Colorado Statutes of Limitations and Repose, A First Step in Construction Defect Litigation
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Grund Dagner, a law firm operating in Denver and Boulder, Colorado notes on their blog that when defending a construction defect claim, one of their first steps is to determine if the claims are affected by the statutes of limitations or repose, and that they “have had much success raising these defenses with the court before trial.”
Colorado has a two-year statute of limitations, starting from when the homeowner discovers the defect. Further, Colorado’s statute of repose precludes lawsuits beginning “more than six years after the substantial completion of the improvement to the real property.”
Grund Dagner notes that they “recently obtained dismissal of claims related to eight of 22 buildings in a condominium project, where the homeowners in those building observed the defects more than two years before the HOA initiated its claims against our client.”
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Homebuilding Still on the Rise
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The National Association of Home Builders reports that spending on private homes was up three percent in October 2012, bringing it to a four-year high. This was part of a trend in which fourteen of the last fifteen months have seen increases in spending on residential construction. Likewise, multifamily residences have seen thirteen months of increased spending, putting it 82% higher than its low, two years ago. ¬?In addition to new homes, remodeling is also up, reaching its highest point in five years.
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A Lien Might Just Save Your Small Construction Business
April 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog
Many owners incorrectly believe that payment to the general contractor gets the owner off the hook for payment to subcontractors and suppliers. This assumption sometimes fosters the irresponsible owner, who fails to ensure that everyone is getting paid. Fortunately for those contractors further down the contracting chain, this assumption is incorrect.
Suppliers and subcontractors can file a lien to secure payment for their labor and materials. A filing party must offer proper notice (if applicable) and file an adequate and timely lien in the County where the work is performed. You can read our earlier posts on these topics by following this link.
A lien notice and a lien put an owner on notice that your business has provided labor and/or materials for the improvement of the owner’s property (See RCW 60.04.031 for more info). If the owner fails to take care to ensure that your business is paid the law mandates that the owner may have to pay twice.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
CC&Rs Not the Place for Arbitration Agreement, Court Rules
May 24, 2011 — CDJ Staff
In January, the California Court of Appeals ruled that an arbitration clause inserted in a development’s CC&Rs by the developer could not be enforced. The case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Noble Court Development, involved a case in which, according to the opinion, “following the first sale Nobel controlled the board of directors of the Association and because the initial condominium buyers noticed defects in common areas and common facilities and did not believe Nobel had provided a reserve fund sufficient to repair the defects, the condominium owners brought a derivative action on behalf of the Association against Nobel.”
The court concluded, “The use of CC&R's as a means of providing contractual rights to parties with no interest in or responsibility for a common interest development is also problematic from the standpoint of determining what if any consideration would support such third-party agreements. By their terms the CC&R's bind all successors, even those with whom a third party such as Nobel has never had any contractual relationship and to whom Nobel has not provided any consideration.” The court determined that “the trial court did not err in denying Nobel's motion to compel arbitration.”
Read the court’s decision
Allowing the Use of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 2, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Park District Sues over Leaky Roof
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Glen Ellyn Park District has filed suit against multiple firms over the leaks in the Ackerman Sports and Fitness Center. The district alleges at least twenty leaks can be found throughout the facility. In order to prevent further damage, they have put in a system of “buckets, tarps and flexible piping.”
According to the Chicago Daily Herald, the park district has most recently added the project construction manager, the building designer, and insurer that issued a performance bond on the builder. T.A. Bowman Constructors, the builder of the project, sued the park district. They were first name in the district’s countersuit.
The park district isn’t waiting for the outcome of the suit to repair the roof. Instead, they are using existing funds to pay for roof repairs.
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Alabama “occurrence” and subcontractor work exception to the “your completed work” exclusion
November 18, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Town & Country Property, LLC v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. 1100009 (Ala. Oct. 21, 2010), property owner Town & Country contracted with insured general contractor Jones-Williams for the construction of a car dealership. All of the construction work was performed by Jones-Williams subcontractors. After completion, Town & Country sued Jones-Williams for defective construction. Jones-Williams’ CGL insurer Amerisure defended. The case was tried and a judgment was entered against Jones-Williams in favor of Town & Country. After Amerisure denied any obligation to pay the judgment, Town & Country sued Amerisure in a statutory direct action.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com.
SB800 Cases Approach the Courts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
California’s Right to Repair Law turns ten this year and cases under the statute are finally coming to trial, as John V. O’Meara of Bremer Whyte Brown & O’Meara writes for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library. Mr. O’Meara notes that SB800 eliminated “the traditional definitions of construction defect,” replacing them with “functionality standards.” He argues that these standards are not uniform: “some standards require damage and others do not.” He also wonders what terms like “significant cracks,” “intended water” and “materially comply” mean in a court.
