Homeowner may pursue negligence claim for construction defect, Oregon Supreme Court holds
March 1, 2011 — Original Story by Lori Bauman, Ater Wynne LLP,
Northwest Business Litigation BlogIn Abraham v. T. Henry, Oregon’s court of appeals held that a Oregon’s court of appeals holds that a homeowner may sue builder for common law negligence absent a contractual provision that forecloses such a claim. Plaintiff homeowners hired defendant contractors to build a house. When plaintiffs discovered defects in the construction years later, they sued for negligence.
The Court of Appeals held that the parties’ contractual relationship did not prevent a negligence claim, and that plaintiffs were entitled to pursue a negligence per se claim based on a violation of the Oregon Building Code.
The Supreme Court affirmed, but on a somewhat different basis. First, according to the Court, a construction defect claim concerns damage to property — and not mere economic losses — and thus is not barred by the economic loss doctrine. Second, the existence
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A Downside of Associational Standing - HOA's Claims Against Subcontractors Barred by Statute of Limitations
March 28, 2012 — Bret Cogdill, Colorado Construction Litigation
In multi-family construction defect litigation in Colorado, homeowners associations rely on associational standing to pursue claims affecting more than two units and to bring claims covering an entire development. This practice broadens an association’s case beyond what individual, aggrieved owners would otherwise bring on their own against a developer or builder-vendor. However, reliance on associational standing to combine homeowners’ defect claims into a single lawsuit has its drawbacks to homeowners.
A recent order in the case Villa Mirage Condominium Owners’ Association, Inc., v. Stetson 162, LLC, et al., in El Paso County District Court, presents an example. There, the HOA unsuccessfully sought a determination from the court that its claims against subcontractors were not barred by the statute of limitations. To do so, the HOAs attempted to apply the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”), which governs the creation and operation of HOAs, and a statute intended to apply to persons under a legal disability.
Under CCIOA, during the period of “declarant control” the developer may appoint members to the association’s executive board until sufficient homeowners have moved into the development and taken seats on the board.
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Reprinted courtesy of Bret Cogdill of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Cogdill can be contacted at cogdill@hhmrlaw.com.
Georgia Supreme Court Rules Construction Defects Can Constitute an Occurrence in CGL Policies
April 5, 2011 — April 5, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the decision in American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company v Hathaway Development Company, Inc. stating that because Whisnant’s faulty workmanship caused damage to the surrounding properties, the construction defects constituted “occurrences” under the Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy. Unlike the South Carolina Supreme court ruling in the case of Crossman Communities v Harleysville Mutual, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that an accident can happen intentionally if the effect is not the intended result.
Interestingly, the only dissenting judge, J. Melton, disagreed with his colleagues on the basis that “although the term ‘accident’ is not specifically defined in the policy, it is axiomatic that an ‘accident’ cannot result from ‘intentional’ behavior.” It is clear that what constitutes an occurrence in CGL policies is still being hotly debated.
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Insurer Has Duty to Defend Despite Construction Defects
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a case the judge attributed to “shoddy masonry work,” the US District Court of Illinois has rendered a decision in AMCO Insurance Company v. Northern Heritage Builders. Northern Heritage built a home in Chicago for Michael McGrath (who joined Northern Heritage as a defendant). According to the decision, “seven months after he moved into the house, McGrath noticed water coming in the house and warped millwork.” This was attributed to porous block, installed by the mason with Northern Heritage’s knowledge.
McGrath sued National Heritage for both the damage to his house and its contents. The court rejected his claim for the contents. For the damages to his house, he was awarded $601,570.50 in damages. He also sued his homeowner’s insurance carrier for damages not covered in his suit against National Heritage. There he was awarded $1,130,680.16.
AMCO informed National Heritage that it had neither duty to defend nor duty to indemnify. The judge considered whether AMCO had a duty to defend. Under Illinois law, “damage to a construction project resulting from construction defects is not an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence’ because it represents the natural and ordinary consequence of faulty construction.” However, it is noted that while if the defects lead only to damage to the project itself, there is no occurrence, “if the building owner asserts damages to other property besides the construction itself, there is an ‘occurrence’ and ‘property damage.’” The judge further noted that were construction defects an occurrence, “shoddy work” would be rewarded by double pay, once by the homeowner and a second time by the insurer. Judge Kendall concluded that as McGrath had alleged damage to the contents of his house, AMCO had a duty to defend National Heritage.
