work
November 7, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Our post last week addressed the duty to defend when alleged faulty workmanship caused loss to property adjacent to where the insured was working. See Pamerin Rentals II, LLC v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Constr., Inc., 2012 Wis. App. LEXIS 698 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2012) [post here]. Today, we report on recent developments in the same case where the court determined, despite earlier finding the insurer owed a defense, it had no duty to indemnify. Pamperin Rentals II, LLC v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Constr., Inc., 2012 Wisc. App. LEXIS 793 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2012).
Hendricks contracted to “prepare the site and supply and install concrete, tamped concrete, and colored concrete” at several service stations. The owner sued Hendricks, alleging the concrete “was defective and/or the work performed was not done in a workman-like manner and resulted in damages, and will require replacement.”
Pekin Insurance Company agreed to defend Hendricks subject to a reservation of rights.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
District Court Awards Summary Judgment to Insurance Firm in Framing Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In the case of Continental Western Insurance Company v. Shay Construction Inc., Judge Walker Miller has granted a summary judgment against Shay Construction and their co-defendant, Milender White Construction Company.
Shay was the framing subcontractor for Milender White on what the court described as “a major construction project in Grand County, Colorado.” Two of Shay’s subcontractors, Wood Source Inc. and Chase Lumber Company furnished materials, labor, and equipment to Shay. They subsequently sued for nonpayment and sought to enforce mechanic’s liens, naming both Shay and Milender as defendants. Milender White alleged that Shay had “breached its obligation under its subcontracts with Milender White.”
Shay’s insurance provider, Continental Western, stated that its coverage did not include “the dispute between Shay, its subcontractors, particularly the cross claims asserted by Milender White.” Shay then sued Continental Western, alleging breach of contract and statutory bad faith.
The court, however, has found with Continental Western and has granted them a summary judgment. They found “no genuine issue as to any material fact.” The judge did not side with Continental Western on their interpretation of the phrase “those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages.” The court found that the Colorado courts have not limited this to tort actions only. However, as Milender’s cross claim included claims of faulty workmanship on the part of Shay, Judge Miller found for Continental.
Read the court’s decision…
California Supreme Court to Examine Arbitration Provisions in Several Upcoming Cases
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Glen C. Hansen, writing on Abbott & Kinderman’s Land Use Law Blog looks at several cases pending before the California Supreme Court which ask if a developer can insist on arbitration of construction defect claims, based on provision in the CC&Rs. Currently, there is a split of opinions in the California appeals courts on the issue.
Four of the cases are in California’s Fourth Appellate District. In the earliest case, Villa Milano Homeowners Association v. Il Davorge, from 2000, the court concluded that the arbitration clause was sufficient to require that construction defect claims undergo arbitration. However, the Fourth Appellate District Court concluded in three later cases that the arbitration clauses did not allow the developer to compel arbitration. In two cases, argued in 2008 and 2010, the court concluded that to do otherwise would deprive the homeowners of their right to a jury trial. In the most recent case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Nobel Court Development, the court decided that the CC&Rs did not create contractual rights for the developer.
The Second Appellate District Court came to a similar decision in Promenade at Playa Vista Homeowners Association v. Western Pacific Housing, Inc. In their decision, the court noted that CC&Rs could be enforced by homeowners and homeowners associations, but not developers.
Read the full story…
Insurers Reacting to Massachusetts Tornadoes
August 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Patriot-Ledger reports that insurers could pay out as much as $200 million to cover homes damaged or destroyed in the tornadoes that hit central and southern Massachusetts in June, 2011. Joseph Murphy, Commissioner of the State Division of Insurance didn?t foresee problems with insurers covering these claims. “At this point, there doesn’t seem to be any one company overexposed in that area,” he told the Patriot-Ledger.
Insurance executives did not think the tornadoes would cause them to raise rates. Steve Chevalier, CEO of NLC Companies, said, “it’s a major event for those impacted by it, but it’s not close to a financial hit to us.”
One insurer noted that the winter weather generated more claims; however the cumulative value of those claims was $15 million.
