Safety Officials Investigating Death From Fall
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
California safety officials are looking into the circumstances surrounding the death of a construction worker who fell from a roof in Tiburon, California. Another worker found Gabriel Vasquez unconscious at the site. Vasquez was later pronounced dead. The State Division of Occupational Safety and Health are trying to determine how Vasquez fell.
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Louisiana Politicians Struggle on Construction Bills, Hospital Redevelopment
June 16, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Louisiana politicians are still working on a compromise in the state’s construction budget, as reported in the Times-Picayune. Rob Marrianneax, the chair of the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee, removed a $45 million request from Governor Bobby Jindal and added $4 million for projects that Jindal vetoed last year.
Two senators have formed competing plans to fund redevelopment construction for New Orleans’s Methodist Hospital. Mitch Landrieu, the mayor of New Orleans, hoped for $30 million dollars in state bonds. Senator Cynthia Willard-Lewis proposed an amendment that would supply $1.6 million, while Senator J.P. Morrell has an amendment that would supply $4 million.
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Homebuilders Go Green in Response to Homebuyer Demand
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
McGrawHill Construction reports that 17 percent of new homes and remodels in 2011 were done with green building practices. Their report estimates that by 2016, this will rise to 29 to 38 percent of the market for home construction and remodeling.
Consumers see the green buildings as more desirable, particularly where they are more energy efficient. Two thirds of builders noted their customers were interested in features that would lower the energy use of their homes. Consumers also feel that green building materials are more durable and see green homes as higher quality.
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Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Court Consolidates Cases and Fees in Soil Construction Defect Case
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled in Burrow v. JTL Development. JTL Development had appealed a judgement in a construction defect case in which JTL Development and Highland Development were found liable for damage due to homes built on unstable and improperly compacted soil. The two companies were sued by the two sets of homeowners, the Burrows and the Balls, and their cases were consolidated at trial. Each family was awarded $700,000 in damages. This judgement had also been appealed and affirmed by the appeals court. In the current case, an additional $235,800 in cost-of-proof sanctions had been awarded to the two families.
Before the trial, Dale Burrows, Charles Ball, and Laurie Ball “asked JTL and Highland to admit that they ‘approved grading plans’ for the Burrows’ and Balls’ properties; ‘had knowledge that the [properties] contained improperly compacted fill’; ‘had knowledge that the [properties were’ not properly prepared for structures’; and ‘did not provide Plaintiffs with a complete soils report’ prepared by Gorian & Associates.” These were requests 14, 19, 20, and 22. JTL and Highland denied all of these.
At trial, the Burrows and Balls proved that all these were true. JTL and Highland’s geotechnical subcontractor, Gorian & Associates, had “recommended that Highland remove and re-compact the entire tract to a depth of 25 feet.” JTL and Highland did not follow this recommendation, “in order to avoid expense.”
After judgment, the Burrows and Balls moved for $582,587.45 for “attorneys’ fees and costs incurred proving the truth of requests for admission.” JTL and Highland claimed that only Dale Burrows could recover fees, but that also the fees were not recoverable. Joe Lynch of Highland “declared that he always believed the soils under the Burrows and Balls homes were properly compacted.” The Burrows and Balls responded with six identical sets of requests for admissions and the court awarded each of them twenty-five percent of $235,800, with JTL and Highland each responsible for fifty percent.
The appeals court noted that JTL and Highland filed a timely appeal and goes on to notes the four circumstances under which a responding party does not have to pay costs and fees. The court concluded that none of these were met. Instead of waiving the request, JTL and Highland denied the request, stating “without in any manner waiving the foregoing objection, responding party denies the request for admission.”
Nor was the admission “of no substantial importance,” instead the court said that the matters were of “substantial importance,” and the “trial would have been shortened by their admission. Highland and JTL “relied on Gorian when it denied the request,” but the trial court “discredited Lynch’s assertions,” finding that “Highland knew the soil was improperly compacted.”
