Florida Property Bill Passes Economic Affairs Committee with Amendments
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Florida Property Bill (HBB 803) was passed by the Economic Affairs Committee by a vote of 11-7, according to Property Casualty 360, after adopting nine new amendments. The additions to the bill included limiting notice of claims to a set number of years, extending the statute of limitation on property claims from five years to six years, among others.
HB 803 and SB 408, the Senate companion bill, focus primarily on residential property insurance. They make changes to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, while also promoting increased notification of policy changes to policyholders. Sections of the bills provide minor fixes such as renaming Citizens Property Insurance Corporation to Taxpayer-Funded Property Insurance Corporation. However, other sections of the bills contain more significant policy changes such as sinkhole coverage and hurricane claims.
The bills’ intent, according to the SunSentinel.com, is to reduce fraudulent claims and to bring new insurers into the insurance market. However, SunSentinel.com also reports that the bills may drastically increase property insurance premiums.
Read the full Property Casualty 360 article...
Read the full Sun Sentinel article...
Wisconsin “property damage” caused by an “occurrence.”
April 4, 2011 — April 4, 2011 in CDCoverage.com
In American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. American Girl, Inc., 673 N.W.2d 65 (Wis. 2004), the insured general contractor was hired by the owner to design and build a warehouse on the owner s property. The general contractor hired a soil engineer to do a soil analysis and make site preparation recommendations. The soil engineer determined that the soil conditions were poor and recommended a compression process which the general contractor followed. After the warehouse was completed and the owner took possession, excessive soil settlement caused the foundation to sink which in turn caused structural damage to the warehouse. The warehouse had to be torn down.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Appeals Court Reverses Summary Judgment over Defective Archway Construction
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A judge has ruled that a plaintiff can go forward with her suit that she was injured by a defective archway during a birthday party. A three-judge panel of the California Court of Appeals issued this ruling on January 23, 2012, in the case of Trujillo v. Cosio.
Ms. Trujillo attended a birthday party at the home of Maria Cosio and Joel Verduzco. A piñata was hung between a tree and a brick archway. Ms. Trujillo went to get candy that had fallen from the piñata, during which the archway fell on her hand. Subsequent examination of the archway showed that it had not been “properly anchored to the supporting pillars to protect the arch from falling.”
Ms. Cosio and Mr. Verduzco argued that they could not have been aware of the defective nature of the archway’s construction, as it had been built at the request of the prior property owner. The structure was constructed without building permits. Mark Burns, a civil engineer testifying for the plaintiff, said that “a reasonable property owner would have thoroughly tested the archway to ensure it was capable of withstanding such horizontal forces before allowing children to enter into the area.” Mr. Burns noted that twenty rope pulls would have been sufficient to demonstrate the structure’s instability.
The trial court rejected Mr. Burn’s statements, finding that the respondents did not have any knowledge of the defect and that a visual inspection should have sufficed. The court noted that this a triable issue, whether visual inspection suffices, or whether the property owners should have done as Mr. Burns suggested and yank a rope twenty times. The court noted that “although a jury may ultimately disagree with Burn’s opinion, it was supported by sufficient foundation and was not speculative.”
The opinion was written by Judge Flier, with Judges Rubin and Grimes concurring.
Read the court’s decison…
Ohio Casualty’s and Beazer’s Motions were Granted in Part, and Denied in Part
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Trinity Homes LLC and Beazer Homes Investments LLC has reached the summary judgment stage. The remaining plaintiffs are Trinity Homes LLC (Trinity) and Beazer Homes Investments LLC (Beazer), and the only defendant remaining is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio Casualty). “Ohio Casualty has filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #409) on all claims against it, and Trinity and Beazer have filed a cross-motion seeking partial summary judgment (Dkt. #431) in their favor.” Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and Beazer’s motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The court’s ruling presented a bit of background on the companies involved in the litigation: “Trinity is an Indiana limited liability company with its principal place of business in Indiana and is one of several construction related companies owned by Beazer, which is a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Delaware having its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Beazer’s predecessor, Beazer Homes Investment Corporation, acquired the stock of Crossman Communities, Inc. in 2002. Crossman and its subsidiary owned all interests in Trinity. Beazer and Trinity are in the business of residential real estate development and construction.”
