Texas “Loser Pays” Law May Benefit Construction Insurers
June 7, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Under a new law, Texas HB 274, the Texas Supreme Court will be making rules for motions to dismiss and to expedite suits of less than $100,000. The law also contains two “loser pays” provisions. If a lawsuit is found dismissed for having “no basis in fact or law,” the losing side must pay attorney costs. The other provision caps award of attorney fees if plaintiffs reject settlement offers. Texas Lawyer quotes Houston attorney Mike Gallagher as saying this will affect “the practice of everyone who handles significant lawsuits.”
Gregory Marcum, whose practice includes construction defect litigation, plans to contact insurance companies, as the new law may save them money. “It will definitely be a factor in the defense strategy for handling a case.” He notes that “any insurance carrier would want that done.”
Marcum notes that the offer-of-settlement rules only apply when cases go to trial. “Almost all cases settle.”
Read HB 274
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Minnesota Starts Wide-Ranging Registration of Contractors
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Minnesota has replaced its Independent Contractor Exemption Certificate program with the Contractor Registration Pilot Project, according to an article in the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library by Michael B. Lapicola. Mr. Lapicola notes that “it will be a violation of the law to contract with or perform construction services for another person without first being registered with the Pilot Project, or to contract with or pay another person to perform construction services if the other person is not registered with the Pilot Project. There are, however, quite a few exceptions, including those who are currently registered with the earlier program. Additionally, independent contractors who do not register can avoid the fine (up to $2,000) by registering within thirty days of fines being levied. Individuals and firms that do not perform building construction or improvements are exempt from the hiring aspects of the statute.
Minnesota’s goal is to “assist state agencies to investigate employee misclassification in the building industry.” Employees of construction firms do not individually register. Rather, the intent of the of law is to stop those who would “require any individual through coercion, misrepresentation or fraudulent means to adopt independent contractor status” or to “knowingly misrepresent or misclassify an individual as an independent contractor.”
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Contractor Sues Supplier over Defective Products
June 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Fast Track Specialties has sued RJF International after needing to remove wall protection units at Methodist West Houston Hospital, according to an article in the Houston Chronicle. Fast Track claims that contractors had to disconnect gas, water, and electric from the area to facilitate removal of corner guards, handrails, and crash guards from the hospital. This cost the contractor more than $135,000.
Fast Track is claiming that RJD International has committed breach of contract, breach of warranty, and negligent representation.
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Architectural Firm Disputes Claim of Fault
May 27, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Lake-Flato Architects has disputed the arbitration panel’s conclusion that problems with the home of Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson were due to design flaws. The firm settled with the couple for $900,000, however the Idaho Mountain Express reports that David Lake said, “the settlement in the case in no way represents that Lake Flato was responsible for faulty design.” The Express reported that “the arbitrators found that problems at the home were attributable to design errors that did not take into account the cold winter climate of the Sun Valley area.”
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Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”
The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.
As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.
Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.
The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”
The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.
Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”
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Plaintiffs In Construction Defect Cases to Recover For Emotional Damages?
March 16, 2011 — March 16, 2011 - Construction Defect Journal Staff
A recent post to the Markusson, Green, Jarvis Blog reports on an important appeals decision which promises to impact construction defect litigation in Colorado.
The post provides analysis on the recovery of inconvenience damages. The focus of the piece is centered on Hildebrand v. New Vista Homes II, LLC, 08CA2645, 2010 WL 4492356 (Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2010), wherein it was held that " the plain language of Construction Defect Action Reform Act permits recovery of damages for inconvenience, and that the trial court did not err by allowing inconvenience damages to go to the jury".
According to the MGJ Blog "The Hildebrand decision is important because it provides Construction Defect Plaintiffs with a foothold for collecting emotional damages. While several questions of law remain as to who or under exactly what circumstances a Plaintiff may recover these types of damages, the Hildebrand case has clearly set forth that emotional damages may be considered as part of actual damages pursuant to CDARA."
