New Web Site Tracks Settled Construction Defect Claims
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Peter Lissner, a former Nevada homebuilder, has created a new site to help track homes that have been involved in construction defect litigation. His site, housefaxreview.com, collections documentation about homes where claims of construction defects have been made. He told The Builders Magazine concerns about “the number of homes that have been served notices, received compensation, yet the homes weren’t repaired.” On the site, the creator is identified as “a family owned builder.” According to the site, “the builder had no claims until the neighborhood reached the statutory claims limit 10 years.”
Lissner also claims that in many cases, after settling construction defect lawsuits, the homeowners sell to subsequent buyers without disclosing the lawsuit or their failure to repair. “Who is going to let the new homeowner know about the issue?” he asks.
Documents on the site are priced according to their relevance. Lissner notes that those who provide documents to the site will receive free access.
Read the full story…
Condo Buyers Seek to Void Sale over Construction Defect Lawsuit
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A Michigan couple seeks to void their purchase of a condo in Texas after discovering that the complex was undergoing a construction defect lawsuit. ABQ Journal reports that Charles M. Lea and Olga Y. Ziabrikova said that they would not have purchased the condo if they had known the association was already alleging construction defects. The condo association discovered the defects “by at least late 2010,” according to the suit. The couple bought their condo in August 2011 and heard of the defects only in March 2012.
The couple notes that no one involved with the sale informed them of the construction defect complaints. The community association’s lawsuit states that problems have lead to $2.5 million in damages. The developer, Vegas Verde Condo Partners, have filed a general denial of the construction problems.
Read the full story…
Liability policy covers negligent construction: GA high court
October 31, 2010 — Original article by
Michael Bradford in Business Insurance
ATLANTA—Negligent construction that results in damage to surrounding property constitutes an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy, the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled.
In a 6-1 opinion Monday in
American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Hathaway Development Co. Inc., the Georgia high court upheld a lower court ruling that the general contractor’s claim for damage caused by a subcontractor’s faulty plumbing work was covered.
The ruling on construction defects is the latest in number of such cases across the United States
Read Full Story...
Reprinted courtesy of Michael Bradford of Business Insurance.
Construction on the Rise in Washington Town
June 16, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Kitsap Sun reports that Gig Harbor, a town in the area near Tacoma, Washington, has had a 60% increase in building permit applications as compared to 2010. May, 2011 had as many permits issued for single-family residences in Gig Harbor as were issued for all of 2010. Additionally, a Safeway shopping center on Point Fosdick is described by Dick Bower, Gig Harbor Building and Fire Safety Director, as “a huge project and it’s going to bring in quite a bit of revenue.” He called the increase in building “economic recovery at the grassroots level.”
Bower said that the building officials in other towns have also seen upswings in construction. He anticipates more activity in the future.
Read the full story…
Underpowered AC Not a Construction Defect
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
After buying a home in Louisiana, Mike Gines determined that the home’s air conditioning unit was insufficient to maintain an appropriate temperature. He contacted the home builder, D.R. Horton, Inc., which worked with the air conditioning installer, Reliant Heating & Air Conditioning, in order to repair the system. When the problems persisted, Gines filed a class action petition against Horton and Reliant in state court. Horton and Reliant moved the case to the federal courts, whereupon Gines asserted the defendants were in violation of the Louisiana New Home Warranty Act (NHWA). Horton stated that the claim under the NHWA was invalid, because Gines had not alleged actual physical damage to his home.
The district court granted Horton’s motion to dismiss. Gines sought a reversal from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and sought to have two questions of state law addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The district court ruled that the NHWA was the “sole remedy under Louisiana law for a purchaser of a new home with construction defects. Gines argued that court erred in this, but also conceded that this was the conclusion of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Further, Gines argued that a provision in the NHWA that allows the inclusion of construction defects that do not cause damage was satisfied by paragraph 6 of the contract. The court noted that Gines did not attach a copy of the contract to either the original or amended complaint, and so the court does not need to address these claims. However, the court cautioned that if a copy had been included, they still would have rejected the claim, as “the cited language does not indicate a waiver of the physical damage requirement.” They also note that “paragraph 13 of the contract shows that Gines was aware to the absence of any such waiver in the contract.”
The court concludes that “the moral of this story is that in order to avoid the harsh result that has obtained here, the buyer of a newly constructed home in Louisiana should seek to obtain in the contract of sale an express waiver of the actual damage requirement of the NHWA.” The appeals court affirmed the decision of the circuit court and denied the application to certify questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Read the court’s decision…
Foundation Arbitration Doesn’t Preclude Suing Over Cracks
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Louisiana Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of a lower court, allowing a construction defect case to go through. In Greer v. Town Construction Company, the Greers hired Town Construction to build a home in Baton Rouge. The business relationship went sour, with disputes over “costs, change orders, workmanship, and timeliness issues.”
Town Construction filed an arbitration claim for the unpaid contract balance. In the counterclaim, the Greers made claims of mold and mildew problems, and wall cracks that they attributed to a “structural defect in the foundation.” In arbitration, Town Construction was awarded the full contract balance plus extra costs and interest, while the Greers were awarded for their structural claims.
