Battle of “Other Insurance” Clauses
March 23, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly -
Insurance Law Hawaii - March 23, 2011
The New York Court of Appeals considered the impact of competing “other insurance” provisions located in both a CGL policy and a D&O policy. See Fieldston Property Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Hermitage Ins. Co., Inv., 2011 N.Y. LEXIS 254 (N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011).
In the underlying case, Fieldston’s officers were charged with making false statements and fraudulent claims with respect to a customer's right to access its property from adjacent streets. Suit was eventually filed against Fieldston and its officers, alleging several causes of action including injurious falsehood. Damages were sought.
Fieldston’s CGL policy was issued by Hermitage. The “other insurance” provision stated, “If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we cover . . . our obligations are limited,” but also stated it would share with all other insurance as a primary policy.
Read the full story...Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Lockton Expands Construction and Design Team
July 19, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Lockton Companies, LLC, the largest privately held independent insurance broker, has announced that it is expanding its construction and design team with the hiring of Karen Erger and Tom Miller.
Ms. Erger will provide professional liability practice management, loss prevention, contract and complex claims management consulting services to Lockton's architectural, engineering and construction clients in her role as Vice President, Director of Practice Management. Her background includes construction litigation at a leading construction law firm, professional liability claims defense and claims consulting for major professional liability underwriters.
Miller joins Lockton as a Senior Vice President within the Design and Construction Unit. His role will be dedicated to serving the needs of engineering, architecture and construction firms performing services around the globe. He has spent more than 15 years concentrating on professional liability for design professionals and contractors in multiple roles. He previously managed the professional liability underwriting of one of the largest construction insurers and has developed numerous manuscript insurance products as well as focused on strategic planning to enhance business unit opportunities.
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Defense for Additional Insured Not Barred By Sole Negligence Provision
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
A general contractor was entitled to a defense as an additional insured when the underlying complaint did not allege it was solely negligent. A-1 Roofing Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 656 (Ill. Ct. App. June 24, 2011).
A-1 was the general contractor for a roof resurfacing job at a high school. Jack Frost Iron Works Inc. (“Frost”) was one of A-1’s subcontractors. Frost had a CGL policy with Navigators Insurance Company under which A-1 was an additional insured.
An employee of Frost’s subcontractor Midwest Sheet Metal Inc. was killed at the job site when a boom-lift he was operating flipped over. The boom-lift had been leased by another Frost subcontractor, Bakes Steel Erectors, Inc. (BSE). The deceased's estate filed suit against A-1, BSE and two other defendants.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Upturn in Silicon Valley
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Work resumed after nearly three years on an office tower in Santa Clara, according to the San Jose Mercury News. Work had stalled on the building due to the economy, but now the developer is planning a second five-story building on the site. Other dormant projects in the area are also getting restarted. Santa Clara County saw the addition of 1,800 construction jobs in June.
A spokesperson for the Operating Engineers Local 3 in Alameda told the paper, “two years ago we had five thousand folks on the out-of-work list. It’s now down to about 1,700.”
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Workers Hurt in Casino Floor Collapse
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
More than a dozen construction workers fell about thirty feet when a floor collapsed in a Cincinnati casino. The workers were pouring cement on the second-floor level when the accident happened. The area in question will be the gaming area in the completed casino. Scott Allen, OSHA’s regional spokesperson, said their investigation of the accident would probably take about a month to complete.
The cause of the collapse is still undetermined. Although the weather has been wet in the area, experts thought it unlikely to be the cause. A construction forensics professor at Ohio State University said that “concrete pouring is very common” and that “you cannot go wrong unless something happens with the connection.” Engineering experts said it was more likely an issue with the metal decking.
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Another Guilty Plea in Las Vegas HOA Scandal
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A twenty-eighth person has plead guilty in the ongoing Las Vegas HOA scandal. Dax Louderman, who had been a construction company manager had acknowledged that he stole more than $495,000 from his former employers, Alpha 1 Construction and the Stone Canyon Homeowners Association, and further that he did not report this improper income on his tax returns. He has agreed to work with prosecutors and to pay $134,860 to the IRS. His actual sentencing will happen on June 24.
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United States District Court Confirms That Insurers Can Be Held Liable Under The CCPA.
June 19, 2012 — Chad Johnson
In D.R. Horton, Inc.-Denver v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 10-CV-02826-WJM-KMT, 2012 WL 527204 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2012), the court was asked to rule on Travelers’[1] motion to dismiss D.R. Horton, Inc. ?Äì Denver’s (“DRH”) claim that Travelers violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”).
In the underlying construction defect case (“CD case”), DRH, as the developer and general contractor of a construction project, tendered the defense of the CD case to certain subcontractors and to Travelers as an insurer to those subcontractors. Travelers accepted the duty to defend DRH. DRH hired counsel to defend it, and the attorney fees and costs of suit were billed to Travelers. However, for a period of over five years, Travelers failed to actually pay any portion of the defense of DRH. Finally, on October 31, 2008, Travelers offered checks for payment of only 4% of the costs and fees incurred. DRH then returned the checks to Travelers and provided Travelers with authority to support its position that the amounts in Travelers’ checks were inadequate. Thereafter, Travelers dug its heels in, and resubmitted the same checks.
