Supreme Court of Oregon Affirms Decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al.
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
After reviewing the decision in Abraham v. T. Henry Construction, et al., the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed that a tort claim for property damage arising from construction defects may exist even when the homeowner and the builder are in a contractual relationship.
When the case was initially filed, the plaintiffs alleged breach of contract and negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing that one, the claim was barred by the six-year statute of limitations and two, no special relationship (such as one between a doctor and patient) existed. The court agreed with the defendants. However, the Court of Appeals while affirming the trial court’s decision on breach of contract reversed the decision on negligence. The Court of Appeals stated that an administrative or statute rule could establish a standard of care independent from the contract.
The Oregon Supreme Court gave an example of cases where a tort claim could exist when a contract is present: “If an individual and a contractor enter into a contract to build a house, which provides that the contractor will install only copper pipe, but the contractor installs PVC pipe instead (assuming both kinds of pipe comply with the building code and the use of either would be consistent with the standard of care expected of contractors), that failure would be a breach of contract only. […] If the failure to install the copper pipe caused a reduction in the value of the house, the plaintiff would be able to recover that amount in an action for breach of contract. […] On the other hand, if the contractor installed the PVC pipe in a defective manner and those pipes therefore leaked, causing property damage to the house, the homeowner would have claims in both contract and tort. […] In those circumstances, the obligation to install copper instead of PVC pipe is purely contractual; the manner of installing the pipe, however, implicates both contract and tort because of the foreseeable risk of property damage that can result from improperly installed pipes.”
Read the court’s decision…
$5 Million Construction Defect Lawsuit over Oregon Townhomes
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A homeowners’ association in Lake Oswego, Oregon has filed a $5 million lawsuit against the developers of the luxury townhomes. The homeowners of Sunset Crossing are suing Centurion Homes and Aspen Townhomes over claims that construction defects have lead to water intrusion and structural damages. The townhomes were built in 2005.
Andy Burns, the lawyer for Phillip and Patricia Gentelmann, the owners of both Centurion Homes and Aspen Townhomes, said the Gentelmanns were “taking these allegations very seriously.” The suit says that the construction violated state and local building codes and that the firms did not repair damage caused by water intrusion.
Read the full story…
All Risk Policy Only Covers Repair to Portion of Dock That Sustains Damage
January 6, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
A portion of a dock on Lack Michigan operated by the Ports of Indiana suffered visible damage. See Ports of Indiana v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130979 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 14, 2011). Lexington Insurance Company insured the port. Lexington agreed that a portion of the dock was damaged and paid $1.2 million for repairs. A dispute arose, however, over whether additional sections of the dock were damaged and whether the damage was the result of more than one "occurrence."
An expert report opined that a significant drop creating record lows in the water level of Lake Michigan in 2007 caused damage to the dock. Lexington maintained that only 128 feet of the dock was damaged; other portions of the dock did not sustain "direct physical loss or damage."
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Bad Faith and a Partial Summary Judgment in Seattle Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of Washington has issued a ruling in the case of Ledcor Industries v. Virginia Surety Company, Inc. Ledcor was the builder of a mixed-use real estate project in Seattle called the Adelaide Project. Ledcor purchased an insurance policy from Virginia Surety covering the project. After the completion of the project, Ledcor received complaints of construction defects from the homeowners, which they forwarded to Virginia Surety.
Virginia Surety denied coverage on several grounds. Absent any lawsuit, Virginia claimed that there was “not yet any duty to defend or indemnify.” Further, as the policy commenced ten days after work on the project was substantially completed, Virginia cited a provision in the policy that excluded coverage for damage that occurred before the policy began. As problems included water intrusion, Virginia noted an exclusion for fungal damage. Finally, Virginia noted that it was not clear whether damage was due to Ledcor’s own actions.
The homeowners sued over the construction defects. Ledcor settled these suits before trial. In this, they were defended by, and settlements were paid by American Home, another of Ledcor’s insurers. Ledcor claims that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith by denying coverage and by its failure to investigate the ongoing nature of the work at the project.
The judge determined that Virginia Surety acted in bad faith when it invoked the fungus exclusion. Virginia noted that fungal damage “‘would have been’ referenced in the list of construction defects,” however, the HOAs claimed only “water stains” and “water damage,” and made no mention of mold or fungus. The court found that Virginia Surety “was not entitled to deny coverage simply because it may have suspected that mold or fungus damage existed.” The court noted that further proceedings would be needed to determine what portion of the settlement Virginia is obligated to pay.
The court found that there were matters of fact to be determined on the further issues in the case. The judge wrote that although Virginia acted in bad faith in invoking the fungus exclusion, it still had to be determined if they were in breach of contract by failing to defend Ledcor. Ledcor still needs to show that the damages claimed by the HOA were due to work actually covered by Virginia Surety.
