Colorado “occurrence”
January 6, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In Greystone Construction, Inc. v. National Fire & Marine Insurance Co., No. 09-1412 (10th Cir. November 1, 2011), general contractors Greystone and Branan were each sued by purchases of homes built by each alleging defective construction performed by subcontractors. CGL insurer American Family Mutual Insurance Company defended both Greystone and Brannon while co-insurer National Fire & Marine Insurance Company denied a defense. Greystone, Branan, and American Family sued National Fire for contribution towards defense costs. The federal district trial court entered summary judgment for National Fire.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Gut Feeling Does Not Disqualify Expert Opinion
July 6, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New Jersey Supreme Court issued a ruling in June on the case of Nevins v. Toll in which they reversed an earlier decision and remanded the case to a lower court for retrial. At issue in the case was the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert, J. Anthony Dowling. In depositions, Mr. Dowling said that his estimates for repair were based on a “gut feeling.” Dowling said he had “very little” experience in cost estimates for single-family homes. The defendants sought to bar Dowling’s testimony which was granted by the judge. Without an expert, Ms. Nevin’s case was dismissed.
Describing Dowling’s report as “far from a model of how an expert’s opinion in a construction case should be presented,” the court noted that Dowling is not a professional expert witness. However, the court did note that Dowling is a professional cost estimator. Despite Mr. Dowling using his “gut feeling” to construct his estimate, the New Jersey Supreme Court felt that whether his estimate is convincing is “a question for the jury.”
Read the court’s opinion…
Although Property Damage Arises From An Occurrence, Coverage Barred By Business Risk Exclusions
July 8, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The homeowners hired the insured to raise the structure of their home twenty-four inches above the flood zone. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58985 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011). When the insured’s crew returned from lunch one day, they found the house had fallen from hydraulic jacks being used to raise the structure a few inches at a time. There was substantial damage to the entire structure.
The homeowners sued, asserting several claims, including negligence and breach of contract. The complaint alleged the homeowners entered a contract with the insured to raise their structure while maintaining its integrity. However, the insured failed to use proper equipment, which caused the house to fall and be completely destroyed.
The insured tendered the claim to its insurer, Lafayette Insurance Company. Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed suit for a declaratory judgment. Lafayette’s subsequent motion for summary judgment contended there was no “occurrence” alleged in the underlying complaint and, even if there was, the business risk exclusions barred coverage.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Differing Rulings On Construction Defect Claims Leave Unanswered Questions For Builders, and Construction Practice Groups. Impact to CGL Carriers, General Contractors, Builders Remains Unclear
March 7, 2011 — March 7, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
In the past year a number of state and federal courts have rendered a number of conflicting decisions that promise to alter or perhaps shift entirely the paradigm, of how builders manage risk.
According to a report today by Dave Lenckus in Property Casualty 360 “Nine state and federal courts and one state legislature over the past year have addressed whether a construction defect a defective product or faulty workmanship is fortuitous and therefore an occurrence under the commercial general liability insurance policy. Four jurisdictions determined it is; three said no; two ruled that a construction defect that causes consequential damage to property other than the work product is an occurrence; and one federal court contributed its conflicting case law that has developed in Oregon since its high court ruled in 2000 that a construction defect is not an occurrence”.
The article strongly suggests that in the absence of a clear consensus over what the recent rulings mean for builders and contractors coverage disputes will intensify and continue to proliferate.
Doing this on a state-by-state basis has caused a lot of confusion among buyers and sellers, said Jeffrey A. Segall, a Tampa-based senior vice president and the Florida Construction Practice leader at Willis of Florida, a unit of Willis Group Holdings.
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Construction Defect Journal Seeks Article Submissions Regarding SB800 and Other Builders Right to Repair Laws
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
As we approach the tenth anniversary of the passage and signing of SB800, California’s right-to-repair law, we’d like to hear your reactions to the law, your experiences with it, and your thoughts on it and right-to-repair laws in other states.
