The U.S. Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Rules on Greystone
November 18, 2011 — Derek J. Lindenschmidt, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
On November 1, 2011, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled on the certified question of whether property damage caused by a subcontractor’s faulty workmanship is an “occurrence” for purposes of a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., No. 09-1412 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011), the Tenth Circuit determined that because damage to property caused by poor workmanship is generally neither expected nor intended, it may qualify under Colorado law as an occurrence and liability coverage should apply. Id. at 2.
The short history of the Greystone case is as follows. In Greystone Const., Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 649 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2009), two contractors and one of their insurers brought an action against a second insurer after the second insurer refused to fund the contractors’ defense in construction defect actions brought by separate homeowners. Id. at 1215. The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, relying on General Sec. Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), granted summary judgment in favor of the second insurer on the basis that the homeowners’ complaints did not allege accidents that would trigger covered occurrences under the second insurer’s policies. Id. at 1220. Notably, the Greystone, General Security, and other similar decisions prompted the Colorado General Assembly to enact C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which was designed to provide guidance for courts interpreting perceived coverage conflicts between insurance policy provisions and exclusions. The statute requires courts to construe insurance policies to favor coverage if reasonably and objectively possible. C.R.S. § 13-20-808(5).
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by determining whether C.R.S. § 13-20-808, which defines the term “accident” for purposes of Colorado insurance law, would have a retroactive effect, and thereby settle the question before the court. The Tenth Circuit gave consideration to several Colorado district court orders issued since the enactment of C.R.S. § 13-20-808 which have suggested that the statute does not apply retroactively, including Martinez v. Mike Wells Constr., No. 09cv227 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Mar. 1, 2011), and Colo. Pool. Sys., Inv. V. Scottsdale Ins. Co., No. 09cv836 (Colo. Dist. Ct., Oct. 4, 2010). The Tenth Circuit also attempted to ascertain the General Assembly’s intent behind the term “all insurance policies currently in existence...” Greystone, No. 09-1412, at 12. The Tenth Circuit determined that the General Assembly would have more clearly stated its intentions for the term if it was supposed to apply retroactively to expired policies, rather than those still running. Id. at 12-13. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit decided that C.R.S. § 13-20-808 did not apply retroactively, but noted that “the retrospective application of the statute is not necessarily unconstitutional.” Id. at 9, 11-14. As such, the Tenth Circuit advised that it was required to decide the question presented in the appeal under the principles of Colorado insurance law. Id. at 15.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Lindenschmidt can be contacted at lindenschmidt@hhmrlaw.com
Florida Law: Defects in Infrastructure Improvements Not Covered in Home Construction Warranties
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In April 2012, Governor Rick Scott signed into law House Bill 1013, despite lobbying from homeowner and condominium associations among others. The law was in response to a case in which the court had found that implied warranties covered external subdivision improvements. Prior to the court decision, these were not thought to be covered.
According to an article in the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library, under the new law, road and drainage improvements will not be included implied warranty of a new home. The law took effect on July 1.
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Nevada Assembly Sends Construction Defect Bill to Senate
June 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In a 26 to 16 vote, the Nevada Assembly has passed Assembly Bill 401, which extends the time limit for legal action over home construction defects. According to the Las Vegas Sun, Assembly member Marcus Conklin, Democrat of Las Vegas, said the bill was about “keeping the consumer whole.” However, Ira Hansen, Republican of Sparks, told the sun that suits are happening before contractors can make repairs. The bill would allow attorney fees even if repairs are made.
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Bound by Group Builders, Federal District Court Finds No Occurrence
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The homeowners sued their contractor, alleging the contractor had defectively constructed and failed to complete their home.  State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. v. Vogelgesang, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72618 (D. Haw. July 6, 2011). The homeowners' complaint pled, among other things, damage caused by breach of contract and negligence. State Farm agreed to defend under a reservation of rights.
