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    California Builders Right To Repair Current Law Summary:

    Current Law Summary: SB800 (codified as Civil Code §§895, et seq) is the most far-reaching, complex law regulating construction defect litigation, right to repair, warranty obligations and maintenance requirements transference in the country. In essence, to afford protection against frivolous lawsuits, builders shall do all the following:A homeowner is obligated to follow all reasonable maintenance obligations and schedules communicated in writing to the homeowner by the builder and product manufacturers, as well as commonly accepted maintenance practices. A failure by a homeowner to follow these obligations, schedules, and practices may subject the homeowner to the affirmative defenses.A builder, under the principles of comparative fault pertaining to affirmative defenses, may be excused, in whole or in part, from any obligation, damage, loss, or liability if the builder can demonstrate any of the following affirmative defenses in response to a claimed violation:


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    Construction Expert Witness News and Information
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    Insurance Company Must Show that Lead Came from Building Materials

    August 17, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals for Louisiana has reversed the summary judgment of a lower court in the case of Widder v. Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company. Judge Roland L. Belsome wrote the opinion for the panel of three judges. Ms. Widder discovered that her home and its content were contaminated by lead. She applied to her insurer, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance, which denied her claim.

    In response to Ms. Widder’s suit, LCPIC applied for a summary judgment on the grounds that there was no physical loss and that the policy did not cover defective material, latents defects, and pollution damage.

    The appeals court found that the lead contamination of Widder’s home did meet the standards of a direct physical loss, citing a recent Chinese Drywall case. There, it was found, “when a home has been rendered unusable or uninhabitable, physical damage is not necessary.”

    The lower court addressed only one of LCPIC’s exclusions, addressing only the exclusion on basis of “faulty, inadequate or defective material.” The appeals court noted that the evidence offered at trial does not show that the building materials were the source of the lead. This provided the appeals court with a matter of fact to remand to the lower court.

    Read the court’s decision…


    The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

    January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini

    California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

    The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

    SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

    Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

    Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

    The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4

    This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5

    2005 AMENDMENT

    The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

    What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

    This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

    It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

    In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

    2007 AMENDMENT

    The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

    Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

    Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

    It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

    Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

    2008 AMENDMENT

    The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

    Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

    It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

    The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

    Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

    Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

    The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

    And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

    Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

    This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

    Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

    2011 AMENDMENT

    Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

    As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

    The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7

    The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

    CONCLUSION

    The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

    1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
    2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
    3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
    4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
    5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
    6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
    7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

    Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.


    West Hollywood Building: Historic Building May Be Defective

    August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The Sunset Lanai apartment building in West Hollywood, California has its fans, it also has its detractors. Designed by Edward H. Flickett and built in 1952 by George Alexander, the building isn’t wearing its years lightly. Its owner has opposed a move by the West Hollywood Preservation Commission that the building is a “local cultural resource.” Instead, Edwin Silver, the building’s owner says the group has overstated the building’s significance. His lawyer points to “design and construction flaws,” and says the building is prone to flooding and leaks. Repairs to the building have an estimated cost of $2.3 million, according to the L.A. Times.

    The West Hollywood City Council decided to table the question of a historical designation as that might impede repairs. However, they did decide that if Silver seeks to demolish the building, they will grant the protection.

    Read the full story…


    New Apartment Tower on the Rise in Seattle

    September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The Seattle Times reports that groundbreaking is planned for a forty-story tower in Seattle. The building process will take at least five years, during which time, according to the paper, there will be nearly eight thousand new apartments in Seattle. The planned tower will add another 386 units to that.

    The developer, Holland Partner Group, has four other apartments buildings planned or in construction currently, which will account for more than a thousand of the units being added to the city’s apartment stock.

    Read the full story…


    Construction Company Head Pleads Guilty to Insurance and Tax Fraud

    December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The former head of Orients Construction Company and of Melrose Construciton Company, Herlindo Garcia-Merlos, has entered a guilty plea to charges that the gave false informoation to his insurer, New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Group, for more than three years in order to lower his workers compensation payments. Mr. Garcia-Merlos was able to underpay by more than $315,000 as a result of this deception.

    Mr. Garcia-Merlos additionally failed to file tax returns for his companies and underreported his wages on his own tax returns. The State of New Jersey is seeking an eight-year prison term and restitution of more than $400,000.

