Arizona Contractor Designs Water-Repellant Cabinets
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Dubbing his product “Baltic Duck,” a Mesa, Arizona building contractor is offering household cabinets made with specially treated water-repellent plywood instead of the usual particle board. Pete Celano calls his product Baltic Duck because the plywood is made in the Baltic region of Eastern Europe. To further protect the cabinets from moisture, a silicone-based sealant is applied to the corners and edges.
Celano’s cabinets use standard decorative fronts. The design of the cabinets allows spilled liquids to drain away without encountering the decorative wood.
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Utah Construction Defect Claims Dependant on Contracts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
An owner who wants to sue a subcontractor directly may find limited ability to do so under Utah court decisions. Writing on the JDSupra site, Stewart O. Peay and Mark O. Morris of Snell & Wilmer discuss the distinction the Utah courts make between contractor (with whom an owner has direct contracts) and subcontractors (with whom an owner does not). In the Utah courts, construction defect claims must be based on contract, rather than tort. With no contract, there is no way to pursue claims against a subcontractor alone.
They note that the Utah couts do not “accept negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims that many other jurisdictions embrace.” They recommend that in setting up contracts for a construction project, owners should ensure that they are provided with “third-party beneficiary rights to purse claims against subs.” They suggest that “the owner may require his generals to include language in the various subcontracts that incorporates some or all of the terms of the prime contract into the subcontracts.” Additionally they suggest that the owner “require the general to include ‘flow down’ provisions in the various subcontracts.”
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The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Celebrities Lose Case in Construction Defect Arbitration
May 26, 2011 — CDJ Staff
An arbitration panel has ruled that problems with the Idaho home of actors Tom Hanks and Rita Wilson were not due to construction defects but rather to “poor design and bad architectural advice.” The couple had settled with the architectural firm, Lake Flato of San Antonio, Texas for $900,000 and was subsequently seeking $3 million from Storey Construction of Ketchum, Idaho.
Problems with the couple’s home “included leaking roofs, inadequate drainage, fireplaces that did not vent properly and an inadequate air-conditioning system. In 2003, sliding snow from the roof damaged kitchen windows and roof components.”
The arbitration panel, according to the report in the Idaho Mountain Express and Guide, noted that “Hanks and Wilson were responsible for the full $167,623 cost of arbitration, but further denied a Storey Construction counterclaim that alleged Hanks and Wilson filed their claim out of malice.”
Read the full story…
Illinois Court Determines Insurer Must Defend Property Damage Caused by Faulty Workmanship
July 11, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Illinois Court of Appeals determined the insurer must defend allegations of property damage arising from faulty workmanship. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Larsen, Inc., 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1443 (Ill. Ct. App. June, 20, 2011).
Larsen was a subcontractor for Weather-Tite in a condominium building. Weather-Tite installed windows on the project and hired Larsen to apply sealant to the windows. The windows subsequently leaked and caused water damage within the complex.
The homeowner’s association sued Weather-Tite for breach of express and implied warranties. Weather-Tite filed a third-party complaint against Larsen, seeking contribution and alleging that Larsen was in breach of contract by failing to add Weather-Tite as an additional insured under Larsen’s CGL policy.
Both Weather-Tite and Larsen tendered to Larsen’s insurer. Both tenders were denied because the insurer contended the complaints alleged only construction defects, and not “property damage” or an “occurrence” within the terms of the policy.
The insurer filed suit for a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion as to Weather-Tite, but granted Larsen’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Mississippi exclusions j(5) and j(6) “that particular part”
June 7, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Lafayete Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, No. 3:10cv336 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011), claimant homeowner Peerboom hired insured contractor Absolute to raise Peerboom’s house two feet to avoid future flooding. While Absolute was raising the house, it fell, resulting in physical injury to the home. Peerboom sued Absolute for negligence, breach of contract, and fraud, seeking damages for the destruction of the home. Absolute’s CGL insurer Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed a declaratory judgment action.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
The Hidden Dangers of Construction Defect Litigation
March 28, 2012 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
David M. McLain, writing at Colorado Construction Litigation, has an interesting blog post republishing his article in Common Interests magazine, the monthly periodical of the Rocky Mountain Chapter of the Community Associations Institute. In his article, he touches on a number of pitfalls in construction defect litigation, including the potential conflicts of interests facing HOAs. He also considers the problems homeowners can face, including both “strong-arm tactics” taken by attorneys to compel homeowners to join the lawsuit, or situations in which the interests of the HOA do not match those of the homeowners. He writes:
There is also a conflict of interest with individual owners who attempt to opt out of the case. This can lead to shocking strong-arm tactics on the part of plaintiffs’ attorneys. In one instance, a plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to an individual homeowner that stated that as a 1/58th owner of the common elements, if he refused to go along with the suit, and there was ultimately a finding in favor of the HOA which was in any way limited by his refusal to participate, he would be personally liable for 1/58th of the HOA’s total damages. In another instance, a different plaintiffs’ attorney sent a letter to a homeowner who wanted the builder to perform warranty repairs, informing the owner that if he let the builder perform any repairs, the attorney would bill the HOA according to the fee agreement entered by the HOA board (without knowledge or consent of non-board members) and that the HOA would assess the homeowner for that expense. These are just two examples of conflicts which may arise between the HOA board and individual homeowners when the HOA pursues CD cases.
