California Assembly Bill Proposes an End to Ten Year Statute of Repose
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
California Assemblyman Furutani has introduced a bill that if passed would eliminate the ten year statute of repose in certain construction defect cases. The statute of repose would not apply when “an action in tort to recover damages for damage to real or personal property, or for personal injury or wrongful death from exposure to hazardous or toxic materials, pollution, hazardous waste, or associates environmental remediation activities,” according to the latest amended version of AB 1207.
When Furutani first introduced the bill, it was aimed at small businesses only. However, the description of the bill, which read, “An act to amend Section 14010 of the Corporations Code, relating to small businesses” has been stricken from the bill, and it has been amended to read, “An act to amend Section 337.15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to civil actions.”
The change in the bill’s intent has caused some outcry among attorneys in the blogosphere. For instance, Sean Sherlock of Snell & Wilmer stated that “the proposed amendment is unnecessary, and would upset nearly 50 years of deliberative legislation and judicial precedent on construction defects liability and the 10–year statute — all apparently motivated by a decision in a single, isolated Superior Court lawsuit that has not yet been reviewed by the court of appeal.” Sherlock is referring to Acosta v. Shell Oil Company, in which the Superior Court agreed to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the developer based in part on the ten year statute of repose. AB 1207 was amended five days after the ruling in Acosta v. Shell Oil Company.
California AB 1207 has been re-referred to the Judiciary Committee.
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Court finds subcontractor responsible for defending claim
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - CDJ Staff
In an unpublished decision, the California Fourth Appellate District Court has reversed the judgment of Judge Linda B. Quinn of the Superior Court of San Diego. In the case Inland California, Inc. v. G.A. Abell, Inland, a general contractor had subcontracted with Apache Construction and Precision Electric Company (G.A. Abell).
Apache alleged that extra demolition and drywall work was needed due to Precision’s electrical work. Inland tendered a defense of Apache’s claims. However, Precision did not provide any defense. Inland withheld payment from Precision.
At trial, Inland “conceded Precision earned the $98,000 in progress payments Inland withheld.†They were obligated to additionally pay Precision’s costs and attorney fees.
The Fourth Appellate District court has overturned this and remanded the case back to the lower court. The judges determined that Precision was obligated to defend itself against the claims raised by Apache and therefore vacated the judgment against Inland.
Read the court’s decision…
California insured’s duty to cooperate and insurer’s right to select defense counsel
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Centex Homes, No. C 10-02757 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2011), general contractor Centex was sued by homeowners for construction defects. Centex tendered its defense to Travelers as an additional insured under policies issued by Travelers to two Centex subcontractors. Travelers agreed to defend Centex under a reservation of rights and selected defense counsel to defend Centex. Centex refused to accept the defense, asserting that it was entitled to select defense counsel. Travelers filed suit against Centex seeking a declaratory judgment that Centex had breached the duty to cooperate condition in the Travelers’ policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage
December 9, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Water intrusion caused by a construction defect was not covered under the all risk policy’s ensuing loss provision. See Friedberg v. Chubb & Son, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123582 (D. Minn. Oct. 25, 2011).
Extensive water damage was discovered in the insureds’ home when a small hole in the exterior wall was being repaired. Chubb’s adjuster and an expert found water intrusion causing rot, mold, and damage to the home’s wood framing and insulation. Chubb denied coverage because water intruded through the roof and wall, resulting in gradual deterioration. The insureds filed suit.
The policy excluded coverage for construction defects, but insured "ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies."
The court agreed there was a prima facie case for coverage because the home suffered a physical loss.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Another Colorado District Court Refuses to Apply HB 10-1394 Retroactively
October 28, 2011 — David M. McLain, Colorado Construction Litigation
In Martinez v. Mike Wells Construction Company, 09CV227, Teller County District Court Judge Edward S. Colt refused to apply C.R.S. § 13-20-808 retroactively to provide coverage for the underlying construction defect allegations. According to the recitation of facts in Judge Colt’s March 2011 order, Martinez contracted with Mike Wells Construction to serve as the general contractor for the construction of a home. At that time, Mike Wells Construction was insured through ProBuilders Specialty Insurance Company, RRG. Disputes arose between Martinez and Mike Wells Construction, resulting in Martinez ordering it off of the project in mid-November 2007 and terminating its right to work there by letter dated November 28, 2007.
