No-Show Contractor Can’t Hide from Construction Defect Claim
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The failure of R. J. Haas to produce documents or make himself available for deposition has worn out the patience of the US District Court in San Jose. Judge Howard Lloyd issued a ruling inProbuilders Specialty Ins. Co. v. Valley Corp. (N.D. Cal., 2012).
Probuilders issued an insurance policy covering Haas for their work on the construction of a single-family home for Ty and Karen Levine. The Levines sued Haas for “shoddy and incomplete work.” Probuilders contends that Haas “made material misrepresentations with respect to verifying that the subcontractors had insurance.” Since November 2011, Haas has been without legal counsel in this matter.
Despite Probuilder’s attempts, the court noted that “Hass any not provided any documents in response to the plaintiff’s three sets of requests for production of documents.” Haas also “has refused to make himself available for deposition.” Haas was first scheduled for deposition in September, 2011. Subsequently, Haas has rescheduled his deposition repeatedly, postponing it to January 4, then February 13, and then agreed to be deposed “before the then-scheduled March 15 mediation,” after which he said he would “be unavailable to be deposed before April.
The court noted that although Haas “hay have had legitimate reasons for wishing to continue his deposition, such as illness and his attempt to retain new counsel,” however, the court concluded that “Haas has had ample time to retain new counsel and prepare for deposition.
The court also found fault with Haas’s objections to certain terms in the Request for Admissions, among them “named,” “independent contractor,” and “work,” noting that Haas called these “vague and ambiguous.” The court called it “quibbling,” and noted that the federal courts disfavor this. Later in the decision, the court made it clear that Haas “is obligated under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to respond to discovery requests.” And concludes, “that he has apparently been seeking to retain new counsel for over five months does not give him license to ignore plaintiff’s discovery requests entirely.
The court granted Probuilders the option of filing a motion for sanctions. Mr. Haas did not attend or participate.
Read the court’s decision…
Hawaii Building Codes to Stay in State Control
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Hawaii State Senate voted down Senate Bill 2692. Had it been passed, the State Building Code Council would have been abolished and building codes would have become the responsibility of county governments. The bill was opposed by the Insurance Institute for Business and Home Safety. Their director of code development, Wanda Edwards said that the bill “would have undermined key components that are essential to an effective state building code regime.”
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Seven Former North San Diego County Landfills are Leaking Contaminants
April 7, 2011 — April 7, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Deborah Sullivan Brennan of the North County Times reported that seven former dumps in San Diego are leaking contaminants into the surrounding groundwater. John R. Odermatt, a senior engineering geologist for the California Regional Water Quality Control Board s San Diego region, told the North County Times, “the risk to most county residents is very small or negligible, while local water supplies located in more rural areas may be at a somewhat elevated but unquantified level of risk.”
This issue is causing heavy scrutiny of a new proposed landfill in Gregory Canyon. The landfill would be located on 308 acres of undeveloped land near Pala, alongside the San Luis Rey River. The group “Save Gregory Canyon” has been speaking out against the landfill, stating that “the project threatens major detrimental impacts to both surface and groundwater, as well as a potential compromise of the two major San Diego Water Authority pipelines nearby.” Richard Felago, a Gregory Canyon Ltd. Consultant, told the North County Times that the 8-foot-thick liner, composed of layers of gravel and synthetic material, would not leak.
The appeal hearing is being rescheduled later this month after one of the three panelists recused himself due to having a competing interest in the property, according to the article by Gary Warth in the North County Times.
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Colorado Court of Appeals Finds Damages to Non-Defective Property Arising From Defective Construction Covered Under Commercial General Liability Policy
December 20, 2012 — Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
The recently decided case of Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company (Colo. Ct. App. 10CA2638, October 25, 2012), confirms that absent specific exclusions in the policy, a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy covers damages to non-defective property arising from a builder’s own defective workmanship.
Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. (“Colorado Pool”) was hired as a subcontractor to install a swimming pool at Founders Village Pool and Community Center (“Founders Village”) in Castle Rock, Colorado. After the concrete shell of the pool was placed, some of the rebar frame was found to be too close to the surface. Founders Village demanded that Colorado Pool remove and replace the pool, and Colorado Pool contacted its insurance carrier, Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”), with which Colorado Pool held a CGL policy. After inspecting the pool, Scottsdale’s claims adjuster stated that the insurance policy would cover losses associated with removing and replacing the pool.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com
The Complete and Accepted Work Doctrine and Construction Defects
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Matthew C. Bouchard of Lewis & Roberts PLLC, writes how North Carolina is “bucking the trend” on the “complete and accepted work doctrine.” As he notes, in most states “a contractor can be found liable for personal injuries suffered by third parties from accidents occurring after the contractor’s work is completed and accepted.” But one exception is North Carolina.