As all plaintiffs had identical discovery requests, the court rejected the claim that only Dale Burrows was entitled to an award.
Read the court’s decision…
Arizona Supreme Court Confirms Eight-Year Limit on Construction Defect Lawsuits
July 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Acting on the case of Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled that Arizona’s eight-year statute of repose applies. The case was referred to the court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had asked for a clarification of Arizona law. The case focused on three questions:
1. Does the filing of a motion for class certification in an Arizona court toll the statute of limitations for individuals, who are included within the class, to file individual causes of action involving the same defendants and the same subject matter?2. If so, does this class-action tolling doctrine apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-552?3. If the doctrine applies to statutes of repose, and specifically § 12-552, may a court weigh the equities of the case in determining whether, and to what extent, an action is tolled?
The litigation at hand has a lengthy history, starting with a case referred to as “Hoffman” in 2003. The Albano plaintiffs were not able to join in Hoffman, and they filed their own lawsuit in 2006. An additional lawsuit was filed by the Albano plaintiffs in 2007. The courts decided that the Albano plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the statute of repose was the appropriate standard for this case. They noted that “the eight-year statute of repose period began to run on November 6, 1997, the date of the Town of Gilbert’s final inspection. Albano II was filed on November 5, 2007.”
The court found that the plaintiffs had waited too long for start their suit. As a result, they found it unnecessary to answer the first or third questions. Justice A. John Pelander of the Arizona Supreme Court wrote the opinion, dated June 30, 2011.
Read the court’s decision…
Allowing the Use of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 2, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Good and Bad News on Construction Employment
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The construction industry hit a two-year high in January, with 21,000 jobs added that month. The mild winter is assumed to have helped. According to the General Contractors of America, the construction industry currently employs about 5.57 million people. This is a 21 percent gain over January 2010. Ken Simonson, the chief economist of GCA, noted that “the unemployment rate in construction is still double that of the overall economy.” He said it was not currently clear if “the recent job growth reflects a sustained pickup or merely acceleration of homebuilding and highway projects that normally halt when the ground freezes in December and January.”
Stephen Sandherr, the chief executive officer of the GCA, said that the federal government had to make infrastructure funding a top priority. “Without adequate long-term funding for infrastructure, competitive tax rates and fewer costly regulatory hurdles, the construction industry may lose some of the jobs it gained in the last year.”
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Will They Blow It Up?
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The issues concerning the Harmon Towers building in Las Vegas continue to make their way through the courts. As we noted in a previous piece, Cook County building officials stated that the building could be a hazard if Las Vegas were struck by an earthquake. The question of whether the building will continue to stand is just one of the issues in front of a judge.
MGM Resorts International argued at a March 13 hearing for permission to implode the Harmon hotel building. They claim that more than 1,700 defects have been discovered in the building and that the building is a public safety hazard. Arguing against demolition, Perini Building Company, the general contractor for the hotel, and its subcontractors are claiming that imploding the building would destroy evidence and prejudice juries in the ongoing construction defect claims. They claim that MGM Resorts wishes to abandon the building due to the economic slowdown. Perini Corp, the contractor for the project, claims that the building can be fixed. Perini claims that MGM’s position in the construction trial would be improved if the building is demolished.
After Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez heard the four days of testimony on the Harmon Towers building and whether it should be demolished, she scheduled more testimony, with two days in April and an entire week in July. Judge Gonzalez will be deciding whether the building will be torn down, imploded, or left in place.
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Contract Not So Clear in South Carolina Construction Defect Case
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has reversed a partial summary judgment issued by one of the lower courts in the case of The Retreat at Edisto Co-Owners Association v. The Retreat at Edisto. The underlying issues of the case deal with a construction defect complaint.
The lower court had concluded “Developer’s ‘First Amendment’ to the Master Deed required the Developer to satisfy the provision in the paragraph labeled ‘Master Deed Amendment or Phase II’ as a condition precedent to its election to proceed with the development of Phase II.”
