Can Negligent Contractors Shift Blame in South Carolina?
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Clay Olson looks back to a 1991 Carolina case, Nelson v. Concrete Supply Company. The court concluded in that case that “a plaintiff in South Carolina may recover only if his/her negligence does not exceed that of the defendant’s and amount of plaintiff’s recovery shall be reduced in proportion to amount of his or her negligence; if there is more than one defendant, plaintiff’s negligence shall be compared to combined negligence of all defendants.” In 2005, he reports, as part of tort reform in South Carolina, the legislature further addressed this.
He then suggests a possible outcome of this is that negligent contractors may be able to shift some of the blame (and cost of the settlement) to other defendants who may not be to blame. He offers a scenario in which a contractor is sued for construction defects and a jury has to allocate responsibility for indivisible damage. “A jury need only find the two subcontractors to have each contributed 15% of the indivisible damage.” He adds in another 15% for claims against the architect. Minor blame is given to the manufacturers, and suddenly the negligent contractor is paying less than 50% of the total settlement.
He notes that the previous system in place also had its problems, but notes that this one may not be “fair and equitable.”
Read the full story…
Underpowered AC Not a Construction Defect
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
After buying a home in Louisiana, Mike Gines determined that the home’s air conditioning unit was insufficient to maintain an appropriate temperature. He contacted the home builder, D.R. Horton, Inc., which worked with the air conditioning installer, Reliant Heating & Air Conditioning, in order to repair the system. When the problems persisted, Gines filed a class action petition against Horton and Reliant in state court. Horton and Reliant moved the case to the federal courts, whereupon Gines asserted the defendants were in violation of the Louisiana New Home Warranty Act (NHWA). Horton stated that the claim under the NHWA was invalid, because Gines had not alleged actual physical damage to his home.
The district court granted Horton’s motion to dismiss. Gines sought a reversal from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and sought to have two questions of state law addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
The district court ruled that the NHWA was the “sole remedy under Louisiana law for a purchaser of a new home with construction defects. Gines argued that court erred in this, but also conceded that this was the conclusion of the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Further, Gines argued that a provision in the NHWA that allows the inclusion of construction defects that do not cause damage was satisfied by paragraph 6 of the contract. The court noted that Gines did not attach a copy of the contract to either the original or amended complaint, and so the court does not need to address these claims. However, the court cautioned that if a copy had been included, they still would have rejected the claim, as “the cited language does not indicate a waiver of the physical damage requirement.” They also note that “paragraph 13 of the contract shows that Gines was aware to the absence of any such waiver in the contract.”
The court concludes that “the moral of this story is that in order to avoid the harsh result that has obtained here, the buyer of a newly constructed home in Louisiana should seek to obtain in the contract of sale an express waiver of the actual damage requirement of the NHWA.” The appeals court affirmed the decision of the circuit court and denied the application to certify questions to the Louisiana Supreme Court.
Read the court’s decision…
Delaware “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6)
June 10, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Baldo, No. 09-338 (D. Del. June 2, 2011), claimants condominium association and unit owners sued project developer Rehoboth and general contractor Capano seeking damages because of moisture penetration property damage to common elements and individual units resulting from construction defects. Rehoboth and Capano filed a third party complaint against insured property manager Baldo alleging that, if Rehoboth and Capano were liable to claimants, Baldo was also liable because of Baldo’s failure to properly manage, maintain, and repair the property
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Louisiana Politicians Struggle on Construction Bills, Hospital Redevelopment
June 16, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Louisiana politicians are still working on a compromise in the state’s construction budget, as reported in the Times-Picayune. Rob Marrianneax, the chair of the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee, removed a $45 million request from Governor Bobby Jindal and added $4 million for projects that Jindal vetoed last year.
Two senators have formed competing plans to fund redevelopment construction for New Orleans’s Methodist Hospital. Mitch Landrieu, the mayor of New Orleans, hoped for $30 million dollars in state bonds. Senator Cynthia Willard-Lewis proposed an amendment that would supply $1.6 million, while Senator J.P. Morrell has an amendment that would supply $4 million.
Read the full story…
Georgia Supreme Court Rules Construction Defects Can Constitute an Occurrence in CGL Policies
April 5, 2011 — April 5, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Recently, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the decision in American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Company v Hathaway Development Company, Inc. stating that because Whisnant’s faulty workmanship caused damage to the surrounding properties, the construction defects constituted “occurrences” under the Commercial General Liability (CGL) policy. Unlike the South Carolina Supreme court ruling in the case of Crossman Communities v Harleysville Mutual, the Georgia Supreme Court stated that an accident can happen intentionally if the effect is not the intended result.