State Farm filed suit in federal court for declaratory relief. Judge Mollway granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment. Relying on the Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeal's decision in Group Builders, Inc. v. Admiral Ins. Co., 123 Haw. 142, 231 P.3d 67 (Haw. Ct. App. 2010), Judge Mollway determined that the claims asserted in the underlying litigation arose from the contractor's alleged breach of contract.  Group Builders held that breach of contract claims based on allegations of shoddy performance were not covered under CGL policies.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Tenth Circuit Finds Insurer Must Defend Unintentional Faulty Workmanship
December 9, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Applying Colorado law, the Tenth Circuit found a duty to defend construction defect claims where the faulty workmanship was unintentional. Greystone Const. Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22053 (10th Cir. Nov. 1, 2011). A prior post [here] discussed the Tenth Circuit’s certified question to the Colorado Supreme Court in this matter, a request that was rejected by the Colorado court.
In two underlying cases, Greystone was sued by the homeowner for damage caused to the foundation by soil expansion. In both cases, the actual construction was performed by subcontractors. Further, in neither case was the damage intended or anticipated. Nevertheless, National Union refused to defend, contending property damage resulting from faulty construction was not an occurrence.
Relying on a Colorado Court of Appeals case, General Security Indemn. Co. of Arizona v. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 205 P.3d 529 (Colo. App. 2009), the district court granted summary judgment to National Union.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit first considered whether Colorado legislation enacted to overturn General Security could be applied retroactively. The statute, section 13-20-808, provided courts "shall presume that the work of a construction professional that results in property damage, including damage to the work itself or other work, is an accident unless the property damage is intended and expected by the insured."
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Town Files Construction Lawsuit over Dust
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Washington Township in Ohio has filed a lawsuit against Underground Utilities for their handling of construction fill on a road project. The City of Mansfield had hired the firm to improve road safety. The lawsuit is over the company’s actions in processing soil for fill, which they are doing on three vacant lots that are zoned for residential use. Washington Township Trustee Jack Butler told the Mansfield Journal that “what brought the lawsuit to a head was the fact that the contractor did not control the dust.” Subsequent receiving notices of zoning violations, the company began to move its operation to another site.
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Going Green for Lower Permit Fees
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Clay County, Kansas is offering rebates on building permits for green homes. According to the Kansas City Star, building permits in the county are typically $2,500. The county will rebate anything from half to all of the permit fee, depending on how well the builder meets green standards. The county will monitor and inspect the process to make certain that builders adhere to their promises for green construction. The county hopes this will encourage green building by offsetting the cost.
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MGM Seeks to Demolish Harmon Towers
September 1, 2011 — CJD Staff
Citing public safety concerns and the cost of repair, MGM Resorts International is seeking to demolish the unfinished hotel tower. The company has a few hurdles to go through before they start laying the charges to implode the structure. Any plans would have to be approved by not only Clark County officials, but also the district court has an order blocking any activity during litigation between MGM and the general contractor on the project, Perini Building Company.
Architectural Record reports that MGM states it would take “approximately 18 months to conduct test and come up with an approved, permitted design to fix the Harmon.” MGM feels that repairs would then take another two to three years. Perini contends that they could “provide stamped drawings detailing all necessary repairs within three months.” They attribute MGM’s desire to demolish the building as “buyer’s remorse.”
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Badly Constructed Masonry Walls Not an Occurrence in Arkansas Law
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court for Maryland has granted a summary judgment in the case Konover Construction Corp. v. ATC Associates to Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company and denied a request for dismissal from ACT. Konover (KBE) was contracted by Wal-Mart to build a Wal-Mart store and a Sam’s Club in Port Covington, Maryland. Superus, Inc. was hired by KBE to build the masonry walls. Superus purchased a policy from Massachusetts Bay Insurance which named KBE as an additional insured. Wal-Mart hired ATC Associates to independently test and inspect the concrete structural steel, and masonry.
After the building was in use, a large crack appeared which was attributed a latent construction defect. Other cracks were discovered. Upon investigation, it was discovered that there were “voids or foam in the concrete block surrounding the reinforcing steel that should have been filled with grout,” and in some cases, “reinforcing steel was missing or not installed in accordance with the specifications.” KBE paid for the repair and remediation and Wal-Mart assigned all rights and interests against ATC to KBE.
KBE filed suit against ATC. ATC called for dismissal on the grounds that Wal-Mart had no claims as the problems had been remediated. Wal-Mart then provided KBE with additional agreements to give them enforceable rights against ATC and Superus. KBE filed a fourteen claims against ATC, Superus, and Massachusetts Bay. In the current case, Massachusetts Bay sought summary judgment and ATC sought dismissal of all claims against it.
