No Duty to Indemnify When Discovery Shows Faulty Workmanship Damages Insured’s Own Work
November 7, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Our post last week addressed the duty to defend when alleged faulty workmanship caused loss to property adjacent to where the insured was working. See Pamerin Rentals II, LLC v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Constr., Inc., 2012 Wis. App. LEXIS 698 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2012) [post here]. Today, we report on recent developments in the same case where the court determined, despite earlier finding the insurer owed a defense, it had no duty to indemnify. Pamperin Rentals II, LLC v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Constr., Inc., 2012 Wisc. App. LEXIS 793 (Wis. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2012).
Hendricks contracted to “prepare the site and supply and install concrete, tamped concrete, and colored concrete” at several service stations. The owner sued Hendricks, alleging the concrete “was defective and/or the work performed was not done in a workman-like manner and resulted in damages, and will require replacement.”
Pekin Insurance Company agreed to defend Hendricks subject to a reservation of rights.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Windows and Lawsuits Fly at W Hotel
July 5, 2011 — CDJ Staff
An Austin, Texas lawyer has filed a lawsuit against Starwood Hotels and Resorts, the operator of the W Hotel Austin, after two people were struck by glass which fell from the hotel’s balconies. YNN in Austin reports that the hotel has been closed indefinitely as construction workers removed panels. An additional three panels fell before work started. Randy Howry, the lawyer representing the injured parties, notes that in May glass falling from the W Hotel in Atlanta killed one woman and injured another. “Seventeen days pass and we put them on notice, our clients have put them on notice, yet nothing has been done an only after the glass fell yesterday did they do something about it,” YNN quotes Howry.
The hotel released a statement that they will be replacing all of the balcony glass to ensure safety for their guests and the general public. They relocated all hotel guests and coordinated with Austin officials to close adjacent sidewalks and roads. The statement identifies the firms involved with the design and construction of the balconies.
Read the full story …
Insurance Firm Defends against $22 Million Claim
June 15, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Houston law firm of Eggleston & Briscoe successfully defended their client, Colony Insurance Company, which was being sued for $22 million over roof hail damage. The Summer Hill Village Community Association did not convince a jury that the insurance company had violated state law or breached its contract when it denied coverage for the roofs. The homeowners association contended that the roof damage was due to a hail storm in 2007. The jury agreed with experts who contended the damage was already present at that time.
Mr. Eggleston noted that “when your client is sued for a claim of $22 million, it is very satisfying to hear a jury agree that they in fact acted honorably and owed nothing.”
Read the full story…
California Supreme Court to Examine Arbitration Provisions in Several Upcoming Cases
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Glen C. Hansen, writing on Abbott & Kinderman’s Land Use Law Blog looks at several cases pending before the California Supreme Court which ask if a developer can insist on arbitration of construction defect claims, based on provision in the CC&Rs. Currently, there is a split of opinions in the California appeals courts on the issue.
Four of the cases are in California’s Fourth Appellate District. In the earliest case, Villa Milano Homeowners Association v. Il Davorge, from 2000, the court concluded that the arbitration clause was sufficient to require that construction defect claims undergo arbitration. However, the Fourth Appellate District Court concluded in three later cases that the arbitration clauses did not allow the developer to compel arbitration. In two cases, argued in 2008 and 2010, the court concluded that to do otherwise would deprive the homeowners of their right to a jury trial. In the most recent case, Villa Vicenza Homeowners Association v. Nobel Court Development, the court decided that the CC&Rs did not create contractual rights for the developer.
The Second Appellate District Court came to a similar decision in Promenade at Playa Vista Homeowners Association v. Western Pacific Housing, Inc. In their decision, the court noted that CC&Rs could be enforced by homeowners and homeowners associations, but not developers.
Read the full story…
Insurer Has Duty to Defend in Water Intrusion Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld a summary judgment against an insurance company in a construction defect suit. Lagestee-Mulder, Incorporated (LMI) was hired by Crown Centre to construct a multi-story office building in Franfort, Illinois. LMI hired Frontrunner Glass & Metal to supply and install windows and doors. Frontrunner purchased an insurance policy from Consolidated which named LMI as an additional insured. The project experienced water intrusion and other construction defects and Crown sued LMI. Consolidated denied coverage. LMI sued Consolidated and the US District Court granted a summary judgment against Consolidated.