    Read the full story…


    Ohio Court Finds No Coverage for Construction Defect Claims

    March 1, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    Charles and Valerie Myers hired Perry Miller to build their home. Myers v. United Ohio Ins. Co., 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 287 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2012). After completion of the home, Miller was again hired to construct an addition which included a full basement, staircases, bathroom, bedroom, hallway and garage.

    After the addition was completed, one of the basement walls began to crack and bow. Miller began to make repairs, but eventually stopped working on the project. Other contractors were hired to make repairs, but further problems developed. A second basement wall began to bow and crack, allowing water into the basement. The wall eventually had to be replaced. Subsequently, the roof over the addition began to leak in five or six places before the drywall could be painted. The leaks caused water stains on the drywall and cause it to separate and tear. It was discovered the roof needed to be replaced.

    The Myers sued Miller and his insurer, United Ohio Insurance Company. The trial court ruled that the policy did not provide coverage for faulty workmanship, but did provide coverage for consequential damages caused by repeated exposure to the elements. United Ohio conceded liability in the amount of $2,000 to repair water damage to the drywall. United Ohio was also found liable for $51,576, which included $31,000 to repair the roof and ceiling and $18,576 to replace the basement wall.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    Firm Sued For Construction Defects in Parking Garage

    October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    Northhampton County, Pennsylvania is suing a contractor who resurfaced a parking garage in 2009. According to the Express-Times, three years later, the surface is cracked and the county is seeking $700,000 for repairs. Additionally, they have withheld $44,000 of the $2.2 million contract because of the problems. John Stoffa, Northampton County Executive, says that the garage is stable, but not up to safety standards.

    Read the full story…


    Water Is the Enemy

    August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    So says Melissa Mitchell, writing in the blog of Community Association Consultants. She cites the nightmare scenario of “an unseen presence lurking behind the walls.” Not a horror movie, but water intrusion, which she notes can cause hundreds of thousands of dollars in damage. Eric Hoff, of Western Architectural, is quoted that “it only takes a hole one-eighth inch diameter in a building’s exterior to allow the intrusion of 35 gallons of water over twelve months.” Destructive testing on a building in in the Pacific Northwest revealed that water intrusion had lead to structural failure of the building. The wet wood had made a home for carpenter ants. Repairs exceeded $100,000.

    Mitchell notes that “deferred maintenance can be costly” and cites the importance of preventative maintenance or the development of a maintenance plan. She concludes that “if you own or are responsible for maintaining a condominium complex, apartment building or commercial structure, it’s simply good business sense to have a building envelope assessment conducted by experts in the field.”

    Read the full story…


    Cogently Written Opinion Finds Coverage for Loss Caused By Defective Concrete

    November 7, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    If ever in need of a concise, well-reasoned opinion on “occurrence,” “property damage” and applicability of the business risk exclusions, turn to Pamperin Rentals II, LLC v. R.G. Hendricks & Sons Construction, Inc., 2012 Wis Ct. App. LEXIS 698 (Wis. Ct. App. Sept. 5, 2012).

    A contractor was hired to install concrete during construction of seven gas stations. Red-D-Mix provided the concrete. The contractor and Red-D-Mix were eventually sued by the gas stations, based upon allegations that the concrete was defectively manufactured and installed. The gas stations alleged that Red-D-Mix supplied concrete that was defective and resulted in damages, including the need to repair nearby asphalt.

    Red-D-Mix tendered to its insurers, who denied coverage. Suit was filed and the insurers moved for summary judgment. The trial court determined there were no allegations of either “property damage” or an “occurrence.” Therefore, there was no duty to defend or indemnify Red-D-Mix.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    A Lien Might Just Save Your Small Construction Business

    April 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser in the Builders Counsel Blog

    Many owners incorrectly believe that payment to the general contractor gets the owner off the hook for payment to subcontractors and suppliers. This assumption sometimes fosters the irresponsible owner, who fails to ensure that everyone is getting paid. Fortunately for those contractors further down the contracting chain, this assumption is incorrect.

    Suppliers and subcontractors can file a lien to secure payment for their labor and materials. A filing party must offer proper notice (if applicable) and file an adequate and timely lien in the County where the work is performed. You can read our earlier posts on these topics by following this link.

    A lien notice and a lien put an owner on notice that your business has provided labor and/or materials for the improvement of the owner’s property (See RCW 60.04.031 for more info). If the owner fails to take care to ensure that your business is paid the law mandates that the owner may have to pay twice.

    Read the full story...

