Discovery Ordered in Nevada Construction Defect Lawsuit
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Gemstone LVS was sued by the Manhattan Homeowners Association in Las Vegas, after which Chartis Specialty Insurance informed Gemstone that they “had no duty to defend or indemnify Gemstone under the Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy.” Gemstone “asserts that at the time the Policy was purchased, it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage for a construction defect lawsuit” and now seeks discovery “to prove Chartis’ bad faith purpose in drafting an illusory Policy.”
The opinion notes that “the Court conducted a preliminary peek at the pending motion for partial summary judgment and finds that Chartis has not made the strong showing necessary to support the requested stay.” Further, the court notes that “when ambiguity in the language of a policy exists, the court may consider not only the language of the policy but also the ‘intent of the parties, the subject matter of the policy, and the circumstances surrounding its issuance.’” The court concludes that “this type of discovery is relevant to understanding the intent of the parties, more specifically, whether it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage given the construction defect lawsuit.”
Accordingly, the court denied Chartis’ motion for stay of discovery and established a schedule for discovery, expert designations, rebuttal expert designations, and other matters related to the trial.
Read the court’s decision…
In Colorado, Repair Vendors Can Bring First-Party Bad Faith Actions For Amounts Owed From an Insurer
December 20, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
With the aftermath of Sandy still being felt up and down the Eastern seaboard, the question of many victims turns to how they can rebuild their lives and homes. One of the first things many people do is call on their insurance carriers to help rebuild whatever damaged property they have. In a recent case here in Colorado, those rebuilding efforts got reaffirmed by a Court of Appeals case, Kyle W. Larson Enterprises, Inc., Roofing Experts, d/b/a The Roofing Experts v. Allstate Insurance Company, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 4459112 (Colo. App. September 27, 2012).
The facts of the case are pretty straightforward and could describe many repair vendors in numerous situations. Roofing Experts contracted with four homeowners insured by Allstate to repair their damaged roofs. The contracts provided that repair costs would be paid from insurance proceeds. The contracts also allowed Roofing Experts full authority to communicate with Allstate regarding all aspects of the insurance claims. Before work began, Roofing Experts met with adjusters from Allstate to discuss the four homes and the amount of each claim. After receiving approval for the claims, Roofing Experts began the repairs. During construction, Roofing Experts discovered additional repairs were necessary to maintain certain manufacturer’s warranties and to conform to applicable building codes.
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Statutes of Limitations May be the Colorado Contractors’ Friend
April 18, 2011 — April 18, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Albert Wolf, a principal in Wolf Slatkin & Madison P. C., has written an interesting article on statutes of limitations in construction defect claims in Colorado. While Wolf states that in most cases, “construction defect claims against construction industry participants (contractors, subcontractors, architects, engineers, etc.) requires that suits be started within two years after construction defects have been or should have been—in the exercise of reasonable diligence (care)—discovered,” if a project used the AIA General Conditions (AIA Document A2010) before the 2007 edition, the “statutes of limitations begin to run (accrue) at either substantial completion or breach by the contractor (installation of defective work), depending on the circumstances.”
“That’s a huge difference,” Wolf writes in his article. “For example, if the structural defect caused by faulty foundation work is not discovered or discoverable until walls begin to exhibit cracking more than two years after the building is completed, the owner’s claim against the contractor may be barred if the AIA provision is applied.”
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Construction Defect Claim Did Not Harm Homeowner, Court Rules
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has ruled in Creswell v. Estate of Howe, a case in which a woman bought a home and then sued the seller’s estate, both sets of real estate agents, and the homeowner’s association over construction defects. A district court ruled against her, granting summary judgment to the other parties.
After buying a townhome “as is,” Catherine Creswell claims to have shared a thought with her agent that the homeowners association was, in the words of her agent, “trying to hide something.” Later, Creswell found that a few days before her closing, the board had discussed problems with “roofs, siding and soundproofing of the townhomes.” The court noted that “it was clear from the documents that appellant [Creswell] received that the association had known about various construction defects for many years, some of which affected [her] unit.”
Creswell initially sued the estate, the man who negotiated the sale for his mother’s estate, the real estate companies and the agents involved, the homeowners association, and four board members. Later she sued for punitive damages, dropped a claim for interference with contractual relations, and dismissed her claims against the individual board members. The court dismissed all of Creswell’s claims awarding costs to those she sued.