She then looked at the issue of whether AMCO had a duty to indemnify. Should they pay the $601,570.50? Judge Kendall noted that “the duty to indemnify is narrower than the duty to defend.” The key point here was that once McGrath’s insurance carrier covered him for the damage to the contents of his house, “AMCO’s duty to defend ended.” Once McGrath “only sought damages for the natural consequences of faulty workmanship” there was no occurrence, hence nothing for AMCO to cover.
Judge Kendall granted a summary dismissal of AMCO’s claim that they had no duty to defend while upholding their claim that they had no duty to indemnify.
Read the court’s decision…
No Resulting Loss From Deck Collapsing Due to Rot
July 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawwaii
The Washington Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision that the ensuing loss provision provided coverage for a deck that collapsed due to rot and decay. Sprague v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2012 Wash. LEXIS 375 (Wash. May 17, 2012). Our prior post on the Court of Appeals’ decision is here.
The Sprague’s home had a deck supported by six "fin walls." The fin walls were encased in a foam and stucco coating. Twenty years after they purchased the home, it was discovered that the fin walls were in an advanced state of decay. Engineers discovered that construction defects caused the supports to rot. The deck was in danger of imminent collapse.
Safeco denied coverage. The all-risk policy did not exclude collapse, but did exclude coverage for losses causes by mold, wet or dry rot.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Journal Marks First Anniversary
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
November 2011 marked the first anniversary of the Construction Defect Journal. During the first year our staff and contributors in the insurance and legal communities have compiled several hundred articles of interest to the construction defect and claims community.
Each of these articles are maintained in the CDJ archives, and are accessible at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/archives.html. Each story in the archives is listed in the order it was posted to the archives. Each story in the archives opens up in its own page, so you can easily locate topics and articles of interest.
If you’re new to Construction Defect Journal, or just want peruse past articles, please take a moment to visit the CDJ Archives page. Also please feel encouraged to submit your firm’s articles or legal publications of interest to the CD community at http://www.constructiondefectjournal.com/submitStory.html.
Courts Are Conflicted As To Whether "Good Faith" Settlement Determinations Can Be Reviewed Via Writ Petition Or Appeal
July 10, 2012 — Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP
The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Three, ruled in Oak Springs Villas Homeowners Association v. Advanced Truss Systems, Inc., et al., (June 14, 2012, B234568) __ Cal.App.4th __ [2012 WL 2149923], that a non-settling defendant cannot appeal a trial court's good faith settlement determination. Instead, a non-settling defendant may only file a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 to challenge a good faith determination. This decision comes on the heels of a 2011 ruling in Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, which found that a writ petition is not the sole means of challenging a trial court's good faith settlement determination.
In Oak Springs Villas, supra, the condominium homeowners' association sued a developer, general contractor, and various subcontractors for alleged construction deficiencies and resultant property damage. The association eventually settled with the developer, but not with a truss manufacturer. The trial court approved the developer's motion for good faith settlement determination, and the truss manufacturer immediately appealed, instead of filing a writ petition. On appeal, the developer argued the good faith determination was not an appealable order. The truss manufacturer argued Cahill applied, as well as an older case, Justus v. Atchison (1977) 19 Cal.3d 564, which allowed for appeals when no remaining issues exist as to the appealing party.
The Court of Appeal ruled in the developer's favor and declined to follow Cahill, stating the truss manufacturer should have filed a writ petition, as expressly required under Section 877.6, subdivision (e). The Court also believed Justus was inapplicable because a non-settling party should not be allowed to have two review opportunities ?Äì one after an adverse good faith ruling, and then another after the ultimate conclusion of the case.
