Subcontractor Not Liable for Defending Contractor in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled on January 9, 2012 in Hensel Phelps Construction Company v. Urata & Sons Cement, upholding the judgment of the lower court.
Hensel Phelps was the general contractor for a high-rise in Sacramento. They were sued by the owners of the building after problems were discovered in the concrete slabs of the building’s parking garage. Instead of welded steel wire mesh, the slabs had been constructed with fiber mesh. Hensel Phelps filed a cross-complaint against Urata Cement, the subcontractor that had performed the cement work. Urata refused to defend Hensel Phelps. The owners’ case was subsequently dismissed due to the statute of limitations.
Although the original case was over, Hensel Phelps continued in their claims against Urata. “Urata argued that a handwritten interlineation required Hensel Phelps to prove Urata was at fault for the injury alleged in the building owners’ complaint before Urata was obliged to defend Hensel Phelps in that action.”
The lower court concluded that Urata would have been obligated to defend Hensel Phelps if the owners’ lawsuit had alleged that the damage was due to the subcontractor’s work or if evidence at trial established this. The lower court found neither of these true. Instead, the use of the fiber mesh was a design issue and “that decision was outside the scope of the subcontractor’s work.”
During the trial, Hensel Phelps conceded that Urata was not at fault. The appeals court could find no reading of the contract that would cause Urata to be obligated to defend Hensel Phelps, calling Hensel Phelps’s reading of the contact as “grammatically infeasible.”
Judges Nicholson, Raye, and Butz upheld the decision of the lower court and awarded costs on appeal to Urata.
Read the court’s decision…
Colorado Court of Appeals Finds Damages to Non-Defective Property Arising From Defective Construction Covered Under Commercial General Liability Policy
December 20, 2012 — Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
The recently decided case of Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. v. Scottsdale Insurance Company (Colo. Ct. App. 10CA2638, October 25, 2012), confirms that absent specific exclusions in the policy, a commercial general liability (“CGL”) policy covers damages to non-defective property arising from a builder’s own defective workmanship.
Colorado Pool Systems, Inc. (“Colorado Pool”) was hired as a subcontractor to install a swimming pool at Founders Village Pool and Community Center (“Founders Village”) in Castle Rock, Colorado. After the concrete shell of the pool was placed, some of the rebar frame was found to be too close to the surface. Founders Village demanded that Colorado Pool remove and replace the pool, and Colorado Pool contacted its insurance carrier, Scottsdale Insurance Company (“Scottsdale”), with which Colorado Pool held a CGL policy. After inspecting the pool, Scottsdale’s claims adjuster stated that the insurance policy would cover losses associated with removing and replacing the pool.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heidi Gassman, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Gassman can be contacted at gassman@hhmrlaw.com
Another Las Vegas Tower at the Center of Construction Defect Claims
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Accusations are coming from both sides over construction defects at a Las Vegas tower, only this time, it’s not the Harmon Towers, it’s Hilton Grand Vacations, which is part of the Planet Hollywood Resort. The project was originally dubbed PH Towers Westgate, and it was developed by Westgate Resorts, which is suing the contractor, Tutor-Saliba for $10 million over late completion and construction defects.
Among the defects Westgate is claiming are cracked floor tiles in the valet lobby and cracks and delamination of the pool deck. Tutor-Saliba argues that the failure of the valet lobby floor is due to Westgate specifying only 1/16th inch-wide grouting, instead of the specified ¬º inch, and Westgate’s refusal to allow expansion joints on the pool deck has lead to problems there. Westgate’s attorney, Robert Schumacher, attributes the problems to “shoddy construction practices.”
According to the article in the Las Vegas Review Journal, plans were only 60 percent complete when construction began, leading to “thousands of change orders.” Despite not meeting an August completion deadline, Tutor-Saliba is claiming it is owed a $1.5 million bonus nevertheless.
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Homeowner may pursue negligence claim for construction defect, Oregon Supreme Court holds
March 1, 2011 — Original Story by Lori Bauman, Ater Wynne LLP,
Northwest Business Litigation BlogIn Abraham v. T. Henry, Oregon’s court of appeals held that a Oregon’s court of appeals holds that a homeowner may sue builder for common law negligence absent a contractual provision that forecloses such a claim. Plaintiff homeowners hired defendant contractors to build a house. When plaintiffs discovered defects in the construction years later, they sued for negligence.
The Court of Appeals held that the parties’ contractual relationship did not prevent a negligence claim, and that plaintiffs were entitled to pursue a negligence per se claim based on a violation of the Oregon Building Code.