Interestingly, the only dissenting judge, J. Melton, disagreed with his colleagues on the basis that “although the term ‘accident’ is not specifically defined in the policy, it is axiomatic that an ‘accident’ cannot result from ‘intentional’ behavior.” It is clear that what constitutes an occurrence in CGL policies is still being hotly debated.
Read the full story...
Know the Minnesota Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Writing on the Benson Kerrane Storz Nelson web site, Alex Nelson gives an overview of the Minnesota laws covering statutes of limitation and repose. He notes that frequently when his firm declines to take a construction defect case its’ over a missed statute of limitation. He describes the time periods as both “short” and “ambigious.” The briefest limit is that a homeowner “has only 6 months within which to give written notice of the defect to the builder once the defect has manifested itself.” Any legal action must commence within two years of the same point.
The Minnesota statutes also have a six-year limitation, which starts for a single home at transfer of title to the first purchaser or when the purchaser takes possession, whichever happens first. For a condo, it is the last of “completion of the common element,” first unit sale or “Termination of Declarant control.” Fraud or misrepresentation also has a six-year limit, while negligence claims are limited to within the first two years “after the manifestation of the defect.”
The statues of repose also provide limits to filing construction defect lawsuits. Mr. Nelson points out that the longest are for negligence, fraud, and “major construction defects,” all of which have a ten-year limit. On the other hand, claims against general workmanship and materials must be made in the first year.
Read the full story…
US Courts in Nevada Busy with Yellow Brass
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Judge Robert C. Jones, the chief judge of the United States District Court of Nevada, and Judge Peggy A. Leen, a magistrate judge with the same court, have issued orders in cases involving allegations of high-zinc yellow brass plumbing components. Judge Jones issued orders on Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. and Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association on July 9, 2012. Judge Leen issued orders on Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc. on July 10, and The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc. on July 19.
Chief Judge Jones held an omnibus hearing on Waterfall v. Viega on June 12. During that hearing “Chief Judge Jones had already agreed that the claims against the product manufacturers should be be severed from the majority of the other claims and that discovery should proceed on different tracks.” Judge Leen ordered that the Southern Terrace claims be referred to Chief Judge Jones to determine if it should be consolidated with other yellow brass cases.
Chief Judge Jones’s decision in Greystone Nevada rests on issues of whether the affected homeowners had signed arbitration agreements. The judge found that the “Defendant’s claims that the seven homeowners they have identified are subsequent purchasers who need not arbitrate with Greystone is definitively refuted by the evidence.”
Judge Leen cites the Greystone decision in her ruling on Seasons Homeowners Association v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada. Richmond seeks to compel individual arbitration, stating that “the arbitration clause used singular rather than plural terms, and therefore, class arbitration was foreclosed.” Judge Leen determined that “under Nevada law, a homeowners association has statutory authority to represent homeowners associations in these types of actions. She did, however, accept Richmond’s argument that they could compel arbitration.
The Waterfall order involves an attempt by two homeowners associations to seek a class action against seventeen defendants, the first twelve of whom are described as “the Viega Defendants” and “the Uponor Defendants.” Chief Judge Jones notes that “many of these Defendants have been sued in identical class actions by the same law firms, but with different named defendants.” The homeowner association seek to “represent their own 998 members directly but also wish to represent up to 10,000 homeowner associations representing up to 250,000 similarly situated homeowner members throughout the Las Vega area via this class action.”
The judge has denied the Viega Defendants’ attempt to deny class certification, noting that the plaintiffs “argue that they intend to argue for class certification under Rule 23(b)(3). He also denied the motions by the two groups of the Viega Defendants. The U.S. Viega Defendants sought to be dismissed from the case for a variety of reasons. The judge noted of the claim that the plaintiffs had no injury of fact and are not alleging actual damage is contradicted by the allegations of actual damage made by the plaintiffs. ”They have alleged that the parts are defective and have already begun to corrode in at least a few sample circumstances, even if they have not yet failed.” To the argument that there re not particular claims made against defendants, the judge notes, “it is clear from the Complaint which Defendants are alleged to have manufactured and sold which brands of allegedly defective products, and which Defendants are alleged to have installed them.”
The German Viega firms also sought to be dismissed from the suit, noting that “they have no property, employees, accounts, advertisements, etc. in Nevada and have not sold any products in Nevada.” However, the judge notes that “at least Waterfall, and perhaps Red Bluff, was still under construction when Viega, Inc. became the sole shareholder of Vanguard Industries, Inc.”
Finally, both of Chief Judge Jones’s rulings cite a related case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota involving a class action settlement for those with F1807 systems. He notes in both these cases that “Plaintiffs disclaimed any claims based upon F1807 components.”
Read the courts' decisions…
Waterfall Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
Greystone Nevada, LLC v. Anthem Highlands Community Association
Southern Terrace Homeowners Association v. Viega, Inc.