However, the greater effect is that Cahill and Oak Springs Villas simultaneously stand in conflict and appear to be valid law. One case allows for an appeal of a good faith settlement determination, while the other requires strict adherence to the statute. The Supreme Court is likely to review the issue. In the meantime, parties challenging good faith rulings are advised to consult the statutory requirements under Section 877.6, subdivision (e).
Printed courtesy of Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP. Mr. Sunseri can be contacted at ssunseri@gdandb.com and Ms. Kewalramani can be contacted at akewalramani@gdandb.com.
Connecticut Gets Medieval All Over Construction Defects
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Hartford Courant reports that Connecticut is trying a very old tactic in a construction defect suit. The law library building at the University of Connecticut suffered from leaks which have now been repaired. The state waited twelve years after was complete to file lawsuit, despite that Connecticut has a six-year statute of limitations on construction defect claims. Connecticut claims that the statute of limitations does apply to the state.
The state is arguing that a legal principle from the thirteenth century allows it to go along with its suit. As befits a medieval part of common law, the principle is called “nullum tempus occurrit regi,” or “time does not run against the king.” In 1874, the American Law Register said that nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae “has been adopted in every one of the United States” and “is now firmly established law.”
In the case of Connecticut, Connecticut Solicitor General Gregory D’Auria said that “the statute of limitations does not apply to the state.” He also noted that “the state did not ‘wait’ to file the lawsuit. The lawsuit was filed only after all other options and remedies were exhausted.”
Connecticut also argued that “nullus tempus occurrit regi” applied in another construction defect case at the York Correctional Institution. The judge in that case ruled in December 2008 to let the case proceed. But in the library case, Judge William T. Cremins ruled in February 2009 that the statute of limitations should apply to the state as well. Both cases have been appealed, with the library case moving more quickly toward the Connecticut Supreme Court.
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Insurance Company Must Show that Lead Came from Building Materials
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for Louisiana has reversed the summary judgment of a lower court in the case of Widder v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Judge Roland L. Belsome wrote the opinion for the panel of three judges. Ms. Widder discovered that her home and its content were contaminated by lead. She applied to her insurer, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance, which denied her claim.
In response to Ms. Widder’s suit, LCPIC applied for a summary judgment on the grounds that there was no physical loss and that the policy did not cover defective material, latents defects, and pollution damage.
The appeals court found that the lead contamination of Widder’s home did meet the standards of a direct physical loss, citing a recent Chinese Drywall case. There, it was found, “when a home has been rendered unusable or uninhabitable, physical damage is not necessary.”
The lower court addressed only one of LCPIC’s exclusions, addressing only the exclusion on basis of “faulty, inadequate or defective material.” The appeals court noted that the evidence offered at trial does not show that the building materials were the source of the lead. This provided the appeals court with a matter of fact to remand to the lower court.
Read the court’s decision…
Nevada Bill Aims to Reduce Legal Fees For Construction Defect Practitioners
March 21, 2011 — March 21, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
Assemblyman Ira Hansen and twelve additional members of Nevada’s Assembly are sponsoring Assembly Bill 285. AB 285 Revises provisions governing an award of attorney’s fees in causes of action for constructional defects. Existing law generally provides that a claimant may recover reasonable attorney’s fees as part of the claimant’s damages in a cause of action for constructional defects. (NRS 40.655)
This bill removes this provision and instead authorizes a court to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing party involved in such a cause of action if an independent basis for the award exists pursuant to existing law which authorizes a court to award attorney’s fees in certain circumstances, or Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for the payment of reasonable attorney’s fees by an offeree who rejects an offer and subsequently fails to obtain a more favorable judgment.
In an AP report published in Business Week it is suggested that the target objective of legislators centers on what it refers to as Nevada’s "Rampant construction defect lawsuits".
According to Business Week "The suits bring in hundreds of millions of dollars for lawyers and have put construction companies out of business. Hansen says fewer construction firms mean higher prices for Nevada consumers."