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Defective Drains Covered Despite Water Intrusion Exclusion
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court in Washington State has granted a summary judgment in Hiller v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. The Hillers bought a new home in Wenatchee, Washington and insured it with an “all risk” policy from Allstate. Subsequently, Mr. Hiller discovered that the carpet in the basement was saturated with water. Hiller notified Allstate who requested that he determine the source of the water intrusion. Hiller poured water into a downspout drain and found this caused water to leak into the home’s basement.
Further investigation with the homes original excavation contractor revealed that “the end of the drain pipe was partially blocked by rocks and had been wrapped with fabric landscaping material.” Additionally, “a ‘T’ pipe installed at the foot of the drain was directing water toward the house’s concrete foundation.” Allstate denied the claim “under the policy’s surface water, subsurface water, inherent vice, and latent defect exlusions.” After the denial, Hiller “discovered that the foundation had not been treated with waterproof sealant and that several concrete form pins were still in place.”
The court noted that “there is no genuine dispute about the cause of the claimed loss.” This left the court concluding that “the only relevant question for the purposes of the instant cross-motions for summary judgment is whether a loss caused by defective construction is covered under the Hillers’ ‘all risk’ insurance policy.” Under Washington’s “efficient proximate cause” rule, “where an insured risk itself sets into operation a chain of causation in which the last step may have en an excepted risk, the excepted risk will not defeat recovery.” The court found that a loss caused by defective construction is in fact covered under the policy, noting that “the policy does not contain an exclusion for defective construction.”
The court concluded that the defective drain was not an inherent vice, as it “cannot properly be characterized as defects ‘inherent [in the] nature of the commodity which will cause it to deteriorate with a lapse of time.” Nor was it a latent defect, “one that could not have been discovered by inspection.” The court concluded that “both of the construction defects at issue could have been discovered by a reasonable inspection.”
With these facts determined, the court found for the Hillers.
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Court Strikes Down Reasonable Construction Defect Settlement
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeals of Washington has struck down a construction defect settlement between a building owner and the companies she hired to repair the siding, among other repairs to bring the building up to code. Yuan Zhang hired Hawk Construction LLC to do repair work. Hawk, in turn, hired Ready Construction LLC for some aspects of the project. Hawk and Ready were both insured by Capital Specialty Insurance Corporation.
There were several problems with Ready’s work. After removing old siding, they did not protect the building, nor did they remove all of the damaged layers. Ready covered, but did not fix, a mildew problem under the old siding. When new siding was reattached, the nails used were too short to adequately attach it.
After paying for an inspection of the work, Zhang had Hawk and Ready begin the repairs again, but the work was abandoned without being completed. Zhang sued Hawk for breach of contract. Hawk then sued Ready, claiming that “Ready was liable to Hawk to the extent that Hawk was liable to Zhang.” Capitol retained defense for both contractors.
Zhang settled with Hawk, in an agreement that gave her “the right to collect and/or pursue all costs and attorney fees paid by Hawk or its insurance company defending against the Zhang’s claims and pursuing claims against Ready.” Subsequently, she also settled with Ready. Both companies ceased operations.
Zhang had the settlements reviewed by a court, which concluded that the settlements were reasonable. Capital was allowed to appeal, claiming that the settlement included costs that were Zhang’s responsibility. The appeals court did not examine the question of the reasonableness of the settlement, concluding that Capitol’s interests were relevant only to “questions of bad faith, collusion, and fraud.”
In the case of Zhang, the court concluded that the relationship between Zhang and her former contractors was collusive. The court noted that “bad faith or collusion may exist when the evidence indicates a joint effort to create, in a non-adversarial atmosphere, a resolution beneficial to both parties, yet highly prejudicial to the insurer as intervener.” The court noted that both companies had minimal assets which were, in any case, exempted from the agreement. Further, the court found that the agreements failed to determine “what amount of the repairs related to preexisting water damage.” Zhang’s calculation of costs also included her expenses for architectural and engineering services, which the court points out, “where always Zhang’s costs to bear.”
