Insurer Has Duty to Disclose Insured's Interest In Obtaining Written Explanation of Arbitration Award
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The issue faced by the Minnesota Supreme Court was whether the insurer had a duty to disclose the insured's interest in obtaining a written explanation of an arbitration award that identified the claims of recovery and the portions of the award attributable to each. Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. v. Integrity Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 LEXIS Minn. 404 (Minn. Sup. Ct., Aug. 22, 2012).
Remodeling Dimensions, Inc. ("RDI") built an addition for the homeowners and installed windows in the original part of the house. After construction began, the homeowners also asked RDI to fix the master bedroom window in the original part of the house.
After completion of the project, the house sustained storm damage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Coverage Exists Under Ensuing Loss Provision
July 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Finding coverage under the ensuing loss provision, the Washington Supreme Court overruled a Court of Appeals decision we previously reported here. Vision One, LLC v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 276 P.3d 300 (Wash. 2012).
Vision developed a condominium project. Before concrete was poured, a subcontractor supplied the shoring to temporarily support the poured concrete slabs. After the shoring installation was completed, concrete was poured on the first floor. When the pouring was finished, the shoring gave way. The framing, rebar and newly poured concrete came crashing down onto the the lower level parking area, where the wet concrete eventually hardened. It took several weeks to clean up the debris and repair the damage.
Vision had a builders’ risk policy with Philadelphia. The policy excluded losses caused by or resulting from deficient design or faulty workmanship. Collapse, however, was not listed as an excluded event. Further, the exclusion for faulty workmanship contained a resulting loss clause providing that "if loss or damage by a Covered Cause of Loss results, [Philadelphia] will pay for the loss or damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss."
Philadelphia denied coverage under the faulty workmanship exclusion.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Late Filing Contractor Barred from Involving Subcontractors in Construction Defect Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals looked at that state’s Construction Defect Action Reform Act in determining if a general contractor could add subcontractors as third-party defendants to a construction defect lawsuit. Shaw Construction, LLC was the general contraction of the Roslyn Court condominium complex, and was sued by the homeowners’ association in a construction defect case. United Builder Services was the drywall subcontractor on the project. MB Roofing had installed roofs, gutters, and downspouts. The certificate of occupancy for the last building was issued on March 10, 2004. The project architect certified completion of all known remaining architectural items in June, 2004.
The HOA filed a claim against the developers of the property on January, 21, 2009. A week later, the HOA amended its complaint to add Shaw, the general contractor. Shaw did not file its answer and third-party complaint until March 29, 2010, sending its notice of claim under the CDARA on March 30.
The subcontractors claimed that the six-year statute of limitations had ended twenty days prior. Shaw claimed that the statute of limitations ran until six years after the architect’s certification, or that the HOA’s suit had tolled all claims.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the subcontractors, determining that “substantial completion occurs ‘when an improvement to real property achieves a degree of completion at which the owner can conveniently utilize the improvement of the purpose it was intended.’”
The appeals court noted that “Shaw correctly points out that the CDARA does not define ‘substantial completion.’” The court argued that Shaw’s interpretation went against the history and intent of the measure. “Historically, a construction professional who received a complaint responded by ‘cross-nam[ing] or add[ing] everybody and anybody who had a part to play in the construction chain.’” The court concluded that the intent of the act was to prevent unnamed subcontractors from being tolled.
The court further rejected Shaw’s reliance on the date of the architect’s certification as the time of “substantial completion,” instead agreeing with the trial court that “the architect’s letter on which Shaw relies certified total completion.”
The appeals court upheld the trial court’s determination that the statute of limitation began to run no later than March 10, 2004 and that Shaw’s complaint of March 29, 2010 was therefore barred. The summary judgment was upheld.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Defect Journal Marks First Anniversary
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
November 2011 marked the first anniversary of the Construction Defect Journal. During the first year our staff and contributors in the insurance and legal communities have compiled several hundred articles of interest to the construction defect and claims community.
Each of these articles are maintained in the CDJ archives, and are accessible at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/archives.html. Each story in the archives is listed in the order it was posted to the archives. Each story in the archives opens up in its own page, so you can easily locate topics and articles of interest.
