Delaware “occurrence” and exclusions j(5) and j(6)
June 10, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Goodville Mut. Cas. Co. v. Baldo, No. 09-338 (D. Del. June 2, 2011), claimants condominium association and unit owners sued project developer Rehoboth and general contractor Capano seeking damages because of moisture penetration property damage to common elements and individual units resulting from construction defects. Rehoboth and Capano filed a third party complaint against insured property manager Baldo alleging that, if Rehoboth and Capano were liable to claimants, Baldo was also liable because of Baldo’s failure to properly manage, maintain, and repair the property
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Save a Legal Fee: Prevent Costly Lawsuits With Claim Limitation Clauses
April 25, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Cousel
Ever had that lingering problem with a contracting partner that went away for awhile and then came back to bite you ? years later? In Washington, construction contract claims can be raised for up to six years after substantial completion. Six years!? Why would I want to wait that long to find out if I have a problem? You don’t have to.
Over the past few years, I have discussed the notion of “contractual claim periods” on The Builders Counsel. For today’s Save a Legal Fee column, I cannot think of a better topic. These provisions are specifically intended to save you from unnecessary legal fees that might arise if a problem goes unnoticed for too long.
Contractual claim periods are simply a way to reduce the amount of time that a contracting party has to raise a claim against its contracting partner. For example, a subcontractor might require that a general contractor raise any claim that it might have ? for defective or incomplete work, injury, damages, etc ? within a particular amount of time or forever lose the ability to raise the claim in a legal proceeding.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Washington Court Limits Lien Rights of Construction Managers
August 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
A newly filed, yet unpublished, court opinion opines that a construction manager cannot file a construction lien in Washington state. So, how far reaching is this opinion?
In the case of Blue Diamond Group Inc. v. KB Seattle 1, Inc., et al, a New York construction manager filed a lien against the Westfield Southcenter Mall in Tukwila, Washington. The lien was filed after the owner of a coffee stand failed to pay Blue Diamond for consulting services used in the construction of a kiosk.
Blue Diamond served as the owner’s agent, assisting with managing subcontractors, vendors and other tasks. The manager’s tasks also included paying invoices, managing deliveries, setting schedules and other site managerial tasks. Blue Diamond was not registered as a contractor under Washington’s RCW 18.27.
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Read the court’s decision…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Allowing The Use Of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 16, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. Id. at *1. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
Read the full story…5
Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Hawaii State Senate Requires CGL Carriers to Submit Premium Information To State Legislature
March 20, 2011 — March 20, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
In light of the decision in Hawaii’s Intermediate Court of Appeals in Group Builders, Inc.,v. Admiral Insurance Company, 231 P.3d 67(2010), Hawaii’s state senate is requesting that "every domestic and foreign insurance company that has ever issued commercial general liability policies in the State is requested to submit information to the Legislature on the total premiums received for their commercial general liability policies during the past ten years"
Read Full Text of Hawaii State Senate Resolution
Read Her Lips: “No New Buildings”
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Martha Johnson, the head of the General Services Administration, has said that her agency will not be building any new buildings in the near future. Among other duties, the GSA is responsible for the building, renovating, and leasing of federal office space. The White House had proposed $840 million in new construction, the Senate only $56 million. The House did not appropriate any money for the agency to use for new construction.
In addition to cutbacks on new buildings, Congress is suggesting only $280 million in repairs of existing government buildings. In order to cut back, the GSA has dropped plans to renovate their own offices in favor of renovations at the Department of Homeland Security and the Food and Drug Administration.
Read the full story…
Construction Defects in Home a Breach of Contract
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of North Dakota has ruled in Leno v. K & L Homes, affirming the verdict of the lower court. K & L Homes argued that district court had erred in several ways, including by refusing to instruct the jury on comparative fault, denying a request for inspection, and not allowing a defendant to testify on his observations during jury viewing.
