When Does a Claim Against an Insurance Carrier for Failing to Defend Accrue?
November 7, 2012 — David McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
The following is an update on our December 20, 2010 article regarding United States Fire Insurance Company v. Pinkard Construction Company, Civil Action No. 09-CV-01854-MSK-MJW, and its underlying dispute, Legacy Apartments v. Pinkard Construction Company, Case No. 2003 CV 703, Boulder County Dist. Ct. That article can be found here.
The present action, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co., et al. v. The North River Insurance Co., et al., Civil Action No. 10-CV-02936-MSK-CBS, encompasses the coverage battle that ensued between Pinkard’s insurers, Travelers Indemnity Company of America (“Travelers”) and United States Fire Insurance Company (“USFI”), following the settlement of Legacy’s construction defect claims against Pinkard. A short history of the underlying facts is as follows:
In 1995, Pinkard constructed the Legacy Apartments housing complex in Longmont, Colorado. Following construction, Legacy notified Pinkard of water leaks associated with various elements of construction. Legacy ultimately filed suit against Pinkard in 2003, and would go on to clarify and amend its defect claims in 2004, 2006, and again in 2008. Following Pinkard’s notification of Legacy’s claims, USFI provided a defense to Pinkard, but Travelers refused to do so, on the purported basis that Legacy’s allegations did not implicate property damage under the terms of Travelers’ policy.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Appeals Court Upholds Decision by Referee in Trial Court for Antagan v Shea Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the case Antangan v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership (Cal. App., 2012), Plaintiffs appealed “an order vacating a judgment and entering a modified judgment in their construction defect action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership,” while the Defendant, Shea Homes Limited Partnership (Shea Homes) appealed “an order of the judicial referee denying its motion to strike and tax costs.”
On the Antagon issue, the appeals court concluded that “the trial court did not err by vacating and modifying its judgment so that the cost of referee’s fees would be equally divided by the parties and consistent with a prior stipulation they filed in court.”
On the Shea Homes issue, the appeals court concluded: “1) the judicial referee did not err by ruling that plaintiffs’ offers to compromise (§ 998) were validly served on Shea Homes’ counsel, 2) the offers substantially complied with statutory requirements, 3) the offers were not required to be apportioned, and 4) the referee’s award of $5,000 as costs for a person assisting plaintiffs’ counsel was not an abuse of discretion.” The appeals court affirmed the judgment.
Here is a brief history of the trial case: “Plaintiffs Chito Antangan, Jimmy Alcova and other homeowners brought an action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership for damages alleging that the properties they purchased from these ‘developer defendants’ were defective. Plaintiffs claimed numerous construction defects required them ‘to incur expenses’ for ‘restoration and repairs’ and the value of their homes had been diminished.”
In response, Shea Homes filed a motion for an order to appoint a judicial referee. The motion was granted and it was ruled that “a referee would ‘try all issues’ and ‘report a statement of decision to this court.’”
On May 10, 2010 the judicial referee (Thompson) “awarded plaintiffs damages and various costs, and ruled that ‘Shea Homes shall bear all of the Referee’s fees.’” The latter ruling would become a matter for contention later on.
In July of 2010, the plaintiffs “sought, among other things, $54,409.90 for expert fees, and $14,812.50 for the services of Melissa Fox for ‘exhibit preparation & trial presentation.’ Shea Homes filed a motion to strike and/or tax costs claiming: 1) Fox was a paralegal, 2) plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees, and 3) the fees for Fox’s services were an indirect and improper method to obtain attorney’s fees. The referee disagreed and awarded $5,000 for Fox’s services. The referee also ruled that plaintiffs had properly served valid offers to compromise (§ 998) on Shea Homes’ counsel in 2009. He said those offers to defendants in the case at that time did not have to be apportioned.”
“Antangan contends the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment, which ordered Shea Homes to pay all the referee’s fees. We disagree.”
Antagon contended that the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment regarding Shea Homes paying the referee’s fees. The appeals court disagreed: “A trial court has inherent authority to vacate or correct a judgment that is void on its face, incorrect, or entered by mistake. (§ 473; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998),67 Cal.App.4th 1228; Olivera
Read the court’s decision…
OSHA Extends Delay of Residential Construction Fall Protection Requirements
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
OSHA has announced a fourth delay in full implementation of requiring fall protection in residential construction. The requirements, which would obligate those in residential construction to use the same degree of fall protection as is used in commercial construction, were originally set to go into effect in September 2011. As part of the phasing in of the new requirements, penalties were reduced, originally until March 2012. This has now been extended until December 15, 2012.
Read the full story…
MGM Seeks to Demolish Harmon Towers
September 1, 2011 — CJD Staff
Citing public safety concerns and the cost of repair, MGM Resorts International is seeking to demolish the unfinished hotel tower. The company has a few hurdles to go through before they start laying the charges to implode the structure. Any plans would have to be approved by not only Clark County officials, but also the district court has an order blocking any activity during litigation between MGM and the general contractor on the project, Perini Building Company.