If you’re new to Construction Defect Journal, or just want peruse past articles, please take a moment to visit the CDJ Archives page. Also please feel encouraged to submit your firm’s articles or legal publications of interest to the CD community at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/submitStory.html.
Brown Paint Doesn’t Cover Up Construction Defects
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a decision that describes the case as illustrating “the perils that real estate brokers and their agents assume when acting as a dual listing agent to both the buyers and sellers of the same house,” the California Court of Appeals has issued a decision in William L. Lyon & Associates v. The Superior Court of Placer County. Lyon & Associates sought summary judgment to dismiss the claims of the Henleys who bought a home in a transaction where a Lyon agent represented both sides.
The prior owners of the home, the Costas, had used a Lyon agent in purchasing their home. When they later sought to sell it, that agent “became aware of some of the house’s defects and problems.” In response, the Costas sought the help of another agent, Connie Gidal, also of Lyons & Associates. Photos taken in the presence of Ms. Gidal show defects of the paint and stucco. The Costas also took the step of painting the house dark brown. During the sale process, “rain caused many of the painted-over defects to reappear.” The Costas “purchased more dark brown paint and covered up the newly visible damage prior to inspection by the Henleys.”
With the damage concealed, the Henleys bought the home in May 2006. The agreement with Lyons & Associates noted that “a dual agent is obligated to disclose known facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property to both parties.” Escrow closed on May 9, 2006. The contract with the broker included a two-year limit on the time to bring legal action.
The Henleys moved in during June 2006, and “began to discover construction defects that had been concealed by the Costas.” In addition to the painted-over stucco problems, the Henleys found that the Costas had “installed quartzite stone overlays on the backyard steps in a manner that caused water intrusion on the house’s stucco walls.”
In May 2009, the Henleys sued the Costas, Ron McKim Construction, Lyons & Associates, and Ms. Gidal. Their complaint alleged that Lyons & Associates had committed breach of contact, negligence, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligent nondisclosure in connection with the construction defects. The Costas named Lyons in a cross complaint. Lyons moved for summary judgments on the grounds that the two-year statute of limitations had expired before the complaint and cross-complaint were filed. Both the Henleys and the Costas opposed this claim. The court denied the motion and Lyons appealed.
The appeals court upheld the denial, noting that the both California Supreme Court decision and later action by the legislature compels real estate brokers and salespersons “to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent visual inspection of the property offered for sale.” The court noted that under California law, brokers have responsibilities to both sellers and buyers. The section of law cited by Lyons applies to seller’s agents. The court rejected the contention by Lyons that they were “cooperating brokers.” The Henleys were “not constrained by the two-year statute of limitations.”
Lyons contended that even if California’s statute did not apply, there was a contractual limit of two years. The court also rejected this, agreeing with the Henleys that “the two-year limitation period must be extended by the discovery rule.”
The court noted that “Lyon & Associates may not reap the benefit of a shortened contractual limitation period when its own alleged malfeasance contributed to the delay in the discovery of the buyer’s injury.” The court found that the Henleys could proceed with their breach of contract claim, because, “when a breach of contract is committed in secret, such as the intentional nondisclosure of a real estate broker regarding a previously visible construction defect, the contractual limitations period is properly held subject to the discovery rule.” The court felt that the interpretation favored by the California Association of Realtors would “halve the applicable statute of limitations period.”
In addition to rejecting Lyon request for summary judgment on the claims made by the Henleys, the court also rejected the request of summary judgment on the claims made by the Costas, concluding that neither claim is time-barred. Costs were awarded to both the Henleys and Costas.
Read the court’s decision…
No Coverage for Counterclaim Alleging Construction Defects Pled as Breach of Contract
September 13, 2012 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Colorado Court of Appeals considered whether counterclaims against the insured for alleged faulty construction work were based in contract or constituted allegations of an "accident" under the policy. TCD, Inc. v. Am. Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2012 WL 1231964 (Colo. Ct. App. April 12, 2012).
The developer, Frisco Gateway Center, LLC, contracted with TCD, the general contractor, to construct a building. TCD, in turn, subcontracted with Petra Roofing to install the roof. The subcontract required Petra to "indemnify, hold harmless, and defend" TCD against claims arising out of resulting from the performance of Petra's work on the project. Petra was also required to name TCD as an additional insured on its CGL policy.