Furthermore, “Ohio Casualty’s home office is in Ohio, where it is incorporated. It sells insurance policies to commercial entities such as Plaintiffs. It purchased a book of business from Great American Insurance Company, a subsidiary of which had sold commercial general liability policies (‘CGL’) and umbrella liability policies to Trinity, covering the period of time between May 1, 1994 through May 1, 1999. For ease of reference, we will refer to these policies as the Ohio Casualty policies. Trinity sold and acted as a general contractor for the construction of new homes in Central Indiana throughout the period of time in which the Ohio Casualty policies were in place.”
The court disagreed with almost every argument put forth by Ohio Casualty. However, they did concede “that Ohio Casualty is obligated to indemnify Trinity only for damages arising during its policy periods for pro rata liability as opposed to several and indivisible, by reason of its having limited its indemnity obligation to ‘those sums’ that Trinity becomes liable to pay for property damage which ‘occurs during the policy period.’”
Finally, the court ruled that “Ohio Casualty Company’s Motion For Summary Judgment (Dkt. #409) is GRANTED IN PART, that is, to the extent that Beazer is not an insured under the Ohio Casualty insurance policies, but the motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
The court further ruled that “Trinity and Beazer’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #431) is GRANTED IN PART, that is: (1) Trinity is an insured under the Ohio Casualty CGL and umbrella policies in effect for the time period from May 1, 1994 to May 1, 1999; (2) the claims at issue in the Underlying Lawsuits are "property damage" claims resulting from an "occurrence" and are therefore within the policy coverage provided under the Ohio Casualty Policy; and (3) none of the exclusions in the Ohio Casualty Policy bars coverage. Trinity and Beazer’s Motion is DENIED in all other respects. Moreover, material questions of fact remain with respect to whether payments made to the 54 homeowners, who were part of the putative class in the underlying Colon class action but were not included in the certified settlement class, were voluntary payments and as such do not qualify for indemnification. Material questions of fact also preclude a summary ruling on the issue of whether Ohio Casualty is estopped from raising their voluntary nature as a defense to indemnity.”
Read the court’s decision…
Water District Denied New Trial in Construction Defect Claim
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United District Court in Tampa, Florida has rejected the motion by Tampa Bay Water for a new trial in their claims that HDR Engineering negligently designed the C.W. Bill Young Regional Reservoir. The claims went to a jury trial, at the end of nineteen days, the jury deliberated for four hours, finding for HDR Engineering. In rejecting Tampa Bay’s motion, the judge noted that “on close examination, TBW’s contentions have little to do with the factual determinations of the jury, which evidently concluded that TBW did not meet its burden of proof, an unsurprising conclusion, considering HDR’s evidence and the weaknesses in TBW’s evidence.”
The court cited an earlier decision that “a new trial may be granted where the jury’s ‘verdict is against the great, not merely the greater weight of the evidence.’” However, the court found that the jury’s verdict “was well supported by the evidence” and that “TBW’s case showed signs of weakness at virtually every turn.” TBW’s expert “changed his opinion late in the case concerning the culpability of the contractor.” As a result, “Brumund’s change in opinions effectively bolstered HDR’s faulty construction defense.”
TBW also raised claims a pre-trial order prevented it “from introducing evidence that HDR did not fulfill its contractual quality control responsibilities” and that evidentiary rulings prevented “TBW from introducing evidence concerning quality control.” However, TBW dismissed its claims over quality control, then “attempted no less than three times during ?Ķ testimony to introduce evidence of the purpose of the quality control requirement and quality control assurance.”
TBW also contended “that it was precluded from introducing evidence that HDR’s inspectors never reported that the protective layer exceeded three feet after inspecting the work as part of HDR’s quality control duties.” The court noted that “TBW asked these very questions of HDR’s Engineer of Record.” The court also found that testimony regarding photographs of the construction was properly excluded as TBW never entered the photos into evidence.
TBW had made an argument for a jury view. Prior the trial “after discussion, and to their credit, the parties agreed to a jointly-prepared helicopter ‘flyover’ video.” The court noted that “the size and physical characteristics of the reservoir were adequately and effectively depicted in the video.” The hazards the jury did not, then, have to encounter included the narrow, unpaved rim of the reservoir, snakes, and alligators.
Read the court’s decision…
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
Read the court’s decision…
California Assembly Bill Proposes an End to Ten Year Statute of Repose
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
California Assemblyman Furutani has introduced a bill that if passed would eliminate the ten year statute of repose in certain construction defect cases. The statute of repose would not apply when “an action in tort to recover damages for damage to real or personal property, or for personal injury or wrongful death from exposure to hazardous or toxic materials, pollution, hazardous waste, or associates environmental remediation activities,” according to the latest amended version of AB 1207.