Read the full story…
Faulty Workmanship may be an Occurrence in Indiana CGL Policies
April 7, 2011 — April 7, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The question of whether construction defects can be an occurrence in Commercial General Liabilities (CGL) policies continues to find mixed answers. The United States District Court in Indiana denied the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment in the case of General Casualty Insurance v. Compton Construction Co., Inc. and Mary Ann Zubak stating that faulty workmanship can be an occurrence in CGL policies.
Judge Theresa L. Springmann cited Sheehan Construction Co., et al. v. Continental Casualty Co., et al. for her decision, ”The Indiana Supreme Court reversed summary judgment, which had been granted in favor of the insurer in Sheehan, holding that faulty workmanship can constitute an ‘accident’ under a CGL policy, which means any damage would have been caused by an ‘occurrence’ triggering the insurance policy’s coverage provisions. The Indiana Supreme Court also held that, under identically-worded policy exclusion terms that are at issue in this case, defective subcontractor work could provide the basis for a claim under a CGL policy.”
As we reported on April 1st, South Carolina’s legislature is currently working on bill S-431 that would change the wording of CGL policies in their state to include construction defects. Ray Farmer, Southwest region vice president of the American Insurance Association spoke out against the bill. “CGL policies were never meant to cover faulty workmanship by the contractor,” he said. “The bill’s supplementary and erroneous liability provisions will only serve to unnecessarily impact construction costs in South Carolina.”
Read the Opinion and order...
Read the court’s ruling...
Read the American Insurance Association statement...
New Buildings in California Soon Must Be Greener
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Energy Commission has approved new energy efficiency standards for new homes and commercial buildings. The 2013 Building Energy Efficiency Standards are set to go into effect on January 1, 2014, and will require 30% more energy efficiency for non-residential construction and 25% more for homes. The standards do not affect hospitals, nursing homes, or prisons.
Buildings covered under the standard will have to have roofs that ready for the installation of solar panels. Additionally, non-residential buildings will require high-performance windows, advanced lighting controls, and cool-roof technologies. Residential requirements include insulated hot-water pipes, whole house fans, and more efficient windows.
The new standards are expected to add 3,500 new building industry jobs. One thing these construction workers won’t be building are power plants, since over the next thirty years, the standards are expected to save as much as six power plants.
Read the full story…
Georgia Supreme Court Rules Construction Defects Can Constitute an Occurrence in CGL Policies
April 5, 2011 — April 5, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the decision in American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company v Hathaway Development Company, Inc. stating that because Whisnant’s faulty workmanship caused damage to the surrounding properties, the construction defects constituted “occurrences” under the Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy. Unlike the South Carolina Supreme court ruling in the case of Crossman Communities v Harleysville Mutual, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that an accident can happen intentionally if the effect is not the intended result.
Interestingly, the only dissenting judge, J. Melton, disagreed with his colleagues on the basis that “although the term ‘accident’ is not specifically defined in the policy, it is axiomatic that an ‘accident’ cannot result from ‘intentional’ behavior.” It is clear that what constitutes an occurrence in CGL policies is still being hotly debated.
Read the full story...
The Complete and Accepted Work Doctrine and Construction Defects
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Matthew C. Bouchard of Lewis & Roberts PLLC, writes how North Carolina is “bucking the trend” on the “complete and accepted work doctrine.” As he notes, in most states “a contractor can be found liable for personal injuries suffered by third parties from accidents occurring after the contractor’s work is completed and accepted.” But one exception is North Carolina.
He gives the example of a case, Lamb v. D.S. Duggins Welding, Inc., in which a site superintendent was “injured by the alleged negligence of the project’s steel deck installer, a sub-subcontractor in the contractual chain” “after the sub-sub’s work had been completed and accepted.” The trial court held that the “completed and accepted work doctrine” ended the subcontractor’s liability. The case noted that “employees of the general contractor had modified the installation of the perimeter safety cable in question after the sub-sub had demobilized from the site.”
