Ceiling Collapse Attributed to Construction Defect
May 19, 2011 — May 16, 2011 - CDJ Staff
WSMV, Nashville reports that the ceiling collapse in a Franklin, Tennessee Kohl’s was attributed to a construction defect by fire officials. The officials noted that the ceiling was renovated at the time. No injuries were reported.
The report notes that “inspectors were supposed to look at the renovations next week, but fire officials said that will have to be delayed until another time.”
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Construction Defect Lawsuits? There’s an App for That
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The website ebeeky.com reviews Picture It Settled, an app designed to help people engaged in lawsuits figure out where settlement strategies would be most successful. First available for Android and then iOS, the app is now available for Blackberry. One user of the application wrote that “anyone who has set through a construction defect mediation can immediately grasp the value of this app.
The app tracks the negotiation process, allowing users to see a history of bids and counteroffers. It also models the negotiation process in order to predict the ultimate cost of settlement. These numbers are based on past similar negotiations that the user has entered.
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Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The insureds' home was built in 1989. In 2006, extensive water damage was found to the house. The insureds notified their carrier, Chubb. The insureds had coverage for all risks unless stated otherwise in the policy or if an exclusion applied.
Chubb hired an adjustor who determined that defective construction had enabled water to enter the wall and beam systems. Chubb denied coverage under the faulty planning, construction or maintenance exclusion.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Architect Not Responsible for Injuries to Guests
September 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals has ruled, with one dissent, that the architectural firm that designed a home was not responsible to the injuries caused to guests when a balcony collapsed. Judge David Puryear wrote the majority opinion in Black + Vernooy Architects v. Smith.
Black + Vernooy designed a vacation home for Robert and Kathy Maxfield in 2000. The Maxfields hired a general contractor to build the home. The general contractor hired a subcontractor to build a balcony; however, the subcontractor did not follow the architect’s design in building the balcony.
A year after the house was completed; the Maxfields were visited by Lou Ann Smith and Karen Gravely. The balcony collapsed under the two women. Ms. Gravely suffered a broken finger, a crushed toe, and bruises. Ms. Smith was rendered a paraplegic as a result of the fall. They sued the Maxfields, the general contractor, and the architects for negligence. The Maxfields and the general contractor settled. A jury found that the architects held 10% of the responsibility. The architects appealed the judgment of the district court.
The Appeals Court reversed this judgment, noting that “there has been no allegation that the Architects negligently designed the balcony or that the Architects actually created the defects at issue.” Further, “the Smiths allege that the defect was caused by the construction practices of the contractor and subcontractor when the balcony was not built in accordance with the design plans of the Architects.”
The court found that even though the architects had a duty “to endeavor to guard against defects and deficiencies in the construction of the home and to generally ascertain whether the home was being built in compliance with the construction plans,” this duty did not extend to third parties.
Read the court’s decision…
After Breaching its Duty to Defend, Insurer Must Indemnify
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
In a brief decision analyzing Oregon law, the Ninth Circuit determined that once an insurer breaches its duty to defend, it must indemnify. See Desrosiers v. Hudson Speciality Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12591 (9th CIr. June 21, 2011).
The victim secured a judgment against the insured after he was beaten by another patron outside the insured's bar. Hudson Speciality Insurance refused to defend the insured, claiming the injury arose from an assault and battery, which excluded coverage.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Instant Hotel Tower, But Is It Safe?
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Broad Sustainable Building has leapfrogged in China’s construction boom by building a thirty-story hotel in just fifteen days in the city of Changsha. According to an article in the Los Angeles Times, most of the building was prefabricated, but most prefabricated buildings require a longer time for assembly. Broad claimed that it cut no corners on safety. However, Zhang Li, a Beijing architect, told the Times that “incredible speed also means incredible risk.”
At the completion date, the interior was still partially finished. Some rooms were furnished, while others weren’t quite so ready. The hotel will be used to house clients who are visiting Broad and some of its employees.
Broad called their process “the most profound innovation in human history” and predicted that soon a third of new buildings worldwide would be constructed this way. The company anticipates using the same process to build taller buildings, with hopes of eventually constructing a 150-story building.
China is currently undergoing a building boom which Zhang attributed to a desire to catch up to the developed world. As a result of this boom, he noted that building inspections are often skipped in China to speed up building.
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Insurer Unable to Declare its Coverage Excess In Construction Defect Case
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in the case of American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Several other insurance companies were party to this case. In the earlier case, the US District Court of Appeals for Arizona had granted a summary judgment to Ohio Casualty Group and National Fire & Marine Insurance Company. At the heart of it, is a dispute over construction defect coverage.