The Lenos purchased a home constructed by K & L Homes, after which they alleged they found cracks, unevenness, and shifting, which they attributed to improper construction. They claimed negligence on the part of K & L Homes. K & L Homes responded that the Lenos were responsible for damage to the home. The Lenos dropped their negligence claim, arguing breach of contract and implied warranties.
Before the trial, after the discovery period had passed, K & L Homes requested to inspect the home. This was rejected by the court. Kelly Moldenhauer, the owner of K & L Homes sought to testify about his observations during the jury’s viewing of the house. The court denied this too. The jury found that K & L was in breach of contract and awarded damages to the Lenos.
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that K & L Homes gave “warranties that the home had been built according to local building codes and laws, and that the house was fit for its particular purpose as a residence.” The court found that a defective home breached this warranty. Further, the home violated an implied warranty of fitness.
The district court had denied K & L’s request to inspect the home, as the discovery period had ended and it would not give the Lenos time to do further discovery of their own. At the time of the request, there was only twenty-two days before the trial. The Supreme Court ruled that this was not an abuse of discretion of the part of the district court.
The Lenos had requested that Moldenhauer’s testimony not be permitted, as it would “have the same effect as if the court had granted K & L Homes’ pretrial request for inspection.” K & L Homes agreed to this in court, replying, “okay.”
The decision affirms the judgment of the district court and the damages awarded to the Lenos by the jury.
Read the court’s decision…
Tennessee Court: Window Openings Too Small, Judgment Too Large
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Tennessee Court of Appeals has issued a ruling in the case of Dayton v. Ackerman, upholding the decision of the lower court, even as they found that the award was incorrectly computed. The Daytons purchased a house that had been designed and built by the Ackermans, who operated a construction business. The court noted that the warranty with the house promised that “for a period of 60 days, the following items will be free of defects in materials or workmanship: doors (including hardware); windows; electric switches; receptacles; and fixtures; caulking around exterior openings; pluming fixtures; and cabinet work.”
Soon, the Daytons began to experience problems with the house. Many were addressed by the Ackermans, but the Daytons continued to have problems with the windows. Neither side could specify a firm date when the Ackermans were contacted by the Daytons about the window problems. The Ackermans maintained that more than two years passed before the Daytons complained about the windows. The lower court found the Daytons more credible in this.
Initially, the Daytons included the window manufacturer in their suit, but after preliminary investigations, the Daytons dropped Martin Doors from their suit. Martin Doors concluded that the windows were improperly installed, many of them “jammed into openings that were too small for them.”
After the Daytons dismissed Martin Doors, the Ackermans sought to file a third party complaint against them. This was denied by the court, as too much time had elapsed. The Ackermans also noted that not all of the window installations were defective, however, the courts found that the Daytons ought not to have mismatched windows.
Unfortunately for the Daytons, the window repair was done incorrectly and the windows were now too small for the openings. The firm that did the repair discounted the windows and Daytons concealed the problem with plantation shutters, totalling $400 less than the original lowest estimate. However, the appeals court noted that it was here that the trial court made their computation error. Correcting this, the appeals court assessed the Ackermans $12,016.20 instead of $13,016.20.
Finally, the Ackerman’s expert was excluded as he had changed his testimony between deposition and trial. The trial reviewed the expert’s testimony and had it been admissible, it would not have changed the ruling.
Read the court’s decision…
Negligent Misrepresentation in Sale of Building Altered without Permits
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has ruled in the case Wyle v. Lees. The Leeses owned a two-unit apartment building in North Conway, New Hampshire. They hired a contractor to add a third, larger apartment, including a two-car garage. The Leeses and their contractor submitted a building permit application. They were informed that site plan review was required. After receiving approval on the site plan, construction started. At no point did they obtain a building permit and the construction was never inspected. The Leeses subsequently added more space to the unit, reducing parking spaces below the minimum required. Again, they did not obtain a building permit.