Architectural Record reports that MGM states it would take “approximately 18 months to conduct test and come up with an approved, permitted design to fix the Harmon.” MGM feels that repairs would then take another two to three years. Perini contends that they could “provide stamped drawings detailing all necessary repairs within three months.” They attribute MGM’s desire to demolish the building as “buyer’s remorse.”
Read the full story…
Another Colorado District Court Refuses to Apply HB 10-1394 Retroactively
October 28, 2011 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
In Martinez v. Mike Wells Construction Company, 09CV227, Teller County District Court Judge Edward S. Colt refused to apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively to provide coverage for the underlying construction defect allegations. According to the recitation of facts in Judge Colt’s March 2011 order, Martinez contracted with Mike Wells Construction to serve as the general contractor for the construction of a home. At that time, Mike Wells Construction was insured through ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, RRG. Disputes arose between Martinez and Mike Wells Construction, resulting in Martinez ordering it off of the project in mid-November 2007 and terminating its right to work there by letter dated November 28, 2007.
Mike Wells, the owner of the corporation, subsequently died. Martinez sued Mike Wells Construction in July 2009 for breach of contract and various claims relating to alleged defecting workmanship. Martinez provided notice of the suit to the special administrator of the probate estate. No answer having been filed, the court entered a default judgment against Mike Wells Construction and Martinez sought to garnish Mike Wells Construction’s ProBuilders insurance policy.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
School Sues over Botched Pool
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Daily American reports that the Somerset Area School District has alleged that the contractor who repaired and renovated the district’s swimming pool “botched” the job. Now the school has filed a civil case in the Somerset County Court of Common Pleas. The contractor, Wilson Construction Co. would prefer the matter to be settled in binding arbitration.
The school district alleges that the surface installed by Wilson Construction cracked and bubbled due to improper installation. The manufacturer of the waterproofing system, Dryvit Systems, tested the installation and concluded it was an installation failure instead of a product defect. Dryvit told the district that the exterior walls would have be removed.
The school district paid Wilson Construction $591,081 for their work. In their lawsuit, they are seeking $594,596 to cover the cost of draining the pool and repairing it.
Read the full story…
Construction Defect Litigation at San Diego’s Alicante Condominiums?
March 25, 2011 — Alicante HOA Website
According to recent posts in the Alicante HOA website, construction experts and legal counsel have been retained. The HOA board has been informed that testing of a variety of the building’s components are underway or will begin in the near future.
Read More...
Changes to Arkansas Construction and Home Repair Laws
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A new law, set to take effect in 2012, lowers the ceiling on when work must be done by a licensed contractor. Through the end of the year, projects costing $20,000 or more had to be done by an Arkansas licensed contractor. As of January 1, 2012, that new limit will be $2,000.
This will apply to all single-family residences and according to Lovely County Citizen, covers “construction, alteration, renovation, repair, modification, improvement, removal, demotion, or addition to a pre-existing structure.” Residential building contractors will be required to have workers compensation insurance, as will home improvement contactors if they take jobs worth more than $20,000.
Morris Dillow, a building inspector in Holiday Island, said, “It will get these scammers out of here who are ripping people off.” He cited the example of a contractor who after getting paid for roof repairs and painting, left the job unfinished.
Read the full story…
Failure to Meet Code Case Remanded to Lower Court for Attorney Fees
May 24, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Judge Patricia J. Cottrell, ruling on the case Roger Wilkes, et al. v. Shaw Enterprises, LLC, in the Tennessee Court of Appeals, upheld the trial court’s conclusion that “the builder constructed the house in accordance with good building practices even though it was not in strict conformance with the building code.” However, Judge Cottrell directed the lower court to “award to Appellants reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in their first appeal, as determined by the trial court.”
Judge Cottrell cited in her opinion the contract which specified that the house would be constructed “in accordance with good building practices.” However, after the Wilkes discovered water leakage, the inspections revealed that “that Shaw had not installed through-wall flashing and weep holes when the house was built.” The trial court concluded that:
“Separate and apart from the flashing and weep holes, the trial court concluded the Wilkeses were entitled to recover damages for the other defects they proved based on the cost of repair estimates introduced during the first and second trials, which the court adjusted for credibility reasons. Thus, the trial court recalculated the amount the Wilkeses were entitled to recover and concluded they were entitled to $17,721 for the value of repairs for defects in violation of good business practices, and an additional 15%, or $2,658.15, for management, overhead, and profit of a licensed contractor. This resulted in a judgment in the amount of $20,370.15. The trial court awarded the Wilkeses attorneys” fees through the Page 9 first trial in the amount of $5,094.78 and discretionary costs in the amount of $1,500. The total judgment following the second trial totaled $26,973.93.”
In this second appeal, Judge Cottrell concluded, that “the trial court thus did not have the authority to decide the Wilkeses were not entitled to their attorneys” fees and costs incurred in the first appeal.”
Read the court’s decision
Unit Owners Have No Standing to Sue under Condominium Association’s Policy
February 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
If a condominium owner suffers damage caused by a leak from another unit, may it sue the insurer for the Association of Apartment Owner (AOAO) for coverage? The federal district court for Hawaii said "no" in a decision by Judge Mollway. See Peters v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148734 (D. Haw. December 27, 2011).