Three years later, the Greers found additional cracks and filed a suit against Town Construction. Town Construction argued that the Greer’s lawsuit should be dismissed, as the claims had already been through the arbitration process. The district court agreed with Town Construction and dismissed the suit.
The appeals court noted that the Greers would have no ground for a suit if the arbitration was a “valid and final judgment,” and went on to note that there was no evidence in the trial record that the arbitration met this qualification. The court noted that although it was clear that both parties had agreed to the decisions of the arbiter, under Louisiana law, arbitration is not final until it has been “rendered by a court with jurisdiction over subject mater and over parties.”
The court remanded the case to the lower court, noting that “the district court is obligated to first determine whether a valid arbitration award is in existence and had been confirmed before considering the merits of the exception. The court noted that their decision “should not be read to express any opinion as to the merits of the claims or as to the propriety of damages sought in the Greer’s lawsuit.”
Read the court’s decision…
Ohio subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion
August 11, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Mosser Construction, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 09-4449 (6th Cir. July 14, 2011)(unpublished), claimant project owner Port Clinton contracted with insured general contractor Mosser for the construction of a building. Following completion, Port Clinton sued Mosser for breach of contract seeking damages because of physical injury to the project occurring after completion resulting from defective backfill material that settled improperly.
Mosser’s CGL insurer Travelers denied a defense and Mosser filed suit against Travelers seeking a declaratory judgment. Mosser and Travelers filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the supplier of the backfill material?Gerken?qualified as a subcontractor for purposes of the subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion—exclusion l.—for property damage to or arising out of Mosser’s completed work.  Mosser had purchased the backfill material from Gerken pursuant to a purchase order specifying that Gerken was to supply Mosser with an industry standard grade of backfill for use in the Port Clinton project.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Harmon Towers Duty to Defend Question Must Wait, Says Court
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Harmon Towers project in Las Vegas was eventually halted short of the planned forty-seven stories after “it was determined that there was substantial defective construction, including defective installation of reinforcing steel throughout the Harmon.” The American Home Insurance Company and Lexington Insurance Company put forth a claim that they had no duty to defend Perini Construction, the builder of the defective Harmon Towers. Further, American Home seeks to recover the monies American reimbursed Perini. The United States District Court of Nevada ruled in the case of American Home Assurance Co. v. Perini Building on February 3, 2012.
The two insurance companies covered Perini and its subcontractors, Century Steel, Pacific Coast Steel, and Ceco Concrete Construction. Century Steel was the initial subcontractor for the reinforcing steel; they were later acquired by Pacific Coast Steel. In this current case, Perini Construction is the sole defendant.
Perini sought a dismissal of these claims, arguing that without the subcontractors joined to the case, “the Court cannot afford complete relief among existing parties.” The court rejected this claim, noting that the court can determine the duties of the insurance companies to Perini, which the court described as “separate and distinct from those of the subcontractors.” The subcontractors “have not claimed an interest in the subject matter of the action.” The court concluded that it could determine whether Perini was entitled or not to coverage without affecting the subcontractors. The court rejected Perini’s claim.
Perini also asked the court to abstain from the case, arguing that it was better heard in a state court. The court noted that several considerations cover whether a case is heard in state or federal courts. The court noted that if the case weighed heavily on state law, the state courts would be the obvious location. Further, if there were a parallel action in the state courts, “there is a presumption that the whole suit should be heard in state courts.” This is, however, no parallel state suit, although the court noted that Perini has “threatened” to do so.
However, the issue of who is to blame for the problems at Harmon Towers has not been resolved. The court concluded that until the “underlying action” was concluded, it was premature to consider the issues raised in this case while the earlier lawsuit was still in progress. The court denied Perini’s motion to dismiss the case. Given that the outcome of the earlier construction defect case may lead to further litigation in state court, the District Court granted Perini’s motion to abstain, but staying their judgment until the construction defect case is resolved.
Read the court’s decision…
Colorado statutory “property damage” caused by an “occurrence”
August 4, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
Colorado General Assembly House Bill 10-1394 was signed into law by the Governor on May 21, 2010, codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-808 (2010)
13-20-808. Insurance policies issued to construction professionals
(1) (a) The general assembly finds and determines that:
(I) The interpretation of insurance policies issued to construction professionals is of vital importance to the economic and social welfare of the citizens of Colorado and in furthering the purposes of this part 8.
(II) Insurance policies issued to construction professionals have become increasingly complex, often containing multiple, lengthy endorsements and exclusions conflicting with the reasonable expectations of the insured.
(III) The correct interpretation of coverage for damages arising out of construction defects is in the best interest of insurers, construction professionals, and property owners.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Ensuing Loss Provision Found Ambiguous
April 25, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Construction Law Hawaii
After the insurer denied coverage in a homeowner’s policy for construction defects under various exclusions, the court found the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous.Kesling v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38857 (D. Colo. March 22, 2012).