DRH was then forced to file a coverage action against Travelers for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, bad faith breach of insurance contract, and deceptive trade practices under the CCPA. In its motion to dismiss DRH’s CCPA claim, Travelers’ argued that DRH failed to plead specific facts that Travelers engaged in a deceptive trade practice under C.R.S. § 6-1-105, and DRH failed to plead sufficient facts showing that Travelers’ actions significantly affect the public ?Äì a necessary element of a CCPA claim.
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Reprinted courtesy of Chad Johnson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com
California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
Read the court’s decision…
There Is No Non-Delegable Duty on the Part of Residential Builders in Colorado
August 16, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Recently, in the Arapahoe District Court, the Honorable Michael Spear, issued an order holding that builders do not owe a non-delegable duty to homeowners. In Marx and Corken v. Alpert Custom Homes, Inc., et al., Judge Spear’s order came in response to plaintiffs’ motion for determination of question of law seeking a finding that the defendants owed a non-delegable duty to the plaintiffs and thus, to strike defendants’ designation of nonparties at fault. After being fully briefed, Judge Spear, found that such a non-delegable duty does not exist.
The case arises from the construction of a single-family residence in Aurora, Colorado. Through the construction and interaction with Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. and Scott and Sally Alpert, the defendants, Paul Marx and Kay Corken, the plaintiffs claimed they suffered various damages and losses, and brought claims for breach of contract-warranty, breach of contract, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, breaches of the implied covenant of good faith, promissory estoppel, willful breach of contract, and quantum meruit. During litigation, the defendants filed a designation of nonparties at fault, which named several parties which were at fault for the alleged construction defects at issue in the case.
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Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Nevada Supreme Court Reverses Decision against Grader in Drainage Case
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Nevada Supreme Court has issued an opinion in the case of Rayburn Lawn & Landscape Designers v. Plaster Development Corporation, reversing the decision of the lower court and remanding the case for a new trial.
The case originated in a construction defect suit in which Plaster Development Corporation was sued by homeowners. Plaster filed a third-party complaint against its subcontractor, Reyburn. The testimony of Reyburn’s owner was considered to be admission of liability and so the court limited the scope of Reyburn’s closing argument and did not allow the jury to determine the extent of Reyburn’s liability. Reyburn appealed.
Plaster, in their case, cited California’s Crawford v. Weather Sheild MFG, Inc. The court held the application of these standards, but noted that the “an indemnitor’s duty to defend an indemnitee is limited to those claims directly attributed to the indemnitor’s scope of work and does not include defending against claims arising from the negligence of other subcontractors and the indemnittee’s own negligence.”
On the matter of law against Reyburn, the court concluded, “Given the conflicting evidence at trial as to whether Reyburn’s work was implicated in the defective retaining walls and sidewalls, and viewing the evidence and inferences in Reyburn’s favor, we conclude that a reasonable jury could have granted relief in favor of Reyburn.” The Nevada Supreme Court conduced that the district court should not have granted Plaster’s motion for judgement.
Further, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the district court should have apportioned the fees and costs to those claims directly attributed to Reyburn’s scope of work, “if any,” and should not have assigned all attorney costs and court fees to Reyburn.
Read the court’s decision…
Arbitrator May Use Own Discretion in Consolidating Construction Defect Cases
September 1, 2011 — CJD Staff
The Mississippi Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC v. Sea Breeze I, LLC. Sea Breeze contracted with Harry Baker Smith Architects II, PLLC (HBSA) to design a condominium complex, which would be built by Roy Anderson Corporation. All parties agreed to arbitration.
Subsequently, Sea Breeze alleged defects and sought arbitration against the architectural firm and started a separate arbitration proceeding against the contractor. The special arbitrator appointed by the American Arbitrators Association determined that it would be proper to consolidate the two actions “since they arose from a common question of fact or law.” HBSA filed in chancery court seeking injunctive relief and a reversal of the decision. Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson filed a motion to compel the consolidated arbitration.
The court noted that the special arbitrator “established that the contract between Sea Breeze and Roy Anderson expressly allowed for consolidation of the two cases.” Further, the arbitrator “concluded that HBSA expressly agreed to consolidation by written consent through its 2008 letter, through which it insisted upon Roy Anderson’s involvement ‘in any mediation and/or arbitration.’”
The court concluded that the chancery court “did not have the power to fulfill HBSA’s request.” The court affirmed the chancery court’s judgment.
Read the court’s decision…
Plans Go High Tech
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
One construction executive described it as “the wave of the future.” What is it? Accessing building plans on an iPad. According to an article in MacWorld, several companies are now offering solutions to distribute and update construction plans on iPads. Changes to plans and notes can be distributed quickly through cloud computing.
Alan Dillon, a senior superintendent at DPR Construction told MacWorld, “I can take my iPad into the field and have my whole set of drawings.” He described a set of drawings for a large construction project as “five or six inches thick.” Danielle Douthet, of Level 10 Construction said it “can help everyone be on the same page more quickly, and make sure that everybody is working off the most current set of documents.”
