Discovery Ordered in Nevada Construction Defect Lawsuit
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Gemstone LVS was sued by the Manhattan Homeowners Association in Las Vegas, after which Chartis Specialty Insurance informed Gemstone that they “had no duty to defend or indemnify Gemstone under the Commercial Umbrella Liability Policy.” Gemstone “asserts that at the time the Policy was purchased, it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage for a construction defect lawsuit” and now seeks discovery “to prove Chartis’ bad faith purpose in drafting an illusory Policy.”
The opinion notes that “the Court conducted a preliminary peek at the pending motion for partial summary judgment and finds that Chartis has not made the strong showing necessary to support the requested stay.” Further, the court notes that “when ambiguity in the language of a policy exists, the court may consider not only the language of the policy but also the ‘intent of the parties, the subject matter of the policy, and the circumstances surrounding its issuance.’” The court concludes that “this type of discovery is relevant to understanding the intent of the parties, more specifically, whether it was understood that Chartis would provide insurance coverage given the construction defect lawsuit.”
Accordingly, the court denied Chartis’ motion for stay of discovery and established a schedule for discovery, expert designations, rebuttal expert designations, and other matters related to the trial.
Read the court’s decision…
Windows and Lawsuits Fly at W Hotel
July 5, 2011 — CDJ Staff
An Austin, Texas lawyer has filed a lawsuit against Starwood Hotels and Resorts, the operator of the W Hotel Austin, after two people were struck by glass which fell from the hotel’s balconies. YNN in Austin reports that the hotel has been closed indefinitely as construction workers removed panels. An additional three panels fell before work started. Randy Howry, the lawyer representing the injured parties, notes that in May glass falling from the W Hotel in Atlanta killed one woman and injured another. “Seventeen days pass and we put them on notice, our clients have put them on notice, yet nothing has been done an only after the glass fell yesterday did they do something about it,” YNN quotes Howry.
The hotel released a statement that they will be replacing all of the balcony glass to ensure safety for their guests and the general public. They relocated all hotel guests and coordinated with Austin officials to close adjacent sidewalks and roads. The statement identifies the firms involved with the design and construction of the balconies.
Read the full story …
Largest Per Unit Settlement Ever in California Construction Defect Case?
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
BusinessWire reports that the Chelsea Court Homeowners Association has settled their construction defect case for $5.4 million. That works out to $169,000 per unit, which BusinessWire describes as “California’s largest per-unit recovery known to be on record to date.”
Most of the money in the settlement is coming from insurance companies for the builder and thirteen subcontractors. Issues included roof and window leaks, deck failures, and unsafe walkways.
Read the full story...
Insurer Not Liable for Construction Defect Revealed by Woodpecker
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an insurance provision that excluded construction defects must stand in Friedberg v. Chubb, granting a summary judgment to the insurance firm.
The Friedbergs discovered extensive water damage to their home after a woodpecker drilled a hole in a vertical support. They sought insurance coverage under their Chubb “Masterpiece” policy. The decision quotes the policy as covering “all risk of physical loss” “unless stated otherwise or an exclusion applies.” These exclusions included “gradual or sudden loss,” “structural movement,” and “faulty planning, construction or maintenance,” but the policy covered “ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies.”
Chubb’s expert determined that the Friedbergs’ home had defective construction, and “attributed the damage to the beams and walls below the beam to a failure to install control joints.” After Chubb denied coverage, the Friedbergs sued, although the court ruled that “even under the Friedbergs’ theory, the water damage was a loss caused by faulty construction and therefore excluded under the policy.”
On appeal, the Friedbergs argued that “the loss resulted from the combination of both faulty construction and the presence of water” and that Minnesota’s “concurrent causation” doctrine must apply, which according to the decision, “when a loss results from both a covered peril and an excluded peril, coverage exists unless the excluded peril is the ‘overriding cause’ of the loss.” The court rejected this reasoning, noting that “once the house was plagued with faulty construction, it was a foreseeable and natural consequence that water would enter.”
The Friedbergs also contended that “the damage caused by the intrusion of water into their home is an ‘ensuing covered loss’ for which they are due coverage.” The court also rejected this claim, noting that Minnesota law excludes defective construction from the ensuing loss provision. The court said that “the Friedbergs’ reading of their ensuing-loss clause, by contrast, would dramatically limit their policy’s faulty-construction exclusion, because almost ‘any loss cause by’ faulty construction could also be characterized as an ensuing loss under an all-risk policy.”