The Supreme Court affirmed, but on a somewhat different basis. First, according to the Court, a construction defect claim concerns damage to property — and not mere economic losses — and thus is not barred by the economic loss doctrine. Second, the existence
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Insurer Not Liable for Construction Defect Revealed by Woodpecker
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an insurance provision that excluded construction defects must stand in Friedberg v. Chubb, granting a summary judgment to the insurance firm.
The Friedbergs discovered extensive water damage to their home after a woodpecker drilled a hole in a vertical support. They sought insurance coverage under their Chubb “Masterpiece” policy. The decision quotes the policy as covering “all risk of physical loss” “unless stated otherwise or an exclusion applies.” These exclusions included “gradual or sudden loss,” “structural movement,” and “faulty planning, construction or maintenance,” but the policy covered “ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies.”
Chubb’s expert determined that the Friedbergs’ home had defective construction, and “attributed the damage to the beams and walls below the beam to a failure to install control joints.” After Chubb denied coverage, the Friedbergs sued, although the court ruled that “even under the Friedbergs’ theory, the water damage was a loss caused by faulty construction and therefore excluded under the policy.”
On appeal, the Friedbergs argued that “the loss resulted from the combination of both faulty construction and the presence of water” and that Minnesota’s “concurrent causation” doctrine must apply, which according to the decision, “when a loss results from both a covered peril and an excluded peril, coverage exists unless the excluded peril is the ‘overriding cause’ of the loss.” The court rejected this reasoning, noting that “once the house was plagued with faulty construction, it was a foreseeable and natural consequence that water would enter.”
The Friedbergs also contended that “the damage caused by the intrusion of water into their home is an ‘ensuing covered loss’ for which they are due coverage.” The court also rejected this claim, noting that Minnesota law excludes defective construction from the ensuing loss provision. The court said that “the Friedbergs’ reading of their ensuing-loss clause, by contrast, would dramatically limit their policy’s faulty-construction exclusion, because almost ‘any loss cause by’ faulty construction could also be characterized as an ensuing loss under an all-risk policy.”
Read the court’ decision…
State Audit Questions College Construction Spending in LA
August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A state audit of the Los Angeles Community College District found many problems with their construction spending. Their report, as described in the Los Angeles Times, found construction money spent for other purposes, such as promotional photography and public relation tours, $28.3 million spent on projects that were later cancelled, and oversight committees that provided no oversight.
Earlier this year, the LA Times ran a series of articles detailing problems with the Los Angles Community College District’s construction program. The LA Times reported that the State Controller’s audit reached many of the same conclusions.
The Community College District disputed the findings.
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Record-Setting Construction in Fargo
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Prairie Business reports that Fargo is experiencing the most new construction it has ever seen, totaling $434 million in value, which exceeds the previous high in 2006 of $428 million. Many of the construction starts are for single family homes, although there is also an increase in construction of apartments and townhomes.
The Home Builders Association of Fargo-Moorhead also noted that there was also a large of remodeling projects. Terry Becker, the president of the HBA, said that “remodeling is just huge right now.”
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Builder Cannot Receive Setoff in Construction Defect Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has dismissed an appeal in a San Diego construction defect case. In Smith v. Walters Group, Christopher and Maud Smith sued The Walters Group, a real estate developer, and Galen C. Pavelko, Inc, the builder of their home. Walters had bought five lots and hired Pavelko to build houses on them, selling one of these homes to the Smiths. “After moving in, the Smiths noticed a strong and obnoxious odor permeating the house.” The Smiths sued but were ordered to arbitrate instead, pursuant to a clause in the purchase contract. The Smiths were awarded $1.5 million at arbitration.
Walters requested that the arbitration remain open to determine if Walters was entitled to a setoff for settlements from defendants not involved in the arbitration. During this time, Pavelko made a settlement with the Smiths, which the court found was in good faith. At the same time, the arbitrator “reached the opposite conclusion.” The arbitrator concluded that “only settlements made ‘in good faith before verdict or judgment’ qualified for setoff.”
Walters moved that the trial court “‘correct’ the award,” but the trial court declined to do so and confirmed the award. In the appeal, Walters raised the issue of “whether Pavelko’s settlement occurred ‘before verdict or judgment.’” The appeals court dismissed the appeal, noting that “Walters would not be entitled to a $500,000 setoff if we reversed the trial court’s order determining the Smith-Pavelko settlement was made in good faith because Pavelko’s $500,000 payment was expressly conditioned on such an order.” They add that “were we to reverse the trial court’s order, Pavelko would have no obligation to pay the Smiths the $500,000.” This would then “deprive Walters of the corresponding statutory right to a setoff.”
Read the court’s decision…
Contractual Liability Exclusion Bars Coverage
August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether coverage existed for a defectively built tennis court in light of a contractual liability exclusion. Ewing Construction Company, Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12154 (5th Cir. June 15, 2012).