Mr. O’Meara states that “defendants in construction defect cases have a right to know the standards that apply to a case, the definitions that will be presented to the jury, and the burden of proof that attaches.”
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Crane Dangles and So Do Insurance Questions
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Hurricane Sandy sent a construction crane dangling from the top of One57, a condo construction project in New York City. In response to the risk, the nearby Parker Meridian and other nearby buildings were evacuated until the crane could be stabilized. Businessweek reports that One57 involves “a tangle of companies,” including the developer, Extell Development and the contractor, Lend Lease Construction. Pinnacle Industries was responsible for providing and operating the crane.
The insurance claims are yet to be made, but they will likely include the costs of evacuating nearby buildings and to cover any damage to the building itself. David DeLaRue, a vice president in construction practice at Willis Group Holdings said there would be two questions: “Did our insured do anything to cause that loss? Does this policy cover it?”
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Insurance Firm Under No Duty to Defend in Hawaii Construction Defect Case
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court for Hawaii has granted a motion for summary judgment in Evanston Insurance v. Nagano. The case is related to a construction defect claim, Hu v. Nagano, and the issue at hand is whether Evanston Insurance is obligated to defend the Naganos in the underlying case.
The Hus hired Eric Nagano and his firm PMX to construct a house. Mr. Nagano’s firm was insured by Evanston, however, he lost his contractor’s license in “approximately March 2006.” Mr. Nagano sought the Hus’ authorization to allow HC Builders to take over the contract. HC Builders is headed by Mr. Nagano’s wife, Hiroko, who has held a contractor’s license since “approximately September 2006.” Ms. Nagano and HC Builders were also insured by Evanston Insurance. The house, started by PMX was finished by HC Builders.
The Hus authorized construction to begin in July 2003, but “construction did not commence until approximately October 2004 and, even after commencement, there were numerous delays resulting in months of inactivity on the Project.” The Hus had expressed to Mr. Nagano and PMX “that the construction period could not exceed twelve months after July 1, 2003.” As a result of the delays, “the Hus’ community association fined them because of the prolonged construction and the Hus’ construction lender assessed extension fees and fines for exceeding the term of the loan.”
The Hus noted that the project did not have a licensed contractor from March through September 2006. In the end, the Hus “allege that Defendants did not fulfill the obligations under the Construction Contract,” and that “the Project was ‘grossly delayed’ and the construction was ‘riddled with defects.’” Despite an Owner’s Notice of Completion filed in December 2007, the residence “had no electricity, no hot water, ... no installed appliances” and “parts of the flooring were either missing or incomplete.” And then it leaked.
The Naganos tendered the defense to Evanston. The Naganos “allege the defense is limited because Evanston: allowed default to be entered against the Naganos (the default was later set aside); delayed retaining experts; and limited the ability of the Naganos’ retained counsel to perform necessary actions to advance the case.” Evanston argues that it “does not have a duty to defend or indemnify Defendants against the Hus’ claims,” as the Hus’ claims are not covered under the policy. Further, the PMX policies have an exclusion for breach of contract.
The court concluded that all of the claims made by the Hus were based in contract and therefore were outside of the terms of the Naganos insurance coverage, as the courts have "construed Hawaii law as not providing for insurance coverage for contract related claims." Therefore, Evanston does not have a duty to defend the Naganos.
Read the court’s decision…
Fire Reveals Defects, Appeals Court Affirms Judgment against Builder
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Simms v. Nance Construction. After a fire damaged his home, Jerry Simms discovered some construction defects in the work of the builder, Nance Construction. Nance Construction completed the home in 2000 and it was damaged by fire in 2001. In the course of Simms’ suit against his neighbor, “defense experts opined both that Dusty Creek had negligently repaired the damage to Simms’ residence and that many defects found in the houses were the result of defects in the original construction.” Nance offered to make roof repairs. Simms responded with a list of “numerous construction defects,” stating this was “not a comprehensive and final list of items.” Nance offered to repair some while disputing others. Simms entered a lawsuit against Nance and other parties.
Nance first sought a summary judgment, “asserting that Simms had failed to adequately disclose the repairs for which he sought to hold Nance responsible.” The court denied this. It also would not allow Nance to introduce evidence that Simms had been denied a license by the Arizona Department of Gaming over “questionable business practices, illegal activities, and financial transactions with a person purportedly involved in organized crime.”
During the suit, Simms contracted with Advanced Repair Technologies “for repairs that included a complete remodel of the roof and the exterior stucco system.” Nance later claimed that the cost of ART’s repair was unreasonable, claiming that it should have cost about $600,000 instead of the $1.5 million for which Simms contracted. The jury found against Nance, with a judgment of $870,200 of which half was due to the roofing subcontractor.
After the verdict, Nash moved for a new trial, stating that the jury should have heard expert testimony on whether the contract price was reasonable. Nance also “argued that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow Nance to impeach Simms’ credibility with his purported prior acts of dishonesty.” These motions were denied and Nance appealed.