When Furutani first introduced the bill, it was aimed at small businesses only. However, the description of the bill, which read, “An act to amend Section 14010 of the Corporations Code, relating to small businesses” has been stricken from the bill, and it has been amended to read, “An act to amend Section 337.15 of the Code of Civil Procedure, relating to civil actions.”
The change in the bill’s intent has caused some outcry among attorneys in the blogosphere. For instance, Sean Sherlock of Snell & Wilmer stated that “the proposed amendment is unnecessary, and would upset nearly 50 years of deliberative legislation and judicial precedent on construction defects liability and the 10–year statute — all apparently motivated by a decision in a single, isolated Superior Court lawsuit that has not yet been reviewed by the court of appeal.” Sherlock is referring to Acosta v. Shell Oil Company, in which the Superior Court agreed to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims against the developer based in part on the ten year statute of repose. AB 1207 was amended five days after the ruling in Acosta v. Shell Oil Company.
California AB 1207 has been re-referred to the Judiciary Committee.
Read the full story…
Save A Legal Fee? Sometimes You Better Talk With Your Construction Attorney
May 10, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
I love writing this column, because I think it’s refreshing for contractors to hear that they don’t always need an attorney. Today’s post is the “Un-Save a Legal Fee” because I want to point out a specific illustration of when you definitely need your attorney. Using a construction contract template can be fine, but you always need to consider its application to each project ? or it could bite you in the rear.
Seattle attorney Paul Cressman published a prime depiction of bad contract management, last week. A Florida appellate court struck down a general contractor’s “pay if paid” clause when it became ambiguous because of some incorporated language from its prime contract. Specifically, a clause in the prime contract required the general contractor to pay all subcontractors before receiving payment from the owner, while the general contractor’s “pay if paid” clause required its subcontractors to wait for payment until it arrived from the owner.
Read the full story…
Association May Not Make Claim Against Builder in Vermont Construction Defect Case
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Vermont Supreme Court issued a ruling on September 28 on Long Trail House Condominium Association. The case was heard by a panel of two Supreme Court justices, Marilyn Skoglund and Brian Burgess, and three justices specially assigned for the case, Kupersmith, Davenport, and Johnson. The decision came down with a 3-2 split; Judges Kupersmith and Johnson joining in a dissent.
In the underlying case, Stratton Corporation entered into an agreement with Engelberth Construction in which Engelberth would supply “recommendations on construction feasibility, consultation as to the selection of materials and equipment, assistance with zoning requirements and permits, and cooperation with the ‘design team’ to provide valuable engineering services.” Engelberth was not responsible to determine that the drawings and specifications were in accordance with the law and building codes, nor were they responsible “for the design team’s designs, errors, or omissions.”
Subsequent to the agreement was a construction project which culminated in the incorporation of the Long Trail House Condominium Association. The condominium owners initiated a lawsuit over alleged defects. Stratton, Intrawest, and the association settled claims for $7,025,00 with Stratton and Intrawest both pursuing claims against Engelberth. This case is still unsettled.
The association progressed on remediation, which cost about $1,500,00 more than was provided by the settlement, and so the association also sued Engelberth. In this case, the court granted a summary judgment to Engelberth, concluding that negligence claim was barred both “by the economic loss rule and that the absence of contractual privity was fatal to the warranty claims.”
The court upheld both determinations of the lower court. The court noted that “the economic loss rule ‘prohibits recovery in tort for purely economic losses’” and that “in tort law, duties are imposed by law to protect the public from harm.” A negligence claim could only be supported with evidence of “some accompanying physical harm, which does not include economic loss.”
The association made the claim that the economic loss rule applies only when there is a contractual relationship between the two parties. The court rejected this argument, citing a reference that “economic interests are protected, if at all, by contract principles, rather than tort principles.”
Nor did the court find it persuasive that a “professional services” exception to the economic loss doctrine applied, noting that the court has rejected this notion in two prior cases. The noted that the association’s losses were purely economic, and their inability to settle those claims with Engelberth did not mean that they had not means of settling them, as they were able to settle these very claims with Stratton and Intrawest.
The association also raised claims of an implied warranty, resting on the construction contract between Engelberth and Stratton. This was also rejected by the court, noting that Vermont “case law plainly contemplates the existence of contractual privity before a breach of implied warranty claim can be raised.” The court noted that there was neither a contract nor a sale between Engelberth and the association, and thus there were no grounds for an implied warranty. The court concluded that “the Association’s warranty remedy lies against the entity that sold it the condominium units and implicitly warranted through the sale that the units were built in a good and workmanlike manner and that they were suitable for habitation.”
