Late Filing Contractor Barred from Involving Subcontractors in Construction Defect Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals looked at that state’s Construction Defect Action Reform Act in determining if a general contractor could add subcontractors as third-party defendants to a construction defect lawsuit. Shaw Construction, LLC was the general contraction of the Roslyn Court condominium complex, and was sued by the homeowners’ association in a construction defect case. United Builder Services was the drywall subcontractor on the project. MB Roofing had installed roofs, gutters, and downspouts. The certificate of occupancy for the last building was issued on March 10, 2004. The project architect certified completion of all known remaining architectural items in June, 2004.
The HOA filed a claim against the developers of the property on January, 21, 2009. A week later, the HOA amended its complaint to add Shaw, the general contractor. Shaw did not file its answer and third-party complaint until March 29, 2010, sending its notice of claim under the CDARA on March 30.
The subcontractors claimed that the six-year statute of limitations had ended twenty days prior. Shaw claimed that the statute of limitations ran until six years after the architect’s certification, or that the HOA’s suit had tolled all claims.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the subcontractors, determining that “substantial completion occurs ‘when an improvement to real property achieves a degree of completion at which the owner can conveniently utilize the improvement of the purpose it was intended.’”
The appeals court noted that “Shaw correctly points out that the CDARA does not define ‘substantial completion.’” The court argued that Shaw’s interpretation went against the history and intent of the measure. “Historically, a construction professional who received a complaint responded by ‘cross-nam[ing] or add[ing] everybody and anybody who had a part to play in the construction chain.’” The court concluded that the intent of the act was to prevent unnamed subcontractors from being tolled.
The court further rejected Shaw’s reliance on the date of the architect’s certification as the time of “substantial completion,” instead agreeing with the trial court that “the architect’s letter on which Shaw relies certified total completion.”
The appeals court upheld the trial court’s determination that the statute of limitation began to run no later than March 10, 2004 and that Shaw’s complaint of March 29, 2010 was therefore barred. The summary judgment was upheld.
Read the court’s decision…
Insurer Not Liable for Construction Defect Revealed by Woodpecker
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an insurance provision that excluded construction defects must stand in Friedberg v. Chubb, granting a summary judgment to the insurance firm.
The Friedbergs discovered extensive water damage to their home after a woodpecker drilled a hole in a vertical support. They sought insurance coverage under their Chubb “Masterpiece” policy. The decision quotes the policy as covering “all risk of physical loss” “unless stated otherwise or an exclusion applies.” These exclusions included “gradual or sudden loss,” “structural movement,” and “faulty planning, construction or maintenance,” but the policy covered “ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies.”
Chubb’s expert determined that the Friedbergs’ home had defective construction, and “attributed the damage to the beams and walls below the beam to a failure to install control joints.” After Chubb denied coverage, the Friedbergs sued, although the court ruled that “even under the Friedbergs’ theory, the water damage was a loss caused by faulty construction and therefore excluded under the policy.”
On appeal, the Friedbergs argued that “the loss resulted from the combination of both faulty construction and the presence of water” and that Minnesota’s “concurrent causation” doctrine must apply, which according to the decision, “when a loss results from both a covered peril and an excluded peril, coverage exists unless the excluded peril is the ‘overriding cause’ of the loss.” The court rejected this reasoning, noting that “once the house was plagued with faulty construction, it was a foreseeable and natural consequence that water would enter.”
The Friedbergs also contended that “the damage caused by the intrusion of water into their home is an ‘ensuing covered loss’ for which they are due coverage.” The court also rejected this claim, noting that Minnesota law excludes defective construction from the ensuing loss provision. The court said that “the Friedbergs’ reading of their ensuing-loss clause, by contrast, would dramatically limit their policy’s faulty-construction exclusion, because almost ‘any loss cause by’ faulty construction could also be characterized as an ensuing loss under an all-risk policy.”
Read the court’ decision…
Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration.
The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this.
PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint.
Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.”
The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.”
As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision.
Read the court’s decision…
Official Tried to Influence Judge against Shortchanged Subcontractor
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A contractor testified in the trial of former Cuyahoga County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora. According to Fox 8 in Cleveland, Ohio, Sean Newman, the president of Letter Perfect testified that his company was a subcontractor on the reconstruction of the locker rooms at the Cleveland Browns Stadium. Newman said his company was paid only $400,000 of their $650,000 bid. When Letter Perfect sued the contractor, D.A.S. Construction, Dimora called the judge to influence her to rule in favor of D.A.S.