After a dispute arose between TCD and Gateway regarding payment and performance on the project, TCD sued Gateway and other parties seeking payment. Gateway counterclaimed against TCD for breach of contract and negligence. TCD demanded coverage from Petra's insurer, but coverage was denied.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Recent Case Brings Clarity and Questions to Statute of Repose Application
August 16, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
I have often chatted about the Washington Statute of Repose on this blog. The Statute of Repose prevents construction claims, for the most part, from being raised 6 years from the date of substantial completion or termination. Well, a recent Court of Appeals case dove deep into the specific determinative factors that tell us when to start the clock. It certainly raises questions about how long we really have to file suit.
The Statute of Repose has been a frequent topic here, so I will simply direct you to my prior post for further information on how this law works. A recent post was published about a lawsuit that might raise some questions about when and how the clock begins to roll, and claim periods begin to diminish.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Virginia Chinese Drywall and pollution exclusion
May 27, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. The Overlook, LLC, No. 4:10cv69 (E.D. Va. May 13, 2011), homeowner Edmonds sued insured developer/general contractor Overlook seeking damages resulting from defective Chinese drywall installed in Edmonds’ home. Overlook’s CGL insurer Nationwide defended Overlook under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action. The federal district trial court granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Defect Claims as Occurrences? Check Your State Laws
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Although four states have defined construction defect claims as occurrences, contractors are still dealing with “coverage gaps for faulty work construction,” says Mike Tsikoudakis in a piece at Business Insurance. He quotes Julian Ehrlich, the senior VP of claims for Aon Risk Services that “one of the interesting and compelling aspects of the issue of coverage for defective construction is that jurisdictions differ, so policyholders don’t know what they’re going to get.” He further notes that “in context of construction defect, the term ‘occurrence’ is ambiguous.”
One problem, as noted by Jeffrey J. Vita, a partner at Saxe Doernberger & Vita, is that construction firms end up needing to simultaneously defend against defect claims and to also file suit to be certain their insurance firms will cover claims. Insurance for construction defect claims is described as “expensive and somewhat limited.” Mr. Vita expects more states to help this situation with new laws, clarifying what is an occurrence.
Read the full story…
Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration.
The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this.
PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint.
Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.”
The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.”
As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision.
Read the court’s decision…
Lien Law Unlikely To Change — Yet
May 26, 2011 — Melissa Brumback, Construction Law in North Carolina
For those of you following the proposed revisions to the NC lien law that is currently at the NC House Judiciary Subcommittee B, a quick update: the proposed bill (HB 489) is unlikely to be voted on this legislative session due to its unpopularity with several constituency groups, including both the AIA-North Carolinaand the NC Home Builders Association.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
Construction Workers Unearth Bones
June 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
While digging for a new steam line at Eastern Michigan University, workers unearthed some old bones. Experts have yet to determine if the bones are human or animal, however Walter Kraft, the EMU vice president of communications, noted that a handle also unearthed might have come from a casket. Cindy Heflin, reporting in AnnArbor.com notes that until 1900 a Catholic cemetery was located in the area. Although the bodies were relocated, these may have been left behind.
Read the full story…
Federal District Court Predicts Florida Will Adopt Injury In Fact Trigger
October 23, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida was confronted with determining whether Florida would follow the manifestation or injury in fact trigger in Axis Surplus Ins. Co. v. Contravest Constr. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104502 (D. Fla. June 5, 2012).
The homeowner's association sued the insureds for alleged negligent construction and development of individual dwelling units and common areas of their condominium. Due to this negligence, severe damage was caused by water intrusion. The Association's members only became aware of the defects through the retention of construction experts.
The insured had CGL coverage with Axis, with policies issued from 2003 to 2007. Coverage was denied for the periods 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. Axis provided a defense under the policies issued for 2005-2006 and 2006-2007, but under a reservation of rights. Axis sought a declaration that it had no duty to defend or indemnify because the damage manifested before its policy periods.
For coverage to exist, "property damage" must have "occurred" during Axis' policy period.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Ensuing Loss Found Ambiguous, Allowing Coverage
August 16, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The court determined the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous and found coverage for the home owners in Platek v. Town of Hamburg, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5371 (N.Y. App. Div. July 6, 2012).