The appeals court upheld the trial court on all counts. The court found that, despite the contention made by Nance, the jury had sufficient information to determine if the cost of the repairs were reasonable. The court also found that Simms had given Nance an opportunity to propose repairs. The law, however, “does not require the Plaintiff to accept an offer for repairs,” adding that “the record makes clear that the parties were far apart in their belief of the nature of repairs necessary.” Nor did the court find that Nance should have been allowed to introduce evidence to impeach Simms’ credibility.
Although judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the court took the discretion to decline to award attorneys’ fees to Simms, although he was awarded costs.
Read the court’s decision…
Colorado Court of Appeals Rejects Retroactive Application of C.R.S. § 13-20-808.
April 25, 2012 — Chad W. Johnson, Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC
In TCD, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, TCD appealed the district court’s summary judgment ruling in favor of American Family. TCD, Inc. v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company Colo. App. No. 11CA1046 (April 12, 2012). TCD was the general contractor on a project to construct a building for Frisco General Gateway Center, LLC (“Gateway”). TCD subcontracted with a roofer named Petra Roofing and Remodeling Company (“Petra”) to performing the roofing work for the building. The subcontract required Petra to defend and indemnify TCD and to name TCD as an additional insured under its CGL policy. American Family issued a CGL policy to Petra that named TCD as an additional insured from 2006-2007.
TCD filed suit against Gateway seeking payment for its work at the project. Gateway counterclaimed against TCD for breach of contract, negligence, and violation of the CCPA. TCD demanded that American Family defend it from the counterclaims pursuant to Petra’s policies. American Family denied coverage and a separate coverage suit ensued. At the trial court level, the court entered summary judgment for American Family because the counterclaims of Gateway did not trigger the duty to defend or indemnify TCD as an additional insured.
On appeal, TCD argued that: 1) the counterclaims raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding American Family’s duty to defend; 2) the court should hear evidence beyond the four corners of the complaint; and, 3) the court should apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively.
Read the full story… Reprinted courtesy of Chad W. Johnson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com.
Anti-Concurrent Causation Clause Bars Coverage for Landslide and Water Leak
June 19, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The insured unsuccessfully attempted to get around the policy’s anti-concurrent causation clause by arguing a covered cause of loss was a contributing factor. See Stor/Gard, Inc. v. Strathmore Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63217 (D. Mass. May 4, 2012).
A building at the insured’s storage facility was damaged when heavy rain caused a mass of soil to slide down a slope, causing soil and a retaining wall to fall on the building. The accident caused a partial collapse of the building. The insurer hired two soil engineers, each of whom concluded that a landslide caused the accident. The reports also noted, however, that a leak from the property’s drainage system resulted in a very small percentage of water infiltrating the ground.
The insurer denied coverage based upon an exclusion for landslides.
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
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Repair of Part May Necessitate Replacement of Whole
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Judge Gleuda E. Edmonds, a magistrate judge in the United States District Court of Arizona issued a ruling in Guadiana v. State Farm on January 25, 2012. Judge Edmonds recommended a partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Ms. Guandiana’s home had water damage due to pluming leaks in September 2004. She was informed that polybutylene pluming in her house could not be repaired in parts “it must be completely replaced.” She had had the plumbing replaced. State Farm denied her claim, arguing that “the tear-out provision did not cover the cost of accessing and replacing those pipes that were not leaking.”
In September 2007, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss. The court rejected this motion, stating that “If Guadiana can establish as a matter of fact that the system that caused the covered loss included all the pipes in her house and it was necessary to replace all the pipes to repair that system, State Farm is obligated to pay the tear-out costs necessary to replace all the pipes, even those not leaking.”
In March 2009, State Farm filed for summary judgment, which the court granted. State Farm argued that “the tear-out provision only applied to ‘repair’ and not ‘replace’ the system that caused the covered leak.” As for the rest of the piping, State Farm argued that “the policy does not cover defective materials.”
In December 2011, Ms. Guadiana filed for summary judgment, asking the court to determine that “the policy ‘covers tear-out costs necessary to adequately repair the plumbing system, even if an adequate repair requires replacing all or part of the system.”
In her ruling, Judge Edmonds noted that Ms. Guadiana’s claim is that “the water damage is a covered loss and she is entitled to tear-out costs necessary to repair the pluming system that caused that covered loss.” She rejected State Farm’s claim that it was not obligated to replace presumably defective pipes. Further, she rejected State Farm’s argument that they were only responsible for the leaking portion, noting “Guadiana intends to prove at trial that this is an unusual case where repair of her plumbing system requires replacement of all the PB plumbing.”