The judge in the earlier case, Bridgett McCafferty, has been found guilty of lying to the FBI during their investigation and is serving a 14-month prison sentence.
Read the full story…
Insurer Must Cover Construction Defects Claims under Actual Injury Rule
March 1, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the insured need not prove the exact dates physical damage occurred in order to trigger defense and indemnity coverage. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes, LLC v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10027 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
In 1999, the insured built a home. He was insured under a CGL policy issued by Great American from November 9, 1998 to November 9, 2000. Thereafter, the insured held a CGL policy issued by Mid-Continent from November 9, 2000 to September 18, 2002.
After construction was completed, the insured sold the house to the buyer in May 2000. After moving in, the buyer found numerous construction defects in the home, including water entering cracks in the home, and sinking and sagging of parts of the house. The buyer sued the insured, who sought coverage under the two policies. When the insurers refused to defend the underlying suit, the insured sued for a declaratory judgment.
The underlying case went to arbitration and an award of $2.4 million was granted to the buyer. The insured assigned to the buyer his claims against the insurers.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Association May Not Make Claim Against Builder in Vermont Construction Defect Case
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Vermont Supreme Court issued a ruling on September 28 on Long Trail House Condominium Association. The case was heard by a panel of two Supreme Court justices, Marilyn Skoglund and Brian Burgess, and three justices specially assigned for the case, Kupersmith, Davenport, and Johnson. The decision came down with a 3-2 split; Judges Kupersmith and Johnson joining in a dissent.
In the underlying case, Stratton Corporation entered into an agreement with Engelberth Construction in which Engelberth would supply “recommendations on construction feasibility, consultation as to the selection of materials and equipment, assistance with zoning requirements and permits, and cooperation with the ‘design team’ to provide valuable engineering services.” Engelberth was not responsible to determine that the drawings and specifications were in accordance with the law and building codes, nor were they responsible “for the design team’s designs, errors, or omissions.”
Subsequent to the agreement was a construction project which culminated in the incorporation of the Long Trail House Condominium Association. The condominium owners initiated a lawsuit over alleged defects. Stratton, Intrawest, and the association settled claims for $7,025,00 with Stratton and Intrawest both pursuing claims against Engelberth. This case is still unsettled.
The association progressed on remediation, which cost about $1,500,00 more than was provided by the settlement, and so the association also sued Engelberth. In this case, the court granted a summary judgment to Engelberth, concluding that negligence claim was barred both “by the economic loss rule and that the absence of contractual privity was fatal to the warranty claims.”
The court upheld both determinations of the lower court. The court noted that “the economic loss rule ‘prohibits recovery in tort for purely economic losses’” and that “in tort law, duties are imposed by law to protect the public from harm.” A negligence claim could only be supported with evidence of “some accompanying physical harm, which does not include economic loss.”
The association made the claim that the economic loss rule applies only when there is a contractual relationship between the two parties. The court rejected this argument, citing a reference that “economic interests are protected, if at all, by contract principles, rather than tort principles.”
Nor did the court find it persuasive that a “professional services” exception to the economic loss doctrine applied, noting that the court has rejected this notion in two prior cases. The noted that the association’s losses were purely economic, and their inability to settle those claims with Engelberth did not mean that they had not means of settling them, as they were able to settle these very claims with Stratton and Intrawest.
The association also raised claims of an implied warranty, resting on the construction contract between Engelberth and Stratton. This was also rejected by the court, noting that Vermont “case law plainly contemplates the existence of contractual privity before a breach of implied warranty claim can be raised.” The court noted that there was neither a contract nor a sale between Engelberth and the association, and thus there were no grounds for an implied warranty. The court concluded that “the Association’s warranty remedy lies against the entity that sold it the condominium units and implicitly warranted through the sale that the units were built in a good and workmanlike manner and that they were suitable for habitation.”