Mr. Bouchard notes that “once a project is accepted and turned over, the contractor typically loses control over maintenance of the new facility.” However, he notes that “where the contractor’s work constitutes negligence ?Ķ the doctrine may not apply.” Nor does it end breach of contract claims. It only covers third parties.
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Webinar on Insurance Disputes in Construction Defects
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Seth Lamden, of the firm Neal Gerber Eisenberg will be presenting a webinar on “Insurance Coverage Disputes in Construction Defects” on July 17, 2012 at 1 p.m. EDT. Mr. Lamden’s presentation will focus on “handling both the construction and insurance components of construction defect claims.” He will be discussing recent case law and new insurance products. The presentation will present information on evaluating various types of insurance policies, explaining common issues, contract requirement, and the economic loss doctrine. Mr. Lamden will advise attendees on how to avoid getting into a construction defect case. He will conclude his presentation with a brief question-and-answer session.
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Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
Read the court’s decision…
Insurer Must Cover Construction Defects Claims under Actual Injury Rule
March 1, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the insured need not prove the exact dates physical damage occurred in order to trigger defense and indemnity coverage. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes, LLC v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10027 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
In 1999, the insured built a home. He was insured under a CGL policy issued by Great American from November 9, 1998 to November 9, 2000. Thereafter, the insured held a CGL policy issued by Mid-Continent from November 9, 2000 to September 18, 2002.
After construction was completed, the insured sold the house to the buyer in May 2000. After moving in, the buyer found numerous construction defects in the home, including water entering cracks in the home, and sinking and sagging of parts of the house. The buyer sued the insured, who sought coverage under the two policies. When the insurers refused to defend the underlying suit, the insured sued for a declaratory judgment.
The underlying case went to arbitration and an award of $2.4 million was granted to the buyer. The insured assigned to the buyer his claims against the insurers.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Housing Market on Way to Recovery
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Bloomberg News reports that new home purchases neared a two-year high, with July sales being the strongest since April 2010. Economists polled by Bloomberg expected an annual pace of 380,000 sales, the current levels are at 373,000. Strongest sales gains were in the Northeast, with a 20 percent jump. The Midwest and Western regions had small gains, and the South saw a drop of 4.9 percent. As the Northeast’s home prices are highest and the South’s the lowest, the pattern of sales lead to a sharp increase in median sales price.
Meanwhile, existing stocks of homes continued to deplete, reaching a record low of 38,000 completed homes on the market. In response, builders are constructing new homes at a pace not seen since April 2010, accord to the Commerce Department.
Read the full story…
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Residential Construction Down in San Diego
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
While new home construction is on the rise in some parts of the country, San Diego has seen a fall, comparing the first seven months of 2012 with the first seven months of 2011, dropping nine percent, according to an article in the San Diego Business Journal. The news isn’t all bad, since although July residential construction dropped sharply, nonresidential construction increased thirty-six percent.
Read the full story…
Joinder vs. Misjoinder in Colorado Construction Claims: Roche Constructors v. One Beacon
July 10, 2012 — David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Often, those practicing in the construction defect field have faced questions concerning the joinder of a party. Recently, the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado weighed in on the requirements for joinder under the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure. See Roche Constructors, Inc. v. One Beacon America Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1060000 (D. Colo. 2012). Roche secured a construction contract to build a detention facility for the Lincoln County Sheriff’s Office in Lincoln County, Nebraska. In turn, Roche entered into a subcontract with Dobberstein Roofing Company, Inc. in October 2009 to install the roofing system and other related work at the detention facility. The subcontract agreement required Dobberstein to maintain adequate commercial general liability insurance and to add Roche as an additional insured under the policy. Roche maintained a builder’s risk policy issued by OneBeacon America Insurance Company and Dobberstein secured a certificate of liability insurance underwritten by Transportation Insurance Company (“TIC”). Id. at *1.
Roche alleged that Dobberstein constructed the roofing system in a negligent manner in violation of the subcontract. Roche claims it incurred additional costs to repair structural damage to the roofing system as a result of Dobberstein’s negligent work. In order to cover said damage, Roche tendered insurance claims to OneBeacon and TIC.
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Reprinted courtesy of David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com