Read the court’ decision…
California Bill Would Notify Homeowners on Construction Defect Options
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Building Industry Association supported Assembly Bill 1892, but its goals of informing homeowners of their rights under SB800 have been accomplished through the administrative process. The Department of Consumer Affairs has now posted text on its web site noting that “prior to pursuing legal action or responding to a construction defect solicitation, you must first contact your home builder.” The text goes on to note that “if the homebuilder fails to follow any of the procedures, the homeowner is entitled to proceed with the filing of an action.”
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Michigan Supreme Court Concludes No Statute of Repose on Breach of Contract
July 19, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Judge Marilyn Kelly of the Michigan Supreme Court has remanded the case of Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Constr. Inc. (Mich., 2011) to the Court of Appeals, after determining that the court had improperly applied the statute of repose. She reversed their judgment, pending a new trial.
Ahrens Construction was a subcontractor, hired by Miller-Davis to build and install a natatorium room at a YMCA camp in Kalamazoo, Michigan. After its installation, the YMCA discovered a severe condensation problem, causing moisture to “rain” from the roof. The architect, testifying for Miller-Davis, alleged that the problems were due to improper installation by Ahrens. Ahrens claimed that the condensation problem was due to a design error.
When the roof was removed and reconstructed, the moisture problem ended. Ahrens argued that the alleged defects were caused by the removal. Further, in trial Ahrens raised the issue of the statute of repose. The court found in favor of Miller-Davis and did not address the statute of repose.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, determining that the statute of repose had barred the suit. This rendered the other issues moot.
The Michigan Supreme concluded that the issue at hand was “a suit for breach of contract,” and that the Michigan statute of repose is limited to tort actions. They remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address the issues that had been mooted by the application of the statute of repose.
Read the court’s decision…
Timing of Insured’s SIR Payment Has No Effect on Non-Participating Insurer’s Equitable Contribution to Co-Insurer
April 25, 2012 — Aarti Kewalramani, Gatzke Dillon & Balance LLP
In a case of first impression, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division One, examined whether a non-participating insurer can evade its defense and indemnity obligations because the insured only paid the policy’s self-insured retention ("SIR") as part of a settlement. In Axis Surplus Lines Insurance Company v. Glencoe Insurance LTD. (April 11, 2012, D058963) __ Cal.App.4th __ [2012 WL 11903203], the critical issue for the Court was whether an insurer, with full notice and continued investigation of a claim, can "hide behind the SIR requirement in its policy." The Court declined to "sanction such gamesmanship."
The dispute involved an equitable contribution claim between two insurers. Axis Surplus Insurance Company provided commercial general liability insurance to Pacifica Pointe L.P. During the same time period, Glencoe Insurance Ltd. provided an owner-controlled insurance policy (i.e., wrap policy) to Pacifica Pointe L.P. Both policies included provisions requiring co-carriers to split the defense and indemnity on equal shares. Pacifica was sued in a construction defect lawsuit, involving alleged resultant damages to condominiums it converted and sold. Pacifica tendered the claim to both Axis and Glencoe. While Axis agreed to defend Pacifica, subject to a reservation of rights, Glencoe declined to participate until Pacifica satisfied the $250,000 SIR on the policy. Glencoe continued to monitor the litigation from the sidelines.
Axis and Pacifica settled the underlying construction defect lawsuit for $1 million. Pacifica advised Glencoe of the settlement, and received Glencoe’s approval to contribute its $250,000 SIR towards the settlement. Axis contributed $750,000 towards the settlement. After the settlement, Axis sued Glencoe for declaratory relief and equitable contribution, to recover a portion of the defense and indemnity it paid. The trial court found in favor of Axis and allocated Glencoe 60% of the settlement payment. Glencoe appealed.
On appeal, the Court scrutinized whether Glencoe, as the non-participating insurer, had a legal obligation to provide a defense and indemnity to the insured, despite the timing of the SIR’s satisfaction. The Court determined that in an equitable contribution action, the participating insurer has the burden of proving merely the potential for coverage under the non-participating insurer’s policy. On this showing, the burden of proof shifts to the non-participating insurer to prove the absence of actual coverage under its policy. The Court emphasized that the timing of the SIR’s payment was inconsequential to either insurer’s burden. Because Glencoe admitted coverage existed under its policy, the Court affirmed the trial court’s decision.