The appeals court has affirmed the decision of lower court, noting that Creswell “did not provide us with any argument why the district court erred in dismissing her unjust-enrichment, breach of contract, or rescission claims against the various respondents.” Nor did she provide evidence to support her claims of “breach of duty, fraud, and violation of consumer protection statutes.”
The court noted that Creswell could not sue the homeowners association over the construction defects because she “failed to prove that she was damaged by the association’s nondisclosure.” The court noted that “there are no damages in this case,” as Creswell “was never assessed for any repairs, she had not paid anything out-of-pocket for repairs, and she has presented no evidence that the value of her individual unit has declined because of the alleged undisclosed construction defects.”
The court granted the other parties motion to dismiss and denied Creswell’s motion to supplement the record. Costs were awarded to the respondents.
Read the court’s decision…
David McLain to Speak at the CDLA 2012 Annual Conference
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Dense Lawyers Association will be holding their 2012 Annual Conference from July 26 through the 28, in Crested Butte, Colorado. The CDLA provides benefits to its member defense trial lawyers, including educational and information resources.
David McLain of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC will be joining in a discussion with William J. McConnell, PE of Vertex Engineering on Saturday, July 28. Their topic will be common building code violations alleged in construction defect cases and how to respond to these allegations.
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Seven Former North San Diego County Landfills are Leaking Contaminants
April 7, 2011 — April 7, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Deborah Sullivan Brennan of the North County Times reported that seven former dumps in San Diego are leaking contaminants into the surrounding groundwater. John R. Odermatt, a senior engineering geologist for the California Regional Water Quality Control Board s San Diego region, told the North County Times, “the risk to most county residents is very small or negligible, while local water supplies located in more rural areas may be at a somewhat elevated but unquantified level of risk.”
This issue is causing heavy scrutiny of a new proposed landfill in Gregory Canyon. The landfill would be located on 308 acres of undeveloped land near Pala, alongside the San Luis Rey River. The group “Save Gregory Canyon” has been speaking out against the landfill, stating that “the project threatens major detrimental impacts to both surface and groundwater, as well as a potential compromise of the two major San Diego Water Authority pipelines nearby.” Richard Felago, a Gregory Canyon Ltd. Consultant, told the North County Times that the 8-foot-thick liner, composed of layers of gravel and synthetic material, would not leak.
The appeal hearing is being rescheduled later this month after one of the three panelists recused himself due to having a competing interest in the property, according to the article by Gary Warth in the North County Times.
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Read Her Lips: “No New Buildings”
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Martha Johnson, the head of the General Services Administration, has said that her agency will not be building any new buildings in the near future. Among other duties, the GSA is responsible for the building, renovating, and leasing of federal office space. The White House had proposed $840 million in new construction, the Senate only $56 million. The House did not appropriate any money for the agency to use for new construction.
In addition to cutbacks on new buildings, Congress is suggesting only $280 million in repairs of existing government buildings. In order to cut back, the GSA has dropped plans to renovate their own offices in favor of renovations at the Department of Homeland Security and the Food and Drug Administration.
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The Year 2010 In Review: Design And Construction Defects Litigation
February 25, 2011 — Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen Lauderdale -
Construction & Infrastructure Law Blog - February 25, 2011
This article is the first in a series summarizing construction law developments for 2010
1. Centex Homes v. Financial Pacific Life Insurance Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1995 (E.D. Cal. 2010)
After settling numerous homeowners’ construction defect claims — and more than ten years after the homes were substantially completed — a home developer brought suit against one of the concrete fabrication subcontractors for the development seeking indemnity for amounts paid to the homeowners, as well as for damages for breach of the subcontractor’s duties to procure specific insurance and to defend the developer against the homeowners’ claims. The subcontractor brought a motion for summary adjudication on the ground the developer’s claims were barred by the ten year statute of repose contained in Code of Civil Procedure Section 337.15.
The District Court agreed the developer’s claim for indemnity was barred by Section 337.15. And it held that because the damages recoverable for breach of the subcontractor’s duty to purchase insurance are identical to the damages recoverable through the developer’s indemnity claim, the breach of duty to procure insurance claim also was time-barred. The District Court, however, allowed the claim for breach of the duty to defend to proceed. The categories of losses associated with such a claim (attorneys’ fees and other defense costs) are distinct from the damages recoverable through claims governed by Section 337.15 (latent deficiency in the design and construction of the homes and injury to property arising out of the latent deficiencies).