Read the court’s decision …
The Hidden Dangers of Construction Defect Litigation
March 28, 2012 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
David M. McLain, writing at Colorado Construction Litigation, has an interesting blog post republishing his article in Common Interests magazine, the monthly periodical of the Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Community Associations Institute. In his article, he touches on a number of pitfalls in construction defect litigation, including the potential conflicts of interests facing HOAs. He also considers the problems homeowners can face, including both “strong-arm tactics” taken by attorneys to compel homeowners to join the lawsuit, or situations in which the interests of the HOA do not match those of the homeowners. He writes:
There is also a conflict of interest with individual owners who attempt to opt out of the case. This can lead to shocking strong-arm tactics on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys. In one instance, a plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to an individual homeowner that stated that as a 1/58th owner of the common elements, if he refused to go along with the suit, and there was ultimately a finding in favor of the HOA which was in any way limited by his refusal to participate, he would be personally liable for 1/58th of the HOA’s total damages. In another instance, a different plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to a homeowner who wanted the builder to perform warranty repairs, informing the owner that if he let the builder perform any repairs, the attorney would bill the HOA according to the fee agreement entered by the HOA board (without knowledge or consent of non-board members) and that the HOA would assess the homeowner for that expense. These are just two examples of conflicts which may arise between the HOA board and individual homeowners when the HOA pursues CD cases.
Another example of a conflict which will arise as a result of CD litigation occurs post-settlement. When an HOA settles for less than 100% of the amount necessary to fund all repairs outlined by its experts, plus attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, there will obviously be a shortfall in the amount necessary to fix the development. The HOA board must then choose to impose a special assessment to cover the shortfall or to make some, but not all, of the repairs outlined by its experts. In choosing the latter, the conflict arises with respect to which homes get fixed and which do not. In this situation, the HOA board has acted as the attorney-in-fact for the individual owners by bringing claims on their behalf, and has compromised those claims without their knowledge or consent.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com.
Court finds subcontractor responsible for defending claim
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - CDJ Staff
In an unpublished decision, the California Fourth Appellate District Court has reversed the judgment of Judge Linda B. Quinn of the Superior Court of San Diego. In the case Inland California, Inc. v. G.A. Abell, Inland, a general contractor had subcontracted with Apache Construction and Precision Electric Company (G.A. Abell).
Apache alleged that extra demolition and drywall work was needed due to Precision’s electrical work. Inland tendered a defense of Apache’s claims. However, Precision did not provide any defense. Inland withheld payment from Precision.
At trial, Inland “conceded Precision earned the $98,000 in progress payments Inland withheld.†They were obligated to additionally pay Precision’s costs and attorney fees.
The Fourth Appellate District court has overturned this and remanded the case back to the lower court. The judges determined that Precision was obligated to defend itself against the claims raised by Apache and therefore vacated the judgment against Inland.
Read the court’s decision…
Mandatory Arbitration Provision Upheld in Construction Defect Case
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Superior Court of New Jersey reversed the decision in Frumer v. National Home Insurance Company (NHIC) and the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation (HBW), stating that the mandatory arbitration provision within the Frumer’s home warranty policy was binding.
The Frumers alleged that the construction defects were discovered immediately after moving into their million dollar home. After failing to achieve any results from dealing with the builder, they turned to their home warranty. There was some dispute over claims, and a settlement offer was rejected by the Frumers. The Frumers elected to commence litigation rather than utilize the binding arbitration.
The NHIC and the HBW filed a motion to compel arbitration, however, the motion judge denied the motion: “…the Warranty leaves open the option for [plaintiffs] to commence litigation, which [plaintiffs have] done in this case. The clause also states that ‘the filing of a claim against this limited Warranty shall constitute the election of remedy and shall bar the Homeowner from all other remedies.’ However, the provision does not state that the filing of a claim elects arbitration as the exclusive remedy, and any ambiguity in the language must be inferred against the drafter.”
The NHIC and the HBW appealed the decision. The Superior Court reversed the decision: “Where, such as here, the homeowner files a claim against the warranty for workmanship/systems defects, the warranty clearly and unequivocally establishes binding arbitration as the exclusive remedy. There is, however, no election of remedies for a dispute involving a major structural defect claim. The warranty clearly and unequivocally establishes binding arbitration as the exclusive remedy.”
Charles Curley of Halberstadt Curley in Conshohocken, Pa., the local counsel for National Home and Home Buyers, told the New Jersey Law Journal that “the ruling reaffirms New Jersey’s commitment to enforcing arbitration agreements and requiring people to go to mandatory arbitration when the contracts call for it.”
“At this point, their hope is that the warranty company will do what it's supposed to do — repair covered defects,” Eric McCullough, the Frumer’s lawyer said to the New Jersey Law Journal.
Read the full story…
Gut Feeling Does Not Disqualify Expert Opinion
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in June on the case of Nevins v. Toll in which they reversed an earlier decision and remanded the case to a lower court for retrial. At issue in the case was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, J. Anthony Dowling. In depositions, Mr. Dowling said that his estimates for repair were based on a “gut feeling.” Dowling said he had “very little” experience in cost estimates for single-family homes. The defendants sought to bar Dowling’s testimony which was granted by the judge. Without an expert, Ms. Nevin’s case was dismissed.