He gives the example of a case, Lamb v. D.S. Duggins Welding, Inc., in which a site superintendent was “injured by the alleged negligence of the project’s steel deck installer, a sub-subcontractor in the contractual chain” “after the sub-sub’s work had been completed and accepted.” The trial court held that the “completed and accepted work doctrine” ended the subcontractor’s liability. The case noted that “employees of the general contractor had modified the installation of the perimeter safety cable in question after the sub-sub had demobilized from the site.”
Mr. Bouchard notes that “once a project is accepted and turned over, the contractor typically loses control over maintenance of the new facility.” However, he notes that “where the contractor’s work constitutes negligence ?Ķ the doctrine may not apply.” Nor does it end breach of contract claims. It only covers third parties.
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Ninety-Day Extension Denied to KB Home in Construction Defect Insurance Claim
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A magistrate judge has denied a request by KB Home Nevada to extend the time for service an additional ninety days. KB claims that St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company has failed to defend them in a construction defect claim. However, the judge did grant KB an additional twenty days to effectuate service, noting that the request for additional time may be renewed.
Read the court’s decision…
Lawsuit over Construction Defects Not a Federal Case
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United State District Court in California has dismissed the claims of a contractor against the United States government, on the grounds that it was not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The origins of the case are in a related construction defect claim. The current plaintiff, Performance Contracting, Inc., did the lath and plaster work for a building for the Department of Veterans Affairs. After the building was completed, the Veterans Affairs complained to the general contractor, Wynema, Inc., of water intrusion problems.
Wyema and Performance conducted testing and the water intrusion was found to be due to “a variety of design defects and omissions, including: 1) omission of proper window flashing; 2) inadequate waterproof membrane around the windows; 3) inadequate T-molding around the windows; 4) lack of a window sill pan for the windows; 5) lack of any backing in the window framing; 6) lack of any backing for the stucco expansion joints and seams; and 7) failure to require that a performance mock-up of the window assembly and adjacent areas be built and water tested.” Wyema filed a construction defect action against Performance and other subcontractors.
In the current case, Performance claims that Veteran Affairs was negligent, that it “breached its duty to Plaintiff when it provided deficient plants and specifications” and “failed to properly oversee construction and inspect Project work.” The court determined that it could not hear this case, noting that “Federal Courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions.”
Performance raised its claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The judge was not persuaded by this claim, noting that the FTCA does not apply to purported breach of the General Contract. The FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity in cases of “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
Performance was unable to pursue its claims in the Court of Federal Claims as there was no contract between Performance and the government. However, the court noted that Performance’s inability to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims does not open up a path to the District Court. “Litigants are not guaranteed a forum in which to sue the United States.” The court further noted that “if this Court were to accept Plaintiff’s logic, non-parties to contracts, but not parties, would be free to pursue contract claims in the fora of their choosing.”
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Florida Property Bill Passes Economic Affairs Committee with Amendments
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Florida Property Bill (HBB 803) was passed by the Economic Affairs Committee by a vote of 11-7, according to Property Casualty 360, after adopting nine new amendments. The additions to the bill included limiting notice of claims to a set number of years, extending the statute of limitation on property claims from five years to six years, among others.
HB 803 and SB 408, the Senate companion bill, focus primarily on residential property insurance. They make changes to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, while also promoting increased notification of policy changes to policyholders. Sections of the bills provide minor fixes such as renaming Citizens Property Insurance Corporation to Taxpayer-Funded Property Insurance Corporation. However, other sections of the bills contain more significant policy changes such as sinkhole coverage and hurricane claims.
The bills’ intent, according to the SunSentinel.com, is to reduce fraudulent claims and to bring new insurers into the insurance market. However, SunSentinel.com also reports that the bills may drastically increase property insurance premiums.
Read the full Property Casualty 360 article...
Read the full Sun Sentinel article...
Appeals Court Reverses Summary Judgment over Defective Archway Construction
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A judge has ruled that a plaintiff can go forward with her suit that she was injured by a defective archway during a birthday party. A three-judge panel of the California Court of Appeals issued this ruling on January 23, 2012, in the case of Trujillo v. Cosio.
Ms. Trujillo attended a birthday party at the home of Maria Cosio and Joel Verduzco. A piñata was hung between a tree and a brick archway. Ms. Trujillo went to get candy that had fallen from the piñata, during which the archway fell on her hand. Subsequent examination of the archway showed that it had not been “properly anchored to the supporting pillars to protect the arch from falling.”
Ms. Cosio and Mr. Verduzco argued that they could not have been aware of the defective nature of the archway’s construction, as it had been built at the request of the prior property owner. The structure was constructed without building permits. Mark Burns, a civil engineer testifying for the plaintiff, said that “a reasonable property owner would have thoroughly tested the archway to ensure it was capable of withstanding such horizontal forces before allowing children to enter into the area.” Mr. Burns noted that twenty rope pulls would have been sufficient to demonstrate the structure’s instability.