Ewing Construction Company entered a contract with the School District to construct tennis courts at a school. After completion, the School District complained that the courts were cracking and flaking, rendering them unfit for playing tennis. The School District filed suit, seeking damages for defective construction. It alleged that Ewing breached its contract and performed negligently.
Ewing tendered the underlying lawsuit to Amerisure. Amerisure denied coverage and Ewing filed suit.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Court Consolidates Cases and Fees in Soil Construction Defect Case
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled in Burrow v. JTL Development. JTL Development had appealed a judgement in a construction defect case in which JTL Development and Highland Development were found liable for damage due to homes built on unstable and improperly compacted soil. The two companies were sued by the two sets of homeowners, the Burrows and the Balls, and their cases were consolidated at trial. Each family was awarded $700,000 in damages. This judgement had also been appealed and affirmed by the appeals court. In the current case, an additional $235,800 in cost-of-proof sanctions had been awarded to the two families.
Before the trial, Dale Burrows, Charles Ball, and Laurie Ball “asked JTL and Highland to admit that they ‘approved grading plans’ for the Burrows’ and Balls’ properties; ‘had knowledge that the [properties] contained improperly compacted fill’; ‘had knowledge that the [properties were’ not properly prepared for structures’; and ‘did not provide Plaintiffs with a complete soils report’ prepared by Gorian & Associates.” These were requests 14, 19, 20, and 22. JTL and Highland denied all of these.
At trial, the Burrows and Balls proved that all these were true. JTL and Highland’s geotechnical subcontractor, Gorian & Associates, had “recommended that Highland remove and re-compact the entire tract to a depth of 25 feet.” JTL and Highland did not follow this recommendation, “in order to avoid expense.”
After judgment, the Burrows and Balls moved for $582,587.45 for “attorneys’ fees and costs incurred proving the truth of requests for admission.” JTL and Highland claimed that only Dale Burrows could recover fees, but that also the fees were not recoverable. Joe Lynch of Highland “declared that he always believed the soils under the Burrows and Balls homes were properly compacted.” The Burrows and Balls responded with six identical sets of requests for admissions and the court awarded each of them twenty-five percent of $235,800, with JTL and Highland each responsible for fifty percent.
The appeals court noted that JTL and Highland filed a timely appeal and goes on to notes the four circumstances under which a responding party does not have to pay costs and fees. The court concluded that none of these were met. Instead of waiving the request, JTL and Highland denied the request, stating “without in any manner waiving the foregoing objection, responding party denies the request for admission.”
Nor was the admission “of no substantial importance,” instead the court said that the matters were of “substantial importance,” and the “trial would have been shortened by their admission. Highland and JTL “relied on Gorian when it denied the request,” but the trial court “discredited Lynch’s assertions,” finding that “Highland knew the soil was improperly compacted.”
As all plaintiffs had identical discovery requests, the court rejected the claim that only Dale Burrows was entitled to an award.
Read the court’s decision…
Court Will Not Compel Judge to Dismiss Construction Defect Case
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals of Texas has denied a petition for a writ of mandamus. The parties involved, Bonner Ball, Thomas Zenner, and Rallin Welch, are lmited partners of Black Diamond Builders, LLP. Black Diamond is the recipient of a lawsuit from Grier and Camille Patton, for whom Black Diamond built a home. The Pattons are alleging construction defects.
The Black Diamond partners argue that Judge Jeff Shadwick, presiding judge of the 55th District Court of Harris County, Texas should have granted their motion to dismiss. They sought to have the Fourteenth Court of Appeals compel that action.
The Black Diamond Partners claims that “the homowners failed to satisfy statutory prerequisites before filing suit, and dismissal of the suit was automatic under the applicable statues in effect at the time the Pattons noticed alleged defects in their home.”
The court noted that “a trial court will be held to have abused its discretion only if the party requesting mandamus relief establishes that the trial court could have reached but one decision.” The court did not concur with this and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus.
Read the court's decision…
No “Special Relationship” in Oregon Construction Defect Claim
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Writing on his firm’s blog, Justin Stark discusses recent changes in construction defect claims in Oregon where, as he points out, “courts in Oregon have been lowering legal hurdles that construction defect plaintiffs must overcome in bringing their cases.” He cites a case in which water damage was discovered more than six years after construction was complete. The owners claimed breach of contract and negligence. The trial court found for the contractor, who argued “that there was no ‘special relationship’ with the owners that could support the negligence claim.”
This was overturned on appeal, with the court concluding that if there was a violation of the building code, then the negligence claim could stand. This was appealed to the Oregon Supreme court which concluded that “neither a special relationship nor a statutory standard of care, such as the building code, is necessary to bring a negligence claim here.”