The court concluded that “the overall structure of the settlements is highly probative of collusion, fraud, or bad faith.” Zhang’s agreements with Hawk and Ready allowed her to collect compensation from Hawk and then collect Ready’s compensation to Hawk for their portion of the settlement, allowing Zhang to collect the monies twice. Further, she was allowed to pursue Capitol for Hawk’s attorney expenses, even though Hawk had none. “The right to recover Hawk’s fees merely set up a windfall recovery for Zhang.” The court described the agreements among Zhang, Hawk, and Ready as “precisely the type of manipulation [the law] is intended to preclude.”
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Yellow Brass Fittings Play a Crucial Role in Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Baker v Castle & Cooke Homes Hawaii, et al. is a “class action filed by homeowners who allege that their homes have a construction defect. They allege that their plumbing systems include brass fittings susceptible to corrosion and likely to cause leaks. They bring this action against the developer of their homes and the manufacturers of the brass fittings.”
Zurn, the manufacturer of the allegedly defective brass fittings, sought a dismissal, or if that could not be achieved, then “a more definite statement, of five of the six claims.” Zurn moved for summary judgment on the sixth claim, or alternately sought “summary judgment on one of the five claims it” sought to dismiss.” The court granted in part the motion, and denied the motion for summary judgment.
The developer, Castle & Cooke, sought dismissal of the First Amended Complaint stating “that Plaintiffs have not complied with Hawaii’s Contractor Repair Act, chapter 672E of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which requires, among other things, a plaintiff to give a contractor the results of any testing done before filing an action against that contractor.” The court couldn’t determine “certain facts essential to ruling” on Castle & Cooke’s motion, and therefore denied the motion, but ordered Plaintiffs to submit requested material by the stated deadline.
The Baker v Castle & Cooke case began with the Plaintiffs claim that the use of yellow brass fittings can lead to construction defects. They allege that “yellow brass is particularly susceptible to dezincification, a corrosion process in which zinc leaches into potable water that comes into contact with the brass. According to Plaintiffs, as the brass corrodes, it becomes porous and mechanically weak. Plaintiffs further allege that the PEX systems in the putative class members’ homes have begun to, or are about to, leak water into the walls, ceilings, and floors of their homes. Plaintiffs allege that the leakage will cause water damage and mold growth, exposing the occupants to toxins.”
In response to the plaintiffs’ claims, Zurn argued “because their yellow brass fittings have not failed to date, Plaintiffs fail to allege, and have no evidence showing, that they have suffered any actual injury.” Plaintiffs replied, “even if the fittings have not failed as of today, failure in the future is inevitable.”
However, the court stated, “whether Plaintiffs have suffered any injury, or whether Plaintiffs are attempting to proceed based solely on future injury, implicates Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action, as well as whether this case is ripe for adjudication.” The court has requested the parties to submit “supplemental briefing on whether this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). In supplemental briefs, Zurn argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs lack standing, and Castle & Cooke argues that dismissal is appropriate because Plaintiffs’ claims are not ripe.”
The court continues to discuss the problem of standing: “To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate three things. First, the plaintiff must suffer an "injury-in-fact," which means that there must be a concrete and particularized "invasion of a legally protected interest" and the invasion is actual or imminent. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Second, the injury must be fairly traceable to the challenged action. Third, a favorable decision must be likely to redress the injury. Id. It is the first element (injury-in-fact) that is in issue here.”
The court found that the plaintiffs do have standing: “Even if the court could not rely on the allegations that the pipes will soon leak, the court would conclude that, for standing purposes, Plaintiffs have a sufficient injury-in-fact in the form of their alleged economic loss.” In a hearing, Plaintiffs argued that their homes had decreased in value.
The court also denied Castle & Cooke’s motion to dismiss based on a lack of ripeness, stating “the same reasons Plaintiffs satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing purposes, they satisfy the constitutional ripeness requirement.”
Plaintiffs asserted six counts against Zurn. Zurn, in response, made a motion to dismiss counts VIII, IX, X, XII, and XIII. The court granted Zurn’s motion for Counts VIII, IX, and X only: “Counts VIII (product liability), IX (negligence), and X (strict liability) sound in tort. Zurn argues that, because Plaintiffs allege no injury other than to the PEX systems and the yellow brass fittings themselves, the economic loss rule bars their tort claims. The court agrees.”