Describing Dowling’s report as “far from a model of how an expert’s opinion in a construction case should be presented,” the court noted that Dowling is not a professional expert witness. However, the court did note that Dowling is a professional cost estimator. Despite Mr. Dowling using his “gut feeling” to construct his estimate, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt that whether his estimate is convincing is “a question for the jury.”
Read the court’s opinion…
Nebraska Man Sentenced for Insurance Fraud in Construction Projects
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Thomas Herink has been ordered to repay more than $5 million to his victims and will be serving three years of probation after 18 months in jail for defrauding banks and insurance companies, according to a report in the Insurance Journal. Herink falsified financial statements to lenders and insurers so that his company, Golf Services Group Inc. could participate in construction projects.
Read the full story…
Analysis of the “owned property exclusion” under Panico v. State Farm
March 8, 2011 — March 8, 2011, Colorado Construction Litigation
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit recently concluded that the “owned property exclusion” applied to bar coverage for claims of property damage. See Panico v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2011 WL 322830 (10th Cir. 2011). In Panico, the plaintiffs sold property in Aspen, Colorado to the Taylors, who sued the Panicos upon discovering the property was not as represented. After refusing to defend, the Panicos sued State Farm for breach of contract. The district court concluded that the Taylors’ claims were not covered under the Panicos insurance policies and granted summary judgment in State Farm’s favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
Mr. Panico built the house on the property as well as several additions to the house. As the Taylors lived in Florida, they primarily relied on their real estate agent and an inspector to ensure the property was acceptable. According to their complaint, the Taylors discovered that the house was “virtually uninhabitable due to serious design and construction defects, mold, rodents, and drainage problems.” Id. at *1. In their complaint, the Taylors asserted three claims for relief against the Panicos based upon misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment about the condition of the property.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Colorado “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6) “that particular part”
August 11, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Shay Construction, Inc., No. 10-cv-02126 (D. Col. July 28. 2011), general contractor Milender White subcontracted with insured Shay for framing work.  Shay in turn subcontracted some of its work to others. When Shay?s subcontractors filed suit against Shay and Milender White seeking payment for their work, Milender White cross-claimed against Shay for breach of contract alleging that,Milender White notified Shay during construction that some of Shay?s work was defective and that when Shay repaired its defective work, it damaged work performed by others. Shay’s CGL insurer Continental Western filed suit against Milender White and Shay seeking a judicial declaration of no coverage. The federal district trial court granted Continental Western?s motion for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Repair of Part May Necessitate Replacement of Whole
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Judge Gleuda E. Edmonds, a magistrate judge in the United States District Court of Arizona issued a ruling in Guadiana v. State Farm on January 25, 2012. Judge Edmonds recommended a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Ms. Guandiana’s home had water damage due to pluming leaks in September 2004. She was informed that polybutylene pluming in her house could not be repaired in parts “it must be completely replaced.” She had had the plumbing replaced. State Farm denied her claim, arguing that “the tear-out provision did not cover the cost of accessing and replacing those pipes that were not leaking.”
In September 2007, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss. The court rejected this motion, stating that “If Guadiana can establish as a matter of fact that the system that caused the covered loss included all the pipes in her house and it was necessary to replace all the pipes to repair that system, State Farm is obligated to pay the tear-out costs necessary to replace all the pipes, even those not leaking.”
In March 2009, State Farm filed for summary judgment, which the court granted. State Farm argued that “the tear-out provision only applied to ‘repair’ and not ‘replace’ the system that caused the covered leak.” As for the rest of the piping, State Farm argued that “the policy does not cover defective materials.”
In December 2011, Ms. Guadiana filed for summary judgment, asking the court to determine that “the policy ‘covers tear-out costs necessary to adequately repair the plumbing system, even if an adequate repair requires replacing all or part of the system.”
In her ruling, Judge Edmonds noted that Ms. Guadiana’s claim is that “the water damage is a covered loss and she is entitled to tear-out costs necessary to repair the pluming system that caused that covered loss.” She rejected State Farm’s claim that it was not obligated to replace presumably defective pipes. Further, she rejected State Farm’s argument that they were only responsible for the leaking portion, noting “Guadiana intends to prove at trial that this is an unusual case where repair of her plumbing system requires replacement of all the PB plumbing.”