As a result, the result ultimately turned on whether the non-participating carrier had full notice of the claim and cannot use the timing of the satisfaction of the SIR to shield itself from an equitable contribution claim from the participating co-carrier.
Published courtesy of Aarti Kewalramani of Gatzke Dillon & Balance LLP. Ms. Kewalramani can be contacted at akewalramani@gdandb.com.
Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
Read the court’s decision…
Destruction of Construction Defect Evidence Leads to Sanctions against Plaintiff
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Stating that the plaintiff’s actions have left the defendants in a situation where they “cannot properly defend the action,” a judge in the US District Court of New York has sanctioned the plaintiffs in Aktas v. JMC Dev. Co.
The plaintiffs hired JMC Development and Stephen Jung, an architect, to renovate their vacation home in Adirnodack, New York. As work progressed, “due to disagreements regarding the completion date and payments for the project, the relationship began to deteriorate.” The plaintiffs hired George Villar as an owner’s representative who “testified that he deemed the workmanship to be ‘poor.’”
Subsequently, the locks where changed on the home, preventing JMC from performing any additional work, after which drywall was removed, which Villar stated was so that “the engineer come and look at the framing.” Subsequently, Villar sent a letter to JMC stating that the work was “performed in an inadequate, negligent and un-professional manner.” Villar informed JMC that they were not to visit the property. Subsequently, the plaintiffs hired another firm. “Plaintiffs testified that the materials were ‘carted away’ and ‘thrown out.’”
The plaintiffs filed a suit against JMC and others. JMC filed a motion requesting that the plaintiffs be sanctioned for their spoliation of evidence. The court noted that “the plaintiffs recognized that litigation was imminent,” and that they “had a duty to preserve the evidence. As all of JMC’s work was destroyed, there is no evidence of whether or not the work was defective. The court concluded that it will “issue an adverse inference charge that permits the jury to infer that the missing evidence was favorable to the defendants.”
In conclusion, the court granted in part the spoliation sanctions. They granted JMC a summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims of fraud.
Read the court’s decision…
Texas “your work” exclusion
January 6, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech, L.L.C., No. 10-20499 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011), claimant Ergon hired insured Cat Tech to perform service on a reactor at Ergon’s refinery. During a start-up of the reactor after Cat Tech had completed its work, the reactor suffered damage. Cat Tech performed additional service and repairs. However, again upon start-up of the reactor, it suffered additional damage. Ergon hired another contractor to repair the reactor. Ergon initiated arbitration proceedings against Cat Tech. Cat Tech’s CGL insurer American Home defended Cat Tech against the Ergon arbitration under a reservation of rights.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Construction Defect Lawsuit Stayed by SB800
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of the lower court and has stayed, instead of dismissed, a claim of construction defects. A group of Victorville homeowners sued their homebuilder, K. Hovnanian Communities on a claim of construction defects. Hovnanian argued that under the procedures set forth in SB800, the suit should be dismissed, and that the claims should undergo arbitration. The trial agreed, dismissing the claims of 82 plaintiffs under a first motion, and then granted a second motion to dismiss, which affected a further 21 plaintiffs. The homeowners appealed.
The Court noted that “the parties disagree about the standard of review,” with the Court determining that as the facts were not in dispute, they would use “an independent standard of review.”
Reviewing the relevant statues, the Court concluded that the terms of the limited warranty set out the pre-litigation procedure, noting that “plaintiffs admit they did not comply with the limited warranty because they challenge its validity and enforceability.” The Court concluded that “plaintiffs’ action was premature.”
The Court further noted that “a civil action will not be filed until after the contractual procedures have been followed.” Until these procedures have been followed, the Court said that they “decline to resolve issues about validity and enforceability.” However, as these issues could arise after the limited warranty procedures, the court stayed, rather than dismissed the claims.
Read the court’s decision…
Appeals Court Reverses Summary Judgment over Defective Archway Construction
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A judge has ruled that a plaintiff can go forward with her suit that she was injured by a defective archway during a birthday party. A three-judge panel of the California Court of Appeals issued this ruling on January 23, 2012, in the case of Trujillo v. Cosio.
