A Loud Boom, But No Serious Injuries in World Trade Center Accident
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Wall Street Journal reports that nearly twenty tons of steel fell forty stories at the World Trade Center site on February 16. One person was checked by medical personnel. One person who works in the Financial District said it was “almost like thunder.” Frank Pensabene, one of the ironworkers on the site said that after “loud boom,” “all hell broke loose.” The steel beams and cables fell onto a flatbed truck, which was not occupied at the time.
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Construction Defects Are Occurrences, Says South Carolina High Court
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Supreme Court has left the legislature’s new, expanded definition of “occurrence” in place, declining to declare it unconstitutional. South Carolina included faulty workmanship as an occurrence in response to a Supreme Court decision, which the court later reversed. One of the parties in that earlier decision, Harleysville Insurance, challenged the new law, claiming that the legislature didn’t have the power to pass a law to overturn a court ruling. The court did not concur.
However, the court did determine that the law was not retroactive and covered only claims filed after the law became effective in May 2011. The Chief Justice of South Carolina noted that “insurance coverage for construction liability lacks clarity, particularly with respect to whether construction defects constitute ‘occurrences’ under construction general insurance policies.”
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Oregon agreement to procure insurance, anti-indemnity statute, and self-insured retention
March 5, 2011 — By
CDCoverage.com, March 5, 2011
In Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., No. 09-35484 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2010), general contractor TCR was sued by an employee of subcontractor Safeway for bodily injuries suffered while working on the project. In the subcontract, Safeway agreed to procure primary insurance providing coverage for TCR for liability arising out of Safeway’s negligence. Safeway’s CGL policy included a self-insured retention that had to be satisfied before the insurer had a duty to defend. TCR filed suit against Safeway alleging that
Read the full story...Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Court Strikes Down Reasonable Construction Defect Settlement
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeals of Washington has struck down a construction defect settlement between a building owner and the companies she hired to repair the siding, among other repairs to bring the building up to code. Yuan Zhang hired Hawk Construction LLC to do repair work. Hawk, in turn, hired Ready Construction LLC for some aspects of the project. Hawk and Ready were both insured by Capital Specialty Insurance Corporation.
There were several problems with Ready’s work. After removing old siding, they did not protect the building, nor did they remove all of the damaged layers. Ready covered, but did not fix, a mildew problem under the old siding. When new siding was reattached, the nails used were too short to adequately attach it.
After paying for an inspection of the work, Zhang had Hawk and Ready begin the repairs again, but the work was abandoned without being completed. Zhang sued Hawk for breach of contract. Hawk then sued Ready, claiming that “Ready was liable to Hawk to the extent that Hawk was liable to Zhang.” Capitol retained defense for both contractors.
Zhang settled with Hawk, in an agreement that gave her “the right to collect and/or pursue all costs and attorney fees paid by Hawk or its insurance company defending against the Zhang’s claims and pursuing claims against Ready.” Subsequently, she also settled with Ready. Both companies ceased operations.
Zhang had the settlements reviewed by a court, which concluded that the settlements were reasonable. Capital was allowed to appeal, claiming that the settlement included costs that were Zhang’s responsibility. The appeals court did not examine the question of the reasonableness of the settlement, concluding that Capitol’s interests were relevant only to “questions of bad faith, collusion, and fraud.”
In the case of Zhang, the court concluded that the relationship between Zhang and her former contractors was collusive. The court noted that “bad faith or collusion may exist when the evidence indicates a joint effort to create, in a non-adversarial atmosphere, a resolution beneficial to both parties, yet highly prejudicial to the insurer as intervener.” The court noted that both companies had minimal assets which were, in any case, exempted from the agreement. Further, the court found that the agreements failed to determine “what amount of the repairs related to preexisting water damage.” Zhang’s calculation of costs also included her expenses for architectural and engineering services, which the court points out, “where always Zhang’s costs to bear.”
The court concluded that “the overall structure of the settlements is highly probative of collusion, fraud, or bad faith.” Zhang’s agreements with Hawk and Ready allowed her to collect compensation from Hawk and then collect Ready’s compensation to Hawk for their portion of the settlement, allowing Zhang to collect the monies twice. Further, she was allowed to pursue Capitol for Hawk’s attorney expenses, even though Hawk had none. “The right to recover Hawk’s fees merely set up a windfall recovery for Zhang.” The court described the agreements among Zhang, Hawk, and Ready as “precisely the type of manipulation [the law] is intended to preclude.”