The general contractor for Astragal Luxury Villas, GFTDC, contracted with American Family to provide it with a commercial liability policy. Coverage was issued to various subcontractors by Ohio Casualty and National Fire. These policies included blanket additional insured endorsements that provided coverage to GFTDC. The subcontractor policies had provisions making their coverage excess over other policies available to GFTDC.
The need for insurance was triggered when the Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association filed a construction defect claim in the Arizona Superior Court. CFTDC filed a third-party claim against several subcontractors. The case was settled with American Family paying the settlement, after which it filed seeking reimbursement from the subcontractor’s insurers. The court instead granted summary judgment in favor of Ohio Casualty and National Fire.
American Family appealed to the Ninth Circuit for a review of the summary judgment, arguing that the “other insurance” clauses were “mutually repugnant and unenforceable.” The Ninth Circuit cited a case from the Arizona Court of Appeals that held that “where two policies cover the same occurrence and both contain ‘other insurance’ clauses, the excess insurance provisions are mutually repugnant and must be disregarded. Each insurer is then liable for a pro rate share of the settlement or judgment.”
The court noted that unlike other “other insurance” cases, the American Family policy “states that it provides primary CGL coverage for CFTDC and is rendered excess only if there is ‘any other primary insurance’ available to GFTDC as an additional insured.” They note that “the American Family policy purports to convert from primary to excess coverage only if CFTDC has access to other primary insurance as an additional insured.”
In comparison, the court noted that “the ‘other insurance’ language in Ohio Casualty’s additional insured endorsement cannot reasonably be read to contradict, or otherwise be inconsistent with, the ‘other primary insurance’ provision in the American Family policy.” They find other reasons why National Fire’s coverage did not supersede American Family’s. In this case, the policy is “written explicitly to apply in excess.”
Finally, the Astragal settlement did not exhaust American Family’s coverage, so they were obligated to pay out the full amount. The court upheld the summary dismissal of American Family’s claims.
Read the court’s decision…
Nevada Bill Aims to Reduce Legal Fees For Construction Defect Practitioners
March 21, 2011 — March 21, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
Assemblyman Ira Hansen and twelve additional members of Nevada’s Assembly are sponsoring Assembly Bill 285. AB 285 Revises provisions governing an award of attorney’s fees in causes of action for constructional defects. Existing law generally provides that a claimant may recover reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the claimant’s damages in a cause of action for constructional defects. (NRS 40.655)
This bill removes this provision and instead authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party involved in such a cause of action if an independent basis for the award exists pursuant to existing law which authorizes a court to award attorney’s fees in certain circumstances, or Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees by an offeree who rejects an offer and subsequently fails to obtain a more favorable judgment.
In an AP report published in Business Week it is suggested that the target objective of legislators centers on what it refers to as Nevada’s "Rampant construction defect lawsuits".
According to Business Week "The suits bring in hundreds of millions of dollars for lawyers and have put construction companies out of business. Hansen says fewer construction firms mean higher prices for Nevada consumers."
Click Here To Read Full Text and Revisions of Assembly Bill 285
Arizona Supreme Court Confirms Eight-Year Limit on Construction Defect Lawsuits
July 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Acting on the case of Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled that Arizona’s eight-year statute of repose applies. The case was referred to the court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had asked for a clarification of Arizona law. The case focused on three questions:
1. Does the filing of a motion for class certification in an Arizona court toll the statute of limitations for individuals, who are included within the class, to file individual causes of action involving the same defendants and the same subject matter?2. If so, does this class-action tolling doctrine apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-552?3. If the doctrine applies to statutes of repose, and specifically § 12-552, may a court weigh the equities of the case in determining whether, and to what extent, an action is tolled?
The litigation at hand has a lengthy history, starting with a case referred to as “Hoffman” in 2003. The Albano plaintiffs were not able to join in Hoffman, and they filed their own lawsuit in 2006. An additional lawsuit was filed by the Albano plaintiffs in 2007. The courts decided that the Albano plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the statute of repose was the appropriate standard for this case. They noted that “the eight-year statute of repose period began to run on November 6, 1997, the date of the Town of Gilbert’s final inspection. Albano II was filed on November 5, 2007.”
The court found that the plaintiffs had waited too long for start their suit. As a result, they found it unnecessary to answer the first or third questions. Justice A. John Pelander of the Arizona Supreme Court wrote the opinion, dated June 30, 2011.
