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    Locust Grove, Virginia

    Virginia Builders Right To Repair Current Law Summary:

    Current Law Summary: (HB558; H 150; §55-70.1) Warranty extension applicable to single-family but not HOAs: in addition to any other express or implied warranties; It requires registered or certified mail notice to "vendor" stating nature of claim; reasonable time not to exceed six months to "cure the defect".


    Construction Expert Witness Contractors Licensing
    Guidelines Locust Grove Virginia

    A contractor's license is required for all trades. Separate boards license plumbing, electrical, HVAC, gas fitting, and asbestos trades.


    Construction Expert Witness Contractors Building Industry
    Association Directory
    Fredericksburg Area Builders Association
    Local # 4830
    3006 Lafayette Blvd
    Fredericksburg, VA 22408
    http://www.fabava.com

    Piedmont Virginia Building Industry Association
    Local # 4890
    PO Box 897
    Culpeper, VA 22701
    http://www.pvbia.org

    Shenandoah Valley Builders Association
    Local # 4848
    PO Box 1286
    Harrisonburg, VA 22803
    http://www.valleybuilders.org

    Augusta Home Builders Association Inc
    Local # 4804
    PO Box 36
    Waynesboro, VA 22980
    http://www.augustahomebuilders.net

    Blue Ridge Home Builders Association
    Local # 4809
    PO Box 7743
    Charlottesville, VA 22906
    http://www.brhba.org

    Home Builders Association of Rappahannock
    Local # 4847
    PO Box 88
    Wicomico Church, VA 22579


    Northern Virginia Building Industry Association
    Local # 4840
    3901 Centerview Dr Suite E
    Chantilly, VA 20151
    http://www.nvbia.com


    Construction Expert Witness News and Information
    For Locust Grove Virginia

    Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders

    “Other Insurance” and Indemnity Provisions Determine Which Insurer Must Cover

    SB800 Cases Approach the Courts

    Construction Defects Lead to Demolition

    Harsh New Time Limits on Construction Defect Claims

    All Risk Policy Only Covers Repair to Portion of Dock That Sustains Damage

    No Coverage For Construction Defects When Complaint Alleges Contractual Damages

    Boyfriend Pleads Guilty in Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam Suicide

    Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured

    Architect Not Responsible for Injuries to Guests

    Harmon Tower Construction Defects Update: Who’s To Blame?

    Tenth Circuit Finds Insurer Must Defend Unintentional Faulty Workmanship

    Court Requires Adherence to “Good Faith and Fair Dealing” in Construction Defect Coverage

    Workers Hurt in Casino Floor Collapse

    No Coverage for Property Damage That is Limited to Work Completed by Subcontractor

    Follow Up on Continental Western v. Shay Construction

    Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<

    Des Moines Home Builders Building for Habitat for Humanity

    Statute of Limitations Upheld in Construction Defect Case

    Tennessee Court: Window Openings Too Small, Judgment Too Large

    Couple Sues Attorney over Construction Defect Case, Loses

    Death of Construction Defect Lawyer Ruled a Suicide

    Residential Construction Down in San Diego

    After Construction Defect Case, Repairs to Austin Building

    Are Construction Defects Covered by Your General Liability Policy?

    Insurance Company Must Show that Lead Came from Building Materials

    Homeowner Has No Grounds to Avoid Mechanics Lien

    DA’s Office Checking Workers Comp Compliance

    Negligent Misrepresentation in Sale of Building Altered without Permits

    Driver’s Death May Be Due to Construction Defect

    California Supreme Court Finds Associations Bound by Member Arbitration Clauses

    Tucson Officials to Discuss Construction Defect Claim

    Construction on the Rise in Denver

    HOA Has No Claim to Extend Statute of Limitations in Construction Defect Case

    Crane Dangles and So Do Insurance Questions

    Gilroy Homeowners Sue over Leaky Homes

    Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.