The appeals court reviewed the grounds for summary judgment and determined that under Illinois law, Consolidated had a duty to defend. The court cited an earlier opinion that “if the underlying compliant alleges facts within or potentially within policy coverage, an insurer is obligated to defend its insured even if the allegations are groundless, false, or fraudulent.”
Read the court’s decision…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Ensuing Losses From Faulty Workmanship Must be Covered
May 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Coverage for damages resulting from faulty workmanship in the construction of an apartment complex was at issue in The Bartram, LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 44535 (N.D. Fla. March 30, 2012).
The owner of the apartments, Bartram, had primary coverage and three layers of excess coverage. Each contract excluded loss from faulty workmanship. The policies provided, however, "if loss or damage by a Covered Cause of Loss results, we will pay for that resulting loss or damage."
Bartram contended water intrusion occurred because of faulty workmanship, which caused damage to the buildings’ exterior and interior finishes, wood sheathing, framing, balcony systems, drywall ceilings and stucco walls. This damage was separate from the work needed to simply fix the faulty workmanship. Therefore, Bartram argued, the ensuing losses that resulted from the water intrusion was covered.
The insurer argued the ensuing loss exception was not applicable if the ensuing loss was directly related to the original excluded loss.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
No Coverage Under Ensuing Loss Provision
September 9, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Construction Law Hawaii
The cost of removing and replacing cracked flanges to prevent future leakage was not covered as an ensuing loss under a builder’s risk policy in RK Mechanical, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Casualty Co. of Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83958 (D. Colo. Aug. 1, 2011).
The insured, RK Mechanical Inc., was a subcontractor hired to install plumbing for a residential construction project. RK was an additional insured on the general contractor’s policy with Travelers. RK installed approximately 170 CPVC flanges on the project. Subsequently, two of the flanges cracked, allowing water to overflow and causing water damage to the project. Travelers was notified of the flange failure and resulting water damage.
RK subsequently removed and replaced the two cracked flanges and began water remediation. Travelers paid for the cost of the water damage due to the cracked flanges.
RK then examined all of the flanges installed in the project and discovered many were cracked and/or showed signs of potential failure. RK removed and replaced the cracked flanges. RK tendered a claim and demand for indemnity to Travelers for these repair costs. Travelers denied the claim. RK then sued for breach of contract and declaratory relief. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Environment Decision May Expand Construction Defect Claims
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Could a California Supreme Court decision on environmental claims have an effect on construction defect cases? Jonathan B. Sokol, a lawyer at Greenberg Glusker argues just that in a post on his firm’s blog. He notes that the California Supreme Court has held that “the ‘all sums” method of allocation applies in California” and that “an insurer cannot limit its liability to just the amount of loss that occurred in its particular policy period.” While his focus is on environmental cases, he says that “the decision could also potentially expand the scope of coverage for construction defect claims and other claims involving continuous and progressive property damage and bodily injury.
Read the full story…
Consumer Protection Act Whacks Seattle Roofing Contractor
July 21, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council
It’s been over 1 year since we last visited the CertainTeed Corp. v. Seattle Roof Brokers lawsuit. After my original post, the contractor, James Garcia, appeared at Builders Counsel in a comment to defend himself. It appears that 1 year later, the court decided to side with CertainTeed and award them significant attorneys’ fees. Ready for the whole story? Its a pricey one.
Back in July 2010, good friend Mike Atkins (Seattle Trademark Attorney) authored a post about a Seattle roofing contractor who had been sued for false advertising on his website. The lawsuit was raised by CertainTeed, a roofing material producer, whose products were the target of a Seattle contractor’s ire. Seattle Roof Brokers, owned by James Garcia, published content on its website, remarking that CertainTeed products have a history of “premature failure” and that they “will fail?.resale inspection after 15-20 years.”