Read the court’s decision …
A Call to Washington: Online Permitting Saves Money and the Environment
October 28, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Here’s some good news for Oregon contractors: Electronic Permitting is here. That’s right, no more standing in line with folders full of printed submittals and waiting all day for your permit. The click of a few buttons and you are in business. Great news, right? Unfortunately, Oregon isn’t sharing that celebration with Washington. So I say - why not?
Last week, the State of Oregon released its new ePermitting online interface. The website allows contractors, owners and even local building departments to create an account, submit building plans and procure permits. With your account, you can track the progress of submissions, print documents and get posting information.
The state ran a limited test version in the City of Florence since 2009, working out the kinks. Perhaps the most impressive result of the new system is that Oregon tackled the task of coagulating a local process into one central location.
Read the full story...
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
History of Defects Leads to Punitive Damages for Bankrupt Developer
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled that evidence of construction defects at a developer’s other projects were admissible in a construction defect lawsuit. They issued their ruling on Magnolia North Property Owners’ Association v. Heritage Communities, Inc. on February 15, 2012.
Magnolia North is a condominium complex in South Carolina. The initial builder, Heritage Communities, had not completed construction when they filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. The remaining four buildings were completed by another contractor. The Property Owners’ Association subsequently sued Heritage Communities, Inc. (HCI) alleging defects. The POA also sued Heritage Magnolia North, and the general contractor, BuildStar.
The trial court ruled that all three entities were in fact one. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court improperly amalgamated the defendants. The appeals court noted, however, that “all these corporations share officers, directors, office space, and a phone number with HCI.” Until Heritage Communities turned over control of the POA to the actual homeowners, all of the POA’s officers were officers of HCI. The appeals court concluded that “the trial court’s ruling that Appellants’ entities were amalgamated is supported by the law and the evidence.”
Heritage also claimed that the trial court should not have allowed the plaintiffs to produce evidence of construction defects at other Heritage properties. Heritage argued that the evidence was a violation of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. The court cited a South Carolina Supreme Court case which made an exception for “facts showing the other acts were substantially similar to the event at issue.” The court noted that the defects introduced by the plaintiffs were “virtually identical across all developments.” This included identical use of the same products from project to project. Further, these were used to demonstrate that “HCI was aware of water issues in the other projects as early as 1998, before construction on Magnolia North had begun.”
The trial case ended with a directed verdict. Heritage charged that the jury should have determined whether the alleged defects existed. The appeals court noted that there was “overwhelming evidence” that Heritage failed “to meet the industry standard of care.” Heritage did not dispute the existence of the damages during the trial, they “merely contested the extent.”
Further, Heritage claimed in its appeal that the case should have been rejected due to the three-year statute of limitations. They note that the first meeting of the POA was on March 8, 2000, yet the suit was not filed until May 28, 2003, just over three years. The court noted that here the statute of limitation must be tolled, as Heritage controlled the POA until September 9, 2002. The owner-controlled POA filed suit “approximately eight months after assuming control.”
The court also applied equitable estoppel to the statute of limitations. During the time in which Heritage controlled the board, Heritage “assured the unit owners the construction defects would be repaired, and, as a result, the owners were justified in relying on those assurances.” Since “a reasonable owner could have believed that it would be counter-productive to file suit,” the court found that also prevented Heritage from invoking the statute of limitations. In the end, the appeals court concluded that the even apart from equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations could not have started until the unit owners took control of the board in September, 2002.
Heritage also contested the jury’s awarding of damages, asserting that “the POA failed to establish its damages as to any of its claims.” Noting that damages are determined “with reasonable certainty or accuracy,” and that “proof with mathematical certainty of the amount of loss or damage is not required,” the appeals court found a “sufficiently reasonable basis of computation of damages to support the trial court’s submission of damages to the jury.” Heritage also claimed that the POA did not show that the damage existed at the time of the transfer of control. The court rejected this claim as well.
Finally, Heritage argued that punitive damages were improperly applied for two reasons: that “the award of punitive damages has no deterrent effect because Appellants went out of business prior to the commencement of the litigation” and that Heritages has “no ability to pay punitive damages.” The punitive damages were upheld, as the relevant earlier decision includes “defendant’s degree of culpability,” “defendants awareness or concealment,” “existence of similar past conduct,” and “likelihood of deterring the defendant or others from similar conduct.”
The appeals court rejected all of the claims made by Heritage, fully upholding the decision of the trial court.