The trial court rejected Mr. Burn’s statements, finding that the respondents did not have any knowledge of the defect and that a visual inspection should have sufficed. The court noted that this a triable issue, whether visual inspection suffices, or whether the property owners should have done as Mr. Burns suggested and yank a rope twenty times. The court noted that “although a jury may ultimately disagree with Burn’s opinion, it was supported by sufficient foundation and was not speculative.”
The opinion was written by Judge Flier, with Judges Rubin and Grimes concurring.
Read the court’s decison…
Foundation Arbitration Doesn’t Preclude Suing Over Cracks
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Louisiana Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of a lower court, allowing a construction defect case to go through. In Greer v. Town Construction Company, the Greers hired Town Construction to build a home in Baton Rouge. The business relationship went sour, with disputes over “costs, change orders, workmanship, and timeliness issues.”
Town Construction filed an arbitration claim for the unpaid contract balance. In the counterclaim, the Greers made claims of mold and mildew problems, and wall cracks that they attributed to a “structural defect in the foundation.” In arbitration, Town Construction was awarded the full contract balance plus extra costs and interest, while the Greers were awarded for their structural claims.
Three years later, the Greers found additional cracks and filed a suit against Town Construction. Town Construction argued that the Greer’s lawsuit should be dismissed, as the claims had already been through the arbitration process. The district court agreed with Town Construction and dismissed the suit.
The appeals court noted that the Greers would have no ground for a suit if the arbitration was a “valid and final judgment,” and went on to note that there was no evidence in the trial record that the arbitration met this qualification. The court noted that although it was clear that both parties had agreed to the decisions of the arbiter, under Louisiana law, arbitration is not final until it has been “rendered by a court with jurisdiction over subject mater and over parties.”
The court remanded the case to the lower court, noting that “the district court is obligated to first determine whether a valid arbitration award is in existence and had been confirmed before considering the merits of the exception. The court noted that their decision “should not be read to express any opinion as to the merits of the claims or as to the propriety of damages sought in the Greer’s lawsuit.”
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Defect Exception Does Not Lift Bar in Payment Dispute
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of appeals of Oregon has affirmed the ruling of a lower court, agreeing that ORS 701.131(1) bars John Pincetich from pursuing a payment dispute against his clients, Thomas and Frances Nolan. The Nolans hired Mr. Pincetich to build a home, during which time Mr. Pinchtich lost his license due to a lapse in liability insurance. Mr. Pincetich was reinstated after reestablishing insurance.
After the house was concluded, a dispute over payment arose. The Nolans claimed that Mr. Pincetich was unable to bring an action against them as ORS 701.131(1)(b) specifies that the contractor must hold a license “continuously while performing the work for which compensation is sought.” As there were fourteen days in which Mr. Pincetich did not hold a license, the trial court concluded that this law did not apply.
Mr. Pincetich claimed that in hiring him, the defendants became residential developers. Mr. Pincetich argued that developers are exempted under ORS 701.121(2)(C), but this was rejected by the trial court. This formed the basis of his appeal. The appeals court concluded that the exception he cited was motivated to “further benefit consumers by providing authority for unlicensed contractors to pursue third-party claims in construction-defect cases.” The court concluded that Mr. Pincetich’s reasoning would “allow unlicensed contractors to do the very thing that the claims bar is intended to prevent them from doing.”
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Connecticut Gets Medieval All Over Construction Defects
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Hartford Courant reports that Connecticut is trying a very old tactic in a construction defect suit. The law library building at the University of Connecticut suffered from leaks which have now been repaired. The state waited twelve years after was complete to file lawsuit, despite that Connecticut has a six-year statute of limitations on construction defect claims. Connecticut claims that the statute of limitations does apply to the state.
The state is arguing that a legal principle from the thirteenth century allows it to go along with its suit. As befits a medieval part of common law, the principle is called “nullum tempus occurrit regi,” or “time does not run against the king.” In 1874, the American Law Register said that nullum tempus occurrit reipublicae “has been adopted in every one of the United States” and “is now firmly established law.”
In the case of Connecticut, Connecticut Solicitor General Gregory D’Auria said that “the statute of limitations does not apply to the state.” He also noted that “the state did not ‘wait’ to file the lawsuit. The lawsuit was filed only after all other options and remedies were exhausted.”
Connecticut also argued that “nullus tempus occurrit regi” applied in another construction defect case at the York Correctional Institution. The judge in that case ruled in December 2008 to let the case proceed. But in the library case, Judge William T. Cremins ruled in February 2009 that the statute of limitations should apply to the state as well. Both cases have been appealed, with the library case moving more quickly toward the Connecticut Supreme Court.