2. UDC — Universal Development v. CH2M Hill, 181 Cal. App. 4th 10 (6th Dist. Jan. 2010)
Indemnification clauses in construction agreements often state that one party to the agreement — the “indemnitor” — will defend and indemnify the other party from particular types of claims. Of course, having a contract right to a defense is not the same as actually receiving a defense. Any indemnitor attempting to avoid paying for defense costs can simply deny the tender of defense with the hope that when the underlying claim is resolved the defense obligations will be forgotten. In the past, when parties entitled to a defense — the “indemnitees” — had long memories and pressed to recover defense costs, indemnitors attempted to justify denying the tender by claiming their defense obligations coincided with their indemnity obligations and neither arose until a final determination was made that the underlying claim was one for which indemnity was owed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Candace Matson, Harold Hamersmith, and Helen Lauderdale, Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP. Ms. Matson can be contacted at cmatson@sheppardmullin.com, Mr. Hamersmith can be contacted at hhamersmith@sheppardmullin.com, and Ms. Lauderdale can be contacted at hlauderdale@sheppardmullin.com.
Federal District Court Continues to Find Construction Defects do Not Arise From An Occurrence
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Coverage for construction defects continues to be hotly contested in Hawaii state and federal courts. In a recent decision, Judge Mollway felt bound to follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Burlington Ins. Co. v. Oceanic Design & Constr., Inc., 383 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2004), where the court found construction defect claims arise from breach of contract, not from an occurrence. Judge Mollway’s most recent decision on the issue is Illinois Nat. Ins. Co. v. Nordic PCL Constr., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58464 (D. Haw. April 26, 2012).
Nordic constructed a grocery store for Safeway. In addition to the grocery store, Nordic built a 165-space rooftop parking deck, retail shops and related improvements. After opening for business in 2007, Safeway experienced significant leaks. Safeway demanded that Nordic repair the parking deck. Nordic sent the demand letter to the insurer, who agreed to appoint counsel subject to a reservation of rights.
Safeway filed suit against Nordic in state court alleging, among other things, breach of contract and negligence. The insurer provided Nordic with a defense, but Nordic hired independent counsel.
The insurer filed for declaratory relief in federal district court.
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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
Read the court’s decision…
Kentucky Court Upholds Arbitration Award, Denies Appeal
June 15, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Kentucky Court of Appeals has ruled in Lake Cumberland Community Action Agency v. CMW, Inc. affirming the arbitration award. CMW, Inc. was responsible for the construction of a facility to be used for pre-school students and the housing of Alzheimer patients and senior citizens. An agreement was made that any disputes would be heard by an arbitrator selected by the construction industry.
The plaintiff alleged that there were design and construction defects in the building trusses, violation of the Kentucky Building Code, and problems with the HVAC system. The arbitrator awarded $106,000 to the plaintiff which then sought to vacate the award. The circuit court upheld the arbitrator’s decision.
The Court of Appeals found that there was no basis for rejecting the arbitrator’s decision, noting “there is nothing to show that there was any fraud or bias on the part of the arbitrator.” The appeals court, with all three judges concurring, upheld the arbitration award.
Read the court’s decision
Tacoma Construction Site Uncovers Gravestones
August 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Seattle Times reports that a transit construction project has uncovered about twenty-five gravestones. The area was historically sensitive, as it is in territory once occupied by the Puyallup Tribe. At current report, no human remains have been found and the article cites the project?s archeological consultant as describing the gravestones as “not historically significant.”
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Delaware “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6)
June 10, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Baldo, No. 09-338 (D. Del. June 2, 2011), claimants condominium association and unit owners sued project developer Rehoboth and general contractor Capano seeking damages because of moisture penetration property damage to common elements and individual units resulting from construction defects. Rehoboth and Capano filed a third party complaint against insured property manager Baldo alleging that, if Rehoboth and Capano were liable to claimants, Baldo was also liable because of Baldo’s failure to properly manage, maintain, and repair the property
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Insurer Must Cover Construction Defects Claims under Actual Injury Rule
March 1, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the insured need not prove the exact dates physical damage occurred in order to trigger defense and indemnity coverage. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes, LLC v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10027 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
In 1999, the insured built a home. He was insured under a CGL policy issued by Great American from November 9, 1998 to November 9, 2000. Thereafter, the insured held a CGL policy issued by Mid-Continent from November 9, 2000 to September 18, 2002.