Massachusetts Bay claims that they need not indemnify Superus, as “there is no evidence adequate to establish that Superus’ defective work caused any collateral and/or resulting damage that was not subject to an Impaired Property exclusion, and that, in any event, no damage occurred during the policy period.”
As Wal-Mart is headquarted in Arkansas, certain contracts were under Arkansas law. Under the Arkansas courts, “defective workmanship, standing alone and resulting in damages only to the work product itself, is not an ‘occurrence.’” The court determined that collateral or resultant damage would be covered. The court found that “it is clear under Arkansas law, and the parties appear to agree, that Massachusetts Bay is not obligated to indemnify KBE for any repairs to the masonry walls themselves, including any cracks or gaps in the walls.” The court also found that “there is no evidence adequate to prove that any allegedly resultant property damage was caused by Superus’ faulty construction of the walls.” The court also noted that “if the building code violation and structural integrity problem were ‘property damage,’ insurance coverage would be barred by the Impaired Property Exclusion.” Based on these findings, the court concluded that Massachusetts Bay is entitled to summary judgment.
While the court dismissed the case against Massachusetts Bay, the court declined ATC’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that ACT’s alleged negligence in conducting inspections “created only a risk of economic loss for KBE.” Although hired by Wal-Mart, ATC “transmitted its daily testing and inspection reports of the Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club projects directly to KBE.” The court found that “KBE has made a plausible claim.”
ATC also claimed that KBE contributed to the negligence due to the negligence of its subcontractor. The court concluded that it was plausible that “ATC will not be able to carry its burden of proving KBE was contributorily negligent.” The court was less sanguine about KBE’s fraud claim, but though it “may not now appear likely to have merit, it is above the ‘plausibility’ line.”
In conclusion, KBE may not continue its case against Massachusetts Bay. However, the judge allowed the other proceedings to continue.
Read the court’s decision…
In Colorado, Primary Insurers are Necessary Parties in Declaratory Judgment Actions
December 9, 2011 — Heather M. Anderson, Colorado Construction Litigation
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado recently ruled that primary insurers are necessary parties, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, in a declaratory judgment action being pursued by an excess carrier. See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. LNC Communities II, LLC, 2011 WL 5548955 (D. Colo. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 is almost identical to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and pertains to the joinder of persons needed for “just adjudication.” The Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”) sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the defendants (collectively referred to as “Lennar Companies”) with regard to the underlying lawsuit brought by The Falls at Legend Trail Owners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”). Id. at *2. In its lawsuit, the HOA alleged Lennar Companies were liable for construction defects at The Falls at Legend Trail residential development.
Lennar Companies held two primary insurance policies, one issued by OneBeacon Insurance Company f/k/a General Accident Insurance Company (“General Accident”) and the other issued by American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“American Safety”). Lennar Companies also carried excess policies issued by ICSOP and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“Ohio Casualty”).
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Harsh New Time Limits on Construction Defect Claims
April 26, 2011 — April 26, 2011 by Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of
Sullan2, Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C. in the
HindemanSanchez blogA recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2010), considerably shortens the time limit for bringing many construction defect lawsuits. Homeowners and homeowner associations risk losing the right to seek reimbursement from builders, developers and other construction professionals unless they carefully and quickly act upon discovery of evidence of any potential construction defect.
The Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims
Colorado’s construction defect statute of limitations limits the time for homeowners and homeowners associations to bring lawsuits for construction defects against “construction professionals,” including developers, general contractors, builders, engineers, architects, other design professionals, inspectors and subcontractors. The statute requires homeowners and associations to file suit within two years “after the claim for relief arises.” A claim for relief “arises” when a homeowner or association discovers or reasonably should have discovered the physical manifestation of a construction defect.
The two-year time limitation applies to each construction defect separately, and will begin to run upon the appearance of a “manifestation” of a construction defect (which may include, for example, a condition as simple as a roof leak or drywall cracks), even if the homeowner or association does not know the cause of the apparent problem.
The Smith Opinion and its Effect on the Statute of Limitations
In Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., the plaintiff homeowner, Mrs. Smith, slipped on ice that had accumulated on her sidewalk because of a leaking gutter and suffered injury. When she first noticed the leak, she reported it to her property manager, who reported it to the builder. The builder attempted to repair the gutter, unbeknownst to Mrs. Smith, and she did not notice further problems until approximately one year after she first observed the leak, when she fell and suffered serious injury. She sued the builder within two years of her injury, but nearly three years after she first learned of the leak.