    Court Consolidates Cases and Fees in Soil Construction Defect Case

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    Nevada Construction Defect Lawyers Dead in Possible Suicides

    Repair of Part May Necessitate Replacement of Whole

    Coverage for Construction Defects Barred by Business Risk Exclusions

    Counterpoint: Washington Supreme Court to Rule on Resulting Losses in Insurance Disputes

    After Breaching its Duty to Defend, Insurer Must Indemnify

    Utah Construction Defect Claims Dependant on Contracts

    Park District Sues over Leaky Roof

    Construction Defects as Occurrences, Better Decided in Law than in Courts

    Residential Construction: Shrinking Now, Growing Later?

    Construction Defects and Contractor-Owners

    Florida: No Implied Warranties for Neighborhood Improvements

    Safety Officials Investigating Death From Fall

    Nevada Supreme Court Reverses Decision against Grader in Drainage Case

    Consulting Firm Indicted and Charged with Falsifying Concrete Reports

    Loss Caused by Seepage of Water Not Covered

    Public Relations Battle over Harmon Tower

    Kansas Man Caught for Construction Scam in Virginia

    Construction Defect Journal Marks First Anniversary

    No Coverage for Construction Defects Under Alabama Law

    Damage During Roof Repairs Account for Three Occurrences

    Differing Rulings On Construction Defect Claims Leave Unanswered Questions For Builders, and Construction Practice Groups. Impact to CGL Carriers, General Contractors, Builders Remains Unclear

    Contractor Sues Supplier over Defective Products

    One Colorado Court Allows Negligence Claim by General Contractor Against Subcontractor

    Home Repair Firms Sued for Fraud

    Contractor Manslaughter? Safety Shortcuts Are Not Worth It

    Who Is To Blame For Defective — And Still LEED Certified — Courthouse Square?

    Judge Kobayashi Determines No Coverage for Construction Defect Claim

    Construction Workers Unearth Bones

    West Coast Casualty Promises Exciting Line Up at the Nineteenth Annual Conference

    “Details Matter” is the Foundation in a Texas Construction Defect Suit

    Celebrities Lose Case in Construction Defect Arbitration

    Bad Faith and a Partial Summary Judgment in Seattle Construction Defect Case

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    State Audit Questions College Construction Spending in LA

    Preparing For the Worst with Smart Books & Records

    Construction Firm Charged for Creating “Hail” Damage

    South Carolina Legislature Defines "Occurrence" To Include Property Damage Arising From Faulty Workmanship

    Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage

    Landmark San Diego Hotel Settles Defects Suit for $6.4 Million

    Preventing Costly Litigation Through Your Construction Contract

    Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case

    Pier Fire Started by Welders

    Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm

    Although Property Damage Arises From An Occurrence, Coverage Barred By Business Risk Exclusions

    Bill Seeks to Protect Legitimate Contractors

    Builder Waits too Long to Dispute Contract in Construction Defect Claim

    Texas res judicata and co-insurer defense costs contribution

    School District Marks End of Construction Project by Hiring Lawyers

    Appeals Court Upholds Decision by Referee in Trial Court for Antagan v Shea Homes

    Senate Committee Approves Military Construction Funds

    Mortar Insufficient to Insure Summary Judgment in Construction Defect Case
    Corporate Profile

    LOCUST GROVE VIRGINIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
    DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

    The Locust Grove, Virginia Construction Expert Witness Group at BHA, leverages from the experience gained through more than 5,500 construction related expert witness designations encompassing a wide spectrum of construction related disputes. Drawing from this considerable body of experience, BHA provides construction related trial support and expert services to Locust Grove's most recognized construction litigation practitioners, commercial general liability carriers, owners, construction practice groups, as well as a variety of state and local government agencies.

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    Construction Expert Witness News & Info
    Locust Grove, Virginia

    Colorado Court of Appeals Rejects Retroactive Application of C.R.S. § 13-20-808.