In 2007, three years after all these changes were complete, the Leeses sold their building to Mr. Wyle. To the question “are you aware of any modifications or repairs made without the necessary permits?” they answered “no.” About six weeks after closing, Wyle “received a letter from the town code enforcement officer regarding the legality of the removal of a garage door from the new unit.” A subsequent inspection revealed “numerous building and life safety code violations.”
Mr. Wyle brought a claim against the Leeses for negligent misrepresentation. The defendants filed a motion “seeking to preclude economic loss damages.” At a two-day bench trial, Mr. Wyle won. The Leeses appealed.
The appeals court found that “the defendants negligently misrepresented that the premises were licensed for immediate occupancy and that the defendants had obtained all necessary permits,” and thus upheld the lower court’s finding of negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court also rejected the Leeses’ argument that damages must be apportioned on all parties, including “the plaintiff himself, the plaintiff’s building inspector, and the defendant’s contractor,” finding a lack of “adequate evidence.”
The Leeses further argued that they were unaware that modifications and repairs were accomplished without the required permits. The appeals court noted that “the trial court found that both the conditional approval and final approval for the site plan stated that a building permit and a certificate of occupancy were required prior to any use.” The court concluded that the Leeses “knew or should have known of the falsity of their representation.”
The appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court.
Read the court’s decision…
In Colorado, Primary Insurers are Necessary Parties in Declaratory Judgment Actions
December 9, 2011 — Heather M. Anderson, Colorado Construction Litigation
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado recently ruled that primary insurers are necessary parties, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19, in a declaratory judgment action being pursued by an excess carrier. See Insurance Co. of State of Pennsylvania v. LNC Communities II, LLC, 2011 WL 5548955 (D. Colo. 2011). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 is almost identical to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 19 and pertains to the joinder of persons needed for “just adjudication.” The Insurance Co. of the State of Pennsylvania (“ICSOP”) sought a declaratory judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify the defendants (collectively referred to as “Lennar Companies”) with regard to the underlying lawsuit brought by The Falls at Legend Trail Owners Association, Inc. (the “HOA”). Id. at *2. In its lawsuit, the HOA alleged Lennar Companies were liable for construction defects at The Falls at Legend Trail residential development.
Lennar Companies held two primary insurance policies, one issued by OneBeacon Insurance Company f/k/a General Accident Insurance Company (“General Accident”) and the other issued by American Safety Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“American Safety”). Lennar Companies also carried excess policies issued by ICSOP and Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (“Ohio Casualty”).
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather M. Anderson of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLP. Ms Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Construction Defects Lead to Demolition of Seattle’s 25-story McGuire Apartments Building
March 16, 2011 — March 16, 2011 Construction Defect Journal Staff
According to a story published last Thursday in Seattle PI: " The 25-story McGuire Apartments, at Second Avenue and Wall Street, would cost more to fix than the building is worth, according to its owners. Its most serious defect involves steel cables that are corroding inside of concrete slabs because the ends weren’t properly treated with a rust-proof coating and a pocket in the edge of the concrete that wasn’t properly sealed"
The report by Aubrey Cohen outlines the demolition plans which are expected to take between 12 and 18 months, and will utilize robotic Brokk Machines. The demolition plan calls for one story at a time to be demolished, with the debris to be trucked offsite. Demolition plans aim to minimize disruption to residents and businesses in the area by Limiting work 7 a.m. to 6 p.m. on weekdays and 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. Saturdays with "impact and percussive activities" limited to 8 a.m to 5 p.m weekdays.
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Safer Schools Rendered Unsafe Due to Construction Defects
February 10, 2012 — CJD Staff
Built on a program for safer school buildings, schools in Neenan County, Colorado have been shown to have mild-to-moderate structural problems, rendering some of them unsafe. The Denver Post reports that a third-party review of schools built by the Neenan Company has shown structural issues in all fifteen school buildings.
One school, Meeker Elementary, has been closed as it could collapse under high winds or during an earthquake. Sargent Junior-Senior High School is in use, but there are plans to evacuate the buildings if winds exceed 25 mile per hour. Two schools have roofs that are unable to bear expected loads of snow during the winter.