Judge Edmonds concluded by directing the District Court to interpret the tear out issue as “the tear-out provision in State Farm’s policy requires State Farm to pay all tear-out costs necessary to repair the plumbing system (that caused the covered loss) even if repair of the system requires accessing more than the leaking portion of the system.”
Read the court’s decision…
Insurer Unable to Declare its Coverage Excess In Construction Defect Case
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment in the case of American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co. Several other insurance companies were party to this case. In the earlier case, the US District Court of Appeals for Arizona had granted a summary judgment to Ohio Casualty Group and National Fire & Marine Insurance Company. At the heart of it, is a dispute over construction defect coverage.
The general contractor for Astragal Luxury Villas, GFTDC, contracted with American Family to provide it with a commercial liability policy. Coverage was issued to various subcontractors by Ohio Casualty and National Fire. These policies included blanket additional insured endorsements that provided coverage to GFTDC. The subcontractor policies had provisions making their coverage excess over other policies available to GFTDC.
The need for insurance was triggered when the Astragal Condominium Unit Owners Association filed a construction defect claim in the Arizona Superior Court. CFTDC filed a third-party claim against several subcontractors. The case was settled with American Family paying the settlement, after which it filed seeking reimbursement from the subcontractor’s insurers. The court instead granted summary judgment in favor of Ohio Casualty and National Fire.
American Family appealed to the Ninth Circuit for a review of the summary judgment, arguing that the “other insurance” clauses were “mutually repugnant and unenforceable.” The Ninth Circuit cited a case from the Arizona Court of Appeals that held that “where two policies cover the same occurrence and both contain ‘other insurance’ clauses, the excess insurance provisions are mutually repugnant and must be disregarded. Each insurer is then liable for a pro rate share of the settlement or judgment.”
The court noted that unlike other “other insurance” cases, the American Family policy “states that it provides primary CGL coverage for CFTDC and is rendered excess only if there is ‘any other primary insurance’ available to GFTDC as an additional insured.” They note that “the American Family policy purports to convert from primary to excess coverage only if CFTDC has access to other primary insurance as an additional insured.”
In comparison, the court noted that “the ‘other insurance’ language in Ohio Casualty’s additional insured endorsement cannot reasonably be read to contradict, or otherwise be inconsistent with, the ‘other primary insurance’ provision in the American Family policy.” They find other reasons why National Fire’s coverage did not supersede American Family’s. In this case, the policy is “written explicitly to apply in excess.”
Finally, the Astragal settlement did not exhaust American Family’s coverage, so they were obligated to pay out the full amount. The court upheld the summary dismissal of American Family’s claims.
Read the court’s decision…
Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
Read the court’s decision…
Environment Decision May Expand Construction Defect Claims
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Could a California Supreme Court decision on environmental claims have an effect on construction defect cases? Jonathan B. Sokol, a lawyer at Greenberg Glusker argues just that in a post on his firm’s blog. He notes that the California Supreme Court has held that “the ‘all sums” method of allocation applies in California” and that “an insurer cannot limit its liability to just the amount of loss that occurred in its particular policy period.” While his focus is on environmental cases, he says that “the decision could also potentially expand the scope of coverage for construction defect claims and other claims involving continuous and progressive property damage and bodily injury.
Read the full story…
Arizona Court of Appeals Rules Issues Were Not Covered in Construction Defect Suit
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Peters v. Marque Homes. In this case, Walter Peters provided the land and funding for Marque Homes to build a luxury residence in Glendale, Arizona. By the terms of the “Joint Venture Agreement,” Peters provided the land and funding, while Marque would not charge Peters for overhead, profits, or supervision fees. The agreement specified that profits would be divided equally.
Two years later, Marque sued Peters claiming he had breached his obligations by refusing several offers for the home. Peters replied that Marque had “failed to complete the home so it is habitable to prospective purchasers.” Peters stated he had “retained an expert inspector who had identified numerous defects.” The court appointed a Special Commissioner to list the home for sale. Peters purchased the home with two stipulations ordered by the court. At this point, the earlier case was dismissed with prejudice.
Peters then sued Marque “asserting express and implied warranty claims arising out of alleged construction defects in the home.” Marque claimed that Peters’s claims were “precluded by the prior joint venture dispute.” The court granted Marque’s motion.
The appeals court reversed the lower court’s decision, determining that Peters’s claims were not precluded by the agreement. Although there had been a prior case between the two parties, warranty issues did not form a part of that case. “Peters never raised these allegations nor presented this evidence in support of any warranty claim.”
The court also noted that the “parties never agreed to preclude future warranty claims.” Marque and Peters “agreed in the stipulated sale order that ‘the sale of the property to a third party shall be “as is” with a 10-year structural warranty.’” The court noted that the agreement said nothing about one of the parties buying the house.
The appeals court left open a claim by Marque that there are no implied or express warranties available to Peters. They asked the Superior Court to address this.
Read the court’s decision…