Mike Wells, the owner of the corporation, subsequently died. Martinez sued Mike Wells Construction in July 2009 for breach of contract and various claims relating to alleged defecting workmanship. Martinez provided notice of the suit to the special administrator of the probate estate. No answer having been filed, the court entered a default judgment against Mike Wells Construction and Martinez sought to garnish Mike Wells Construction’s ProBuilders insurance policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McClain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
In Re Golba: The Knaubs v. Golba and Rollison, Debtors
June 19, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio
Now comes another cautionary tale for builders and developers, especially those using single purpose business entities to handle individual construction projects. The United States Bankruptcy Court in Denver, Colorado, through the Honorable Michael Romero, provided an order regarding plaintiffs’ problems with a home they purchased from an entity controlled or represented by defendants. Plaintiffs, Kelvin and Holly Knaub (the “Knaubs”) filed adversary proceedings against debtor Robert Golba in his bankruptcy proceeding and against debtor Greg Rollison in his separate bankruptcy proceeding. The adversary proceedings were partially consolidated to proceed in parallel but not substantively.
The Knaubs purchased a home from Gemm Homes (“Gemm”) in May 2003. Problems stemming from the foundation caused the Knaubs to seek an explanation and ultimately a solution from Gemm and then from Avalon Homes (“Avalon”), which the Knaubs claim is just a continuation of Gemm. Through their complaint, the Knaubs seek relief for 1) damages caused by fraudulent representations and false pretenses under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s misrepresentation that Gemm and Rollison were not involved in Avalon; 2) damages caused by actual fraud under § 523(a)(2)(A), based on Golba’s and Rollison’s alleged conspiracy fraudulently to convey the assets of Gemm to the Avalon entities; and 3) damages caused by breach of fiduciary duty under § 523(a)(4), alleging Gemm was an insolvent company which owed a fiduciary duty to its creditors, and alleging Golba participated in transferring Gemm’s assets to Avalon for no consideration. In the Golba action, the third claim for relief was dismissed.
The facts of the case are important and somewhat convoluted. In an effort to make the cases clear, the evidence, allegations, and facts will be laid out in detail below. The Knaubs’ house was purchased from Gemm and soon after both Gemm and Rollison had an engineering company perform an analysis which discovered the foundation was not laid on stable ground.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Lower Court “Eminently Reasonable” but Wrong in Construction Defect Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Noting that “circuit court’s orders are eminently reasonable, logical and just” the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia has granted a writ to halt enforcement of these orders and to compel arbitration instead in the case of State v. Tucker. The initial case concerned claims that an HVAC system had been improperly designed, constructed, manufactured, or maintained, leading to serious problems. Glenmark Holding, the owner of the Suncrest Executive Plaza brought a lawsuit against seven defendants. Three of the defendants, Morgan Keller, Inc, York International Corporation, and Johnson Controls, Inc. argued that Glenmark was obligated to enter into arbitration.
Glenmark and the other defendants argued that the motions for arbitration should be denied “so all the claims and cross-claims of the parties could be litigated in one forum, in one proceeding.” The circuit court noted that arbitration is preferred over litigation because of its supposed “expeditious, economic resolution of issues,” but that in this case, “the petitioners would expend additional, not fewer resources responding to the parties’ claims and cross-claims.” As “compulsory arbitration would be insufficient and inequitable” the court denied the request, finding the arbitration clauses “unconscionable and, therefore, unenforceable.”
Morgan Keller, York, and Johson argued that “the interpretation of arbitration clauses is governed exclusively by the Federal Arbitration Act.” The appeals court found that “the circuit court was within its authority to consider Glenmark’s claim that the arbitration clauses were unenforceable.” However, the appeals court rejected the circuit court’s conclusion about the “piecemeal” resolution of the conflict, as it contradicts a Supreme Court ruling. The Supreme Court stated in 1983 that the FAA “requires piecemeal resolution when necessary to give effect to an arbitration agreement.” In a 1985 decision, the Court held that a court could “not substitute [its] own views of economy and efficiency.”
Nor could the court find the arbitration clause to be unconscionable or unenforceable. The court noted that the contract was a standard AIA form, and was amended by the parties involved, whom the court characterized as “commercially sophisticated.” The court found that the agreement limited the rights of all parties and was not one-sided.