The Seasons Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Richmond American Homes of Nevada, Inc.
Instant Hotel Tower, But Is It Safe?
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Broad Sustainable Building has leapfrogged in China’s construction boom by building a thirty-story hotel in just fifteen days in the city of Changsha. According to an article in the Los Angeles Times, most of the building was prefabricated, but most prefabricated buildings require a longer time for assembly. Broad claimed that it cut no corners on safety. However, Zhang Li, a Beijing architect, told the Times that “incredible speed also means incredible risk.”
At the completion date, the interior was still partially finished. Some rooms were furnished, while others weren’t quite so ready. The hotel will be used to house clients who are visiting Broad and some of its employees.
Broad called their process “the most profound innovation in human history” and predicted that soon a third of new buildings worldwide would be constructed this way. The company anticipates using the same process to build taller buildings, with hopes of eventually constructing a 150-story building.
China is currently undergoing a building boom which Zhang attributed to a desire to catch up to the developed world. As a result of this boom, he noted that building inspections are often skipped in China to speed up building.
Read the full story…
Insurance Policy Provides No Coverage For Slab Collapse in Vision One
August 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
This post will examine whether Division Two of the Washington Court of Appeals properly reversed and remanded several lower court decisions in the case of Vision One LLC v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance. In short, and from the perspective of an appellate attorney, the court of appeals got the decision right. Given the rules of contract interpretation and causation in tort claims, there was really no other way the court could have ruled. I understand that from a contractor’s perspective and insurance perspective, the decision seems odd. But from a purely legal standpoint, the decision is well-reasoned and well-supported. Let me explain.
Background
First, here are the facts in a nutshell. Vision One is a construction company that undertook to construct a condo complex in Tacoma. Vision then contracted with D&D Concrete to pour a concrete slab for a section of the foundation. To shore the concrete slab, D&D further contracted Berg Equipment to provide necessary equipment to stabilize the structure. Well, something down the line went wrong. The shoring failed and the slab collapsed, causing a great deal of damage.
Read the full story…
Read the court’s decision…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Virginia Homebuilding Slumps After Last Year’s Gain
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
As of May, only 61 residential construction permits have been issues in Roanoke County, Virginia, leaving officials doubtful that this year will meet last year’s mark of 179 permits. Residential construction was at its highest in the county in 2004. The worst year since then was 2009, when the county issued 143 permits. The county is in the western end of the state, near the border with West Virginia, and far from the D.C. metropolitan area.
Arnold Covey, the Director of Community Development for the county said that “it may be until 2014 before we really see a difference. The article by WDBJ7.com notes that a “key part” of the county budget comes from real estate.
Read the full story…
Coverage for Construction Defects Barred by Business Risk Exclusions
September 1, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Although the court determined there was an occurrence, coverage was excluded by the business risk exclusions. See Cont’l W. Ins. Co. v. Shay Constr. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82839 (D. Colo. July 28, 2011).
White was the general contractor on the project. White had three subcontracts with Shay to provide framing, siding, and related work on the project. Shay was insured under a CGL policy issued by Continental Western.
Two of Shay’s subcontractors furnished materials, labor and equipment to Shay. These subcontractors filed suit in state court alleging they had not been compensated for the work and materials. White and Shay were named as defendants. White cross claimed against Shay, alleging Shay had breached its obligations under the subcontracts. Several allegations sounded in contract. Other allegations, however, contended Shay had performed defective work and had damaged the work of other trades in correcting deficiencies in its own performance.
Shay sought coverage under Continental Western’s policy. Continental Western filed suit for a declaratory judgment and moved for summary judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Insurer Must Defend Claims for Diminution in Value of Damaged Property
June 19, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The insurer’s duty to defend a developer sued by purchasers of homes for damages for diminution in value of homes was at issue in Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Academy Dev., Inc., 2012 WL 1382459 (5th Cir. April 20, 2012).
In the underlying action, plaintiffs alleged the developer knew when it sold the homes that the lake walls were falling and that water was leaking from the lakes onto adjacent home sites. They sought damages for diminution in the value of their homes resulting from the defective lakes. The action was tried in 2008, and the jury returned a verdict for the developer.
Mid-Continent initially defended under a reservation of rights.
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Read the full story…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Statute of Repose Dependant on When Subcontractors Finished
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Scott C. Sandberg of Snell and Wilmer writes a post on the JDSupra site about the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Shaw Construction v. United Builder Services. Sanberg notes that when the general contractor was sued by an HOA, the contractor turned around and sued its subcontractors. The contractor made three claims. They claimed that “improvement” referred to the whole project, that “substantial completion” was reached when the architect certified completion, and that the statute of repose was tolled by the HOA’s service of a Construction Defect Action Reform Act notice.