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    Toxic Drywall Not Covered Under Homeowner’s Policy

    March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The Duphuys of Baton Rouge Louisiana found themselves needing to argue both sides of an issue, according to the judge in Duphuy v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company. The Duphuys alleged that the drywall in their home “emits odorous gases that cause damage to air-condition and refrigerator coils, copper tubing, electrical wiring, computer wiring, and other household items.” Additionally, they reported damage to “their home’s insulation, trimwork, floors, cabinets, carpets, and other items” which they maintained were “covered under the ‘ensuing loss’ portion of their policy.”

    Their insurer declined coverage, stating that the damages were not a “direct, physical loss,” and even if they were “four different exclusions independently exclude coverage, even if such loss occurred.” The policy excludes defective building materials, latent defects, pollutants, and corrosion damage. The court noted that “ambiguities in policy exclusions are construed to afford coverage to the insured.”

    The court did determine that the Duphuys were not in “a situation where the plaintiffs caused the risk for which they now seek coverage.” The judge cited an earlier case, In re Chinese Drywall, “a case with substantially similar facts and construing the same policy” and in that case, “property damage” was determined to “include the loss of use of tangible property.” The court’s conclusion was that the Duphuys “suffered a direct, physical loss triggering coverage under their policy.”

    Unfortunately for the Duphuys, at this point the judge noted that while they had a “direct, physical loss,” the exclusions put them “in the tough predicament of claiming the drywall is neither defective nor its off-gassing corrosive or a pollutant, but nonetheless damage-causing.”

    In the earlier Chinese Drywall case, the judge found that “faulty and defective materials” “constitutes a physical thing tainted by imperfection or impairment.” The case “found the drywall served its intended purpose as a room divider and insulator but nonetheless qualified under the exclusion, analogizing the drywall to building components containing asbestos that courts have previously determined fit under the same exclusion.” In the current case, the judge concluded that the drywall was “outside the realm of coverage under the policy.”

    The court also found that it had to apply the corrosion exclusion, noting that the plaintiffs tried to evade this by stating, “simplistically and somewhat disingenuously, that the damage is not caused by corrosion but by the drywall itself.” The plaintiffs are, however, parties to another Chinese drywall case, Payton v. Knauf Gips KG, in which “they directly alleged that ‘sulfides and other noxious gases, such as those emitted from [Chinese] drywall, cause corrosion and damage to personal property.’” As the court pointed out, the Duphuys could not claim in one case that the corrosion was caused by gases emitted by the drywall and in another claim it was the drywall itself. “They hope their more ambiguous allegations will be resolved in their favor and unlock the doors to discovery.”

    The court quickly noted that “the remaining damage allegations are too vague and conclusory to construe” and permitted “exploration of the latent defect and pollution exclusions.”

    The judge concluded that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficient facts to establish coverage under the ensuing loss provision, stating that the “plaintiffs must allege, at the very least, how the drywall causes damage to the trimwork, carpet, etc., not simply that it does so.” Given the court’s determinations in the case, the plaintiffs’ motion was dismissed.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Court Consolidates Cases and Fees in Soil Construction Defect Case

    August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The California Court of Appeals has ruled in Burrow v. JTL Development. JTL Development had appealed a judgement in a construction defect case in which JTL Development and Highland Development were found liable for damage due to homes built on unstable and improperly compacted soil. The two companies were sued by the two sets of homeowners, the Burrows and the Balls, and their cases were consolidated at trial. Each family was awarded $700,000 in damages. This judgement had also been appealed and affirmed by the appeals court. In the current case, an additional $235,800 in cost-of-proof sanctions had been awarded to the two families.

    Before the trial, Dale Burrows, Charles Ball, and Laurie Ball “asked JTL and Highland to admit that they ‘approved grading plans’ for the Burrows’ and Balls’ properties; ‘had knowledge that the [properties] contained improperly compacted fill’; ‘had knowledge that the [properties were’ not properly prepared for structures’; and ‘did not provide Plaintiffs with a complete soils report’ prepared by Gorian & Associates.” These were requests 14, 19, 20, and 22. JTL and Highland denied all of these.

    At trial, the Burrows and Balls proved that all these were true. JTL and Highland’s geotechnical subcontractor, Gorian & Associates, had “recommended that Highland remove and re-compact the entire tract to a depth of 25 feet.” JTL and Highland did not follow this recommendation, “in order to avoid expense.”