After construction was completed, the insured sold the house to the buyer in May 2000. After moving in, the buyer found numerous construction defects in the home, including water entering cracks in the home, and sinking and sagging of parts of the house. The buyer sued the insured, who sought coverage under the two policies. When the insurers refused to defend the underlying suit, the insured sued for a declaratory judgment.
The underlying case went to arbitration and an award of $2.4 million was granted to the buyer. The insured assigned to the buyer his claims against the insurers.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Was Jury Right in Negligent Construction Case?
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Yes, said the South Carolina Court of Appeals in Pope v. Heritage Communities, Inc. Heritage Communities developed Riverwalk, a community in South Carolina. During the earlier trial, HCI “conceded that construction defects existed at Riverwalk, and repairs needed to be made.” The trial court found that the construction was negligent, awarding the property owners association $4.25 million in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive damages, with the class of owners awarded $250,000 in actual damages and $750,000 in punitive damages. HCI appealed on nine issues. All were rejected by the appeals court.
The court rejected HCI’s claim that the judge’s instruction to the jury suggested to the jury that “the court had already determined that Appellants were willful, wanton, and reckless.” But here, the appeals court found “no reversible error.”
The general contractor for Riverwalk was BuildStar. Off-site management and sale were managed by Heritage Riverwalk, Inc., which also owned title to the property. Both these companies were owned by Heritage Communities, Inc. During the trial, an HCI employee testified that “the three corporations shared the same officers, directors, office, and telephone number.” The trial court found that the three entities were amalgamated. This was upheld by the appeals court.
Nor did the appeals agree with the HCI that the trial court had improperly certified a class. The owners were seen as properly constituting a class. Further, the court held that the property owners’ losses were properly included by the trial court. HCI objected at trial to the inclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures, however, as they did not object that it was inadmissible, the issue could not be addressed at appeal.
HCI argued on appeal that the trial court should not have allowed evidence of defects at other HCI developments. The appeals court noted that “the construction defects at the other HCI developments were substantially similar to those experienced by Riverwalk.”
The court additionally found that the negligence claims, the estimated damages (since full damage could not be determined until all defective wood was removed), and the award of punitive damages were all properly applied.
Read the court’s decision…
Badly Constructed Masonry Walls Not an Occurrence in Arkansas Law
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court for Maryland has granted a summary judgment in the case Konover Construction Corp. v. ATC Associates to Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company and denied a request for dismissal from ACT. Konover (KBE) was contracted by Wal-Mart to build a Wal-Mart store and a Sam’s Club in Port Covington, Maryland. Superus, Inc. was hired by KBE to build the masonry walls. Superus purchased a policy from Massachusetts Bay Insurance which named KBE as an additional insured. Wal-Mart hired ATC Associates to independently test and inspect the concrete structural steel, and masonry.
After the building was in use, a large crack appeared which was attributed a latent construction defect. Other cracks were discovered. Upon investigation, it was discovered that there were “voids or foam in the concrete block surrounding the reinforcing steel that should have been filled with grout,” and in some cases, “reinforcing steel was missing or not installed in accordance with the specifications.” KBE paid for the repair and remediation and Wal-Mart assigned all rights and interests against ATC to KBE.
KBE filed suit against ATC. ATC called for dismissal on the grounds that Wal-Mart had no claims as the problems had been remediated. Wal-Mart then provided KBE with additional agreements to give them enforceable rights against ATC and Superus. KBE filed a fourteen claims against ATC, Superus, and Massachusetts Bay. In the current case, Massachusetts Bay sought summary judgment and ATC sought dismissal of all claims against it.
Massachusetts Bay claims that they need not indemnify Superus, as “there is no evidence adequate to establish that Superus’ defective work caused any collateral and/or resulting damage that was not subject to an Impaired Property exclusion, and that, in any event, no damage occurred during the policy period.”
As Wal-Mart is headquarted in Arkansas, certain contracts were under Arkansas law. Under the Arkansas courts, “defective workmanship, standing alone and resulting in damages only to the work product itself, is not an ‘occurrence.’” The court determined that collateral or resultant damage would be covered. The court found that “it is clear under Arkansas law, and the parties appear to agree, that Massachusetts Bay is not obligated to indemnify KBE for any repairs to the masonry walls themselves, including any cracks or gaps in the walls.” The court also found that “there is no evidence adequate to prove that any allegedly resultant property damage was caused by Superus’ faulty construction of the walls.” The court also noted that “if the building code violation and structural integrity problem were ‘property damage,’ insurance coverage would be barred by the Impaired Property Exclusion.” Based on these findings, the court concluded that Massachusetts Bay is entitled to summary judgment.