Read the court’s decision…
Utah Construction Defect Claims Dependant on Contracts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
An owner who wants to sue a subcontractor directly may find limited ability to do so under Utah court decisions. Writing on the JDSupra site, Stewart O. Peay and Mark O. Morris of Snell & Wilmer discuss the distinction the Utah courts make between contractor (with whom an owner has direct contracts) and subcontractors (with whom an owner does not). In the Utah courts, construction defect claims must be based on contract, rather than tort. With no contract, there is no way to pursue claims against a subcontractor alone.
They note that the Utah couts do not “accept negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims that many other jurisdictions embrace.” They recommend that in setting up contracts for a construction project, owners should ensure that they are provided with “third-party beneficiary rights to purse claims against subs.” They suggest that “the owner may require his generals to include language in the various subcontracts that incorporates some or all of the terms of the prime contract into the subcontracts.” Additionally they suggest that the owner “require the general to include ‘flow down’ provisions in the various subcontracts.”
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Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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One to Watch: Case Takes on Economic Loss Rule and Professional Duties
June 28, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
According to the Supreme Court of Washington Blog, The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Jackowski v. Hawkins Poe on Thursday, June 16, 2011. The court’s synopsis of the case can be found on the Washington State Court website.
In short, two home purchasers brought a lawsuit against the home’s sellers, the sellers’ agent and the purchasers’ own agent, alleging claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation and breach of common law and statutory duties. The trial court dismissed the buyers’ claims on the basis of the economic loss doctrine and Division II reversed, opining that the ELR does not apply to professional duties. The Supreme Court will now look at applying the Independent Duty Doctrine established last year, and whether professional duties (those of the real estate agents) should be reviewed under a different light.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
No-Show Contractor Can’t Hide from Construction Defect Claim
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The failure of R. J. Haas to produce documents or make himself available for deposition has worn out the patience of the US District Court in San Jose. Judge Howard Lloyd issued a ruling inProbuilders Specialty Ins. Co. v. Valley Corp. (N.D. Cal., 2012).
Probuilders issued an insurance policy covering Haas for their work on the construction of a single-family home for Ty and Karen Levine. The Levines sued Haas for “shoddy and incomplete work.” Probuilders contends that Haas “made material misrepresentations with respect to verifying that the subcontractors had insurance.” Since November 2011, Haas has been without legal counsel in this matter.
Despite Probuilder’s attempts, the court noted that “Hass any not provided any documents in response to the plaintiff’s three sets of requests for production of documents.” Haas also “has refused to make himself available for deposition.” Haas was first scheduled for deposition in September, 2011. Subsequently, Haas has rescheduled his deposition repeatedly, postponing it to January 4, then February 13, and then agreed to be deposed “before the then-scheduled March 15 mediation,” after which he said he would “be unavailable to be deposed before April.
The court noted that although Haas “hay have had legitimate reasons for wishing to continue his deposition, such as illness and his attempt to retain new counsel,” however, the court concluded that “Haas has had ample time to retain new counsel and prepare for deposition.
The court also found fault with Haas’s objections to certain terms in the Request for Admissions, among them “named,” “independent contractor,” and “work,” noting that Haas called these “vague and ambiguous.” The court called it “quibbling,” and noted that the federal courts disfavor this. Later in the decision, the court made it clear that Haas “is obligated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to respond to discovery requests.” And concludes, “that he has apparently been seeking to retain new counsel for over five months does not give him license to ignore plaintiff’s discovery requests entirely.
The court granted Probuilders the option of filing a motion for sanctions. Mr. Haas did not attend or participate.
Read the court’s decision…
Will They Blow It Up?
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The issues concerning the Harmon Towers building in Las Vegas continue to make their way through the courts. As we noted in a previous piece, Cook County building officials stated that the building could be a hazard if Las Vegas were struck by an earthquake. The question of whether the building will continue to stand is just one of the issues in front of a judge.
MGM Resorts International argued at a March 13 hearing for permission to implode the Harmon hotel building. They claim that more than 1,700 defects have been discovered in the building and that the building is a public safety hazard. Arguing against demolition, Perini Building Company, the general contractor for the hotel, and its subcontractors are claiming that imploding the building would destroy evidence and prejudice juries in the ongoing construction defect claims. They claim that MGM Resorts wishes to abandon the building due to the economic slowdown. Perini Corp, the contractor for the project, claims that the building can be fixed. Perini claims that MGM’s position in the construction trial would be improved if the building is demolished.
After Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez heard the four days of testimony on the Harmon Towers building and whether it should be demolished, she scheduled more testimony, with two days in April and an entire week in July. Judge Gonzalez will be deciding whether the building will be torn down, imploded, or left in place.