Read the court’s decision…
Plaintiff Not Entitled to Further Damages over Defective Decking
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District has rejected an appeal from the successful plaintiff of a construction defect case in Evilsizor v. Calaveras Lumber Company. John Evilsizor hired Scott Hunton to remove and replace the deck at the rear of his home. Subsequently, the deck, which had been constructed with a product called SmartDeck, a product of the subsequently bankrupt US Plastic Lumber, exhibited problems. Hunton made some repairs. Calaveras Lumber offered replacement decking if Evilsizor would pay the difference in price. Mr. Evilsizor hired another contractor to replace the decking and then sued for lost use and compensation for the amount he paid the second contractor. Replacing the deck a second time cost Mr. Evilsizor $113,065.44.
During the trial, the defendant conceded that the planking was defective. It has been recalled by the manufacturer. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from a construction and building codes consultant, Lonne Haughton, however the trial court found that Mr. Haughton did not have sufficient expertise in wood-plastic composite materials. Further, Haughton had been a California contractor for only three years, and though he claimed a college degree, this was “‘a distance learning diploma’ that required no in-class work.” The appeals court upheld the decision that Mr. Haughton was not qualified to testify as an expert about wood-plastic materials.
The court also upheld the trial court’s exclusion of two pieces of evidence. One was a list of SmartDeck sales. However, the witness asked about it was not able “to testify who prepared it or confirm that it had been prepared by a Cascade employee.” Further, “the fact defendant bought and sold SmartDeck was not disputed.” The other was an e-mail in which US Plastics said they had “some bad product in the field.” This e-mail went to Westmark & Associates, and the plaintiff did not establish that it was ever sent to the defendant.
Though the defense has suggested an award of $18,000 plus loss-of-use damages for one year and an additional $4,000 if the jury believed that leftover material from the front deck was used in the rear. As the plaintiff requested $100 per month of loss of use, this would have totaled $34,000. The jury awarded the cost of the decking, $6,275,82. The court cites earlier decision that the amount of the award is “a question of fact to be determined by the jury.”
In conclusion, Mr. Evilsizor was not only unable to receive a larger award, but the court ruled that he must pay the defendant’s cost on appeal.
Read the court's decision…
Preventing Costly Litigation Through Your Construction Contract
August 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
It’s Tuesday, which means it ’s the middle of your work week. Tuesday is a great time to take an hour to look over your contracts, while the crews are pushing through their scheduled work. Today’s food for thought: How do you use your contract to reduce your litigation burden?
Your contract should do many things. It should discuss the scope of work, scheduling of work, quality of work, coverage for liabilities and conditions and timeliness for payment. But often overlooked is how your contract can lend to dispute resolution.
Commonly, you will see a simple provision that covers governing law, venue for disputes and the awarding of attorneys’ fees. But you can do better. Remember, a contract is enforced to the maximum extent possible in Washington state.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Mobile Home Owners Not a Class in Drainage Lawsuit
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Comparing it to a “complex construction defect action,” the California Court of Appeals for Orange County has rejected the claims of a group of mobile home owners that they should be certified as a class in their lawsuit against Huntington Shorecliffs Mobilehome Park. The Appeals court sustained the judgment of the lower court. The court issued a decision in the case of Criswell v. MMR Family LLC on January 17, 2012.
The claims made by the group were that the owners and operators of the mobile home park had known of an “on-going and potentially worsening shallow groundwater condition on the property” and had “exacerbated the problem by changing ‘the configuration and drainage related to the hillside that abuts’ the park.” The homeowners claimed that the class should consist of “any past or current homeowner during the same time frame” who had experienced “the accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” “property damage to his/her mobilehome and/or other property resulting from drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins,” emotional distress related to drainage problems or mold, and finally health problems “resulting from exposure to drainage problems, water seepage, water accumulation, moisture build-up, mold, fungus, and/or other toxins, in or around one’s home, lot, or common areas of the park.”
The lower court concluded that while the limits of the class were identifiable, they failed to constitute a class in other ways. First, the people affected were small enough in number that they could be brought together. They “are not so numerous that it would be impracticable to bring them all before the Court.”
The court noted that while many of the homeowners would have issues in common, they did not find “a well-defined community of interest among the class members.” The Appeals Court wrote that “the individual issues affecting each mobile home and homeowner will predominate over the common issue of the presence of standing or pooling water in and around the park.” The court noted that each home would be affected differently by water and “the ‘accumulation of mold, fungus, and/or other toxins.’”