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Statute of Repose Dependant on When Subcontractors Finished
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Scott C. Sandberg of Snell and Wilmer writes a post on the JDSupra site about the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Shaw Construction v. United Builder Services. Sanberg notes that when the general contractor was sued by an HOA, the contractor turned around and sued its subcontractors. The contractor made three claims. They claimed that “improvement” referred to the whole project, that “substantial completion” was reached when the architect certified completion, and that the statute of repose was tolled by the HOA’s service of a Construction Defect Action Reform Act notice.
The subcontractors claimed that “improvement” only referred to their specific work, which reached “substantial completion” when they finished, despite work to be done by other later, and the HOA’s notice to the contractor did not affect the subcontractors. The Colorado court agreed with the subcontractors.
Sandberg notes that some of the contractor’s were not addressed by the court, noting that “the court did not decide whether an improvement triggering the statute of repose can be determined on a trade-by-trade basis,” and that “the court did not decide whether substantial completion occurs when a certificate of occupancy is issued or when the architect certifies completion.”
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Cleveland Condo Board Says Construction Defects Caused Leaks
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A Cleveland condo association has sued the developer of their building, claiming that construction defects resulted in water intrusion. The K&D Group, which still owns forty units in the 160-unit building, claim that it’s a maintenance issue that they’d like to see fixed, but it’s their responsibility as the developer. Doug Price, CEO of K&D calls it a “frivolous lawsuit.” He blames a “hostile board” and told The Plain Dealer “there’s simple maintenance that they refuse to do.”
An outside company evaluated Stonebridge Towers. According to the condo board’s lawyer, Laura Hauser, the building design and construction are to blame for the water intrusion. Hauser said that the board’s “goal through this litigation is to find a resolution for the association, the building and the owners.”
David Kaman, a Cleveland attorney not involved in the lawsuit, told the Plain Dealer that construction litigation in the Cleveland area had fallen off from 2007, but he sees it on the rise, which he attributes to cost-cutting on recently finished projects. “If an owner moves in and two years later the wallpaper needs to be replaced because the wall is leaking, that’s a construction defect.”
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Restitution Unlikely in Las Vegas Construction Defect Scam
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The San Francisco Chronicle reports that the money lost in the Las Vegas HOA fraud cause is probably not recoverable. Victims of the scam have asked the court for restitution, but Judge Lloyd George doubts any of the money will be found, saying “the money is not available, it would appear.”
One Vistana board members not part of the conspiracy told reporters that the $8 million construction defect settlement never went for needed repairs. “Within six months that money was gone,” said Bruce Wallace, a retired Air Force colonel. After the construction defect account was depleted to $450,000, two board members disappeared with the funds.
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Businesspeople to Nevada: Revoke the Construction Defect Laws
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Nevada chapter of the National Federation of Independent Businesses has said that Nevada’s construction defect and minimum wage laws are hampering job growth. The organization conducted a survey, and although only about two percent of the members responded, they passed the opinions of the group on to Governor Brian Sandoval. Sandoval has said, according to the report by Fox News Reno, that he wants the state to be more business friendly. He supports reforms to Nevada’s construction defect laws, saying that he’d “like to see some reform” on the issue of mandatory attorney’s fees.
Randi Thompson, the spokesperson for the Nevada chapter of the National Federation of Independent Businesses, said that members of her organization would like to see current Nevada construction defect law revoked. She described current law as “driven towards lawyers and not toward protecting consumers.”
Read the full story…
Michigan Supreme Court Concludes No Statute of Repose on Breach of Contract
July 19, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Judge Marilyn Kelly of the Michigan Supreme Court has remanded the case of Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr. Inc. (Mich., 2011) to the Court of Appeals, after determining that the court had improperly applied the statute of repose. She reversed their judgment, pending a new trial.
Ahrens Construction was a subcontractor, hired by Miller-Davis to build and install a natatorium room at a YMCA camp in Kalamazoo, Michigan. After its installation, the YMCA discovered a severe condensation problem, causing moisture to “rain” from the roof. The architect, testifying for Miller-Davis, alleged that the problems were due to improper installation by Ahrens. Ahrens claimed that the condensation problem was due to a design error.
When the roof was removed and reconstructed, the moisture problem ended. Ahrens argued that the alleged defects were caused by the removal. Further, in trial Ahrens raised the issue of the statute of repose. The court found in favor of Miller-Davis and did not address the statute of repose.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, determining that the statute of repose had barred the suit. This rendered the other issues moot.
The Michigan Supreme concluded that the issue at hand was “a suit for breach of contract,” and that the Michigan statute of repose is limited to tort actions. They remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the issues that had been mooted by the application of the statute of repose.
Read the court’s decision…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.