The subcontractors claimed that “improvement” only referred to their specific work, which reached “substantial completion” when they finished, despite work to be done by other later, and the HOA’s notice to the contractor did not affect the subcontractors. The Colorado court agreed with the subcontractors.
Sandberg notes that some of the contractor’s were not addressed by the court, noting that “the court did not decide whether an improvement triggering the statute of repose can be determined on a trade-by-trade basis,” and that “the court did not decide whether substantial completion occurs when a certificate of occupancy is issued or when the architect certifies completion.”
Read the full story…
Homeowners May Not Need to Pay Lien on Defective Log Cabin
July 1, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Perception Construction Management v. Bell. The Bells hired PCM to build a log home, agreeing to play monthly invoices in full within ten days. The Bells paid the first four invoices in full, part of the fifth, and ceased payment after that. Beofre seventh invoice, the Bells terminated the contract and hired a new contractor. PCM filed a claim of lien and ceased work.
The Bells responded that PCM was in breach of contract and had failed to fulfill the contract in a workmanlike manner. They claimed construction defects and in the lien suit, sought to include testimony from an architect and a plumber reviewing PCM’s work. The court only allowed the architect to testify as to whether the amount of the lien was reasonable. No testimony was permitted from the plumber.
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that the claims of construction defects were important to case and remanded it to the lower court for a new trial taking into evidence that Bell’s contention that PCM’s work was defective.
Read the court’s decision
Ohio subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion
August 11, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Mosser Construction, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., No. 09-4449 (6th Cir. July 14, 2011)(unpublished), claimant project owner Port Clinton contracted with insured general contractor Mosser for the construction of a building. Following completion, Port Clinton sued Mosser for breach of contract seeking damages because of physical injury to the project occurring after completion resulting from defective backfill material that settled improperly.
Mosser’s CGL insurer Travelers denied a defense and Mosser filed suit against Travelers seeking a declaratory judgment. Mosser and Travelers filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the supplier of the backfill material?Gerken?qualified as a subcontractor for purposes of the subcontractor work exception to the “your work” exclusion—exclusion l.—for property damage to or arising out of Mosser’s completed work.  Mosser had purchased the backfill material from Gerken pursuant to a purchase order specifying that Gerken was to supply Mosser with an industry standard grade of backfill for use in the Port Clinton project.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Washington Court Limits Lien Rights of Construction Managers
August 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
A newly filed, yet unpublished, court opinion opines that a construction manager cannot file a construction lien in Washington state. So, how far reaching is this opinion?
In the case of Blue Diamond Group Inc. v. KB Seattle 1, Inc., et al, a New York construction manager filed a lien against the Westfield Southcenter Mall in Tukwila, Washington. The lien was filed after the owner of a coffee stand failed to pay Blue Diamond for consulting services used in the construction of a kiosk.
Blue Diamond served as the owner’s agent, assisting with managing subcontractors, vendors and other tasks. The manager’s tasks also included paying invoices, managing deliveries, setting schedules and other site managerial tasks. Blue Diamond was not registered as a contractor under Washington’s RCW 18.27.
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Read the court’s decision…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Foundation Arbitration Doesn’t Preclude Suing Over Cracks
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Louisiana Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of a lower court, allowing a construction defect case to go through. In Greer v. Town Construction Company, the Greers hired Town Construction to build a home in Baton Rouge. The business relationship went sour, with disputes over “costs, change orders, workmanship, and timeliness issues.”
Town Construction filed an arbitration claim for the unpaid contract balance. In the counterclaim, the Greers made claims of mold and mildew problems, and wall cracks that they attributed to a “structural defect in the foundation.” In arbitration, Town Construction was awarded the full contract balance plus extra costs and interest, while the Greers were awarded for their structural claims.
Three years later, the Greers found additional cracks and filed a suit against Town Construction. Town Construction argued that the Greer’s lawsuit should be dismissed, as the claims had already been through the arbitration process. The district court agreed with Town Construction and dismissed the suit.
The appeals court noted that the Greers would have no ground for a suit if the arbitration was a “valid and final judgment,” and went on to note that there was no evidence in the trial record that the arbitration met this qualification. The court noted that although it was clear that both parties had agreed to the decisions of the arbiter, under Louisiana law, arbitration is not final until it has been “rendered by a court with jurisdiction over subject mater and over parties.”
The court remanded the case to the lower court, noting that “the district court is obligated to first determine whether a valid arbitration award is in existence and had been confirmed before considering the merits of the exception. The court noted that their decision “should not be read to express any opinion as to the merits of the claims or as to the propriety of damages sought in the Greer’s lawsuit.”
Read the court’s decision…