While the court conceded that there would be common issues, such as the “defendants’ alleged concealment of excess moisture conditions and their allegedly negligent roadwork and landscaping,” they noted that “these common issues would be swamped by the swarm of individual determinations of property damage, emotional distress, and personal injury.” The Appeals Court cited an earlier case that ruled against certification “if a class action ‘will splinter into individual trials.’” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court that they could not proceed as a class.
Read the court’s decision…
Colorado “property damage” caused by an “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6) “that particular part”
August 11, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Shay Construction, Inc., No. 10-cv-02126 (D. Col. July 28. 2011), general contractor Milender White subcontracted with insured Shay for framing work.  Shay in turn subcontracted some of its work to others. When Shay?s subcontractors filed suit against Shay and Milender White seeking payment for their work, Milender White cross-claimed against Shay for breach of contract alleging that,Milender White notified Shay during construction that some of Shay?s work was defective and that when Shay repaired its defective work, it damaged work performed by others. Shay’s CGL insurer Continental Western filed suit against Milender White and Shay seeking a judicial declaration of no coverage. The federal district trial court granted Continental Western?s motion for summary judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Demand for Urban Living Leads to Austin Building Boom
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The New York Times reports that Austin is undergoing a building boom as a high-tech firms, including Facebook and Google, have moved into the downtown area. With them, comes a need for more apartment buildings and more retail space. Mike Kennedy, the president and chief executive of an Austin real estate firm, told the Times “the office space was here, the housing came, and retail is arriving last to the scene.” Currently, two large projects that will add about 500 apartment units is underway, including a 222-unit, 18-story building, and another that will contain 277 units. Apartment occupancy in Austin is at ninety-seven percent.
Developers also have hotels and more office space planned. The area has about 6,000 hotel rooms with an additional 2,000 planned, but events in Austin can bring in more people than the city’s 30,000 hotel rooms can accommodate. Office space is eighty-eight percent occupied, and a lack of office space could cause firms to look elsewhere.
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Courts Are Conflicted As To Whether "Good Faith" Settlement Determinations Can Be Reviewed Via Writ Petition Or Appeal
July 10, 2012 — Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP
The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, ruled in Oak Springs Villas Homeowners Association v. Advanced Truss Systems, Inc., et al., (June 14, 2012, B234568) __ Cal.App.4th __ [2012 WL 2149923], that a non-settling defendant cannot appeal a trial court's good faith settlement determination. Instead, a non-settling defendant may only file a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 to challenge a good faith determination. This decision comes on the heels of a 2011 ruling in Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, which found that a writ petition is not the sole means of challenging a trial court's good faith settlement determination.
In Oak Springs Villas, supra, the condominium homeowners' association sued a developer, general contractor, and various subcontractors for alleged construction deficiencies and resultant property damage. The association eventually settled with the developer, but not with a truss manufacturer. The trial court approved the developer's motion for good faith settlement determination, and the truss manufacturer immediately appealed, instead of filing a writ petition. On appeal, the developer argued the good faith determination was not an appealable order. The truss manufacturer argued Cahill applied, as well as an older case, Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, which allowed for appeals when no remaining issues exist as to the appealing party.
The Court of Appeal ruled in the developer's favor and declined to follow Cahill, stating the truss manufacturer should have filed a writ petition, as expressly required under Section 877.6, subdivision (e). The Court also believed Justus was inapplicable because a non-settling party should not be allowed to have two review opportunities ?Äì one after an adverse good faith ruling, and then another after the ultimate conclusion of the case.
However, the greater effect is that Cahill and Oak Springs Villas simultaneously stand in conflict and appear to be valid law. One case allows for an appeal of a good faith settlement determination, while the other requires strict adherence to the statute. The Supreme Court is likely to review the issue. In the meantime, parties challenging good faith rulings are advised to consult the statutory requirements under Section 877.6, subdivision (e).
Printed courtesy of Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP. Mr. Sunseri can be contacted at ssunseri@gdandb.com and Ms. Kewalramani can be contacted at akewalramani@gdandb.com.
Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Homeowners May Not Need to Pay Lien on Defective Log Cabin
July 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Perception Construction Management v. Bell. The Bells hired PCM to build a log home, agreeing to play monthly invoices in full within ten days. The Bells paid the first four invoices in full, part of the fifth, and ceased payment after that. Beofre seventh invoice, the Bells terminated the contract and hired a new contractor. PCM filed a claim of lien and ceased work.