The appeals court found that “the language of the First Amendment to the Master Deed is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” The court additionally concluded that the “Developer presented the requisite scintilla of evidence on the question of its intent in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact. As the material facts were in dispute, the appeals court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Read the court’s decision…
Mortar Insufficient to Insure Summary Judgment in Construction Defect Case
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of Nevada issued a summary judgment in the case of R&O Construction Company V. Rox Pro International Group, Ltd. on December 19, 2011. The case involved the installation of stone veneer at a Home Depot location (Home Depot was not involved in the case). R&O’s subcontractor, New Creation Masonry, purchased the stone veneer from Arizona Stone. Judge Larry Hicks noted that “the stone veneer failed and R&O was forced to make substantial structural repairs to the Home Depot store.”
Rox Pro asked the court for a summary judgment, which the court granted only in part. The court looked at two issues in the case, whether the installation instructions constituted a breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and whether there was a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Judge Hicks found that there was a breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The instructions drafted by Real Stone and distributed by Arizona Stone were not sufficient for affixing the supplied stones, according to R&O’s expert, a claim the plaintiffs dispute. “Because there is an issue of material fact concerning the installation guidelines, the court shall deny Arizona Stone’s motion for a summary judgment on this issue.”
On the other hand, the judge did not find that the instructions had any bearing as to whether R&O bought the stone, since the stone was selected by the shopping center developer. This issue was, in the view of the judge, appropriately dismissed.
Read the court’s decision…
Harmon Towers Duty to Defend Question Must Wait, Says Court
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Harmon Towers project in Las Vegas was eventually halted short of the planned forty-seven stories after “it was determined that there was substantial defective construction, including defective installation of reinforcing steel throughout the Harmon.” The American Home Insurance Company and Lexington Insurance Company put forth a claim that they had no duty to defend Perini Construction, the builder of the defective Harmon Towers. Further, American Home seeks to recover the monies American reimbursed Perini. The United States District Court of Nevada ruled in the case of American Home Assurance Co. v. Perini Building on February 3, 2012.
The two insurance companies covered Perini and its subcontractors, Century Steel, Pacific Coast Steel, and Ceco Concrete Construction. Century Steel was the initial subcontractor for the reinforcing steel; they were later acquired by Pacific Coast Steel. In this current case, Perini Construction is the sole defendant.
Perini sought a dismissal of these claims, arguing that without the subcontractors joined to the case, “the Court cannot afford complete relief among existing parties.” The court rejected this claim, noting that the court can determine the duties of the insurance companies to Perini, which the court described as “separate and distinct from those of the subcontractors.” The subcontractors “have not claimed an interest in the subject matter of the action.” The court concluded that it could determine whether Perini was entitled or not to coverage without affecting the subcontractors. The court rejected Perini’s claim.
Perini also asked the court to abstain from the case, arguing that it was better heard in a state court. The court noted that several considerations cover whether a case is heard in state or federal courts. The court noted that if the case weighed heavily on state law, the state courts would be the obvious location. Further, if there were a parallel action in the state courts, “there is a presumption that the whole suit should be heard in state courts.” This is, however, no parallel state suit, although the court noted that Perini has “threatened” to do so.
However, the issue of who is to blame for the problems at Harmon Towers has not been resolved. The court concluded that until the “underlying action” was concluded, it was premature to consider the issues raised in this case while the earlier lawsuit was still in progress. The court denied Perini’s motion to dismiss the case. Given that the outcome of the earlier construction defect case may lead to further litigation in state court, the District Court granted Perini’s motion to abstain, but staying their judgment until the construction defect case is resolved.
Read the court’s decision…
Exclusions Bar Coverage for Damage Caused by Chinese Drywall
July 5, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly,
Insurance Law HawaiiThe insured homeowners were unsuccessful in arguing around the policy's exclusions when seeking coverage for damage caused by Chinese drywall. Ross v. C. Adams. Constr. & Design, L.L.C., 2011 La. App. LEXIS 769 (La. Ct. App. June 14, 2011).