Read the court’s decision…
One World Trade Center Due to Be America’s Tallest and World’s Priciest
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
As One World Trade Center rises, so does the price tag. After construction delays and cost overruns, the cost of the building at the site of the September 11 attacks has risen to $3.8 billion. Part of the expense of the skyscraper is the heavily reinforced base of the building. The elevator shafts are also heavily reinforced, all part of guarding against future terrorist attacks.
In comparison, the world’s tallest tower, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, cost only $1.5 billion, less than half the cost of One World Trade Center. As a result, the Port Authority does not see the building as being profitable in near future. In order to fund it, the agency is raising tolls on bridge and tunnel traffic.
Currently, about the half the unfinished building is leased. Construction is expected to conclude in 2013.
Read the full story…
Construction Delayed by Discovery of Bones
June 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Work stopped on a $7 million construction project in Oak Harbor, Washington, after three sets of Native American remains were found. The Washington State Department of Archaeology and Historic Preservation had suggested that the project employ an archaeologist. City, state, and tribal officials are determining what will happen next. The Seattle Times reports that Jim Slowik, Oak Harbor’s mayor, has asked for a review of why no archaeologist was part of the project.
Read the full story…
Anti-Assignment Provision Unenforceable in Kentucky
December 20, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
On a certified question from the Federal District Court, the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided that an anti-assignment provision in a policy is unenforceable.Wehr Constructors v. Paducah Div. Assur. Co. of Am., 2012 Ky. LEXIS 183 (Ky. Oct. 25, 2012).
Before building an addition to its hospital, Murray Calloway County Hospital purchased a builder's risk policy from Assurance Company of America.The policy provided, "Your rights and duties under this policy may not be transferred without Assurance's written consent . . . ." The Hospital contracted with Wehr Constructors to install concrete subsurfaces and vinyl floors in order to expand the hospital. After installation, a portion of the floors and subsurface work was damaged. The Hospital submitted a claim to Assurance for $75,000, but the claim was denied.
Wehr sued the Hospital to recover money for its work on the construction project. In settling the case, the Hospital assigned to Wehr any claim or rights the Hospital had against Assurance.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Delaware “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6)
June 10, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Baldo, No. 09-338 (D. Del. June 2, 2011), claimants condominium association and unit owners sued project developer Rehoboth and general contractor Capano seeking damages because of moisture penetration property damage to common elements and individual units resulting from construction defects. Rehoboth and Capano filed a third party complaint against insured property manager Baldo alleging that, if Rehoboth and Capano were liable to claimants, Baldo was also liable because of Baldo’s failure to properly manage, maintain, and repair the property
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Ghost Employees Steal Jobs from Legit Construction Firms
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Firms that skirt labor laws for construction workers can undercut firms that are obeying those laws. In a piece in Raleigh, North Carolina’s News & Observer, Doug Burton, a commercial masonry contractor summed it up: “my competitors are cheating.” The article describes the low-bidding firms “called their workers independent contractors ? or treated them like ghosts, paid under the table and never acknowledged.” The cost to the state is “unpaid medical bills for injured workers, uncollected business and personal taxes, and payments not made to a depleted state unemployment reserve.”
One firm examined in the article, Martin’s Bricklaying, employs mostly immigrant Mexican laborers, many of whom are in the country illegally. One employee told the News & Observer, “we don’t complain.”
Read the full story…
Construction Defects Leave Animal Shelter Unusable
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Press Democrat reports that the Healdsburg Animal Shelter is proceeding in its lawsuit against the architect, general contractor, and subcontractors of its unfinished new facility. Shelter officials described the building as “effectively uninhabitable,” and the board has suggested that the building might have to be demolished. The chair of the shelter board told donors that “your investment is protected.”
The defects in the building include cracked concrete slabs and gaps around windows. However, even without these defects, the shelter alleges that the architect failed to correct design flaws.
Read the full story…
Consulting Firm Indicted and Charged with Falsifying Concrete Reports
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The New York Times reports that a company paid to inspect concrete at major public works projects in New York has been charged with falsifying results. They had been hired by the city three years ago after their predecessor was found to have falsified results.
According to the Times, investigators found nothing legitimate in nearly three thousand reports. The owner and five employees of American Standard Testing and Consulting Laboratories have been indicted on twenty-nine counts, including charges under New York’s racketeering law. Prison terms could be up to twenty-five years.
Prior to the city’s contract with American Standard, the city employed a firm called Testwell. Testwell was found in 2008 to have falsified its test results.
Read the full story…