The Bells responded that PCM was in breach of contract and had failed to fulfill the contract in a workmanlike manner. They claimed construction defects and in the lien suit, sought to include testimony from an architect and a plumber reviewing PCM’s work. The court only allowed the architect to testify as to whether the amount of the lien was reasonable. No testimony was permitted from the plumber.
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the claims of construction defects were important to case and remanded it to the lower court for a new trial taking into evidence that Bell’s contention that PCM’s work was defective.
Read the court’s decision
Insurer Unable to Declare its Coverage Excess In Construction Defect Case
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in the case of American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Several other insurance companies were party to this case. In the earlier case, the US District Court of Appeals for Arizona had granted a summary judgment to Ohio Casualty Group and National Fire & Marine Insurance Company. At the heart of it, is a dispute over construction defect coverage.
The general contractor for Astragal Luxury Villas, GFTDC, contracted with American Family to provide it with a commercial liability policy. Coverage was issued to various subcontractors by Ohio Casualty and National Fire. These policies included blanket additional insured endorsements that provided coverage to GFTDC. The subcontractor policies had provisions making their coverage excess over other policies available to GFTDC.
The need for insurance was triggered when the Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association filed a construction defect claim in the Arizona Superior Court. CFTDC filed a third-party claim against several subcontractors. The case was settled with American Family paying the settlement, after which it filed seeking reimbursement from the subcontractor’s insurers. The court instead granted summary judgment in favor of Ohio Casualty and National Fire.
American Family appealed to the Ninth Circuit for a review of the summary judgment, arguing that the “other insurance” clauses were “mutually repugnant and unenforceable.” The Ninth Circuit cited a case from the Arizona Court of Appeals that held that “where two policies cover the same occurrence and both contain ‘other insurance’ clauses, the excess insurance provisions are mutually repugnant and must be disregarded. Each insurer is then liable for a pro rate share of the settlement or judgment.”
The court noted that unlike other “other insurance” cases, the American Family policy “states that it provides primary CGL coverage for CFTDC and is rendered excess only if there is ‘any other primary insurance’ available to GFTDC as an additional insured.” They note that “the American Family policy purports to convert from primary to excess coverage only if CFTDC has access to other primary insurance as an additional insured.”
In comparison, the court noted that “the ‘other insurance’ language in Ohio Casualty’s additional insured endorsement cannot reasonably be read to contradict, or otherwise be inconsistent with, the ‘other primary insurance’ provision in the American Family policy.” They find other reasons why National Fire’s coverage did not supersede American Family’s. In this case, the policy is “written explicitly to apply in excess.”
Finally, the Astragal settlement did not exhaust American Family’s coverage, so they were obligated to pay out the full amount. The court upheld the summary dismissal of American Family’s claims.
Read the court’s decision…
One to Watch: Case Takes on Economic Loss Rule and Professional Duties
June 28, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
According to the Supreme Court of Washington Blog, The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jackowski v. Hawkins Poe on Thursday, June 16, 2011. The court’s synopsis of the case can be found on the Washington State Court website.
In short, two home purchasers brought a lawsuit against the home’s sellers, the sellers’ agent and the purchasers’ own agent, alleging claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation and breach of common law and statutory duties. The trial court dismissed the buyers’ claims on the basis of the economic loss doctrine and Division II reversed, opining that the ELR does not apply to professional duties. The Supreme Court will now look at applying the Independent Duty Doctrine established last year, and whether professional duties (those of the real estate agents) should be reviewed under a different light.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Follow Up on Continental Western v. Shay Construction
March 28, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Colorado Construction Litigation
Writing in Construction Law Colorado, Brady Iandiorio revisits the case Continental Western v. Shay Construction. He promises to continue to follow cases dealing with Colorado HB 10-1394.
Recently the Court ruled on two Motions to Reconsider filed by Defendants Milender White and Shay Construction.
Procedurally, the Motions to Reconsider were ruled on by the Honorable William J. Martinez, because the day after the motions were filed the action was reassigned to Judge Martinez. In the short analysis of the Motion to Reconsider, the court leaned on Judge Walker D. Miller’s ruling on the summary judgment and his analysis of the (j)(5) and (j)(6) exclusions.