Click Here To Read Full Text and Revisions of Assembly Bill 285
Alaska Supreme Court Dismisses Claims of Uncooperative Pro Se Litigant in Defect Case
August 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Alaska Supreme Court found that in the case of Khalsa v. Chose, Ms. Khalsa? failure to cooperate with the courts has obligated them to dismiss her claims against Mr. Chose. Ms. Khalsa bought a home kit from Mandala Custom Homes of Nelson, British Columbia, Canada. Mr. Chose, one of the owners of Mandala was paid by Ms. Khalsa to supervise assembly in Fairbanks. After construction, the roof developed leaks. Ms. Khalsa stated that when climbing a ladder to inspect a skylight leak, she fell and injured herself.
During the subsequent suit, Khalsa proved uncooperative. She skipped a pretrial conference. She attended a hearing that set discovery deadlines but then did not comply with discovery, including her failure to provide medical records documenting her injuries. She eventually said that she would only be able to travel from Arizona to Alaska if the defendants paid for her and her caretaker?s expenses.
When finally deposed, Khalsa terminated the deposition after five minutes, alleging the deposition was “intentionally designed to cause [her] to endure further emotional distress, due to the psychological trauma . . . that was caused or contributed to by the defendants.”
Eventually, the lower court sanctioned her twice. In July, 2008, the court concluded that her failure to provide medical records required dismissal of her injury lawsuit. In October of that year, the court dismissed all remaining claims due to her “pattern of excuses and long delays in providing information for discovery culminating in her refusal to participate in her deposition by the defendants.” Further, Khalsa has argued that the trial court displayed “prejudice and bias toward the pro se plaintiff.”
The Alaska Supreme Court rejected all of Ms. Khalsa?s claims, dismissing her case. They did, however, note that she has thirty days to file an appeal.
Read the court’s decision…
State Farm Too Quick To Deny Coverage, Court Rules
July 22, 2011 — CDJ Staff
On July 13, 2011, Judge Sarah S. Vance of the US District Court issued a rule in the case of Travelers Cas. & Surety Co. of Am. v. Univ. Facilities, Inc. (E.D. La., 2011). In this case, Stanley Smith Drywall was contracted by Capstone Building Corporation to “perform undisclosed work at the facility believed to involve the installation of drywall.” The project involved the design and construction of student residences for the Southeastern Louisiana University in Hammond, Louisiana. In May, 2009, University Facilities, Inc. (UFI) sued Capstone Development Corporation and Capstone On-Campus Management.
State Farm insured Stanley Smith Drywall and they sought a declaration that they have no duty: “(1) to insure Stanley Smith or CBC, or (2) to defend or indemnify any party against UFI's claims in the pending arbitration.” State Farm contends “(1) there is no "occurrence" to trigger coverage under the policy; (2) only breach of contract claims are asserted; (3) there is no property damage alleged; and (4) various coverage limitations and exclusions apply to prevent coverage.’
The court concluded that “whether State Farm has a duty to defend in the arbitration must be determined by considering the claims asserted in the arbitration.” However, the arbitration claims were not made part of the record. There, “, the Court cannot determine as a matter of law State Farm's duty to defend on the present record.” The same was true of State Farm’s duty to indemnify. “Stanley Smith and CBC assert that State Farm's motion for summary judgment was filed before any discovery was conducted in the arbitration proceeding or in this case. The Court finds that State Farm has failed to develop the record sufficiently to establish that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to its duty to indemnify Stanley Smith or CBC in the arbitration.’
The court denied State Farm’s motion for a summary judgment on its duty to defend and indemnify.
Read the court’s decision…
Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Utah Construction Defect Claims Dependant on Contracts
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
An owner who wants to sue a subcontractor directly may find limited ability to do so under Utah court decisions. Writing on the JDSupra site, Stewart O. Peay and Mark O. Morris of Snell & Wilmer discuss the distinction the Utah courts make between contractor (with whom an owner has direct contracts) and subcontractors (with whom an owner does not). In the Utah courts, construction defect claims must be based on contract, rather than tort. With no contract, there is no way to pursue claims against a subcontractor alone.