As the arbitration clause was neither unconscionable nor unenforceable, and Supreme Court rulings preclude a court from substituting its own procedures, even when these are “eminently reasonable, logical and just,” the appeals court halted the order of the circuit court, sending the matter to arbitration.
Read the court’s decision…
Plaintiff Not Entitled to Further Damages over Defective Decking
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District has rejected an appeal from the successful plaintiff of a construction defect case in Evilsizor v. Calaveras Lumber Company. John Evilsizor hired Scott Hunton to remove and replace the deck at the rear of his home. Subsequently, the deck, which had been constructed with a product called SmartDeck, a product of the subsequently bankrupt US Plastic Lumber, exhibited problems. Hunton made some repairs. Calaveras Lumber offered replacement decking if Evilsizor would pay the difference in price. Mr. Evilsizor hired another contractor to replace the decking and then sued for lost use and compensation for the amount he paid the second contractor. Replacing the deck a second time cost Mr. Evilsizor $113,065.44.
During the trial, the defendant conceded that the planking was defective. It has been recalled by the manufacturer. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from a construction and building codes consultant, Lonne Haughton, however the trial court found that Mr. Haughton did not have sufficient expertise in wood-plastic composite materials. Further, Haughton had been a California contractor for only three years, and though he claimed a college degree, this was “‘a distance learning diploma’ that required no in-class work.” The appeals court upheld the decision that Mr. Haughton was not qualified to testify as an expert about wood-plastic materials.
The court also upheld the trial court’s exclusion of two pieces of evidence. One was a list of SmartDeck sales. However, the witness asked about it was not able “to testify who prepared it or confirm that it had been prepared by a Cascade employee.” Further, “the fact defendant bought and sold SmartDeck was not disputed.” The other was an e-mail in which US Plastics said they had “some bad product in the field.” This e-mail went to Westmark & Associates, and the plaintiff did not establish that it was ever sent to the defendant.
Though the defense has suggested an award of $18,000 plus loss-of-use damages for one year and an additional $4,000 if the jury believed that leftover material from the front deck was used in the rear. As the plaintiff requested $100 per month of loss of use, this would have totaled $34,000. The jury awarded the cost of the decking, $6,275,82. The court cites earlier decision that the amount of the award is “a question of fact to be determined by the jury.”
In conclusion, Mr. Evilsizor was not only unable to receive a larger award, but the court ruled that he must pay the defendant’s cost on appeal.
Read the court's decision…
Arbitration Clause Not Binding on Association in Construction Defect Claim
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Determining that a community’s CC&Rs do not form an agreement to arbitrate, the California Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of the Superior Court inVerano Condo. Homeowners the Ass’n v. La Cima Dev., LLC (Cal. App., 2012). La Cima purchased an apartment complex in December 2004, which they converted into condominiums. In the process, La Cima created the CC&Rs, under which the Verano Condominium Homeowners Association came into being. One section of the CC&Rs included arbitration clauses. Additionally, the purchase agreements for individual condominium units also contained arbitration clauses. Subsequently, the owners became aware of construction defect both in units and in the common areas. The Association sued La Cima both in its own interest and on behalf of its members. La Cima moved to compel arbitration, which was denied by the trial court. La Cima appealed.
The court concluded that “CC&Rs are insufficient to form an agreement to arbitrate between La Cima and the Association.” The court noted that “no evidence exists to show the Association consented to the terms of the CC&Rs, either explicitly or implicitly.”
The court agreed with La Cima that the arbitration agreement applied to those owners who had purchased their units directly from La Cima. Moreover, as the conversion to condominiums involved interstate commerce, in part because a Delaware company was selling condominiums located in California, the court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied, and as such “even a state constitutional standard, such as the the jury waiver provision requirements of the California Constitution, cannot be used to circumvent the FAA in the face of an otherwise valid arbitration agreement.”
However, the court also held that there was “no agreement in the CC&Rs between La Cima and owners who did not purchase units directly from La Cima,” adding that “no meeting of the minds between La Cima and these later purchasers and their successors occurred.” The court did not believe that “the Legislature intended that CC&Rs would be used to provide continuing and irrevocable contractual development or role as a representative of the owners of the development.”