The Neenan Company says that the school buildings are not up to their standards and is working with the school districts to repair the buildings. Repairs are expected to be complete by August.
Read the full story…
Eighth Circuit Remands to Determine Applicability of Collapse Exclusion
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Eighth Circuit determined a jury instruction regarding the applicability of the "all-risk" policy’s exclusion for "collapse" was inadequate. See KAAPA Ethanol, LLC v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22158 (8th Cir. Nov. 3, 2011).
KAAPA had nine large, cylindrical, stainless steel tanks fabricated at its location. Soon after operations began in 2003, some of the tanks experienced unusual movement and began to shift. A geotechnical engineer found "silty clay" had been used for infill instead of compacted granular fill called for in engineering drawings. A year long plan to repair all nine tanks was implemented.
Affiliated’s "all-risk" policy excluded damage caused by faulty workmanship. It also excluded damage caused by settling or cracking. The settling exclusion went on to provide, "This exclusion will not apply to loss or damage resulting from collapse of: a building or structure; or material part of a building or structure." Affiliated denied coverage because of the faulty workmanship and settling exclusions.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Late Filing Contractor Barred from Involving Subcontractors in Construction Defect Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Colorado Court of Appeals looked at that state’s Construction Defect Action Reform Act in determining if a general contractor could add subcontractors as third-party defendants to a construction defect lawsuit. Shaw Construction, LLC was the general contraction of the Roslyn Court condominium complex, and was sued by the homeowners’ association in a construction defect case. United Builder Services was the drywall subcontractor on the project. MB Roofing had installed roofs, gutters, and downspouts. The certificate of occupancy for the last building was issued on March 10, 2004. The project architect certified completion of all known remaining architectural items in June, 2004.
The HOA filed a claim against the developers of the property on January, 21, 2009. A week later, the HOA amended its complaint to add Shaw, the general contractor. Shaw did not file its answer and third-party complaint until March 29, 2010, sending its notice of claim under the CDARA on March 30.
The subcontractors claimed that the six-year statute of limitations had ended twenty days prior. Shaw claimed that the statute of limitations ran until six years after the architect’s certification, or that the HOA’s suit had tolled all claims.
The trial court granted summary judgment to the subcontractors, determining that “substantial completion occurs ‘when an improvement to real property achieves a degree of completion at which the owner can conveniently utilize the improvement of the purpose it was intended.’”
The appeals court noted that “Shaw correctly points out that the CDARA does not define ‘substantial completion.’” The court argued that Shaw’s interpretation went against the history and intent of the measure. “Historically, a construction professional who received a complaint responded by ‘cross-nam[ing] or add[ing] everybody and anybody who had a part to play in the construction chain.’” The court concluded that the intent of the act was to prevent unnamed subcontractors from being tolled.
The court further rejected Shaw’s reliance on the date of the architect’s certification as the time of “substantial completion,” instead agreeing with the trial court that “the architect’s letter on which Shaw relies certified total completion.”
The appeals court upheld the trial court’s determination that the statute of limitation began to run no later than March 10, 2004 and that Shaw’s complaint of March 29, 2010 was therefore barred. The summary judgment was upheld.
Read the court’s decision…
Preventing Costly Litigation Through Your Construction Contract
August 17, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
It’s Tuesday, which means it ’s the middle of your work week. Tuesday is a great time to take an hour to look over your contracts, while the crews are pushing through their scheduled work. Today’s food for thought: How do you use your contract to reduce your litigation burden?
Your contract should do many things. It should discuss the scope of work, scheduling of work, quality of work, coverage for liabilities and conditions and timeliness for payment. But often overlooked is how your contract can lend to dispute resolution.
Commonly, you will see a simple provision that covers governing law, venue for disputes and the awarding of attorneys’ fees. But you can do better. Remember, a contract is enforced to the maximum extent possible in Washington state.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Preparing for Trial on a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 895, et seq.