The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed Mrs. Smith’s claims as untimely and held that under the construction defect statute of limitations, the two-year period for suing for injuries due to construction defects begins when the homeowner first observes the physical manifestation of the defect, even if the resulting injury has not yet occurred. The court acknowledged that this ruling could result in “unfair results,” especially if a serious and unforeseeable injury occurs more than two years after the first time the homeowner noticed the problem, and as a result the victim is unable to seek redress from those responsible for the defect.
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Reprinted courtesy of Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of Sullan2, Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C., and they can be contacted through their web site.
Texas “Loser Pays” Law May Benefit Construction Insurers
June 7, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Under a new law, Texas HB 274, the Texas Supreme Court will be making rules for motions to dismiss and to expedite suits of less than $100,000. The law also contains two “loser pays” provisions. If a lawsuit is found dismissed for having “no basis in fact or law,” the losing side must pay attorney costs. The other provision caps award of attorney fees if plaintiffs reject settlement offers. Texas Lawyer quotes Houston attorney Mike Gallagher as saying this will affect “the practice of everyone who handles significant lawsuits.”
Gregory Marcum, whose practice includes construction defect litigation, plans to contact insurance companies, as the new law may save them money. “It will definitely be a factor in the defense strategy for handling a case.” He notes that “any insurance carrier would want that done.”
Marcum notes that the offer-of-settlement rules only apply when cases go to trial. “Almost all cases settle.”
Read HB 274
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Exact Dates Not Needed for Construction Defect Insurance Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court in Vines-Herrin Custom Homes v Great American Lloyds Insurance Company on December 21, 2011. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes built a single-family home in Plano, Texas in 1999. They obtained a commercial general liability policy from Great American, later purchasing coverage from Mid-Continent, which the decision describes as “a sister company of Great American.”
While the home was under construction, Emil G. Cerullo sought to purchase it. At the time, it was under contract to another buyer. Two months later, Vines-Herrin told Cerullo that the deal had “fell through.” Cerullo bought the house with modifications from the original plan. Upon moving in, Cerullo began having water intrusion and other problems. “Cerullo noticed water gathering on window sills and damage to the sheetrock and baseboard.” Additional problems followed, including cracks, leaks, “and in early 2002, the ceiling and roof began to sag.”
Cerullo sued Vines-Herrin, claiming negligent construction. Vines-Herrin filed a claim seeking defense and indemnification under the insurance policies. Coverage was denied and Vines-Herrin filed suit to require coverage and also bringing claims for “breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and DTPA and insurance code violations.”
In May, 2006 Vines-Herrin stated that it had no more defense funds and went into arbitration with Cerullo. The underlying construction defect action was settled for about $2.5 million. As part of the settlement, “Cerullo became the rightful owner of all remaining claims, rights, and causes of action against” Vines-Herrin’s insurers. He then joined the coverage lawsuit.
The non-jury trial was held under the controlling law of the time which “imposed a duty to defend only if the property damage manifested or became apparent during the policy period.” The court concluded in Cerullo’s favor. During the post-judgment motions, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the manifestation rule. Under this ruling, the trial court set aside its judgment and found in favor of the insurance companies. The trial court noted that although “the Residence was covered by an uninterrupted period of insurance (which began before the Residence was constructed) and that the damages to the Residence manifested during the uninterrupted period of insurance coverage,” “Mr. Cerullo failed to allege the date when actual physical damage to the property occurred.”
The first claim by Cerullo and Vines-Herrin was that the “Final Judgment” occurred in October 2004, and that all proceedings thereafter were void. The court rejected this as the “final judgment” is not “final for the purposes of an appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Despite the use of the word “final,” the trial court’s decision did not do this.
The second issue was the application of the Texas Supreme Court case Don’s Building Supply Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance. In this case, framing rot due to defective stucco was not discovered until after the end of the policy period. The Supreme Court noted that “the key date is when injury happens, not when someone happens on it.”