Ledcor made an additional claim that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s laws concerning the insurance industry. Here, the court noted that the improper exclusion for fungus issues “constitutes a per se unfair trade practice.” Six other claims were made under this law. The court found that Virginia Surety did not misrepresent “pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions.” It also issued its denial letter promptly, satisfying the fifth provision. However, Virginia Surety did violate the second provision, in that it failed “to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with respect to claims.” Two other issues could not be determined.
Judge Martinez’s decision granted a summary judgment to Ledcor on the issue of bad faith. An additional summary judgment was granted that Virginia Surety violated Washington’s Insurance Fair Conduct Act. Judge Martinez did not grant summary judgment on any of the other issues Ledcor raised.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Defect Bill Introduced in California
June 10, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Linda Halderman (R-Fresno) has introduced a bill which would require lawyers soliciting clients for construction defect cases to provide their prospective clients with a statement including that sellers may be required to disclose that they were engaged in a construction lawsuit. Further, the bill would require lawyers to disclose that they cannot guarantee financial recovery.
Halderman was quoted by The Business Journal as saying, “Lawsuit abuse has been very damaging, especially to homeowners in the Valley.” Halderman hopes that her bill will discourage class action lawsuits against builders and that this will protect jobs in the construction industry.
Read the full story…
Geometrically Defined Drainage Cavities in EIFS as a Guard Against Defects
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The blog Stucco & Insulation Contractor writes up some details on a “relatively new modification to modern Exterior Insulation Finish Systems,” known as “geometrically defined insulation boards.” They note that the insulation has grooves cut in the back to provide a route for water to drain, instead of getting trapped. They note that when EIFS is installed by a skilled applicator, this is unnecessary. However, with less experienced (and cheaper) installers, problems are more likely.
By cutting these channels, the application of EIFS is rendered “idiot proof,” as they note. Their preference would be that EIFS installers take the time to do the job right, but call this “a step in the right direction.”
Read the full story…
Ceiling Collapse Attributed to Construction Defect
May 19, 2011 — May 16, 2011 - CDJ Staff
WSMV, Nashville reports that the ceiling collapse in a Franklin, Tennessee Kohl’s was attributed to a construction defect by fire officials. The officials noted that the ceiling was renovated at the time. No injuries were reported.
The report notes that “inspectors were supposed to look at the renovations next week, but fire officials said that will have to be delayed until another time.”
Read the full story…
Contractor Sues License Board
June 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Judge Kendall J. Newman of the US District Court handed down a decision on June 24 on the case of Kent v California Department of Consumer Affairs. Mr. Kent, appearing as his own counsel, had brought the suit against the California Department of Consumer Affairs and the Contractors State Licensing Board after he was arrested in a sting operation and, as the plaintiff put it, “was absurdly arrested and uncooperatively detained for a time longer than necessary or allowed by law under the false pretense of contracting with out a license.” Mr. Kent’s alleged that Rick Lopez, one of the defendants, formed him to read allow from the California Business and Professions Code. He said he was later handcuffed and placed in an uncomfortable chair, “enduring physical pain and emotional agony.”
Although Kent was given a Notice to Appear, he alleged that a further defendant, Stuart Rind, “closed the plaintiff’s case marked citation A7773 without giving written notice to anyone.” As a result, the Placer County District Attorney’s Office had no record of his Notice to Appear.
Kent alleged that subsequently his firm was essentially shut down for two years and that he was prevented from “legally contracting or selling services for any other contractor or qualifying for any other licensed capacity governed by the CSLB.” After this, the CSLB suspended the license for his firm, DSI Construction. He was assessed a $1,500 fine, after which he claims he sent a letter to the CSLB demanding money damages. The judge noted that the letter was not included in the plaintiff’s Ninth Amended Complaint.
Judge Kendall recommended that the plaintiff’s Complaints be dismissed, although he did allow that sixth, and perhaps the eighth and ninth, could be amended with a tenth amended complaint.
Read the court’s decision…
Court Strikes Down Reasonable Construction Defect Settlement
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Court of Appeals of Washington has struck down a construction defect settlement between a building owner and the companies she hired to repair the siding, among other repairs to bring the building up to code. Yuan Zhang hired Hawk Construction LLC to do repair work. Hawk, in turn, hired Ready Construction LLC for some aspects of the project. Hawk and Ready were both insured by Capital Specialty Insurance Corporation.
There were several problems with Ready’s work. After removing old siding, they did not protect the building, nor did they remove all of the damaged layers. Ready covered, but did not fix, a mildew problem under the old siding. When new siding was reattached, the nails used were too short to adequately attach it.