Before the insureds purchased and moved into their home, it was renovated. After moving in, the insures discovered foreign gypsum drywall, or Chinese drywall. The insureds submitted a claim to Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. In an investigation, the insurer confirmed the presence of Chinese drywall and damage to the metal surfaces caused by corrosion. Louisiana Citizens refused coverage and the insureds sued. The trial court denied the insured's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to Louisiana Citizens.
The court of appeal affirmed. Initially, the court determined the insureds sustained a direct physical loss. The inherent qualities of the Chinese drywall created a physical loss to the home and required that the drywall be removed and replaced.
Four exclusions, however, barred coverage. First, damages due to faulty or defective materials were excluded from coverage. The Chinese drywall emitted high levels of sulfuric gas which caused the damage to the insured's plumbing, electrical wiring and metal components.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Pipes May Be Defective, But Owners Lack Standing
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United States District Court in Minnesota has determined that Steven and Cecilia Thundander cannot make a class-action claim against Uponor, Inc. over the plumbing in their home, as they do not have Article III standing. In this situation, the alleged defect is that Uponor made fraudulent claims that the pipes met National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) standards for use in potable water systems. Uponor submitted samples of other pipes, and their substitution was discovered when the NSF made an inspection of the manufacturing facility. The court noted that “the Thunanders contend that Uponor failed to inform homeowners, plumbers and consumers that it had been selling pipe that failed to meet NSF toxicity requirements at the time of sale and installation.”
The Court noted that the Thunanders have not tested their piping to determine if they “demonstrate toxicity or lack of compliance with the NSF 61 standards,” noting also that the Complaint seeks to require Uponor to instruct the plaintiffs on “how to test the piping and water to determine the level of risk.” Lacking testing, the Court could not find that the Thundanders have defective pipes. The Court found that the “Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing as to their product liability claims.”
The Court also concluded that it could not determine if the Plaintiff’s warranty actions could not be applied, as they “have failed to allege a plausible defect.” Even in the presence of a defect, the Court noted that more than eight years had passed before the filing of the suit, when the warranties under both Indiana and Minnesota law have a four-year statute of limitations. The Court also rejected the Thunanders tort claims, once again because “Plaintiffs have not tested their pipes,” noting that “a tort requires the existence of an injury.”
In conclusion, Judge Nelson rejected the entirety of the complaint, granting the motions to dismiss by the defendants. However, despite the problems with the Thunanders’ claims, she found that they were not “patently frivolous or groundless.” Therefore, she denied attorney fees requested by one of the defendants.
Read the court’s decision…
Retaining Wall Contractor Not Responsible for Building Damage
July 20, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeals of Indiana ruled on July 8 in the case of Rollander Enterprises, Inc. v. H.C. Nutting Co. Judge Baily wrote the opinion affirming the decision of the trial court.
The case involved an unfinished condominium complex, the Slopes of Greendale, in Greendale, Indiana. Rollander is a real estate development company incorporated in Ohio. One of the issues in the case was whether the case should be settled in the Indiana courts or be tried in Ohio. The project was owned by a special purpose entity limited liability corporation incorporated in Indiana.
Rollander hired Nutting to determine the geological composition of the site. Nutting’s report described the site as “a medium plastic clay containing pieces of shale and limestone.” The court summarized this as corresponding with “slope instability and landslides.” Rollander then hired Nutting to design the retaining walls, which were constructed by Scherziner Drilling.
After cracking was discovered on State Route 1, the walls were discovered to be inadequate. More dirt was brought in and a system of tie-backs was designed to anchor the walls. Not only were the tie-backs unsightly, local officials would not approve the complex for occupancy. Further, the failure of the wall below one building lead to damage of that building.