We invite you to submit articles either reacting to SB800 or on other matters relevant to construction defect and claims issues. You can promote your firm’s capabilities and get valuable exposure through the publication of your articles. Construction Defect Journal is widely read by our highly targeted audience of decision makers, construction attorneys, builders, owners, and claims professionals.
Articles may contain relevant images, your firm’s name, and links to your corporate website or third parties and can be submitted through e-mail to submitstory@constructiondefectjournal.com. Please remember to include your contact information if you would like it to be published with your content. If you are submitting photos or PDF documents with your article, please send them as e-mail attachments. Items submitted are assumed to be cleared for publishing upon receipt by CDJ.
Normally articles are published in full, although we reserve the right to edit content for space purposes. All articles submitted are considered for publication. For additional questions please contact editor@constructiondefectjournal.com.
Another Colorado District Court Refuses to Apply HB 10-1394 Retroactively
October 28, 2011 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
In Martinez v. Mike Wells Construction Company, 09CV227, Teller County District Court Judge Edward S. Colt refused to apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively to provide coverage for the underlying construction defect allegations. According to the recitation of facts in Judge Colt’s March 2011 order, Martinez contracted with Mike Wells Construction to serve as the general contractor for the construction of a home. At that time, Mike Wells Construction was insured through ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, RRG. Disputes arose between Martinez and Mike Wells Construction, resulting in Martinez ordering it off of the project in mid-November 2007 and terminating its right to work there by letter dated November 28, 2007.
Mike Wells, the owner of the corporation, subsequently died. Martinez sued Mike Wells Construction in July 2009 for breach of contract and various claims relating to alleged defecting workmanship. Martinez provided notice of the suit to the special administrator of the probate estate. No answer having been filed, the court entered a default judgment against Mike Wells Construction and Martinez sought to garnish Mike Wells Construction’s ProBuilders insurance policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
Nevada District Court Dismisses Case in Construction Defect Coverage Suit
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United States District Court of Nevada has dismissed a case filed by Maryland Casualty Company against National Fire & Marine Insurance Company. This case follows a case in which National was sued over “200 causes of action arising out of 193 separate insurance coverage disputes related to 75 different insureds and 163 unrelated construction defect or Chapter 40 proceedings across seven states.” The judge in this initial case severed the plaintiffs, as he found that allowing joinder “would make this case impossible to manage.” In this particular instance, National seeks to have the claims made by Maryland Casualty dismissed.
Maryland Casualty alleged that for insurance policies issued to 38 companies, National was obligated to defend the insured. National was, according to the plaintiff, named as defendants in 72 unrelated lawsuits to which National disclaimed coverage. However, the court found that Maryland Casualty failed “to provide enough detail regarding the relevant property damage, policies, claims, and time periods.” The court found that Maryland failed to “state a claim upoin which relief can be granted.
The court also found that “the Complaint lacks any well-pled allegations from which the Court could conclude the Plaintiff has standing since the Complaint is devoid of information about the specific policies at issue.
The court did allow Maryland Casualty up to September 3, 2012 in which to file an amended complaint.
Read the court’s decision…
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…
Appeals Court Reverses Summary Judgment over Defective Archway Construction
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A judge has ruled that a plaintiff can go forward with her suit that she was injured by a defective archway during a birthday party. A three-judge panel of the California Court of Appeals issued this ruling on January 23, 2012, in the case of Trujillo v. Cosio.
Ms. Trujillo attended a birthday party at the home of Maria Cosio and Joel Verduzco. A piñata was hung between a tree and a brick archway. Ms. Trujillo went to get candy that had fallen from the piñata, during which the archway fell on her hand. Subsequent examination of the archway showed that it had not been “properly anchored to the supporting pillars to protect the arch from falling.”
Ms. Cosio and Mr. Verduzco argued that they could not have been aware of the defective nature of the archway’s construction, as it had been built at the request of the prior property owner. The structure was constructed without building permits. Mark Burns, a civil engineer testifying for the plaintiff, said that “a reasonable property owner would have thoroughly tested the archway to ensure it was capable of withstanding such horizontal forces before allowing children to enter into the area.” Mr. Burns noted that twenty rope pulls would have been sufficient to demonstrate the structure’s instability.