    April 25, 2012 — Chad W. Johnson, Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC

    In TCD, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, TCD appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of American Family. TCD, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company Colo. App. No. 11CA1046 (April 12, 2012). TCD was the general contractor on a project to construct a building for Frisco General Gateway Center, LLC (“Gateway”). TCD subcontracted with a roofer named Petra Roofing and Remodeling Company (“Petra”) to performing the roofing work for the building. The subcontract required Petra to defend and indemnify TCD and to name TCD as an additional insured under its CGL policy. American Family issued a CGL policy to Petra that named TCD as an additional insured from 2006-2007.

    TCD filed suit against Gateway seeking payment for its work at the project. Gateway counterclaimed against TCD for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of the CCPA. TCD demanded that American Family defend it from the counterclaims pursuant to Petra’s policies. American Family denied coverage and a separate coverage suit ensued. At the trial court level, the court entered summary judgment for American Family because the counterclaims of Gateway did not trigger the duty to defend or indemnify TCD as an additional insured.

    On appeal, TCD argued that: 1) the counterclaims raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding American Family’s duty to defend; 2) the court should hear evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint; and, 3) the court should apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Chad W. Johnson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com.


    Another Colorado District Court Refuses to Apply HB 10-1394 Retroactively

    October 28, 2011 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation

    In Martinez v. Mike Wells Construction Company, 09CV227, Teller County District Court Judge Edward S. Colt refused to apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively to provide coverage for the underlying construction defect allegations. According to the recitation of facts in Judge Colt’s March 2011 order, Martinez contracted with Mike Wells Construction to serve as the general contractor for the construction of a home. At that time, Mike Wells Construction was insured through ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, RRG. Disputes arose between Martinez and Mike Wells Construction, resulting in Martinez ordering it off of the project in mid-November 2007 and terminating its right to work there by letter dated November 28, 2007.

    Mike Wells, the owner of the corporation, subsequently died. Martinez sued Mike Wells Construction in July 2009 for breach of contract and various claims relating to alleged defecting workmanship. Martinez provided notice of the suit to the special administrator of the probate estate. No answer having been filed, the court entered a default judgment against Mike Wells Construction and Martinez sought to garnish Mike Wells Construction’s ProBuilders insurance policy.

    Read the full story...

    Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com


    Contractor Underpaid Workers, Pocketed the Difference

    February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Property Casualty 360 reports that the owner of a construction company in California’s Bay Area has been arraigned in San Francisco Superior Court. The fifty-seven felony counts include charges of payroll theft and insurance fraud.

    San Francisco District Attorney, George Gascon is quoted as saying that Doherty’s actions “hurts the honest businesses that were unable to successfully compete for these projects which the defendant was able to underbid and win as a result of this scheme.”

    Frances Ann Doherty, owner of Doherty Painting & Construction has been charged with submitting false documentation as to what wages she paid her workers. It is alleged that over three years she pocketed $600,000. Additionally, she is charged with underpaying her insurer by more than $100,000 by submitting to them the fake payroll information.

    Read the full story…


    Cabinetmaker Exceeds Expectations as Conditions Improve

    October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    American Woodmark, the manufacturer of several national brands of cabinets and vanities, saw greater than anticipated earnings in its most recent quarter. Their revenue was $148.3 million, an increase of 13% over the same quarter a year prior. They saw a 40% increase in sales. As a result, their per-share earnings were 7 cents, instead of the projected loss of 3 cents per share. Forbes reports that the share price for American Woodmark has been rising in August 2012.

    Read the full story…


    A Lien Might Just Save Your Small Construction Business

    April 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog

    Many owners incorrectly believe that payment to the general contractor gets the owner off the hook for payment to subcontractors and suppliers. This assumption sometimes fosters the irresponsible owner, who fails to ensure that everyone is getting paid. Fortunately for those contractors further down the contracting chain, this assumption is incorrect.

    Suppliers and subcontractors can file a lien to secure payment for their labor and materials. A filing party must offer proper notice (if applicable) and file an adequate and timely lien in the County where the work is performed. You can read our earlier posts on these topics by following this link.