The burst of a water main caused water damage to the insureds' basement. Allstate disclaimed coverage under exclusion 4 for losses caused by "[w]ater . . . on or below the surface of the ground, regardless of its source . . . [,] includ[ing] water . . . which exerts pressure on or flows, seeps or leaks through any part of the residence premises."
Another policy provision covered "sudden and accidental direct physical loss caused by fire, explosion or theft resulting from item []. . . 4 . . . ." Plaintiffs argued that this exception applied because their claimed loss was caused by an "explosion" of the water main.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
Read the court’s decision…
Demand for Urban Living Leads to Austin Building Boom
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The New York Times reports that Austin is undergoing a building boom as a high-tech firms, including Facebook and Google, have moved into the downtown area. With them, comes a need for more apartment buildings and more retail space. Mike Kennedy, the president and chief executive of an Austin real estate firm, told the Times “the office space was here, the housing came, and retail is arriving last to the scene.” Currently, two large projects that will add about 500 apartment units is underway, including a 222-unit, 18-story building, and another that will contain 277 units. Apartment occupancy in Austin is at ninety-seven percent.
Developers also have hotels and more office space planned. The area has about 6,000 hotel rooms with an additional 2,000 planned, but events in Austin can bring in more people than the city’s 30,000 hotel rooms can accommodate. Office space is eighty-eight percent occupied, and a lack of office space could cause firms to look elsewhere.
Read the full story…
Lawsuit over Construction Defects Not a Federal Case
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United State District Court in California has dismissed the claims of a contractor against the United States government, on the grounds that it was not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The origins of the case are in a related construction defect claim. The current plaintiff, Performance Contracting, Inc., did the lath and plaster work for a building for the Department of Veterans Affairs. After the building was completed, the Veterans Affairs complained to the general contractor, Wynema, Inc., of water intrusion problems.
Wyema and Performance conducted testing and the water intrusion was found to be due to “a variety of design defects and omissions, including: 1) omission of proper window flashing; 2) inadequate waterproof membrane around the windows; 3) inadequate T-molding around the windows; 4) lack of a window sill pan for the windows; 5) lack of any backing in the window framing; 6) lack of any backing for the stucco expansion joints and seams; and 7) failure to require that a performance mock-up of the window assembly and adjacent areas be built and water tested.” Wyema filed a construction defect action against Performance and other subcontractors.
In the current case, Performance claims that Veteran Affairs was negligent, that it “breached its duty to Plaintiff when it provided deficient plants and specifications” and “failed to properly oversee construction and inspect Project work.” The court determined that it could not hear this case, noting that “Federal Courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions.”
Performance raised its claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The judge was not persuaded by this claim, noting that the FTCA does not apply to purported breach of the General Contract. The FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity in cases of “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
Performance was unable to pursue its claims in the Court of Federal Claims as there was no contract between Performance and the government. However, the court noted that Performance’s inability to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims does not open up a path to the District Court. “Litigants are not guaranteed a forum in which to sue the United States.” The court further noted that “if this Court were to accept Plaintiff’s logic, non-parties to contracts, but not parties, would be free to pursue contract claims in the fora of their choosing.”
Read the court’s decision…
Utah Construction Defect Claims Dependant on Contracts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
An owner who wants to sue a subcontractor directly may find limited ability to do so under Utah court decisions. Writing on the JDSupra site, Stewart O. Peay and Mark O. Morris of Snell & Wilmer discuss the distinction the Utah courts make between contractor (with whom an owner has direct contracts) and subcontractors (with whom an owner does not). In the Utah courts, construction defect claims must be based on contract, rather than tort. With no contract, there is no way to pursue claims against a subcontractor alone.
They note that the Utah couts do not “accept negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims that many other jurisdictions embrace.” They recommend that in setting up contracts for a construction project, owners should ensure that they are provided with “third-party beneficiary rights to purse claims against subs.” They suggest that “the owner may require his generals to include language in the various subcontracts that incorporates some or all of the terms of the prime contract into the subcontracts.” Additionally they suggest that the owner “require the general to include ‘flow down’ provisions in the various subcontracts.”
Read the full story…