The purpose of the CC&Rs, according to the court are to “protect owners from one another and permit enforcement of its terms by the Association.” The court stated that “La Cima relinquished its interests in the land by selling its property and may not assert any rights under the CC&Rs following the transfer of its ownership interest.
In its conclusion, the court determined that claims must be organized in three classes. The claims the association made against La Cima for defects in the common area “are not subject to any valid agreement to arbitrate.” The second category are those owners who did not purchase their units directly from La Cima. Here, also, the court found that the units “are similarly not subject to a valid arbitration agreement.”
The third category, however, was “owners who purchased units directly from La Cima.” The court held that these arbitration agreements were valid, and if the claims were to be taken up by the association, the association could only submit these claims to arbitration. The lower court was instructed to separate these claims, as here La Cima’s motion could be granted.
Read the court’s decision…
Foundation Arbitration Doesn’t Preclude Suing Over Cracks
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Louisiana Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of a lower court, allowing a construction defect case to go through. In Greer v. Town Construction Company, the Greers hired Town Construction to build a home in Baton Rouge. The business relationship went sour, with disputes over “costs, change orders, workmanship, and timeliness issues.”
Town Construction filed an arbitration claim for the unpaid contract balance. In the counterclaim, the Greers made claims of mold and mildew problems, and wall cracks that they attributed to a “structural defect in the foundation.” In arbitration, Town Construction was awarded the full contract balance plus extra costs and interest, while the Greers were awarded for their structural claims.
Three years later, the Greers found additional cracks and filed a suit against Town Construction. Town Construction argued that the Greer’s lawsuit should be dismissed, as the claims had already been through the arbitration process. The district court agreed with Town Construction and dismissed the suit.
The appeals court noted that the Greers would have no ground for a suit if the arbitration was a “valid and final judgment,” and went on to note that there was no evidence in the trial record that the arbitration met this qualification. The court noted that although it was clear that both parties had agreed to the decisions of the arbiter, under Louisiana law, arbitration is not final until it has been “rendered by a court with jurisdiction over subject mater and over parties.”
The court remanded the case to the lower court, noting that “the district court is obligated to first determine whether a valid arbitration award is in existence and had been confirmed before considering the merits of the exception. The court noted that their decision “should not be read to express any opinion as to the merits of the claims or as to the propriety of damages sought in the Greer’s lawsuit.”
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Workers Face Dangers on the Job
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
OSHA calculates that for each 33,000 active construction workers, one will die on the job each year, making their risk over the course of their careers at one out of every 200 workers. This puts it many times over OSHA’s definition of “significant risk” of 1 death per 1,000 workers over the course of their careers. According to an article in People’s World, “the main risk of death is from falls.”
At a talk at the American Public Health Association’s meeting, one expert noted that “construction workers make up 6 percent to 8 percent of all workers, but account for 20 percent of all deaths on the job every year.”
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Excess Carrier Successfully Appeals Primary Insurer’s Summary Judgment Award
December 9, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Although the excess carrier was given inadequate notice of the underlying arbitration, the trial court determined it shared responsibility with the primary carrier for the arbitration award. Finding disputed issues of fact, the Washington Court of Appeals reversed in Am. States Ins. Co. v. Century Surety Co., 2011 Wash. App. LEXIS 2488 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2011).
The primary insurer, American States, issued two liability policies to Professional Home Builders (PHB), a siding contractor. The policies were for successive years, 1998-1999 and 1999-2000. Each policy had annual limits of $1 million per occurrence. PHB also had a commercial excess liability policy for 1999-2000 with Century Surety Company.
PHB was sued by Residential Investment Partners (RIP) for construction defects after moisture entered the building envelope, causing decay and damage. Century’s expert determined the decay started before the 1999-2000 policy period.
RIP and PHB went to arbitration.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Defect Claims as Occurrences? Check Your State Laws
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Although four states have defined construction defect claims as occurrences, contractors are still dealing with “coverage gaps for faulty work construction,” says Mike Tsikoudakis in a piece at Business Insurance. He quotes Julian Ehrlich, the senior VP of claims for Aon Risk Services that “one of the interesting and compelling aspects of the issue of coverage for defective construction is that jurisdictions differ, so policyholders don’t know what they’re going to get.” He further notes that “in context of construction defect, the term ‘occurrence’ is ambiguous.”