Another example of a conflict which will arise as a result of CD litigation occurs post-settlement. When an HOA settles for less than 100% of the amount necessary to fund all repairs outlined by its experts, plus attorneys’ fees and litigation costs, there will obviously be a shortfall in the amount necessary to fix the development. The HOA board must then choose to impose a special assessment to cover the shortfall or to make some, but not all, of the repairs outlined by its experts. In choosing the latter, the conflict arises with respect to which homes get fixed and which do not. In this situation, the HOA board has acted as the attorney-in-fact for the individual owners by bringing claims on their behalf, and has compromised those claims without their knowledge or consent.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of David M. McLain of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com.
Construction Defect Not a RICO Case, Says Court
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of North Carolina has rejected an attempt by a homeowner to restart her construction defect claim by turning it into a RICO lawsuit. Linda Sharp, the plaintiff in the case of Sharp v. Town of Kitty Hawk, attempted to amend a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and argued that her case belonged in the federal courts.
Ms. Sharp sued in November, 2010 claiming construction defects. She sued in federal court, although the court noted that as she and most of the defendants are citizens of North Carolina, the state court would have been the appropriate jurisdiction. Further, the court noted that one federal claim Sharp made was dismissed with prejudice, leaving only the state law claims. These the court dismissed without prejudice, declining to exercise jurisdiction over North Carolina law.
After the dismissal, Ms. Sharp attempted to amend her complaint after the deadline. To do so, according to the court, she would be required to obtain consent from defendants or leave of the court. She did neither.
In his opinion, Judge W. Earl Britt rejected her motion for leave to amend. He also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The clerk was directed to close the case.
Read the court’s decision…
Ensuing Loss Found Ambiguous, Allowing Coverage
August 16, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The court determined the ensuing loss provision was ambiguous and found coverage for the home owners in Platek v. Town of Hamburg, 2012 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5371 (N.Y. App. Div. July 6, 2012).
The burst of a water main caused water damage to the insureds' basement. Allstate disclaimed coverage under exclusion 4 for losses caused by "[w]ater . . . on or below the surface of the ground, regardless of its source . . . [,] includ[ing] water . . . which exerts pressure on or flows, seeps or leaks through any part of the residence premises."
Another policy provision covered "sudden and accidental direct physical loss caused by fire, explosion or theft resulting from item []. . . 4 . . . ." Plaintiffs argued that this exception applied because their claimed loss was caused by an "explosion" of the water main.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Negligent Construction an Occurrence Says Ninth Circuit
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
One June 27, the US Court of Appeals has rejected an appeal from Mid-Continent Casualty Company. Mid-Continent had appealed a summary judgment granted to Titan Construction Company.
Titan Construction had built condominiums for the Williamsburg Condominium Association, which later filed a construction defect lawsuit against Titan and other defendants. Titan settled with the developer, Kennydale, assigning its rights against Mid-Continent to Kennydale. Mid-Continent filed suit, claiming that “it had no obligation to indemnify or defend Titan, Kennydale, or various other defendants.” The district court found in favor of Mid-Continent, granting a summary judgment, concluding that Titan’s insurance covered “occurrences,” and none had taken place.
On appeal, the court found that the negligent construction of the condominiums constituted an “occurrence” The case was remanded and the district court this time found in favor of Titan, “concluding that Mid-Continent failed to raise a triable issue as to the applicability of the remaining policy exclusions.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has now affirmed that decision and Titan’s summary judgment stands.
Read the court’s decision…
A Performance-Based Energy Code in Seattle: Will It Save Existing Buildings?
August 11, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
The City of Seattle has one of the most stringent energy codes in the nation. Based upon the Washington State Energy Code (which has been embroiled in litigation over its high standards), the code demands a lot from commercial developers. But, does it prevent developers from saving Seattle?s classic and old buildings? Perhaps.
The general compliance procedure requires buildings to be examined during the permitting process. This means that buildings are examined before they begin operating. The procedure is not malleable and is applicable to all buildings, old and new, big and small.
The downside of this procedure is that it eliminates awarding compliance to those buildings exhibiting a number of passive features, such as siting, thermal mass, and renewable energy production. This problem has prevented a number of interesting and architecturally pleasing existing building retrofits from getting off the ground. The cost of complying with the current system can be 20% more, and it might prevent builders from preserving a building?s historical integrity.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Housing Prices Up through Most of Country
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Home prices in October were up more than six percent compared with prices in October 2011. The LA Times noted that some of the strongest gains were in California and Arizona. The Phoenix metropolitan area saw a 24.5% rise in home prices. In California, Riverside and Los Angeles were just above the national average, at 7.3% and 6.4%, contributing to the state’s overall nine percent increase.
The news wasn’t good throughout the entire country, as five states did not see any price increases. Mark Fleming, the chief economist at CoreLogic, a research firm in Irvine, California said that “the housing recovery that started earlier in 2012 continues to gain momentum.