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Certificate of Merit to Sue Architects or Engineers Bill Proposed
May 3, 2011 — May 3, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
North Carolina may become the twelfth state to require a Certificate of Merit to sue an architect or engineer. If North Carolina Senate Bill 435 (SB435) passes, then plaintiffs when filing a complaint will need to also attach an affidavit of a third-party licensed professional engineer or architect stating that the case has merit.
SB435 is a short two pages in its current form. The bill states that the “third-party licensed professional engineer or licensed architect shall (i) be competent to testify and hold the same professional license and practice in the same area of practice as the defendant design professional and (ii) offer testimony based upon knowledge, skill, experience, education, training, and practice. The affidavit shall specifically state for each theory of recovery for which damages are sought, the negligence, if any, or other action, error, or omission of the design professional in providing the professional service, including any error or omission in providing advice, judgment, opinion, or a similar professional skill claimed to exist and the factual basis for each such claim. The third-party licensed professional engineer or licensed architect shall be licensed in this State and actively engaged in the practice of engineering or architecture respectively.”
A few of the amendments allude to disciplining design professionals who certify civil actions that are without merit. The bill has been referred to the Committee on Judiciary I.
While North Carolina is considering enacting a Certificate of Merit law, eleven other states already require one, including Arizona, California, Colorado, Georgia, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Texas. Christopher D. Montez, a partner with Thomas, Feldman & Wilshusen, LLP, has written a useful summary for each state’s certificate of merit scheme.
Read the text of SB435
Track the progress of SB435
Read more from Christopher D. Montez’s article on Thomas, Feldman & Wilshusen, LLP site
The Montrose Language Interpreted: How Many Policies Are Implicated By A Construction Defect That Later Causes a Flood?
March 17, 2011 — By Shaun McParland Baldwin, March 17, 2011
The Court of Appeals of Indiana recently addressed the “Montrose” language added to the CGL ISO form in 2001 in the context of a construction defect claim where a fractured storm drain caused significant flooding a year after the drain was damaged. The insuring agreement requires that “bodily injury or “property damage” be caused by an occurrence and that the “bodily injury or “property damage” occur during the policy period. The Montrose language adds that the insurance applies only if, prior to the policy period, no insured knew that the “bodily injury or “property damage” had occurred in whole or in part. Significantly, it also states that any “bodily injury” or “property damage” which occurs during the policy period and was not, prior to the policy period known to have occurred, includes a continuation, change or resumption of that “bodily injury” or “property damage” after the end of the policy period.
In Grange Mutual Cas. Co. v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co., No. 29D04-0706-PL-1112 (Ct. App. IN March 15, 2011), http://www.ai.org/judiciary/opinions/pdf/03151109ehf.pdf, Sullivan was the General Contractor for a school construction project. Its subcontractor, McCurdy, installed the storm drain pipes. One of the storm pipes was fractured in 2005 while McCurdy was doing its installation work. More than a year later, the school experienced significant water damage due to flooding. It was later discovered that the flooding was due to the fractured storm drain. Sullivanrsquo;s insurer paid $146,403 for the water damage. That insurer brought a subrogation claim against McCurdy and its two insurers: West Bend and Grange. West Bend had issued CGL coverage to McCurdy while the construction was ongoing, including the date in which the storm pipe was fractured. Grange issued CGL coverage to McCurdy at the time of the flooding. Those two carriers jointly settled the subrogation claim and then litigated which insurer actually owed coverage for the loss. Significantly, the loss that was paid included only damages from the flooding, not any damages for the cost of repairing the pipe.
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Reprinted courtesy of Shaun McParland Baldwin of Tressler LLP. Ms Baldwin can be contacted at sbaldwin@tresslerllp.com
Can Negligent Contractors Shift Blame in South Carolina?
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Clay Olson looks back to a 1991 Carolina case, Nelson v. Concrete Supply Company. The court concluded in that case that “a plaintiff in South Carolina may recover only if his/her negligence does not exceed that of the defendant’s and amount of plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in proportion to amount of his or her negligence; if there is more than one defendant, plaintiff’s negligence shall be compared to combined negligence of all defendants.” In 2005, he reports, as part of tort reform in South Carolina, the legislature further addressed this.
He then suggests a possible outcome of this is that negligent contractors may be able to shift some of the blame (and cost of the settlement) to other defendants who may not be to blame. He offers a scenario in which a contractor is sued for construction defects and a jury has to allocate responsibility for indivisible damage. “A jury need only find the two subcontractors to have each contributed 15% of the indivisible damage.” He adds in another 15% for claims against the architect. Minor blame is given to the manufacturers, and suddenly the negligent contractor is paying less than 50% of the total settlement.
He notes that the previous system in place also had its problems, but notes that this one may not be “fair and equitable.”
Read the full story…
California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
Read the court’s decision…