The court concluded that since almost all events occurred in Indiana, they rejected Rollander’s contention that the case should be tried in Ohio. Further, the court notes “the last event making Nutting potentially liable on both claims was an injury that occurred in Indiana and consequently, under the lex loci delicti analysis, Indiana law applies.”
Nor did the court find that Nutting was responsible for the damage to the rest of the project, citing an Indiana Supreme Court ruling, that “there is no liability in tort to the owner of a major construction project for pure economic loss caused unintentionally by contractors, subcontractors, engineers, design professionals, or others engaged in the project with whom the project owner, whether or not technically in privity of contract, is connected through a network or chain of contracts.”
The court concluded:
Because Rollander was in contractual privity with Nutting, and Indy was connected to Nutting through a chain of contracts and no exception applies, the economic loss rule precludes their recovery in tort. Damage to Building B was not damage to "other property," and the negligent misrepresentation exception to the economic loss rule is inapplicable on these facts. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by entering judgment on the evidence in favor of Nutting on the Appellants' negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims.
Read the court’s decision…
Discovery Ordered in Nevada Construction Defect Lawsuit
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Gemstone LVS was sued by the Manhattan Homeowners Association in Las Vegas, after which Chartis Specialty Insurance informed Gemstone that they “had no duty to defend or indemnify Gemstone under the Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy.” Gemstone “asserts that at the time the Policy was purchased, it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage for a construction defect lawsuit” and now seeks discovery “to prove Chartis’ bad faith purpose in drafting an illusory Policy.”
The opinion notes that “the Court conducted a preliminary peek at the pending motion for partial summary judgment and finds that Chartis has not made the strong showing necessary to support the requested stay.” Further, the court notes that “when ambiguity in the language of a policy exists, the court may consider not only the language of the policy but also the ‘intent of the parties, the subject matter of the policy, and the circumstances surrounding its issuance.’” The court concludes that “this type of discovery is relevant to understanding the intent of the parties, more specifically, whether it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage given the construction defect lawsuit.”
Accordingly, the court denied Chartis’ motion for stay of discovery and established a schedule for discovery, expert designations, rebuttal expert designations, and other matters related to the trial.
Read the court’s decision…
South Carolina “occurrence” and allocation
September 1, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Crossman Communities of North Carolina, Inc. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., No. 26909 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2011), insured Crossman was the developer and general contractor of several condominium projects constructed by Crossman’s subcontractors over multiple years. After completion, Crossman was sued by homeowners alleging negligent construction of exterior components resulting in moisture penetration property damage to non-defective components occurring during multiple years. Crossman settled the underlying lawsuit and then filed suit against its CGL insurers to recover the settlement amount. Crossman settled with all of the insurers except for Harleysville. Crossman and Harleysville stipulated that the only coverage issue was whether there was an “occurrence.” The trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of Crossman, determining that there was an “occurrence.” The trial court also ruled that Harleysville was liable for the entire settlement amount without offset for the amounts paid by the other insurers.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Continuous Trigger of Coverage Adopted for Loss Under First Party Policy
August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Seventh Circuit predicted that the Wisconsin Supreme Court would adopt the continuous injury trigger for first party property loss that extends over several policy periods. Miller v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12940 (7th Cir. June 25, 2012).
A home inspection report performed before the Millers purchased their home showed a soft spot on the roof. The stucco's finish color was also uneven and stained. Further, some water damage was found in the study and skylights above the kitchen sink. But the report advised that the exterior walls, chimney, grass roof, flashings, floor joists/beams and columns, garage walls and floor appeared serviceable. A roof specialist determined the soft spot was not significant and could be repaired for $1,500.
The Millers purchased a homeowner's policy from Safeco on June 30, 2005. The policy went into effect the next day when the Millers closed on the property. But the Millers did not see the policy's terms until Safeco mailed them a copy of the policy at the end of July.
Before receiving the policy, the Millers discovered severe inner wall water leaks and significant water infiltration on three of the home's exterior walls.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com