One problem, as noted by Jeffrey J. Vita, a partner at Saxe Doernberger & Vita, is that construction firms end up needing to simultaneously defend against defect claims and to also file suit to be certain their insurance firms will cover claims. Insurance for construction defect claims is described as “expensive and somewhat limited.” Mr. Vita expects more states to help this situation with new laws, clarifying what is an occurrence.
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Liability policy covers negligent construction: GA high court
October 31, 2010 — Original article by
Michael Bradford in Business Insurance
ATLANTA—Negligent construction that results in damage to surrounding property constitutes an occurrence under a commercial general liability policy, the Georgia Supreme Court has ruled.
In a 6-1 opinion Monday in
American Empire Surplus Lines Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Hathaway Development Co. Inc., the Georgia high court upheld a lower court ruling that the general contractor’s claim for damage caused by a subcontractor’s faulty plumbing work was covered.
The ruling on construction defects is the latest in number of such cases across the United States
Read Full Story...
Reprinted courtesy of Michael Bradford of Business Insurance.
Claims Under Colorado Defect Action Reform Act Count as Suits
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals has affirmed the judgment of the lower court in Melssen v. Auto-Owners Insurance. The Melssens built a custom home for the Holleys, during which time the Melssens retained a comprehensive general liability policy from Auto-Owners, which “obligated Auto-Owerns to defend the Melssens with respect to any ‘suit’ seeking damages for ‘property damage’ during the policy period.” Soon after the house was constructed, cracks developed in the drywall, then outside stucco and basement slab. The Holleys contended that “approximately $300,000 of damages to the Holleys’ property was caused by the Melssens’ engineering and construction defects” and filed a claim under the Colorado Defect Action Reform Act (CDARA). The Melssens “demanded Auto-Owners defend and indemnify the Melssens and forwared Auto-Owners the notice of claim.”
Although the Melssens notified Auto-Owners in June 2008, it was not until October 2008 that Auto-Owners denied coverage stating that the claims were sustained outside the policy period. The Melssens filed an action against Auto-Owners. At trial, the jury ruled in favor of the Melssens awarding them damages, to which the trial court added costs and attorney fees.
On appeal, Auto-Owners contended that the trial court erred in allowing the Melssens to argue that the CDARA notice of claim “was the functional equivalent of a complaint commencing a suit.” The appeals court found that “the CDARA notice of claim process constituted an alternative dispute resolution proceeding under the policy.” The court agreed that jury should not have been asked to determine if a CDARA action is a “suit,” but as the jury found for the Melssens, the concluding it “constituted harmless error.” Further, the court found that an action under the CDARA satisfied the definition of a “suit.”
The court found for the Melssens, affirming the lower court’s decision and remanding the case to the lower court for the awarding of appeals costs to the Melssens.
Read the court’s decision…
Federal Judge Dismisses Insurance Coverage Lawsuit In Construction Defect Case
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A federal judge dismissed a coverage lawsuit brought by Mid Continent Casualty Company against its insured, Greater Midwest Builders Ltd.
Plaintiff brought this declaratory judgment action in response to a suit filed in Johnson County District Court, seeking a judicial determination that it had no coverage obligation for claims asserted against its insured. This case was stayed until the state court action entered judgment against the insured. The prevailing parties then commenced a garnishment action against the plaintiff, and another insurance company, in state court in Missouri. The court was asked whether it should lift the stay and proceed with the case, or decline jurisdiction in favor of resolution in the Missouri state court.
The court granted the motion to dismiss holding that proceeding with the case would lead to protracted, piecemeal litigation, while deferring to the Missouri state court would decide all the claims involved in the dispute.
Read the court’s decision…
Home Repair Firms Sued for Fraud
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Illinois Attorney General has filed a lawsuit in Cook County Circuit Court alleging that two connected firms took money from homeowners and then failed to perform the contracted work. One of the three defendants, Chris Bidigare, was an owner of agent of both Fairway Construction and Maintenance Services, LLC, and Rock Construction Management, LLC.
In once case, according to the article on the OakPark Patch, one homeowner provided a $111,000 down payment, only to have the company cancel the job and refuse to return the money. One homeowner was told by Fairway that she should contact their insurance provider. The insurance provider told her that Fairway’s insurance had been cancelled due to non-payment.
The suit seeks to bar the three defendants from working in home repair in Illinois.
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Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 — April 25, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
Read the trial court’s decision…