The trial court rejected Mr. Burn’s statements, finding that the respondents did not have any knowledge of the defect and that a visual inspection should have sufficed. The court noted that this a triable issue, whether visual inspection suffices, or whether the property owners should have done as Mr. Burns suggested and yank a rope twenty times. The court noted that “although a jury may ultimately disagree with Burn’s opinion, it was supported by sufficient foundation and was not speculative.”
The opinion was written by Judge Flier, with Judges Rubin and Grimes concurring.
Read the court’s decison…
Construction Defects Are Occurrences, Says South Carolina High Court
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Supreme Court has left the legislature’s new, expanded definition of “occurrence” in place, declining to declare it unconstitutional. South Carolina included faulty workmanship as an occurrence in response to a Supreme Court decision, which the court later reversed. One of the parties in that earlier decision, Harleysville Insurance, challenged the new law, claiming that the legislature didn’t have the power to pass a law to overturn a court ruling. The court did not concur.
However, the court did determine that the law was not retroactive and covered only claims filed after the law became effective in May 2011. The Chief Justice of South Carolina noted that “insurance coverage for construction liability lacks clarity, particularly with respect to whether construction defects constitute ‘occurrences’ under construction general insurance policies.”
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Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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BUILD Act Inching Closer To Reality
July 8, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
A select group of Senators have launched a marketing campaign for the BUILD Act. If this is the first you are hearing about the BUILD Act, do not fret. The Act still has a long way to go, but if successful it would bring a national infrastructure bank.
I have been fascinated with the concept of a national infrastructure bank for quite some time. The idea has been around since the Clinton years ? and perhaps beyond. The Act’s purpose is to create a national bank (American Infrastructure Financing Authority) to provide loans and loan guarantees to encourage private investment in upgrading America’s infrastructure. For a number of years, we have seen similar legislation float around Congress. But, none of those initiatives have gained as much traction as BUILD.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration.
The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this.
PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint.
Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.”
The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.”
As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision.
Read the court’s decision…
Faulty Workmanship Causing Damage to Other Property Covered as Construction Defect
September 30, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
In yet another recent construction defect case, the Illinois Court of Appeal found for coverage. See Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Larsen, Inc., 2011 Ill. App. Ct. LEXIS 872 (Ill. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2011).
Weather-Tite, Inc. hired Larson as a subcontractor to apply sealant to windows installed by Weather-Tite in a condominium building. The windows subsequently leaked and caused water damage. The homeowner’s association sued Weather-Tite for breach of express and implied warranties. Weather-Tite filed a third-party complaint against Larsen alleging that, if it was liable to the association for breach of warranty, Larsen was liable for contribution as a joint tortfeasor. Weather-Tite and Larsen both tendered defenses to Milwaukee Insurance. The tenders were denied and Milwaukee Insurance filed suit to determine rights under the policy.
Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed by all parties. The trial court granted Milwaukee Insurance’s summary judgment motion as to Weather-Tite, but granted Larsen’s cross-motion against Milwaukee Insurance.
On appeal, the appellate court considered whether the underlying pleadings alleged facts demonstrating "property damage" resulting from an "occurrence" within the terms of the policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
An Upward Trend in Commercial Construction?
March 28, 2012 — Melissa Dewey Brumback, Construction Law North Carolina
Year-end economic indicators demonstrate that private commercial construction may be increasing in 2012, primarily as demand grows for new projects built in the United States.
According to an article in Businessweek, the Architecture Billings Index held at 52 in December, indicating a modest expansion in the market. The American Institute of Architects said that the commercial and industrial component of the number climbed to 54.1 in December, the highest in 10 months.
The monthly survey of U.S.-based architecture firms is one of the main indicators of nonresidential construction, and these numbers suggest that modest improvement may be on the horizon.