Stark notes that “many forms of construction contract incorporate the phrase ‘workmanlike,’ which implicates the ‘common law standard of care’ in negligence law.
Read the full story…
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Broker Not Liable for Failure to Reveal Insurer's Insolvency After Policy Issued
March 28, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Faced with an issue of first impression in California, the Court of Appeals held that a broker was not liable for failing to reveal the insurer's insolvency occurring after issuance of the policy. Pacific Rim Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. Aon Risk Ins. Serv. West, Inc., 2012 Cal. App. LEXIS 232 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 28, 2012).
The developer for a construction project in downtown San Diego retained Aon as its broker to secure coverage. Aon procured a general liability policy for the project with Legion Indemnity Company. Legion was solvent when it issued the policy.
The developer hired Pacific Rim (“PacRim”) as one of several subcontractors on the project. The parties entered into a contract in which the developer agreed to provide PacRim with liability insurance through an Owner Controlled Insurance Program (“OCIP”). Aon was not a party to the contract and PacRim was never its client. PacRim, however, enrolled in the OCIP by contacting Aon and providing all necessary paperwork.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
New Apartment Tower on the Rise in Seattle
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Seattle Times reports that groundbreaking is planned for a forty-story tower in Seattle. The building process will take at least five years, during which time, according to the paper, there will be nearly eight thousand new apartments in Seattle. The planned tower will add another 386 units to that.
The developer, Holland Partner Group, has four other apartments buildings planned or in construction currently, which will account for more than a thousand of the units being added to the city’s apartment stock.
Read the full story…
Recent Case Brings Clarity and Questions to Statute of Repose Application
August 16, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
I have often chatted about the Washington Statute of Repose on this blog. The Statute of Repose prevents construction claims, for the most part, from being raised 6 years from the date of substantial completion or termination. Well, a recent Court of Appeals case dove deep into the specific determinative factors that tell us when to start the clock. It certainly raises questions about how long we really have to file suit.
The Statute of Repose has been a frequent topic here, so I will simply direct you to my prior post for further information on how this law works. A recent post was published about a lawsuit that might raise some questions about when and how the clock begins to roll, and claim periods begin to diminish.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Plaintiff Not Entitled to Further Damages over Defective Decking
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District has rejected an appeal from the successful plaintiff of a construction defect case in Evilsizor v. Calaveras Lumber Company. John Evilsizor hired Scott Hunton to remove and replace the deck at the rear of his home. Subsequently, the deck, which had been constructed with a product called SmartDeck, a product of the subsequently bankrupt US Plastic Lumber, exhibited problems. Hunton made some repairs. Calaveras Lumber offered replacement decking if Evilsizor would pay the difference in price. Mr. Evilsizor hired another contractor to replace the decking and then sued for lost use and compensation for the amount he paid the second contractor. Replacing the deck a second time cost Mr. Evilsizor $113,065.44.
During the trial, the defendant conceded that the planking was defective. It has been recalled by the manufacturer. Additionally, the jury heard testimony from a construction and building codes consultant, Lonne Haughton, however the trial court found that Mr. Haughton did not have sufficient expertise in wood-plastic composite materials. Further, Haughton had been a California contractor for only three years, and though he claimed a college degree, this was “‘a distance learning diploma’ that required no in-class work.” The appeals court upheld the decision that Mr. Haughton was not qualified to testify as an expert about wood-plastic materials.
The court also upheld the trial court’s exclusion of two pieces of evidence. One was a list of SmartDeck sales. However, the witness asked about it was not able “to testify who prepared it or confirm that it had been prepared by a Cascade employee.” Further, “the fact defendant bought and sold SmartDeck was not disputed.” The other was an e-mail in which US Plastics said they had “some bad product in the field.” This e-mail went to Westmark & Associates, and the plaintiff did not establish that it was ever sent to the defendant.
Though the defense has suggested an award of $18,000 plus loss-of-use damages for one year and an additional $4,000 if the jury believed that leftover material from the front deck was used in the rear. As the plaintiff requested $100 per month of loss of use, this would have totaled $34,000. The jury awarded the cost of the decking, $6,275,82. The court cites earlier decision that the amount of the award is “a question of fact to be determined by the jury.”
In conclusion, Mr. Evilsizor was not only unable to receive a larger award, but the court ruled that he must pay the defendant’s cost on appeal.
Read the court's decision…
Tacoma Construction Site Uncovers Gravestones
August 11, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Seattle Times reports that a transit construction project has uncovered about twenty-five gravestones. The area was historically sensitive, as it is in territory once occupied by the Puyallup Tribe. At current report, no human remains have been found and the article cites the project?s archeological consultant as describing the gravestones as “not historically significant.”
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