Ms. Trujillo attended a birthday party at the home of Maria Cosio and Joel Verduzco. A piñata was hung between a tree and a brick archway. Ms. Trujillo went to get candy that had fallen from the piñata, during which the archway fell on her hand. Subsequent examination of the archway showed that it had not been “properly anchored to the supporting pillars to protect the arch from falling.”
Ms. Cosio and Mr. Verduzco argued that they could not have been aware of the defective nature of the archway’s construction, as it had been built at the request of the prior property owner. The structure was constructed without building permits. Mark Burns, a civil engineer testifying for the plaintiff, said that “a reasonable property owner would have thoroughly tested the archway to ensure it was capable of withstanding such horizontal forces before allowing children to enter into the area.” Mr. Burns noted that twenty rope pulls would have been sufficient to demonstrate the structure’s instability.
The trial court rejected Mr. Burn’s statements, finding that the respondents did not have any knowledge of the defect and that a visual inspection should have sufficed. The court noted that this a triable issue, whether visual inspection suffices, or whether the property owners should have done as Mr. Burns suggested and yank a rope twenty times. The court noted that “although a jury may ultimately disagree with Burn’s opinion, it was supported by sufficient foundation and was not speculative.”
The opinion was written by Judge Flier, with Judges Rubin and Grimes concurring.
Read the court’s decison…
Construction Spending Dropped in July
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Bloomberg News reports that after four months of gains in construction spending, July saw a drop of 0.9 percent, wiping out June’s gain of 0.4 percent. Despite the overall decline in spending, there was an increase of 1.5 percent in expenditure on building new single-family homes and 2.8 percent on multifamily residential construction.
Read the full story…
Ohio Casualty’s and Beazer’s Motions were Granted in Part, and Denied in Part
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Trinity Homes LLC and Beazer Homes Investments LLC has reached the summary judgment stage. The remaining plaintiffs are Trinity Homes LLC (Trinity) and Beazer Homes Investments LLC (Beazer), and the only defendant remaining is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio Casualty). “Ohio Casualty has filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #409) on all claims against it, and Trinity and Beazer have filed a cross-motion seeking partial summary judgment (Dkt. #431) in their favor.” Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and Beazer’s motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The court’s ruling presented a bit of background on the companies involved in the litigation: “Trinity is an Indiana limited liability company with its principal place of business in Indiana and is one of several construction related companies owned by Beazer, which is a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Delaware having its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Beazer’s predecessor, Beazer Homes Investment Corporation, acquired the stock of Crossman Communities, Inc. in 2002. Crossman and its subsidiary owned all interests in Trinity. Beazer and Trinity are in the business of residential real estate development and construction.”
Furthermore, “Ohio Casualty’s home office is in Ohio, where it is incorporated. It sells insurance policies to commercial entities such as Plaintiffs. It purchased a book of business from Great American Insurance Company, a subsidiary of which had sold commercial general liability policies (‘CGL’) and umbrella liability policies to Trinity, covering the period of time between May 1, 1994 through May 1, 1999. For ease of reference, we will refer to these policies as the Ohio Casualty policies. Trinity sold and acted as a general contractor for the construction of new homes in Central Indiana throughout the period of time in which the Ohio Casualty policies were in place.”
The court disagreed with almost every argument put forth by Ohio Casualty. However, they did concede “that Ohio Casualty is obligated to indemnify Trinity only for damages arising during its policy periods for pro rata liability as opposed to several and indivisible, by reason of its having limited its indemnity obligation to ‘those sums’ that Trinity becomes liable to pay for property damage which ‘occurs during the policy period.’”
Finally, the court ruled that “Ohio Casualty Company’s Motion For Summary Judgment (Dkt. #409) is GRANTED IN PART, that is, to the extent that Beazer is not an insured under the Ohio Casualty insurance policies, but the motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
The court further ruled that “Trinity and Beazer’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #431) is GRANTED IN PART, that is: (1) Trinity is an insured under the Ohio Casualty CGL and umbrella policies in effect for the time period from May 1, 1994 to May 1, 1999; (2) the claims at issue in the Underlying Lawsuits are "property damage" claims resulting from an "occurrence" and are therefore within the policy coverage provided under the Ohio Casualty Policy; and (3) none of the exclusions in the Ohio Casualty Policy bars coverage. Trinity and Beazer’s Motion is DENIED in all other respects. Moreover, material questions of fact remain with respect to whether payments made to the 54 homeowners, who were part of the putative class in the underlying Colon class action but were not included in the certified settlement class, were voluntary payments and as such do not qualify for indemnification. Material questions of fact also preclude a summary ruling on the issue of whether Ohio Casualty is estopped from raising their voluntary nature as a defense to indemnity.”