While the court dismissed the case against Massachusetts Bay, the court declined ATC’s motion to dismiss. The court noted that ACT’s alleged negligence in conducting inspections “created only a risk of economic loss for KBE.” Although hired by Wal-Mart, ATC “transmitted its daily testing and inspection reports of the Wal-Mart and Sam’s Club projects directly to KBE.” The court found that “KBE has made a plausible claim.”
ATC also claimed that KBE contributed to the negligence due to the negligence of its subcontractor. The court concluded that it was plausible that “ATC will not be able to carry its burden of proving KBE was contributorily negligent.” The court was less sanguine about KBE’s fraud claim, but though it “may not now appear likely to have merit, it is above the ‘plausibility’ line.”
In conclusion, KBE may not continue its case against Massachusetts Bay. However, the judge allowed the other proceedings to continue.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Defects in Home a Breach of Contract
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has ruled in Leno v. K & L Homes, affirming the verdict of the lower court. K & L Homes argued that district court had erred in several ways, including by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, denying a request for inspection, and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during jury viewing.
The Lenos purchased a home constructed by K & L Homes, after which they alleged they found cracks, unevenness, and shifting, which they attributed to improper construction. They claimed negligence on the part of K & L Homes. K & L Homes responded that the Lenos were responsible for damage to the home. The Lenos dropped their negligence claim, arguing breach of contract and implied warranties.
Before the trial, after the discovery period had passed, K & L Homes requested to inspect the home. This was rejected by the court. Kelly Moldenhauer, the owner of K & L Homes sought to testify about his observations during the jury’s viewing of the house. The court denied this too. The jury found that K & L was in breach of contract and awarded damages to the Lenos.
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that K & L Homes gave “warranties that the home had been built according to local building codes and laws, and that the house was fit for its particular purpose as a residence.” The court found that a defective home breached this warranty. Further, the home violated an implied warranty of fitness.
The district court had denied K & L’s request to inspect the home, as the discovery period had ended and it would not give the Lenos time to do further discovery of their own. At the time of the request, there was only twenty-two days before the trial. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not an abuse of discretion of the part of the district court.
The Lenos had requested that Moldenhauer’s testimony not be permitted, as it would “have the same effect as if the court had granted K & L Homes’ pretrial request for inspection.” K & L Homes agreed to this in court, replying, “okay.”
The decision affirms the judgment of the district court and the damages awarded to the Lenos by the jury.
Read the court’s decision…
Mandatory Arbitration Provision Upheld in Construction Defect Case
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Superior Court of New Jersey reversed the decision in Frumer v. National Home Insurance Company (NHIC) and the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation (HBW), stating that the mandatory arbitration provision within the Frumer’s home warranty policy was binding.
The Frumers alleged that the construction defects were discovered immediately after moving into their million dollar home. After failing to achieve any results from dealing with the builder, they turned to their home warranty. There was some dispute over claims, and a settlement offer was rejected by the Frumers. The Frumers elected to commence litigation rather than utilize the binding arbitration.
The NHIC and the HBW filed a motion to compel arbitration, however, the motion judge denied the motion: “…the Warranty leaves open the option for [plaintiffs] to commence litigation, which [plaintiffs have] done in this case. The clause also states that ‘the filing of a claim against this limited Warranty shall constitute the election of remedy and shall bar the Homeowner from all other remedies.’ However, the provision does not state that the filing of a claim elects arbitration as the exclusive remedy, and any ambiguity in the language must be inferred against the drafter.”
The NHIC and the HBW appealed the decision. The Superior Court reversed the decision: “Where, such as here, the homeowner files a claim against the warranty for workmanship/systems defects, the warranty clearly and unequivocally establishes binding arbitration as the exclusive remedy. There is, however, no election of remedies for a dispute involving a major structural defect claim. The warranty clearly and unequivocally establishes binding arbitration as the exclusive remedy.”
Charles Curley of Halberstadt Curley in Conshohocken, Pa., the local counsel for National Home and Home Buyers, told the New Jersey Law Journal that “the ruling reaffirms New Jersey’s commitment to enforcing arbitration agreements and requiring people to go to mandatory arbitration when the contracts call for it.”
“At this point, their hope is that the warranty company will do what it's supposed to do — repair covered defects,” Eric McCullough, the Frumer’s lawyer said to the New Jersey Law Journal.
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