CertainTeed filed its action to obtain an injunction and damages under the Consumer Protection Act.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Time to Repair Nevada’s Construction Defect Laws?
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Builders Magazine writes that during the previous session of the Nevada legislature, reforms sought by the building industry were stopped by the Speaker of the Nevada Assembly. The new session brings a new speaker and new hope for construction defect reform in Nevada.
Pat Hickey, a member of the Assembly and a small business owner told The Builders Magazine that “we need to apply pressure on the legislators to fix the law.” He also recommended that people “go to Governor Sandoval and ask for his help.” Builders seeks legislation that will include right to repair and it should “define construction defect in such a way that it allows for a fair process.”
Read the full story…
Florida Appeals Court Rules in Favor of Homeowners Unaware of Construction Defects and Lack of Permits
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Florida Court of Appeals has ruled that a homeowner is not liable for defects in unpermitted alterations, reversing a lower court’s decision in Jensen v. Bailey. The Jensens sold their house to the Baileys. During the sale, the Jensens filled out a property disclosure statement, checking “no” to a question about “any improvement or additions to the property, whether by your or by others that have been constructed in violation of building codes or without necessary permits.”
After moving in, the Baileys discovered several problems with the home. One involved a defective sewer connection leading to repeated backups. The Baileys also found problems with remodeling the Jensens had done in the kitchen, master bath, and bedroom. The remodeling work was not done with required permits nor was it up to code.
The court noted that an earlier case, Johnson v. Davis, established four criteria: “the seller of a home must have knowledge of a defect in the property; the defect must materially affect the value of the property; the defect must not be readily observable and must be unknown to the buyer; and the buyer must establish that the seller failed to disclose the defect to the buyer.” The court found that the first of these criteria was crucial to determining the case.
In the Johnson ruling, the then Chief Justice dissented, fearing that the courts “would ultimately construe Johnson’s requirement of actual knowledge to permit a finding of liability based on constructive knowledge,” quoting Justice Boyd, “a rule of constructive knowledge will develop based on the reasoning that if the seller did not know of the defect, he should have known about it before attempting to sell the property.” The Appeals Court concluded that the lower court hit this point in ruling on Jensen v. Bailey.
Citing other Florida cases, the court noted that the Johnson rule does require “proof of the seller’s actual knowledge of the defect.” The court cited a case in which it was concluded that the seller “should have known” that there was circumstantial evidence was that the seller did know about the defects, as the seller had been involved in the construction of the home.
In the case of the Jensens, the lower court concluded that they did not know that the work was defective, nor did they know that they were obligated to obtain permits for it. The Appeals Court found this one fact sufficient to reverse the decision and remand the case to the lower court for a final judgment in favor of the Jensens.
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Differing Rulings On Construction Defect Claims Leave Unanswered Questions For Builders, and Construction Practice Groups. Impact to CGL Carriers, General Contractors, Builders Remains Unclear
March 7, 2011 — March 7, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
In the past year a number of state and federal courts have rendered a number of conflicting decisions that promise to alter or perhaps shift entirely the paradigm, of how builders manage risk.
According to a report today by Dave Lenckus in Property Casualty 360 “Nine state and federal courts and one state legislature over the past year have addressed whether a construction defect a defective product or faulty workmanship is fortuitous and therefore an occurrence under the commercial general liability insurance policy. Four jurisdictions determined it is; three said no; two ruled that a construction defect that causes consequential damage to property other than the work product is an occurrence; and one federal court contributed its conflicting case law that has developed in Oregon since its high court ruled in 2000 that a construction defect is not an occurrence”.
The article strongly suggests that in the absence of a clear consensus over what the recent rulings mean for builders and contractors coverage disputes will intensify and continue to proliferate.
Doing this on a state-by-state basis has caused a lot of confusion among buyers and sellers, said Jeffrey A. Segall, a Tampa-based senior vice president and the Florida Construction Practice leader at Willis of Florida, a unit of Willis Group Holdings.
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Fifth Circuit Reverses Insurers’ Summary Judgment Award Based on "Your Work" Exclusion
November 18, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Application of the facts to the "your work" exclusion was the key to resolving coverage issued in Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech L.L.C., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 21076 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011).