After purchasing a home from the sellers, the insureds noticed problems with the deck of the home. Massive cracking appeared, causing lifting and leaking on the deck and water running through the exterior foundation wall into the home. There was also damage to the roof and crawlspace.
The insureds had a homeowner’s policy with American Family, which covered accidental direct physical loss to property described in the policy unless the loss was excluded. They requested coverage for "conditions, defects and damages." American Family denied coverage because wear and tear, as well as damage to foundations, floors and roofs were excluded. The policy did provide coverage, however, for "any resulting loss to property described . . . above, not excluded or excepted in this policy.
When coverage was denied, the insureds sued American Family.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Claims Under Colorado Defect Action Reform Act Count as Suits
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals has affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Melssen v. Auto-Owners Insurance. The Melssens built a custom home for the Holleys, during which time the Melssens retained a comprehensive general liability policy from Auto-Owners, which “obligated Auto-Owerns to defend the Melssens with respect to any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘property damage’ during the policy period.” Soon after the house was constructed, cracks developed in the drywall, then outside stucco and basement slab. The Holleys contended that “approximately $300,000 of damages to the Holleys’ property was caused by the Melssens’ engineering and construction defects” and filed a claim under the Colorado Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA). The Melssens “demanded Auto-Owners defend and indemnify the Melssens and forwared Auto-Owners the notice of claim.”
Although the Melssens notified Auto-Owners in June 2008, it was not until October 2008 that Auto-Owners denied coverage stating that the claims were sustained outside the policy period. The Melssens filed an action against Auto-Owners. At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the Melssens awarding them damages, to which the trial court added costs and attorney fees.
On appeal, Auto-Owners contended that the trial court erred in allowing the Melssens to argue that the CDARA notice of claim “was the functional equivalent of a complaint commencing a suit.” The appeals court found that “the CDARA notice of claim process constituted an alternative dispute resolution proceeding under the policy.” The court agreed that jury should not have been asked to determine if a CDARA action is a “suit,” but as the jury found for the Melssens, the concluding it “constituted harmless error.” Further, the court found that an action under the CDARA satisfied the definition of a “suit.”
The court found for the Melssens, affirming the lower court’s decision and remanding the case to the lower court for the awarding of appeals costs to the Melssens.
Read the court’s decision…
Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 — April 25, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
Read the trial court’s decision…
Construction Defect Journal Marks First Anniversary
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
November 2011 marked the first anniversary of the Construction Defect Journal. During the first year our staff and contributors in the insurance and legal communities have compiled several hundred articles of interest to the construction defect and claims community.
Each of these articles are maintained in the CDJ archives, and are accessible at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/archives.html. Each story in the archives is listed in the order it was posted to the archives. Each story in the archives opens up in its own page, so you can easily locate topics and articles of interest.
If you’re new to Construction Defect Journal, or just want peruse past articles, please take a moment to visit the CDJ Archives page. Also please feel encouraged to submit your firm’s articles or legal publications of interest to the CD community at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/submitStory.html.
Contractor Burns Down Home, Insurer Refuses Coverage
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
InsuranceStep reports that a Connecticut insurance company has rejected a claim over a fire in a remodeling project that killed five people. Utica First Insurance states that the coverage was invalid as the insured, Tiberias Construction, had misrepresented information about the company and the work performed in applying for insurance. During a remodel, the contractor allegedly placed fireplace ashes near trash. The trash ignited, leading to the house fire.
Read the full story…
Quarter Four a Good One for Luxury Homebuilder
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Toll Brothers has announced that their fourth-quarter net income is $2.35 per share, which they attribute in part to an income tax benefit. Their revenue, at $632.8 million, easily exceeded analysts’ projections of $565.1 million. Additionally, their number of signed contracts jumped seventy percent while their cancellation rate dropped nearly half to 4.9 percent.
Read the full story…
Death of Construction Defect Lawyer Ruled a Suicide
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Clark County Coroner’s Office has concluded that Nancy Quon, the construction defect attorney implicated in the wide-ranging HOA scandal, died by her own hand. The cause of death was a combination of anti-anxiety and insomnia medication mixed with alcohol. Quon survived an earlier incident in which she took GHB and her apartment was set on fire. Quon denied that it was a suicide attempt.
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Homeowners May Not Need to Pay Lien on Defective Log Cabin
July 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Perception Construction Management v. Bell. The Bells hired PCM to build a log home, agreeing to play monthly invoices in full within ten days. The Bells paid the first four invoices in full, part of the fifth, and ceased payment after that. Beofre seventh invoice, the Bells terminated the contract and hired a new contractor. PCM filed a claim of lien and ceased work.
The Bells responded that PCM was in breach of contract and had failed to fulfill the contract in a workmanlike manner. They claimed construction defects and in the lien suit, sought to include testimony from an architect and a plumber reviewing PCM’s work. The court only allowed the architect to testify as to whether the amount of the lien was reasonable. No testimony was permitted from the plumber.
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the claims of construction defects were important to case and remanded it to the lower court for a new trial taking into evidence that Bell’s contention that PCM’s work was defective.
Read the court’s decision
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
Read the court’s decision…