May 10, 2012 — Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP
In 2002, the California Legislature enacted the Right to Repair Act (hereinafter “SB-800”), as codified in Title VII of the Civil Code. As set forth in Civil Code section 895, et seq., SB-800 established a set of standards for residential construction, and provides a statutory protocol to address alleged violations of those standards. SB-800 applies to all new single family homes sold after January 1, 2003, and it created its own cause of action governed completely by its own terms, in that in order to state a cause of action under SB-800, a plaintiff may only allege a violation of the Act. (Civ. Code, § 938.) Under Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944, the Legislature made it clear that it intended to create a single cause of action for construction defects in homes that fall under the purview of SB-800. By passing SB-800, the Legislature eliminated multiple and often redundant or conflicting causes of action, burdens of proof, statutes of limitations, and types of damages that were common in construction defect actions prior to the enactment of the same.
Civil Code section 895, et seq. has significantly changed the landscape of construction defect lawsuits. Yet, for years, the only attention given to the statutes focused solely on the codified pre-litigation process that requires plaintiffs and builders to meet and confer regarding defects and attempt a process to repair the alleged defects before litigation is pursued. A major impediment to the implementation of the pre-litigation procedures has often been that the statutes specifically state that the information obtained during the pre-litigation process is admissible at trial. Hence, through use of the pre-litigation process, plaintiffs’ counsel can engage in a builder funded fishing expedition and later use the information obtained to advance their litigation goals. As such, many builders have chosen to opt out of codified pre-litigation process altogether, an option which the builder can elect within their Purchase and Sale Agreements.
Recently, counsel for builders throughout California have turned their attention to the “exclusive remedy” aspect of SB-800 by seeking, often successfully, to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. (Civ. Code, § 943.) Â
The question remains: what is the benefit of requiring plaintiffs to trim down their complaint and eliminate their tried and true common law causes of action, and requiring them to pursue only a single cause of action for violation of SB800?
The construction standards enumerated within SB-800 include fifty-plus functionality standards. On their face, any benefit to pursuing a construction defect action under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800 initially appears trivial at best, in light of the fact that a jury may be very confused with the complexity of the functionality standards set forth within the Civil Code. Nevertheless, Title VII of the Civil Code actually contains numerous provisions that builders can utilize to their benefit throughout the process of construction defect litigation, including during preparation for trial.
First and foremost, counsel for builders can assert numerous affirmative defenses that will be beneficial if the matter proceeds to trial. These affirmative defenses, as codified in Civil Code section 945.5, include mitigation, in whole or in part, for damages caused by: an unforeseen act of nature; a homeowner’s failure to allow reasonable and timely access for inspections and repair under the pre-litigation procedures; the homeowner’s failure to follow the builder’s recommendations and commonly accepted homeowner maintenance obligations; ordinary wear and tear; misuse; abuse; or neglect. Builders should include these affirmative defenses within their responsive pleadings and as trial approaches, prepare appropriate motions in limine and request special jury instructions regarding the same. As frustrated builders and their attorneys are well aware, many construction defect suits result from a homeowner’s failure to properly maintain their property in a manner that is consistent with normal maintenance procedures and guidelines. Furthermore, within the ten year statute of limitations for most defects, ordinary wear and tear is often attributable to numerous deficiencies alleged by plaintiffs. The affirmative defense for a homeowner’s failure to allow inspections and repairs is also vital, as plaintiffs’ counsel may encourage a homeowner to forego the repair and seek monetary damages, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to ultimately obtain their share of attorney’s fees. Therefore, the SB-800 statutes provide the builder with recourse and distinctive mitigation defenses that were previously and confusingly mixed into tort and contract related defenses. These affirmative defenses can also be utilized by counsel during the cross-examination of plaintiff homeowners and expert witnesses. Defense counsel should fully grasp these defenses and utilize them as defense themes throughout litigation.