The court disagreed with Zurn’s motion regarding Count XII: “Count XII asserts that Zurn has breached the implied warranty of merchantability. Zurn argues that Count XII is barred by the applicable statute of limitations and that Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege an injury. The court disagrees.”
Zurn’s motion regarding Count XIII was also denied: “Count XIII asserts that Zurn violated section 480-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes.” Furthermore, “Plaintiffs allege that Zurn ‘engaged in unfair and deceptive acts or practices when [it] designed, manufactured and sold Yellow Brass Fittings.’ Zurn argues that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim under section 480-2(a) because their claims are barred by the statute of limitations and they do not adequately allege reliance or a cognizable injury. The court disagrees.”
The court denied the motion for summary judgment with respect to Counts XI and XII.
Castle & Cooke sought to dismiss “Plaintiffs’ claims against it under section 672E-2 of Hawaii Revised Statutes, which provides for dismissal when claimants fail to comply with chapter 672E.” There was some discussion regarding the test results. Apparently, the plaintiffs had failed to provide a written notice of claim at least 90 days before filing the action. However, it is unclear if the Plaintiffs have since complied with the requirements of the chapter. “The court has received no supplemental information from either party about whether any test results from another case have been turned over or whether those materials are subject to a confidentiality agreement. The record at this point does not establish noncompliance with the requirement in chapter 672E to provide such information. The court therefore denies the motion to dismiss.”
In summary, “Zurn’s motion to dismiss is granted as to Count VIII, Count IX, and Count X. Zurn’s motion to dismiss is denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ other claims. Zurn’s request for a more definite statement and its summary judgment motion are denied. Plaintiffs are given leave to file an amended Complaint no later than May 21, 2012.” Furthermore, “the court denies Castle & Cooke’s motion, but directs Plaintiffs to file, within two weeks, either a certificate of compliance with section 672E-3(c), or an explanation as to why they have not complied. Castle & Cooke may submit a response within two weeks of Plaintiffs’ submission. Each party’s submission is limited to 1000 words.”
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Oregon agreement to procure insurance, anti-indemnity statute, and self-insured retention
March 5, 2011 — By
CDCoverage.com, March 5, 2011
In Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. Zurich American Ins. Co., No. 09-35484 (9th Cir. Oct. 28, 2010), general contractor TCR was sued by an employee of subcontractor Safeway for bodily injuries suffered while working on the project. In the subcontract, Safeway agreed to procure primary insurance providing coverage for TCR for liability arising out of Safeway’s negligence. Safeway’s CGL policy included a self-insured retention that had to be satisfied before the insurer had a duty to defend. TCR filed suit against Safeway alleging that
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Ensuing Loss Provision Found Ambiguous
April 25, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Construction Law Hawaii
After the insurer denied coverage in a homeowner’s policy for construction defects under various exclusions, the court found the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous.Kesling v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38857 (D. Colo. March 22, 2012).
After purchasing a home from the sellers, the insureds noticed problems with the deck of the home. Massive cracking appeared, causing lifting and leaking on the deck and water running through the exterior foundation wall into the home. There was also damage to the roof and crawlspace.
The insureds had a homeowner’s policy with American Family, which covered accidental direct physical loss to property described in the policy unless the loss was excluded. They requested coverage for "conditions, defects and damages." American Family denied coverage because wear and tear, as well as damage to foundations, floors and roofs were excluded. The policy did provide coverage, however, for "any resulting loss to property described . . . above, not excluded or excepted in this policy.
When coverage was denied, the insureds sued American Family.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Texas Law Bars Coverage under Homeowner’s Policy for Mold Damage
July 13, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Although the insurer paid for some of the mold damage at the insured’s home, the Fifth Circuit eventually determined the homeowner’s policy did not cover such damage. Rooters v. State Farm Lloyds, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 12306 (5th Cir. June 15, 2011).