After paying for an inspection of the work, Zhang had Hawk and Ready begin the repairs again, but the work was abandoned without being completed. Zhang sued Hawk for breach of contract. Hawk then sued Ready, claiming that “Ready was liable to Hawk to the extent that Hawk was liable to Zhang.” Capitol retained defense for both contractors.
Zhang settled with Hawk, in an agreement that gave her “the right to collect and/or pursue all costs and attorney fees paid by Hawk or its insurance company defending against the Zhang’s claims and pursuing claims against Ready.” Subsequently, she also settled with Ready. Both companies ceased operations.
Zhang had the settlements reviewed by a court, which concluded that the settlements were reasonable. Capital was allowed to appeal, claiming that the settlement included costs that were Zhang’s responsibility. The appeals court did not examine the question of the reasonableness of the settlement, concluding that Capitol’s interests were relevant only to “questions of bad faith, collusion, and fraud.”
In the case of Zhang, the court concluded that the relationship between Zhang and her former contractors was collusive. The court noted that “bad faith or collusion may exist when the evidence indicates a joint effort to create, in a non-adversarial atmosphere, a resolution beneficial to both parties, yet highly prejudicial to the insurer as intervener.” The court noted that both companies had minimal assets which were, in any case, exempted from the agreement. Further, the court found that the agreements failed to determine “what amount of the repairs related to preexisting water damage.” Zhang’s calculation of costs also included her expenses for architectural and engineering services, which the court points out, “where always Zhang’s costs to bear.”
The court concluded that “the overall structure of the settlements is highly probative of collusion, fraud, or bad faith.” Zhang’s agreements with Hawk and Ready allowed her to collect compensation from Hawk and then collect Ready’s compensation to Hawk for their portion of the settlement, allowing Zhang to collect the monies twice. Further, she was allowed to pursue Capitol for Hawk’s attorney expenses, even though Hawk had none. “The right to recover Hawk’s fees merely set up a windfall recovery for Zhang.” The court described the agreements among Zhang, Hawk, and Ready as “precisely the type of manipulation [the law] is intended to preclude.”
Read the court’s decision…
New Buildings in California Soon Must Be Greener
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Energy Commission has approved new energy efficiency standards for new homes and commercial buildings. The 2013 Building Energy Efficiency Standards are set to go into effect on January 1, 2014, and will require 30% more energy efficiency for non-residential construction and 25% more for homes. The standards do not affect hospitals, nursing homes, or prisons.
Buildings covered under the standard will have to have roofs that ready for the installation of solar panels. Additionally, non-residential buildings will require high-performance windows, advanced lighting controls, and cool-roof technologies. Residential requirements include insulated hot-water pipes, whole house fans, and more efficient windows.
The new standards are expected to add 3,500 new building industry jobs. One thing these construction workers won’t be building are power plants, since over the next thirty years, the standards are expected to save as much as six power plants.
Read the full story…
The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Arizona Supreme Court Confirms Eight-Year Limit on Construction Defect Lawsuits
July 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Acting on the case of Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership, the Arizona Supreme Court has ruled that Arizona’s eight-year statute of repose applies. The case was referred to the court by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals which had asked for a clarification of Arizona law. The case focused on three questions:
1. Does the filing of a motion for class certification in an Arizona court toll the statute of limitations for individuals, who are included within the class, to file individual causes of action involving the same defendants and the same subject matter?2. If so, does this class-action tolling doctrine apply to statutes of repose, and more specifically, to the statute of repose for construction defects set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") § 12-552?3. If the doctrine applies to statutes of repose, and specifically § 12-552, may a court weigh the equities of the case in determining whether, and to what extent, an action is tolled?
The litigation at hand has a lengthy history, starting with a case referred to as “Hoffman” in 2003. The Albano plaintiffs were not able to join in Hoffman, and they filed their own lawsuit in 2006. An additional lawsuit was filed by the Albano plaintiffs in 2007. The courts decided that the Albano plaintiffs’ lawsuit was untimely.
The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that the statute of repose was the appropriate standard for this case. They noted that “the eight-year statute of repose period began to run on November 6, 1997, the date of the Town of Gilbert’s final inspection. Albano II was filed on November 5, 2007.”
The court found that the plaintiffs had waited too long for start their suit. As a result, they found it unnecessary to answer the first or third questions. Justice A. John Pelander of the Arizona Supreme Court wrote the opinion, dated June 30, 2011.
Read the court’s decision…
United States District Court Confirms That Insurers Can Be Held Liable Under The CCPA.
June 19, 2012 — Chad Johnson
In D.R. Horton, Inc.-Denver v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 10-CV-02826-WJM-KMT, 2012 WL 527204 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2012), the court was asked to rule on Travelers’[1] motion to dismiss D.R. Horton, Inc. ?Äì Denver’s (“DRH”) claim that Travelers violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”).