As a plaintiff is limited to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800, if defense counsel has failed to properly eliminate excessive tort and contract causes of action prior to trial, a motion for summary adjudication, or at the very least, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be brought to limit the introduction of evidence outside of a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Practical judges are always looking for ways to streamline and expedite trials, and they are currently ruling that SB-800 is the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs. In fact, plaintiffs’ firms in SB-800 matters are now voluntarily limiting their complaints to this one cause of action.
Special jury instructions can also be crafted to limit a jury’s computation of damages pursuant to Civil Codesection 944, which provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts, the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards, the reasonable cost of removing and replacing any improper repair by the builder, reasonable relocation and storage expenses, lost business income if the home was used as a principal place of a business licensed to be operated from the home, reasonable investigative costs for each established violation, and all other costs or fees recoverable by contract or statute. (Civ. Code, § 944.) [Emphasis added.]
Civil Code section 944 specifically prohibits recovery for damages outside the scope of its explicit language as it states “the homeowner is only entitled to ... damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title....” [Emphasis added.] The statute ultimately provides a “reasonableness” standard for the computation of damages that did not exist when computing damages on traditional common law tort and contract claims. Therefore, defense counsel should prepare special jury instructions to limit evidence of damages introduced at trial to the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards, and to exclude any evidence of damages beyond the reasonableness standard. Defense counsel should seize the opportunity to utilize the theme of “reasonableness” when attacking plaintiffs’ allegations and plaintiffs’ proposed repair methodology throughout the discovery process and at trial.
Defense counsel may also prepare a motion in limine or special jury instruction regarding the limitation of evidence regarding defects that did not cause resultant damage. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civ. Code, § 897.) [Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel can argue that the introduction of any evidence supporting a claim for construction-related deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, or for deficiencies where no damage has occurred is prohibited and must be excluded at trial. This requirement of resultant damages is familiar as the general rule was previously established in Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, in which the California Supreme Court held that there is no tort recovery for construction defects that have not actually caused property damage. The legislature effectively codified this rule within Civil Code section 897.
A motion in limine can also be crafted to limit expert testimony to the standards enumerated in Civil Code section 896, and to deficiencies that caused damage pursuant to Civil Code 897. The motion in limine can be based upon Civil Code section 943 and the fact that claims for defects in homes which were sold after January 1, 2003 may only be pursued under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. As such, expert testimony should be controlled by the standards set forth in Civil Code section 896. Furthermore, throughout a construction defect matter, defense counsel should ensure that their experts are well versed with the standards and that they can provide testimony that utilizes the same. Defense counsel’s knowledge of the standards will also be helpful during the cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
If, despite the efforts of defense counsel, the complaint still has numerous causes of action, or if only some homes fall under the purview of SB-800 while others do not, defense counsel can utilize a motion to bifurcate trial. The motion’s basis is that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 will require the introduction of evidence regarding the violations of the fifty-plus standards, and the tort and contract-based claims would also require the introduction of a wide range of evidence to prove each cause of action. For example, in order to prove the tort causes of action, plaintiffs must prove elements such as: duty, breach, proximate and actual causation, and that the builder placed the homes into the stream of commerce. (See Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63; Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227.) On the contract causes of action, plaintiffs must prove the existence of a valid written contract for the sale of the home, including proof regarding the existence of basic contractual elements such as offer, acceptance, and consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1624 subd. (a); Roth v. Malson (1997) 67 Cal.App.4th 552, 557.) Defense counsel can argue that exposing the jury to elements that may or may not be applicable to all of the homes in the action will complicate and confuse the jury. Thus, concurrently exposing the jury to the SB-800 claims and the non-SB-800 claims will necessitate undue consumption of time, and create the substantial danger of undue prejudice of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
One of the most important and relevant features of the SB-800 statutes is that they include shortened statutes of limitation as to certain enumerated defects. The codified statutes of limitations apply from the date of “close of escrow,” and are much more definitive than statutes of limitations regarding tort and contract claims. Therefore, they can be utilized within a motion for summary adjudication in cases where only one or a few defects are alleged. For example, under Civil Code section 896, et seq., there is a five year limitation on paint (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(1)); a four year limitation on plumbing fixtures (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (e)); a three year limitation on landscaping (Civ. Code § 896, subd. (g)(12)); and a one year limitation on irrigation systems and drainage (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(7)). The non-SB-800 claims are subject to a four year statute of limitation for patent defects and a ten year statute of limitation for latent defects. (See Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1, 337.15.) The contrast between the statute of limitations for the SB-800 claims and non-SB-800 claims can complicate a matter at trial, further establishing the necessity to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Hence, defense counsel should also utilize a motion to bifurcate the statute of limitations issues from the issue of liability if a question of fact exists. If successful on the motion to bifurcate, plaintiff’s counsel will be barred from the introducing evidence at trial regarding a defect where the statute of limitations has run.