And it’s not just building plans. Other firms offer building management applications designed to be taken into the field on mobile devices.
Read the full story…
Construction Case Alert: Appellate Court Confirms Engineer’s Duty to Defend Developer Arises Upon Tender of Indemnity Claim
January 27, 2010 — By
Steven M. Cvitanovic,
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP, January 27, 2010
In the recent case of UDC-Universal Development, L.P. v. CH2M Hill, 2010 Cal.App.LEXIS 47 (filed January 15, 2010), the Sixth District Court of Appeal provided a stunning illustration of the far-reaching effects of the California Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541. In Crawford, the Court held the duty to defend under an indemnity agreement arose upon the mere tender of defense of a claim covered by the indemnity.
In the UDC case, CH2M Hill provided engineering and environmental planning services to developer UDC on a project that ultimately wound up in a construction defect lawsuit by the homeowners association ( HOA ). UDC tendered its defense to CH2M Hill, the tender was rejected, and UDC filed a cross-complaint for negligence, breach of contract and indemnity against CH2M Hill and others. After the HOA’s construction defect claims were settled, UDC proceeded to trial against CH2M Hill. The jury found in favor of CH2M Hill on the claims for negligence and breach of contract. At the request of the parties prior to trial, the trial court ruled on the application of the indemnity agreement in light of Crawford and, in so doing, found that the defense obligation arose upon the tender and that CH2M Hill breached that duty despite the jury finding in favor of CH2M Hill.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the defense obligation arose as soon as the defense was tendered and did not depend on the outcome of the litigation, and that the HOA’s general description of the defects along with an allegation that Doe engineers were negligent triggered the duty to defend.
Although this case did not expand the crushing impact of Crawford’s holding, it is
Read the full story...
Washington Supreme Court Sides with Lien Claimants in Williams v. Athletic Field
September 30, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
The Washington Supreme Court issued their opinion today on Williams v. Athletic Field, perhaps the most talked about construction law case in the past few years. I have discussed this case exhaustively here on Builders Counsel. Today we have a resolution.
In an unanimous opinion issued today, the high court sided with lien filers who followed a sample form provided in RCW 60.04.091. Additionally, the court found that a lien company - and presumably other persons - could sign the lien for the lien claimant, as an agent, without invalidating the lien.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Homebuilders Go Green in Response to Homebuyer Demand
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
McGrawHill Construction reports that 17 percent of new homes and remodels in 2011 were done with green building practices. Their report estimates that by 2016, this will rise to 29 to 38 percent of the market for home construction and remodeling.
Consumers see the green buildings as more desirable, particularly where they are more energy efficient. Two thirds of builders noted their customers were interested in features that would lower the energy use of their homes. Consumers also feel that green building materials are more durable and see green homes as higher quality.
Read the full story…
Eleventh Circuit Asks Georgia Supreme Court if Construction Defects Are Caused by an "Occurrence"
December 20, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Eleventh Circuit certified a question to the Georgia Supreme Court, asking whether property damage can constitute an "occurrence" under a CGL policy where its effects are not felt on "other property." HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co. v. Morrison Homes, Inc., 2012 U.S. App. Ct. LEXIS 23813 (11th Cir. Nov. 19, 2012).
The general contractor, Taylor Morrison Services, Inc., was covered by a CGL policy issued by Gerling. The policy excluded "expected or intended injury," contractual liability," and business risk exclusions. Morrison was sued by homeowners in a class action suit. Morrison had allegedly omitted four inches of gravel required beneath the base of the concrete foundations by the Uniform Building Code. Thereafter, the houses sustained water intrusion, cracks in the floors and driveways, and warped and buckling flooring.
Gerling defended, but sued Morrison for a declaratory judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Important Information Regarding Colorado Mechanic’s Lien Rights.
November 7, 2012 — David McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
With payment problems in the construction economy having accelerated over the past few years, there has been a substantial increase in mechanic’s lien activity and associated litigation. The typical mechanic’s lien claimant is a material supplier, a trade subcontractor, or even a general contractor that has not been paid by the developer/owner of the construction project. The reason for filing a mechanic’s lien claim is that it offers the prospect in many cases to make the unpaid construction professional a priority creditor, with a lien on the real estate that is superior to the construction lender.
One of the primary rules governing a mechanic’s lien claim is that the creditor’s formal written “Notice of Intent to File a Mechanic’s Lien” (hereafter “Lien Notice”) must be (1) served on the owner of the property for which the work was done or the materials used, and (2) served at the same time on the general contractor who has handled the construction project. After the creditor has made service of the lien claim by USPS certified mail (using the green return receipt card for proof of service) or separate personal delivery of the notice to the property owner and general contractor, ten full days must pass (not including the date of mailing of the notices) before the lien notice is filed in the public records.
After ten days have expired following the date of mailing using certified mail, or personal delivery of the notice to the property owner and the general contractor, the lien notice can be filed to make the lien valid.
Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
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Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.