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Webinar on Insurance Disputes in Construction Defects
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Seth Lamden, of the firm Neal Gerber Eisenberg will be presenting a webinar on “Insurance Coverage Disputes in Construction Defects” on July 17, 2012 at 1 p.m. EDT. Mr. Lamden’s presentation will focus on “handling both the construction and insurance components of construction defect claims.” He will be discussing recent case law and new insurance products. The presentation will present information on evaluating various types of insurance policies, explaining common issues, contract requirement, and the economic loss doctrine. Mr. Lamden will advise attendees on how to avoid getting into a construction defect case. He will conclude his presentation with a brief question-and-answer session.
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Hovnanian Sees Second-Quarter Profit, Points to Recovery
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Hovnanian Enterprises has shown a profit in the second quarter, which the company attributes to recovery in the homebuilding industry. Apart from a sales promotion in 2007, the company sold more homes per community in April than it has in any other month since 2006. Ara K. Hovnanian said that “the sales improvements we have experienced are fairly wide-based in terms of geography, price points and buyer profiles.”
The quarter’s profit was $1.8 million. In the year prior, Hovnanian faced losses of $72.7 million. The Wall Street Journal’s Marketwatch reported that Hovnanian’s stock price recently went up 19%.
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Colorado Court of Appeals holds that insurance companies owe duty of prompt and effective communication to claimants and repair subcontractors
March 1, 2011 — Courtesy
Colorado Construction LitigationIn Dunn v. American Family Insurance, 09CA2173, 2010 WL 4791948 (Colo. App. Nov. 24, 2010), the Dunns reported a claim to American Family on their homeowners insurance policy after sewer and water backup caused sewage to flood their basement. American Family gave the Dunns contact information for a contractor (ICA) to remediate the flooding. However, ICA was unsuccessful and sewage began to infiltrate the Dunns’ HVAC system. Subsequently, black mold was detected in the HVAC system, the Dunns suffered health and respiratory problems, and they soon after vacated the home. The Dunns hired and fired two more contractors for unsatisfactory work throughout the winter before hiring a fourth to finish the job. Because the home remained vacant and unheated throughout the winter, the water pipes ruptured. The mold spread throughout the entire home and all of the contents needed to be replaced, which amounted to a claim of $340,000 on the policy.
American Family agreed to pay the full $340,000. However, the Dunns brought suit claiming that American Family breached the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing by: 1) failing to screen ICA for expertise; 2) failing to screen ICA for liability insurance coverage; 3) failing to monitor ICA’s work; 4) failing to advise them that flooding can cause further damage, including freezing pipes and mold; and, 5) failing to adequately and promptly communicate with them and remediation subcontractors in the course of investigating and handling their claim.The trial court found no duty owed by American Family beyond adjustment and timely payment of claims. Because American Family paid timely and in full, they dismissed all of the Dunns’ claims. However, the Court of Appeals reversed in part.
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Reprinted courtesy of Chad Johnson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com
Policing Those Subcontractors: It Might Take Extra Effort To Be An Additional Insured
June 14, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Council Blog
I just came across a case that I think truly paints the insurance dilemma for contractors. Thanks to this recent Illinois case, I don’t have to make up any factual scenarios—so kudos to Attorney Robert Boylan for posting it.
In reading over my RSS feeds this weekend, I noticed a great writeup on long-time blogger Josh Glazov’s Construction Law Today. Attorney Robert Boylan’s post describes a recent Illinois case where a general contractor was denied its additional insured status on a second-tier subcontractor’s insurance. The reason for the denial: the general contractor failed to procure an agreement in writing with the second-tier subcontractor, requiring it to be listed as an additional insured.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Condo Buyers Seek to Void Sale over Construction Defect Lawsuit
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A Michigan couple seeks to void their purchase of a condo in Texas after discovering that the complex was undergoing a construction defect lawsuit. ABQ Journal reports that Charles M. Lea and Olga Y. Ziabrikova said that they would not have purchased the condo if they had known the association was already alleging construction defects. The condo association discovered the defects “by at least late 2010,” according to the suit. The couple bought their condo in August 2011 and heard of the defects only in March 2012.
The couple notes that no one involved with the sale informed them of the construction defect complaints. The community association’s lawsuit states that problems have lead to $2.5 million in damages. The developer, Vegas Verde Condo Partners, have filed a general denial of the construction problems.
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Hovnanian Increases Construction Defect Reserves for 2012
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In their fourth quarter earnings call, executives of Hovnanian Enterprises made some projections for investors, covering the company’s plans for 2012. During the call, Ara K. Hovnanian, the firm’s CEO, discussed their reserves to meet construction defect claims. The firm does an annual actuarial study of their construction defect reserves.
Mr. Hovnanian noted that there have been no changes for the past several years, but this year they are increasing their reserves by about $6.3 million. Additionally, the firm has added $2.5 million to their legal reserves. Mr. Hovnanian stated “we do not anticipate that changes of this magnitude will be recurring as we look forward to 2012.”
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