The appeals court found that the trial court misapplied the Don’s Building Supply decision. Rather than an exact date, “so long as that damage occurred within the policy period, coverage was provided.” The appeals court noted that “Cerullo alleged the house was constructed in 1999 and he purchased it in May 2000.” “By April of 2001, Cerullo noticed that the windowsills in the study were showing signs of leakage and water damage.” As the court put it, “the petitions then alleged a litany of defects.”
The court noted that coverage by Great American was in effect from November 9, 1999 to November 9, 2000. In May of 2000, the house suffered “substantial flooding from a rainstorm that caused damage.” This was during the policy period. “As a matter of law, actual damages must occur no later than when they manifest.”
The court concluded that as damage manifested during the period of coverage, so must have the damage. The court ruled that “contrary to the trial court’s determination otherwise, the evidence showed Great American’s duty to indemnify was triggered, and expert testimony establishing the exact date of injury was not required to trigger the duty.”
Read the court’s decision…
Arizona Homeowners Must Give Notice of Construction Defect Claims
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Chris Combs of the Combs Law Group notes that “the new home construction industry is recovering” and that some of the buyers of these homes “will have claims for construction defects.” But not so quick on filing that claim.
Under Arizona law, as Mr. Combs notes the law “requires that, at least 90 days before filing any lawsuit, the buyer furnish notice by certified mail to the homebuilder specifying in detail the construction defect.” Only if there is no agreement over proposed repair can the homeowner file a lawsuit.
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Ohio subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion
August 11, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Mosser Construction, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 09-4449 (6th Cir. July 14, 2011)(unpublished), claimant project owner Port Clinton contracted with insured general contractor Mosser for the construction of a building. Following completion, Port Clinton sued Mosser for breach of contract seeking damages because of physical injury to the project occurring after completion resulting from defective backfill material that settled improperly.
Mosser’s CGL insurer Travelers denied a defense and Mosser filed suit against Travelers seeking a declaratory judgment. Mosser and Travelers filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the supplier of the backfill material?Gerken?qualified as a subcontractor for purposes of the subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion—exclusion l.—for property damage to or arising out of Mosser’s completed work.  Mosser had purchased the backfill material from Gerken pursuant to a purchase order specifying that Gerken was to supply Mosser with an industry standard grade of backfill for use in the Port Clinton project.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Water Damage Covered Under Efficient Proximate Cause Doctrine
August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
A U.S. District Court in Washington found coverage in what it described as a text book study of the efficient proximate cause rule. Hiller v. Allstate Pro. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84862 (E.D. Wash. June 19, 2012).
The Hillers purchased a newly constructed home in December 2006. They also purchased an all-risk homeowner's policy from Allstate.
In July 2010, the Hillers discovered that the carpet in the basement of the residence was saturated with water. Allstate was immediately notified. Hiller began an investigation to attempt to determine the source of the water. He poured water into a downspout drain at the northwest corner of the residence. This caused water to leak into the northwest corner of the home's basement.
An area was excavated around the northwest downspout drain. The end of the drain pipe was partially blocked by rocks and had been wrapped with fabric landscaping material. Further, a “T” pipe installed at the foot of the drain was directing water toward the house's concrete foundation. Hiller notified Allstate that the problems with the drain was due to construction defects and the system was designed to fail.
Allstate denied the claim. Based upon Hiller's information, coverage was excluded under the policy's surface water, subsurface water, inherent vice, and latent defect exclusions.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 — April 25, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
Read the trial court’s decision…
Judge Okays Harmon Tower Demolition, Also Calls for More Testing
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Vegas.Inc reports that Clark County District Court Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez has permitted the demolition the tower, which MGM Resorts has claimed is a safety hazard. Perini Building Co. claims that the building does not need to be demolished. CityCenter claims that repairing the building would take nearly a year longer than a demolition and cost about $200 million. Further, CityCenter assumes that the building’s reputation would cost it another $30 million.
Subsequently, Judge Gonzalez ruled that the pattern of destructive testing would not support a claim that there were an estimated 1,400 defective items in the building. An attorney for CityCenter, Steve Morris, has suggested that they may seek more testing, impossible to do once the building is demolished. CityCenter issued a statement that “nearly every time CityCenter has chipped away concrete to review structural work at the Harmon, we have found defects.” They describe the building as “unusable.”
Tutor Perini contends that it “remains confident that it will prevail when the issues of safety, reparability and responsibility for the issues facing the Harmon tower are considered.
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