    A lien notice and a lien put an owner on notice that your business has provided labor and/or materials for the improvement of the owner’s property (See RCW 60.04.031 for more info). If the owner fails to take care to ensure that your business is paid the law mandates that the owner may have to pay twice.

    Read the full story...

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    Unlicensed Contractors Nabbed in Sting Operation

    September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The California State License Board charged sixteen people in the Fresno area with accepting contracting jobs without licenses. The Statewide Investigative Fraud Team of the CSLB set up a sting operation at a home in Clovis, California seeking bids on tree service, painting, and general contracting services. Those who bid for jobs at more than $500 are required under California law to be licensed. Unlicensed contractors can only work on jobs with a cost to the homeowner of less than $500 and must inform the homeowner that they are not licensed.

    In addition to citing contractors for not possessing appropriate licenses, the CSLB also cited contractors for failure to carry workers compensation insurance and illegal advertising. Further, California law limits down payments to the lesser of ten percent or $1,000. Two contractors were cited for requesting excessive down payments.

    One contractor, an unlicensed tree service contractor, had been cited previously in a sting operation. He failed to show up for his court date.

    Read the full story…


    Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage

    August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision finding no coverage due to exclusions from the all-risk policy for losses related to mold, rot and condensation. Koskovich v. Am Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 Minn. App. Unpub. LEXIS 581 (Minn. Ct. App. June 25, 2012).

    In 1978, the insureds purchased a home that was built in 1904. From 1991 to 1995, they remodeled, which included rotating the house 45 degrees, removing a wing and adding a new section. Polypropylene vapor barriers were installed, with pinholes for ventilation.

    In 2008, water was observed on an interior floor. An investigation revealed that the sheathing under the siding and the house's framing were wet and rotten, requiring removal and replacement of the siding and studs. Repairs were made and a claim was submitted to American Family Mutual Insurance Company.

    American's structural engineer inspected and determined that moisture was likely caused by condensation of water vapor where the vapor barrier was held tight to the sheathing and by inward water migration from wet siding during rainy periods through the vapor-barrier perforations. The structural engineer opined that, although the home's framing was deteriorated and structurally compromised, it did not appear as though the home was in imminent danger of collapse.

    American denied coverage.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

    California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

    The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

    SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

    Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

    Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

    The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4

    This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5

    2005 AMENDMENT

    The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

    What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

    This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

    It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

    In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

    2007 AMENDMENT

    The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

    Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

    Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

    It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

    Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

    2008 AMENDMENT

    The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

    Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

    It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

    The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

    Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

    Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

    And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

    Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

    This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

    Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

    2011 AMENDMENT

    Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

    As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

    The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7

    The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

    CONCLUSION

    The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

    1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
    2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
    3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
    4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
    5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
    6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
    7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

    Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.


    A Performance-Based Energy Code in Seattle: Will It Save Existing Buildings?

    August 11, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel

    The City of Seattle has one of the most stringent energy codes in the nation. Based upon the Washington State Energy Code (which has been embroiled in litigation over its high standards), the code demands a lot from commercial developers. But, does it prevent developers from saving Seattle?s classic and old buildings? Perhaps.

    The general compliance procedure requires buildings to be examined during the permitting process. This means that buildings are examined before they begin operating. The procedure is not malleable and is applicable to all buildings, old and new, big and small.

    The downside of this procedure is that it eliminates awarding compliance to those buildings exhibiting a number of passive features, such as siting, thermal mass, and renewable energy production. This problem has prevented a number of interesting and architecturally pleasing existing building retrofits from getting off the ground. The cost of complying with the current system can be 20% more, and it might prevent builders from preserving a building?s historical integrity.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com

    Construction Defect Lawsuits? There’s an App for That

    July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The website ebeeky.com reviews Picture It Settled, an app designed to help people engaged in lawsuits figure out where settlement strategies would be most successful. First available for Android and then iOS, the app is now available for Blackberry. One user of the application wrote that “anyone who has set through a construction defect mediation can immediately grasp the value of this app.