Ergon Refining, Inc. hired Cat Tech L.L.C. to service a hydrotreating reactor. In January 2005, Cat Tech replaced certain parts in the reactor. After Cat Tech finished the job and left, Ergon noticed a high pressure drop in the reactor, forcing it to be shut down. Cat Tech returned in February 2005, removed, repaired and replaced the damaged parts, and loaded new parts. After completion, a second large pressure drop occurred during the reactor’s start-up process. The reactor was shut down until October 2005, when Ergon hired a different contractor to perform the repair work. Additional damage to the reactor was found.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Ceiling Collapse Attributed to Construction Defect
May 19, 2011 — May 16, 2011 - CDJ Staff
WSMV, Nashville reports that the ceiling collapse in a Franklin, Tennessee Kohl’s was attributed to a construction defect by fire officials. The officials noted that the ceiling was renovated at the time. No injuries were reported.
The report notes that “inspectors were supposed to look at the renovations next week, but fire officials said that will have to be delayed until another time.”
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Judge Rejects Extrapolation, Harmon Tower to Remain Standing
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
CityCenter has filed an emergency motion asking the Nevada Supreme Court to intervene in Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez’ order that the building’s defects cannot be extrapolated from those tested. CityCenter’s structural engineering expert “evaluated 397 of the Harmon’s critical structural elements and found all but one defective,” according to the article on Vegas.Inc. Judge Gonzalez would not permit this to be extrapolated to the untested 1,072, as the locations tested were not random.
Judge Gonzalez also ruled that if CityCenter does additional testing, they may not appeal her order that ruled the extrapolation inadmissible. CityCenter argued to the Nevada Supreme Court that “the notion that CityCenter should be forced to incur additional millions of dollars in testing costs and sanctions ?Äì on the condition that it waive its right to appeal this ruling ?Äì just to be permitted to present its own damages evidence, shocks the conscience.”
Gonzalez gave the okay to CityCenter to demolish the building, but its demolition would make any further testing impossible. Under Gonzalez’ ruling, the untested structural elements cannot b assumed to be defective.
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Arizona Supreme Court Confirms Eight-Year Limit on Construction Defect Lawsuits
July 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Acting on the case of Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled that Arizona’s eight-year statute of repose applies. The case was referred to the court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had asked for a clarification of Arizona law. The case focused on three questions:
1. Does the filing of a motion for class certification in an Arizona court toll the statute of limitations for individuals, who are included within the class, to file individual causes of action involving the same defendants and the same subject matter?2. If so, does this class-action tolling doctrine apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-552?3. If the doctrine applies to statutes of repose, and specifically § 12-552, may a court weigh the equities of the case in determining whether, and to what extent, an action is tolled?
The litigation at hand has a lengthy history, starting with a case referred to as “Hoffman” in 2003. The Albano plaintiffs were not able to join in Hoffman, and they filed their own lawsuit in 2006. An additional lawsuit was filed by the Albano plaintiffs in 2007. The courts decided that the Albano plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the statute of repose was the appropriate standard for this case. They noted that “the eight-year statute of repose period began to run on November 6, 1997, the date of the Town of Gilbert’s final inspection. Albano II was filed on November 5, 2007.”
The court found that the plaintiffs had waited too long for start their suit. As a result, they found it unnecessary to answer the first or third questions. Justice A. John Pelander of the Arizona Supreme Court wrote the opinion, dated June 30, 2011.
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Another Guilty Plea In Nevada Construction Defect Fraud Case
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The eleventh defendant has entered a guilty plea in the ongoing federal investigation of construction defect fraud in the Las Vegas area. Mahin Quintero plead guilty to producing a false authentication feature, a misdemeanor. Ms. Quintero’s part in the scheme was to falsely authenticate signatures on loan documents for straw buyers. Ms. Quintero stated in court that she had been ordered to destroy her notary book three years ago. According to her plea bargain, the straw buyers did not appear in front of her when she notarized their signatures. As part of the scheme, the straw buyers would take control of homeowners associates, sending construction defect complaints and repairs to favored firms.
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