Two cases were consolidated. In each case, Plaintiffs owned condominium units at the Watercrest Resort on Molokai. Water leaking from another unit damaged Plaintiffs’ units.
Watercrest Resort was insured by Lexington pursuant to a policy maintained by the AOAO. Plaintiffs filed claims with Lexington. Lexington hired an adjustor.
Unhappy with the adjustment of their claims, Plaintiffs sued Lexington and the adjustor.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Washington Court Limits Lien Rights of Construction Managers
August 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
A newly filed, yet unpublished, court opinion opines that a construction manager cannot file a construction lien in Washington state. So, how far reaching is this opinion?
In the case of Blue Diamond Group Inc. v. KB Seattle 1, Inc., et al, a New York construction manager filed a lien against the Westfield Southcenter Mall in Tukwila, Washington. The lien was filed after the owner of a coffee stand failed to pay Blue Diamond for consulting services used in the construction of a kiosk.
Blue Diamond served as the owner’s agent, assisting with managing subcontractors, vendors and other tasks. The manager’s tasks also included paying invoices, managing deliveries, setting schedules and other site managerial tasks. Blue Diamond was not registered as a contractor under Washington’s RCW 18.27.
Read the full story…
Read the court’s decision…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Construction Workers Unearth Bones
June 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
While digging for a new steam line at Eastern Michigan University, workers unearthed some old bones. Experts have yet to determine if the bones are human or animal, however Walter Kraft, the EMU vice president of communications, noted that a handle also unearthed might have come from a casket. Cindy Heflin, reporting in AnnArbor.com notes that until 1900 a Catholic cemetery was located in the area. Although the bodies were relocated, these may have been left behind.
Read the full story…
Colorado Court of Appeals Finds Damages to Non-Defective Property Arising From Defective Construction Covered Under Commercial General Liability Policy
December 20, 2012 — Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
The recently decided case of Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company (Colo. Ct. App. 10CA2638, October 25, 2012), confirms that absent specific exclusions in the policy, a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy covers damages to non-defective property arising from a builder’s own defective workmanship.
Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. (“Colorado Pool”) was hired as a subcontractor to install a swimming pool at Founders Village Pool and Community Center (“Founders Village”) in Castle Rock, Colorado. After the concrete shell of the pool was placed, some of the rebar frame was found to be too close to the surface. Founders Village demanded that Colorado Pool remove and replace the pool, and Colorado Pool contacted its insurance carrier, Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”), with which Colorado Pool held a CGL policy. After inspecting the pool, Scottsdale’s claims adjuster stated that the insurance policy would cover losses associated with removing and replacing the pool.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com
Increased Expenditure on Injuries for New York City School Construction
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
You can buy a lot of bandages for $270 million, but even though the expenses are related to the New York City schools, the money is being budgeted by the School Construction Agency as what they expect to pay for injuries and liability expenses related to school construction. The New York Post notes that this is nearly ten times what the city spent in 2000 on workers' compensation and liability claims. Michael Elmdendorf of the General Contractors Association likened injury compensation to a broken slot machine, telling the Post, "when you pull that lever, you win." A spokesperson from the Department of Education, Margie Feinberg, attributed the rise to higher medical care costs.
Read the full story…
Ohio “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.”
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In JTO, Inc. v. State Automobile Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2010-L-062 (Ohio Ct. App. March 25, 2011), general contractor JTO was sued by hotel project owner Marriott for breach of contract and warranties seeking damages for the repair of construction defects resulting in moisture penetration property damage to interior components. JTO filed a third party complaint against subcontractor Farizel and also tendered its defense as an additional insured under Farizel’s State Auto CGL policy.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Census Bureau, HUD Show Declines in Residential Construction
May 17, 2011 – CDJ Staff
The U.S. Census Bureau and the Department of Housing and Urban Development released their summary of residential construction for April 2011 on May 17.
Building permits for privately owned housing units were down 4% from last month and 12% from last year. Similarly, privately-owned housing starts were down 10% from March and 23% below the previous year.
For further details, read the Census Bureau/HUD report
Parking Garage Collapse May Be Due to Construction Defect
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A parking garage under construction at the Doral campus of Miami Dade College collapsed on October 9. Experts state that the collapse may have been due to errors in the construction process, either in the fabrication of the pre-cast components or in their assembly. The Bradenton Herald quotes Mark Santos, a structural engineer, who “would look at erection procedures ?Äì that’s probably the one question to ask first.”
During the failure, floors separated from the south wall of the structure. The contractor responsible for the garage, Ajax Building Corp, said there was “no indication of any potential cause.”
Read the full story…
New Construction Laws, New Forms in California
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
New construction laws came into effect in California on July 1. Writing for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library, Glenn Mau, J. Michael McGuire, and John Tonsing, all of Archer Norris, discuss these changes. They note that the most important part of the changes to California construction law is that “all mechanics liens, stop notices and bond claims recorded after July 1, 2012 must use the new standardized forms and follow the new definitions, notice prerequisites and statutory release form language.”
Read the full story…