    The app tracks the negotiation process, allowing users to see a history of bids and counteroffers. It also models the negotiation process in order to predict the ultimate cost of settlement. These numbers are based on past similar negotiations that the user has entered.

    Read the full story…


    Arbitrator May Use Own Discretion in Consolidating Construction Defect Cases

    September 1, 2011 — CJD Staff

    The Mississippi Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC v. Sea Breeze I, LLC. Sea Breeze contracted with Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC (HBSA) to design a condominium complex, which would be built by Roy Anderson Corporation. All parties agreed to arbitration.

    Subsequently, Sea Breeze alleged defects and sought arbitration against the architectural firm and started a separate arbitration proceeding against the contractor. The special arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitrators Association determined that it would be proper to consolidate the two actions “since they arose from a common question of fact or law.” HBSA filed in chancery court seeking injunctive relief and a reversal of the decision. Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson filed a motion to compel the consolidated arbitration.

    The court noted that the special arbitrator “established that the contract between Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson expressly allowed for consolidation of the two cases.” Further, the arbitrator “concluded that HBSA expressly agreed to consolidation by written consent through its 2008 letter, through which it insisted upon Roy Anderson’s involvement ‘in any mediation and/or arbitration.’”

    The court concluded that the chancery court “did not have the power to fulfill HBSA’s request.” The court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Legislatures Shouldn’t Try to Do the Courts’ Job

    March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    David Thamann, writing in Property Casualty 360, argues that current actions by legislatures on insurance coverage amount to “legislative interference or overreach.” He notes that under current Colorado law, “a court shall presume that the work of a construction professional that results in property damage — including damage to the work itself or other work — is an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the insured.” He argues that here legislators are stepping into the role of the courts. “Insureds and insurers are not always going to be pleased with a court ruling, but that is the system we have.”

    Read the full story…


    Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm

    March 8, 2011 — March 8, 2011, Colorado Construction Litigation

    The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that the “owned property exclusion” applied to bar coverage for claims of property damage. See Panico v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2011 WL 322830 (10th Cir. 2011). In Panico, the plaintiffs sold property in Aspen, Colorado to the Taylors, who sued the Panicos upon discovering the property was not as represented. After refusing to defend, the Panicos sued State Farm for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the Taylors’ claims were not covered under the Panicos insurance policies and granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

    Mr. Panico built the house on the property as well as several additions to the house. As the Taylors lived in Florida, they primarily relied on their real estate agent and an inspector to ensure the property was acceptable. According to their complaint, the Taylors discovered that the house was “virtually uninhabitable due to serious design and construction defects, mold, rodents, and drainage problems.” Id. at *1. In their complaint, the Taylors asserted three claims for relief against the Panicos based upon misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment about the condition of the property.

    Read the full story...

    Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com


    Colorado Senate Bill 12-181: 2012’s Version of a Prompt Pay Bill

    May 10, 2012 — W. Berkeley Mann, Jr., Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC

    A potentially important legislative bill has been introduced in waning days of the 2012 legislative session, which would change many of the commercial practices that prevail in the construction industry. Senate Bill 12-181 applies to all building and construction contracts and would prohibit any contract provision that requires a contractor, subcontractor, or supplier to waive their lien in advance of payment. It also would ban any “choice of law” provisions that make a Colorado-based construction contract subject to enforcement only in another state, or under the laws of another state.

    The bill also seeks to change many existing commercial practices between contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers. It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions, or whether these requirements are simply “gap filling” provisions that pertain if there are no written contract terms specified on these issues. The proposed statute would mandate payment to subcontractors and material suppliers due within seven days in the absence of a dispute about the work or materials being billed. After this seven day period, the bill would require the payment of interest at the rate of 1.5% monthly (18% annually). In any later suit for payment, the creditor would also be able to collect reasonable attorneys’ fees. Additionally, non-payment to a subcontractor or supplier who is later found to be entitled to prompt payment would excuse the subcontractor or supplier, and its surety bond provider, from any further performance under the contract.