They note that the Utah couts do not “accept negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims that many other jurisdictions embrace.” They recommend that in setting up contracts for a construction project, owners should ensure that they are provided with “third-party beneficiary rights to purse claims against subs.” They suggest that “the owner may require his generals to include language in the various subcontracts that incorporates some or all of the terms of the prime contract into the subcontracts.” Additionally they suggest that the owner “require the general to include ‘flow down’ provisions in the various subcontracts.”
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Construction Defects and Contractor-Owners
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
On the expert advice site Avvo.com, a user asks if he can be sued for construction defects by the new owner of a building for which he served as general contractor and then owned for four years. He had construction insurance, but does not think he had construction defect insurance.
A lawyer responding to his question says that “you could be sued.” In the event of a suit, “you would have to bring claims against all of your subcontractors.”
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Court Rules on a Long List of Motions in Illinois National Insurance Co v Nordic PCL
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Illinois National Insurance Co. v Nordic PCL, et al. “involves a dispute about whether insurance benefits are available to a general contractor who built structures that allegedly have construction defects. Plaintiffs Illinois National Insurance Company (‘Illinois National’) and National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA (‘National Union’) (collectively, the ‘Insurers’), commenced this action for declaratory relief against Defendant Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction, Ltd. ("Nordic"), on August 23, 2011.”
The court was asked to rule on a long list of motions: “Counterclaim Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice in Support of Their (1) Motion to Dismiss the Counterclaim and (2) Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim, ECF No. 16 (‘Request for Judicial Notice’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 14 (‘Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim’); Counterclaim Defendants’ Motion to Strike Portions of the Counterclaim Filed October 24, 2011, ECF No. 15 (‘Motion to Strike’); Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 33 (‘Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay’); Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc., f/k/a Nordic Construction Ltd.’s Substantive Joinder to Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA Inc.’s Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Stay Proceedings in Favor of Pending State Action, ECF No. 36 (‘Nordic’s Joinder’); and Third-Party Defendant Marsh USA, Inc.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on Counts V and VI of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Nordic PCL Construction, Inc.’s Third-Party Complaint, ECF No. 29 (‘Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings’).”
In result, the court reached the following decisions: “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice to the extent it covers matters relevant to these motions; GRANTS IN PART the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, but gives Nordic leave to amend the Counterclaim in certain respects; DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike; DENIES Marsh’s Motion To Dismiss Or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder; and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings.”
The court provides a bit of background on the case: “This action arises out of alleged construction defects involving two projects on which Nordic acted as the general contractor. Nordic is a defendant in a pending state court action with respect to one of the projects and says it spent more than $400,000 on repairs with respect to the other project. Nordic tendered the defense of the pending state court action to the Insurers and sought reimbursement of the cost of repairs already performed. The Insurers responded by filing this action to determine their rights under the insurance policies issued to Nordic.”
Furthermore, the court presented a brief procedural history: “The Insurers commenced this declaratory action in this court on August 23, 2011. The Complaint asserts two claims, one seeking a declaration that the Insurers have no duty to provide a defense or indemnification regarding the Safeway Action, the other seeking such a declaration regarding the Moanalua Claims. Along with its Answer, Nordic filed a Counterclaim against the Insurers. The Counterclaim asserts breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, and bad faith, and seeks declaratory relief against the Insurers.”
The procedural history continues: “Nordic also filed a Third-Party Complaint against Marsh, the broker that had procured the Policies from the Insurers for Nordic. Nordic alleges that it reasonably believed that the Policies would provide completed operations insurance coverage for the types of construction defects alleged in the Safeway Action and Moanalua Claims. The Third-Party Complaint asserts breach of contract, negligence, promissory estoppel, breach of fiduciary duties, implied indemnity, and contribution and equitable subrogation.”
In conclusion, “The court GRANTS IN RELEVANT PART the Insurers’ Request for Judicial Notice. With regard to the Insurers’ Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim, the court GRANTS the motion as to Count I (breach of contract), Count II (duty of good faith and fair dealing), Count III (fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation), the portion of Count IV (bad faith) premised on fraud, and Count IV (declaratory relief). The court DENIES the motion as to Count IV (bad faith) that is not premised on fraud. Except with respect to the "occurrence" issue, which the court disposes of here on the merits, and Count V, which concerns only a form of relief, Nordic is given leave to amend its Counterclaim within three weeks of the date of this order. The court DENIES the Insurers’ Motion to Strike, DENIES Marsh’s Motion to Dismiss or Stay and Nordic’s Joinder, and GRANTS Marsh’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Counts V and VI of the Third-Party Complaint.”