The information is confirmed by data from the Census Bureau that shows that spending on lodging, office, commercial and manufacturing buildings grew 8.2 percent in November to $9.2 billion from a year ago. These types of commercial and industrial projects are historically canaries in the mine and are usually the first part of the industry to improve as the economy expands.
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Reprinted courtesy of Melissa Dewey Brumback of Ragsdale Liggett PLLC. Ms. Brumback can be contacted at mbrumback@rl-law.com.
There Is No Non-Delegable Duty on the Part of Residential Builders in Colorado
August 16, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Recently, in the Arapahoe District Court, the Honorable Michael Spear, issued an order holding that builders do not owe a non-delegable duty to homeowners. In Marx and Corken v. Alpert Custom Homes, Inc., et al., Judge Spear’s order came in response to plaintiffs’ motion for determination of question of law seeking a finding that the defendants owed a non-delegable duty to the plaintiffs and thus, to strike defendants’ designation of nonparties at fault. After being fully briefed, Judge Spear, found that such a non-delegable duty does not exist.
The case arises from the construction of a single-family residence in Aurora, Colorado. Through the construction and interaction with Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. and Scott and Sally Alpert, the defendants, Paul Marx and Kay Corken, the plaintiffs claimed they suffered various damages and losses, and brought claims for breach of contract-warranty, breach of contract, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, breaches of the implied covenant of good faith, promissory estoppel, willful breach of contract, and quantum meruit. During litigation, the defendants filed a designation of nonparties at fault, which named several parties which were at fault for the alleged construction defects at issue in the case.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Florida Law: Defects in Infrastructure Improvements Not Covered in Home Construction Warranties
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In April 2012, Governor Rick Scott signed into law House Bill 1013, despite lobbying from homeowner and condominium associations among others. The law was in response to a case in which the court had found that implied warranties covered external subdivision improvements. Prior to the court decision, these were not thought to be covered.
According to an article in the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library, under the new law, road and drainage improvements will not be included implied warranty of a new home. The law took effect on July 1.
Read the full story…
Contractor Liable for Soils Settlement in Construction Defect Suit
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on January 9 in Burrow v. JTL Dev. Corp., a construction defect case in which houses suffered damage due to improperly compacted soil, upholding the decision of the lower court.
Turf Construction entered into a deal with JTL to develop a parcel they acquired. A third firm, Griffin Homes, withdrew from the agreement “when a geotechnical and soils engineering firm reported significant problems with soil stability on 14 of the lots.” Turf Construction then took over compacting and grading the lots. Turf “had never compacted or graded a residential tract before.” Robert Taylor, the owner of Turf, “testified he knew there was a significant problem with unstable soils.”
After homes were built, the plaintiffs bought homes on the site. Shortly thereafter, the homes suffered damage from soil settlement “and the damage progressively worsened.” They separately filed complaints which the court consolidated.
During trial, the plaintiff’s expert said that there had been an inch and a half in both homes and three to five inches in the backyard and pool areas. “He also testified that there would be four to eight inches of future settlement in the next fifteen to twenty years.” The expert for Turf and JTL “testified that soil consolidation was complete and there would be no further settlement.”
Turf and JTL objected to projections made by the plaintiffs’ soil expert, William LaChappelle. Further, they called into question whether it was permissible for him to rely on work by a non-testifying expert, Mark Russell. The court upheld this noting that LaChappelle “said that they arrived at the opinion together, through a cycle of ‘back and forth’ and peer review, and that the opinion that the soil would settle four to eight inches in fifteen to twenty years was his own.”
Turf and JTL contended that the court relied on speculative damage. The appeals court disagreed, stating that the lower court based its award “on evidence of reasonably certain damage.”
Turf also that it was not strictly liable, since it did not own or sell the properties. The court wrote that they “disagree because Turf’s grading activities rendered it strictly liable as a manufacturer of the lots.” The court concluded that “Turf is strictly liable as a manufacturer of the lots.”
Judge Coffee upheld the decision of the lower court with Judges Yegan and Perren concurring.
Read the court’s decision…