    It is presently unclear whether the bill allows parties to contract around these payment procedure provisions. However, it is clear that the bill provides some leeway for change orders, as long as there is (1) negotiation in good faith between the parties concerning the changed scope of work, and (2) a 50% payment of a subcontractor’s costs by the changing party within 30 days of the change order work being done. Additionally, the bill provides for retainage, but in an amount of no more than 5%.

    The bill is presently set for hearing before the Colorado Senate Committee on Business, Labor, and Technology Committee on May 2, 2012 at 1:30 p.m.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of W. Berkeley Mann, Jr. of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Mann can be contacted at mann@hhmrlaw.com.


    Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case

    February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.

    About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.

    A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.

    In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.

    Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.

    Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”

    Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.

    Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.

    The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Virginia Homebuilding Slumps After Last Year’s Gain

    June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    As of May, only 61 residential construction permits have been issues in Roanoke County, Virginia, leaving officials doubtful that this year will meet last year’s mark of 179 permits. Residential construction was at its highest in the county in 2004. The worst year since then was 2009, when the county issued 143 permits. The county is in the western end of the state, near the border with West Virginia, and far from the D.C. metropolitan area.

    Arnold Covey, the Director of Community Development for the county said that “it may be until 2014 before we really see a difference. The article by WDBJ7.com notes that a “key part” of the county budget comes from real estate.

    Read the full story…


    Lawsuit over Construction Defects Not a Federal Case

    August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The United State District Court in California has dismissed the claims of a contractor against the United States government, on the grounds that it was not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The origins of the case are in a related construction defect claim. The current plaintiff, Performance Contracting, Inc., did the lath and plaster work for a building for the Department of Veterans Affairs. After the building was completed, the Veterans Affairs complained to the general contractor, Wynema, Inc., of water intrusion problems.

    Wyema and Performance conducted testing and the water intrusion was found to be due to “a variety of design defects and omissions, including: 1) omission of proper window flashing; 2) inadequate waterproof membrane around the windows; 3) inadequate T-molding around the windows; 4) lack of a window sill pan for the windows; 5) lack of any backing in the window framing; 6) lack of any backing for the stucco expansion joints and seams; and 7) failure to require that a performance mock-up of the window assembly and adjacent areas be built and water tested.” Wyema filed a construction defect action against Performance and other subcontractors.

    In the current case, Performance claims that Veteran Affairs was negligent, that it “breached its duty to Plaintiff when it provided deficient plants and specifications” and “failed to properly oversee construction and inspect Project work.” The court determined that it could not hear this case, noting that “Federal Courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions.”

    Performance raised its claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The judge was not persuaded by this claim, noting that the FTCA does not apply to purported breach of the General Contract. The FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity in cases of “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”

    Performance was unable to pursue its claims in the Court of Federal Claims as there was no contract between Performance and the government. However, the court noted that Performance’s inability to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims does not open up a path to the District Court. “Litigants are not guaranteed a forum in which to sue the United States.” The court further noted that “if this Court were to accept Plaintiff’s logic, non-parties to contracts, but not parties, would be free to pursue contract claims in the fora of their choosing.”

    Read the court’s decision…


    Contractor Manslaughter? Safety Shortcuts Are Not Worth It

    August 11, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel

    It’s been a while since I discussed the importance of safety. But, a recent article on ENR.com compelled this brief article. Don’t shortcut safety — you could be facing serious criminal repercussions.

    A New York crane company owner and one of his employees are each facing a second-degree manslaughter charge for the death of two construction workers.  The charges stem from the collapse of a crane in New York City. The district attorney determined that the crane owner cut a few corners to reduce its operation costs, significantly sacrificing safety.

    Another example was the 2010 trial of another New York crane operator who was charged with manslaughter. In that case, the criminal charges failed to stick, but an administrative judge found that the contractor used a damaged sling to support the steel collar binding the tower-crane mast to the 18th floor of a high-rise building being constructed. The company also used four slings instead of the eight, as specified by the crane manufacturer; improperly attached the slings and failed to pad or soften them.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com