Judge Edmonds concluded by directing the District Court to interpret the tear out issue as “the tear-out provision in State Farm’s policy requires State Farm to pay all tear-out costs necessary to repair the plumbing system (that caused the covered loss) even if repair of the system requires accessing more than the leaking portion of the system.”
Read the court’s decision…
Texas contractual liability exclusion
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In Ewing Construction Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. C-10-256 (S.D. Tex. April 28, 2011), insured Ewing was the general contractor for an athletic facility constructed for a school district. The school district sued Ewing alleging defective construction of the project. The underlying complaint included contract and negligence causes of action, and sought damages for the repair of the damages and loss of the use of the project. The complaint did not allege damage to any property other than the project itself. Ewing tendered its defense to its CGL insurer Amerisure. Amerisure denied a defense and Ewing filed suit against Amerisure. The federal district trial court entered summary judgment for Amerisure. Applying Texas law, the court held that all of the damages fell within the “contractual liability†exclusion precluding any duty to defend or indemnify.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Hawaii Building Codes to Stay in State Control
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Hawaii State Senate voted down Senate Bill 2692. Had it been passed, the State Building Code Council would have been abolished and building codes would have become the responsibility of county governments. The bill was opposed by the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety. Their director of code development, Wanda Edwards said that the bill “would have undermined key components that are essential to an effective state building code regime.”
Read the full story…
Seven Tips to Manage Construction Defect Risk
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Jody T. Wright looks at “seven strategies being used around the country to identify, manage and mitigate your exposures” in a piece in Business Insurance. Wright, Senior VP, Construction Department Manager for Lockton Companies in Denver, gives seven simple steps from the perspective of a insurer.
His first step is to match your project to your insurance. He suggests keeping the riskier projects separate, noting that from an insurer’s point-of-view, “any project that creates a homeowners association carries a higher potential threat of future litigation.” This leads to his second point: you need to “determine what makes your liability insurer nervous.” In other words, talk with your insurer.
His third point suggests that builders look back and see if there is a pattern of problems that have lead to payouts from your insurer. Keep your insurer happier by making sure these areas don’t continue to be problems. Nor should you look for new problems. He suggests against leading in new technologies.
Three more points deal with being careful about with whom you associate. He tells builders to negotiate their contracts, avoiding clauses that would obligate a builder to “indemnify the owner for the negligent work of others that they did not control.” Avoid subcontractors “with loss patterns that might affect your project and reputation.” Builders should identify “owners with a pattern of suing contractors” adding that risk to the cost of the job. They should also identify “the most effective attorneys and expert witnesses” and get them involved before the litigation starts.
Read the full story…
Negligent Misrepresentation in Sale of Building Altered without Permits
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has ruled in the case Wyle v. Lees. The Leeses owned a two-unit apartment building in North Conway, New Hampshire. They hired a contractor to add a third, larger apartment, including a two-car garage. The Leeses and their contractor submitted a building permit application. They were informed that site plan review was required. After receiving approval on the site plan, construction started. At no point did they obtain a building permit and the construction was never inspected. The Leeses subsequently added more space to the unit, reducing parking spaces below the minimum required. Again, they did not obtain a building permit.
In 2007, three years after all these changes were complete, the Leeses sold their building to Mr. Wyle. To the question “are you aware of any modifications or repairs made without the necessary permits?” they answered “no.” About six weeks after closing, Wyle “received a letter from the town code enforcement officer regarding the legality of the removal of a garage door from the new unit.” A subsequent inspection revealed “numerous building and life safety code violations.”
Mr. Wyle brought a claim against the Leeses for negligent misrepresentation. The defendants filed a motion “seeking to preclude economic loss damages.” At a two-day bench trial, Mr. Wyle won. The Leeses appealed.
The appeals court found that “the defendants negligently misrepresented that the premises were licensed for immediate occupancy and that the defendants had obtained all necessary permits,” and thus upheld the lower court’s finding of negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court also rejected the Leeses’ argument that damages must be apportioned on all parties, including “the plaintiff himself, the plaintiff’s building inspector, and the defendant’s contractor,” finding a lack of “adequate evidence.”
The Leeses further argued that they were unaware that modifications and repairs were accomplished without the required permits. The appeals court noted that “the trial court found that both the conditional approval and final approval for the site plan stated that a building permit and a certificate of occupancy were required prior to any use.” The court concluded that the Leeses “knew or should have known of the falsity of their representation.”
The appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court.
Read the court’s decision…