Read the court’s decision…
Home Repair Firms Sued for Fraud
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Illinois Attorney General has filed a lawsuit in Cook County Circuit Court alleging that two connected firms took money from homeowners and then failed to perform the contracted work. One of the three defendants, Chris Bidigare, was an owner of agent of both Fairway Construction and Maintenance Services, LLC, and Rock Construction Management, LLC.
In once case, according to the article on the OakPark Patch, one homeowner provided a $111,000 down payment, only to have the company cancel the job and refuse to return the money. One homeowner was told by Fairway that she should contact their insurance provider. The insurance provider told her that Fairway’s insurance had been cancelled due to non-payment.
The suit seeks to bar the three defendants from working in home repair in Illinois.
Read the full story…
California Supreme Court Binds Homeowner Associations To Arbitration Provisions In CC&Rs
September 13, 2012 — Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP (http://www.gdandb.com).
The California Supreme Court ruled in Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Development (August 16, 2012, S186149) __ Cal.4th __ [2012 WL 3516134], that arbitration provisions within the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (“CC&Rs”) for condominium projects are enforceable against their homeowner associations. The ruling — two years in the making — was based on legislative history of laws governing common interest developments, and decades of decisional authority involving contracts and arbitration provisions.
In Pinnacle, a homeowners association sued a condominium builder for construction defects and resultant property damage to the common areas, and to the separate property interests held by the individual members. The builder moved to compel arbitration, based on a provision contained in the CC&Rs which required resolution of all construction disputes through binding arbitration. The association argued it could not be compelled to arbitrate these claims because it was not a party to the agreement to arbitrate, asserting “the Association did not bargain with [the builder] over the terms of the Project CC&R's or participate in their drafting.”
The Supreme Court rejected the association's argument on the grounds that the builder-authored CC&Rs complied with the Davis-Stirling Act (“the Act”) (Civil Code §1350, et seq.) ? the law that governs all common interest developments in California. Under the Act, builders and sellers of common interest residential units are required to provide a copy of the CC&Rs to all purchasers, as well as copies of the Department of Real Estate's public report, which informs purchasers of their rights and remedies as members of the association, and encourages each prospective purchaser to review the terms carefully before entering into any agreement. Further, the Act states all CC&Rs are enforceable, unless unreasonable, and inure to the benefit of and bind all owners in the development. (Civ. Code, §1354, subd. (a).) The Court found each owner who purchased a condominium in the project either expressly consented to the terms and provisions of the CC&Rs or was deemed to have consented to the terms at the time of purchase.
The Court also did not find the arbitration provision to be unconscionable. The Court indicated the provision was drafted and recorded in accordance with the Act, which allowed each prospective purchaser to make an informed decision prior buying a condominium unit. The provision also limited arbitration to construction defect disputes. The Court did not find any evidence the provision “shocked the conscience” or was “oppressive” in any way.
Pinnacle settles a decades-long conflict over whether arbitration provisions in CC&Rs for condominium projects are enforceable against homeowner associations and their members. It remains unclear, however, whether Pinnacle’s rationale will be applied to cases involving homeowner associations for single-family residences (as opposed to condominiums), assuming those CC&Rs have similar arbitration requirements. Regardless, the result of Pinnacle is clear, if arbitration provisions contained in condominium CC&Rs meet the fairness and unconscionability tests set out by the Court, more condominium construction defect cases brought by homeowner associations will be resolved through the arbitration process.
Read the court’s decision…
Printed courtesy of Stephen A. Sunseri and Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Ballance LLP. Mr. Sunseri can be contacted at ssunseri@gdandb.com and Ms. Kewalramani can be contacted at akewalramani@gdandb.com.