As a quick refresher regarding the grant of summary judgment, Judge Miller agreed with Continental Western’s argument that the asserted claims were excluded under the “damage to property” exclusion. The policy’s exclusions state: “(j) Damage to Property . . . (5) that particular part of real property on which you or any contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your behalf are performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those operations; or (6) that particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your work’ was incorrectly performed on it.” Judge Miller found that both exclusions (j)(5) and (6) applied to both Shay’s allegedly defective work.
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com.
Florida Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Homeowners Unaware of Construction Defects and Lack of Permits
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Florida Court of Appeals has ruled that a homeowner is not liable for defects in unpermitted alterations, reversing a lower court’s decision in Jensen v. Bailey. The Jensens sold their house to the Baileys. During the sale, the Jensens filled out a property disclosure statement, checking “no” to a question about “any improvement or additions to the property, whether by your or by others that have been constructed in violation of building codes or without necessary permits.”
After moving in, the Baileys discovered several problems with the home. One involved a defective sewer connection leading to repeated backups. The Baileys also found problems with remodeling the Jensens had done in the kitchen, master bath, and bedroom. The remodeling work was not done with required permits nor was it up to code.
The court noted that an earlier case, Johnson v. Davis, established four criteria: “the seller of a home must have knowledge of a defect in the property; the defect must materially affect the value of the property; the defect must not be readily observable and must be unknown to the buyer; and the buyer must establish that the seller failed to disclose the defect to the buyer.” The court found that the first of these criteria was crucial to determining the case.
In the Johnson ruling, the then Chief Justice dissented, fearing that the courts “would ultimately construe Johnson’s requirement of actual knowledge to permit a finding of liability based on constructive knowledge,” quoting Justice Boyd, “a rule of constructive knowledge will develop based on the reasoning that if the seller did not know of the defect, he should have known about it before attempting to sell the property.” The Appeals Court concluded that the lower court hit this point in ruling on Jensen v. Bailey.
Citing other Florida cases, the court noted that the Johnson rule does require “proof of the seller’s actual knowledge of the defect.” The court cited a case in which it was concluded that the seller “should have known” that there was circumstantial evidence was that the seller did know about the defects, as the seller had been involved in the construction of the home.
In the case of the Jensens, the lower court concluded that they did not know that the work was defective, nor did they know that they were obligated to obtain permits for it. The Appeals Court found this one fact sufficient to reverse the decision and remand the case to the lower court for a final judgment in favor of the Jensens.
Read the court’s decision…
Texas res judicata and co-insurer defense costs contribution
March 23, 2011 — Original story by CDCoverage.com, March 23, 2011
In Truck Ins. Exchange v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., No. 03-08-00526-CV (Tex. App. 3d Aug. 27, 2010), insured contractor DCI was sued by the project owner seeking damages for defective construction. DCI tendered its defense to its CGL insurers Truck and Mid-Continent. Truck agreed to defend while Mid-Continent denied a defense. While the underlying suit was pending, Mid-Continent sued DCI, but not Truck, and obtained a judicial declaration of no duty to defend or indemnify DCI in the underlying suit. After settling the underlying suit, Truck sued Mid-Continent seeking contribution towards defense costs and indemnity payments. The state trial court entered summary judgment for Mid-Continent. The intermediate appellate court affirmed.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Arizona Supreme Court Confirms Eight-Year Limit on Construction Defect Lawsuits
July 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Acting on the case of Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled that Arizona’s eight-year statute of repose applies. The case was referred to the court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had asked for a clarification of Arizona law. The case focused on three questions:
1. Does the filing of a motion for class certification in an Arizona court toll the statute of limitations for individuals, who are included within the class, to file individual causes of action involving the same defendants and the same subject matter?2. If so, does this class-action tolling doctrine apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-552?3. If the doctrine applies to statutes of repose, and specifically § 12-552, may a court weigh the equities of the case in determining whether, and to what extent, an action is tolled?
The litigation at hand has a lengthy history, starting with a case referred to as “Hoffman” in 2003. The Albano plaintiffs were not able to join in Hoffman, and they filed their own lawsuit in 2006. An additional lawsuit was filed by the Albano plaintiffs in 2007. The courts decided that the Albano plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the statute of repose was the appropriate standard for this case. They noted that “the eight-year statute of repose period began to run on November 6, 1997, the date of the Town of Gilbert’s final inspection. Albano II was filed on November 5, 2007.”
The court found that the plaintiffs had waited too long for start their suit. As a result, they found it unnecessary to answer the first or third questions. Justice A. John Pelander of the Arizona Supreme Court wrote the opinion, dated June 30, 2011.
Read the court’s decision…