Defense counsel should also seek to simplify the construction standards for the jury. Ultimately, by drafting jury instructions and a special verdict form that is easy to navigate, counsel can promote an easy interpretation of the standards enumerated within the Civil Code. The best route for drafting a special verdict form is to draft it as a check-list, similar to a traditional real estate walk-through check-list. By incorporating the shortened statutes of limitations into the special verdict form, defense counsel can effectively frame the case for the jury. The special verdict form should also allow the jury to easily eliminate any claim for damages that is mitigated, in whole or in part, through the codified affirmative defenses. Defense counsel should also consider drafting a trial brief that effectively and simplistically provides the trial court judge with an understanding of the specific defects before the court, and simultaneously notes which Civil Code standards are implicated and the scope of the same. If the trial judge is not well versed in construction defect litigation, defense counsel should be all the more careful in breaking down the parameters and limitations codified within SB-800 for the court.
The strategies outlined within this article are only a few tactics that can be utilized to defend a construction defect suit. Depending on the defect allegations within any particular case, defense counsel should become intimately familiar with Title VII of the Civil Code and use all aspects of the same to their advantage. If not, plaintiffs’ counsel will have the advantage during “court-house step” settlement discussions and at trial.
Printed courtesy of Samir R. Patel, Esq. of Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com.
Orange County Home Builder Dead at 93
April 25, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Randall E. Presley was a homebuilder in Southern California for more than thirty years, acting as head of Presley Development Company from 1956 until selling the firm to Lyon Homes in 1987. The two companies merged in 1991 as the Presley Cos. Mr. Presley saw the need in the 1950s to provide people in Southern California with low- to medium-priced quality homes.
His firm built more than 160 communities and was among the ten largest homebuilding firms in the country, expanding beyond California. Mr. Presley was 93 when he succumbed to pneumonia. He is survived by a wife, three children, seven grandchildren, and 11 great-grandchildren.
Read the full story…
Illinois Court Determines Insurer Must Defend Property Damage Caused by Faulty Workmanship
July 11, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Illinois Court of Appeals determined the insurer must defend allegations of property damage arising from faulty workmanship. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Larsen, Inc., 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1443 (Ill. Ct. App. June, 20, 2011).
Larsen was a subcontractor for Weather-Tite in a condominium building. Weather-Tite installed windows on the project and hired Larsen to apply sealant to the windows. The windows subsequently leaked and caused water damage within the complex.
The homeowner’s association sued Weather-Tite for breach of express and implied warranties. Weather-Tite filed a third-party complaint against Larsen, seeking contribution and alleging that Larsen was in breach of contract by failing to add Weather-Tite as an additional insured under Larsen’s CGL policy.
Both Weather-Tite and Larsen tendered to Larsen’s insurer. Both tenders were denied because the insurer contended the complaints alleged only construction defects, and not “property damage” or an “occurrence” within the terms of the policy.
The insurer filed suit for a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion as to Weather-Tite, but granted Larsen’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com