In the underlying construction defect case (“CD case”), DRH, as the developer and general contractor of a construction project, tendered the defense of the CD case to certain subcontractors and to Travelers as an insurer to those subcontractors. Travelers accepted the duty to defend DRH. DRH hired counsel to defend it, and the attorney fees and costs of suit were billed to Travelers. However, for a period of over five years, Travelers failed to actually pay any portion of the defense of DRH. Finally, on October 31, 2008, Travelers offered checks for payment of only 4% of the costs and fees incurred. DRH then returned the checks to Travelers and provided Travelers with authority to support its position that the amounts in Travelers’ checks were inadequate. Thereafter, Travelers dug its heels in, and resubmitted the same checks.
DRH was then forced to file a coverage action against Travelers for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, bad faith breach of insurance contract, and deceptive trade practices under the CCPA. In its motion to dismiss DRH’s CCPA claim, Travelers’ argued that DRH failed to plead specific facts that Travelers engaged in a deceptive trade practice under C.R.S. § 6-1-105, and DRH failed to plead sufficient facts showing that Travelers’ actions significantly affect the public ?Äì a necessary element of a CCPA claim.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Chad Johnson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com
Safer Schools Rendered Unsafe Due to Construction Defects
February 10, 2012 — CJD Staff
Built on a program for safer school buildings, schools in Neenan County, Colorado have been shown to have mild-to-moderate structural problems, rendering some of them unsafe. The Denver Post reports that a third-party review of schools built by the Neenan Company has shown structural issues in all fifteen school buildings.
One school, Meeker Elementary, has been closed as it could collapse under high winds or during an earthquake. Sargent Junior-Senior High School is in use, but there are plans to evacuate the buildings if winds exceed 25 mile per hour. Two schools have roofs that are unable to bear expected loads of snow during the winter.
The Neenan Company says that the school buildings are not up to their standards and is working with the school districts to repair the buildings. Repairs are expected to be complete by August.
Read the full story…
Defense for Additional Insured Not Barred By Sole Negligence Provision
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
A general contractor was entitled to a defense as an additional insured when the underlying complaint did not allege it was solely negligent. A-1 Roofing Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 656 (Ill. Ct. App. June 24, 2011).
A-1 was the general contractor for a roof resurfacing job at a high school. Jack Frost Iron Works Inc. (“Frost”) was one of A-1’s subcontractors. Frost had a CGL policy with Navigators Insurance Company under which A-1 was an additional insured.
An employee of Frost’s subcontractor Midwest Sheet Metal Inc. was killed at the job site when a boom-lift he was operating flipped over. The boom-lift had been leased by another Frost subcontractor, Bakes Steel Erectors, Inc. (BSE). The deceased's estate filed suit against A-1, BSE and two other defendants.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
New Construction Laws, New Forms in California
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
New construction laws came into effect in California on July 1. Writing for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library, Glenn Mau, J. Michael McGuire, and John Tonsing, all of Archer Norris, discuss these changes. They note that the most important part of the changes to California construction law is that “all mechanics liens, stop notices and bond claims recorded after July 1, 2012 must use the new standardized forms and follow the new definitions, notice prerequisites and statutory release form language.”
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Anti-Assignment Provision Unenforceable in Kentucky
December 20, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
On a certified question from the Federal District Court, the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided that an anti-assignment provision in a policy is unenforceable.Wehr Constructors v. Paducah Div. Assur. Co. of Am., 2012 Ky. LEXIS 183 (Ky. Oct. 25, 2012).
Before building an addition to its hospital, Murray Calloway County Hospital purchased a builder's risk policy from Assurance Company of America.The policy provided, "Your rights and duties under this policy may not be transferred without Assurance's written consent . . . ." The Hospital contracted with Wehr Constructors to install concrete subsurfaces and vinyl floors in order to expand the hospital. After installation, a portion of the floors and subsurface work was damaged. The Hospital submitted a claim to Assurance for $75,000, but the claim was denied.
Wehr sued the Hospital to recover money for its work on the construction project. In settling the case, the Hospital assigned to Wehr any claim or rights the Hospital had against Assurance.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Record-Setting Construction in Fargo
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Prairie Business reports that Fargo is experiencing the most new construction it has ever seen, totaling $434 million in value, which exceeds the previous high in 2006 of $428 million. Many of the construction starts are for single family homes, although there is also an increase in construction of apartments and townhomes.
The Home Builders Association of Fargo-Moorhead also noted that there was also a large of remodeling projects. Terry Becker, the president of the HBA, said that “remodeling is just huge right now.”
Read the full story…