The policy excluded loss caused by hail to personal property unless the direct force of wind or hail made an opening in the roof allowing rain to enter. Further, the policy excluded loss caused by mold or other fungi.
In 1999, hail and rain caused water damage to the roof and interior of the residence. State Farm paid $19,000 to repair the roof. Another $1,800 was paid for repairs to the interior of the building. In 2002, the insured noticed black mold. State Farm issued an additional check for $4,402 for mold abatement.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
No Coverage for Construction Defects Under Alabama Law
June 19, 2012 — Tred Eyerely, Insurance Law Hawaii
The federal district court determined that under Alabama law, there was no coverage for breach of contract claims arising from alleged construction defects. Owners Ins. Co. v. Shep Jones Constr., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62085 (N.D. Ala. May 3, 2012).
The insured entered a contract with the homeowner to remodel her home. After construction was completed, the homeowner sued the insured, alleging damages arising form breach of contract, negligence and negligent supervision.
The insured had a policy with Owners Insurance Company. Owners Insurance defended under a reservation rights.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Home Builder Doesn’t See Long Impact from Hurricane
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
No one needs to tell Toll Brothers about the impact of Hurricane Sandy. The Wall Street Journal reports that the home building company lost power as a result of the storm. Martin Connor, the company’s CFO, told the Journal that he did not expect the hurricane to have a big effect on sales. Luckily for the company, many of its large projects are either sufficiently completed to provide shelter or too early in the process to be affected by the storm. “This type of weather event has limited impact on the market. It may move settlements later, and may defer people a weekend or two until they go out shopping. But it doesn’t have a long impact.”
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Colorado Statutes of Limitations and Repose, A First Step in Construction Defect Litigation
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Grund Dagner, a law firm operating in Denver and Boulder, Colorado notes on their blog that when defending a construction defect claim, one of their first steps is to determine if the claims are affected by the statutes of limitations or repose, and that they “have had much success raising these defenses with the court before trial.”
Colorado has a two-year statute of limitations, starting from when the homeowner discovers the defect. Further, Colorado’s statute of repose precludes lawsuits beginning “more than six years after the substantial completion of the improvement to the real property.”
Grund Dagner notes that they “recently obtained dismissal of claims related to eight of 22 buildings in a condominium project, where the homeowners in those building observed the defects more than two years before the HOA initiated its claims against our client.”
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Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
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Judge Okays Harmon Tower Demolition, Also Calls for More Testing
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Vegas.Inc reports that Clark County District Court Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez has permitted the demolition the tower, which MGM Resorts has claimed is a safety hazard. Perini Building Co. claims that the building does not need to be demolished. CityCenter claims that repairing the building would take nearly a year longer than a demolition and cost about $200 million. Further, CityCenter assumes that the building’s reputation would cost it another $30 million.
Subsequently, Judge Gonzalez ruled that the pattern of destructive testing would not support a claim that there were an estimated 1,400 defective items in the building. An attorney for CityCenter, Steve Morris, has suggested that they may seek more testing, impossible to do once the building is demolished. CityCenter issued a statement that “nearly every time CityCenter has chipped away concrete to review structural work at the Harmon, we have found defects.” They describe the building as “unusable.”
Tutor Perini contends that it “remains confident that it will prevail when the issues of safety, reparability and responsibility for the issues facing the Harmon tower are considered.
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Granting Stay, Federal Court Reviews Construction Defect Coverage in Hawaii
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The federal district court ultimately stayed a construction defect case, but offered comments on the current status of coverage disputes for such defects in Hawaii. See National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Simpson Mfg. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128481(D. Haw. Nov. 7, 2011).
National Union filed a complaint for declaratory relief to establish it had no duty to defend or to indemnify Simpson Manufacturing Company in four actions pending in the Hawaii state courts. The state court actions concerned allegedly defective hurricane strap tie hold downs that were manufactured and sold by Simpson. The hurricane ties allegedly began to prematurely corrode and rust, causing cracking, spalling and other damage to homes.
National Union contended the underlying allegations did not constitute "property damage" caused by an "occurrence," as defined in the policies.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com