Read the court’s decision…
Architect Not Liable for Balcony’s Collapse
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from a woman who was partially paralyzed due to the collapse of a balcony. She had sued the architect of her friends’ home, but the Texas Third Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed a jury ruling against the architect, Sinclair Black. Black’s firm, Black + Vernooy, had designed the home and had supervised “administration of the construction contract.” Despite a contractual obligation to “endeavor to guard the owner against defects and deficiencies,” the balcony builder had not followed the architect’s specifications, including in the construction of the balcony.
While the jury found Black liable for ten percent of the blame, Black argued that he could not be held liable for the contractor’s negligence, nor did he have any duty to third parties.
Read the full story…
Guilty Pleas Draw Renewed Interest In Nevada’s Construction Defect Laws
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A report this week by David McGrath Schwarz of the Las Vegas Sun suggests that Nevada’s construction defect laws will be a point of much contention in upcoming legislative sessions. The report cites renewed interest in the state’s construction defect laws due to ongoing federal investigations of construction defect attorney Nancy Quon and construction company owner Leon Benzer. Guilty pleas have been entered by at least ten individuals including an attorney, property managers, straw purchasers, and former HOA board members.
The article suggests that Nevada’s Chapter 40 laws are easily manipulated to the detriment of Nevada’s homebuilding industry. Construction industry lobbyists have tried unsuccessfully to change the laws in past legislative sessions.
The Sun’s article speculates that the building industry might be able to gain legislative concessions due to the volume of guilty pleas and what it refers to as examples of Chapter 40 abuses. ”With federal authorities collecting guilty pleas, the construction industry has prime examples of the system being abused, and how lucrative it can be for attorneys.”
Read the full story…
Water District Denied New Trial in Construction Defect Claim
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United District Court in Tampa, Florida has rejected the motion by Tampa Bay Water for a new trial in their claims that HDR Engineering negligently designed the C.W. Bill Young Regional Reservoir. The claims went to a jury trial, at the end of nineteen days, the jury deliberated for four hours, finding for HDR Engineering. In rejecting Tampa Bay’s motion, the judge noted that “on close examination, TBW’s contentions have little to do with the factual determinations of the jury, which evidently concluded that TBW did not meet its burden of proof, an unsurprising conclusion, considering HDR’s evidence and the weaknesses in TBW’s evidence.”
The court cited an earlier decision that “a new trial may be granted where the jury’s ‘verdict is against the great, not merely the greater weight of the evidence.’” However, the court found that the jury’s verdict “was well supported by the evidence” and that “TBW’s case showed signs of weakness at virtually every turn.” TBW’s expert “changed his opinion late in the case concerning the culpability of the contractor.” As a result, “Brumund’s change in opinions effectively bolstered HDR’s faulty construction defense.”
TBW also raised claims a pre-trial order prevented it “from introducing evidence that HDR did not fulfill its contractual quality control responsibilities” and that evidentiary rulings prevented “TBW from introducing evidence concerning quality control.” However, TBW dismissed its claims over quality control, then “attempted no less than three times during ?Ķ testimony to introduce evidence of the purpose of the quality control requirement and quality control assurance.”
TBW also contended “that it was precluded from introducing evidence that HDR’s inspectors never reported that the protective layer exceeded three feet after inspecting the work as part of HDR’s quality control duties.” The court noted that “TBW asked these very questions of HDR’s Engineer of Record.” The court also found that testimony regarding photographs of the construction was properly excluded as TBW never entered the photos into evidence.
TBW had made an argument for a jury view. Prior the trial “after discussion, and to their credit, the parties agreed to a jointly-prepared helicopter ‘flyover’ video.” The court noted that “the size and physical characteristics of the reservoir were adequately and effectively depicted in the video.” The hazards the jury did not, then, have to encounter included the narrow, unpaved rim of the reservoir, snakes, and alligators.
Read the court’s decision…