    After judgment, the Burrows and Balls moved for $582,587.45 for “attorneys’ fees and costs incurred proving the truth of requests for admission.” JTL and Highland claimed that only Dale Burrows could recover fees, but that also the fees were not recoverable. Joe Lynch of Highland “declared that he always believed the soils under the Burrows and Balls homes were properly compacted.” The Burrows and Balls responded with six identical sets of requests for admissions and the court awarded each of them twenty-five percent of $235,800, with JTL and Highland each responsible for fifty percent.

    The appeals court noted that JTL and Highland filed a timely appeal and goes on to notes the four circumstances under which a responding party does not have to pay costs and fees. The court concluded that none of these were met. Instead of waiving the request, JTL and Highland denied the request, stating “without in any manner waiving the foregoing objection, responding party denies the request for admission.”

    Nor was the admission “of no substantial importance,” instead the court said that the matters were of “substantial importance,” and the “trial would have been shortened by their admission. Highland and JTL “relied on Gorian when it denied the request,” but the trial court “discredited Lynch’s assertions,” finding that “Highland knew the soil was improperly compacted.”

    As all plaintiffs had identical discovery requests, the court rejected the claim that only Dale Burrows was entitled to an award.

    Read the court’s decision…



    Defense for Additional Insured Not Barred By Sole Negligence Provision

    August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii

    A general contractor was entitled to a defense as an additional insured when the underlying complaint did not allege it was solely negligent. A-1 Roofing Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 656 (Ill. Ct. App. June 24, 2011).

    A-1 was the general contractor for a roof resurfacing job at a high school. Jack Frost Iron Works Inc. (“Frost”) was one of A-1’s subcontractors. Frost had a CGL policy with Navigators Insurance Company under which A-1 was an additional insured.

    An employee of Frost’s subcontractor Midwest Sheet Metal Inc. was killed at the job site when a boom-lift he was operating flipped over. The boom-lift had been leased by another Frost subcontractor, Bakes Steel Erectors, Inc. (BSE). The deceased's estate filed suit against A-1, BSE and two other defendants.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com


    Ambitious Building Plans in Boston

    November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    Although most are unlikely to change the Boston skyline, there are several large projects on the drawing boards. The site BostInnovation covered ten of them in a recent post. Downtown Boston will be the site of several of these large projects, including three towers to be added to the Christian Science Plaza, a 404-unit residential tower in the Theater District, and perhaps the largest of these projects, a 47-story tower to be built over Copley Plaza, which will tower over the adjacent buildings. None of the planned buildings will challenge the Hancock Tower’s 60 stories.

    Read the full story…


    Recent Case Brings Clarity and Questions to Statute of Repose Application

    August 16, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel

    I have often chatted about the Washington Statute of Repose on this blog. The Statute of Repose prevents construction claims, for the most part, from being raised 6 years from the date of substantial completion or termination. Well, a recent Court of Appeals case dove deep into the specific determinative factors that tell us when to start the clock. It certainly raises questions about how long we really have to file suit.

    The Statute of Repose has been a frequent topic here, so I will simply direct you to my prior post for further information on how this law works. A recent post was published about a lawsuit that might raise some questions about when and how the clock begins to roll, and claim periods begin to diminish.

    Read the full story…

    Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com


    Lawsuit over Construction Defects Not a Federal Case

    August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    The United State District Court in California has dismissed the claims of a contractor against the United States government, on the grounds that it was not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The origins of the case are in a related construction defect claim. The current plaintiff, Performance Contracting, Inc., did the lath and plaster work for a building for the Department of Veterans Affairs. After the building was completed, the Veterans Affairs complained to the general contractor, Wynema, Inc., of water intrusion problems.

    Wyema and Performance conducted testing and the water intrusion was found to be due to “a variety of design defects and omissions, including: 1) omission of proper window flashing; 2) inadequate waterproof membrane around the windows; 3) inadequate T-molding around the windows; 4) lack of a window sill pan for the windows; 5) lack of any backing in the window framing; 6) lack of any backing for the stucco expansion joints and seams; and 7) failure to require that a performance mock-up of the window assembly and adjacent areas be built and water tested.” Wyema filed a construction defect action against Performance and other subcontractors.

    In the current case, Performance claims that Veteran Affairs was negligent, that it “breached its duty to Plaintiff when it provided deficient plants and specifications” and “failed to properly oversee construction and inspect Project work.” The court determined that it could not hear this case, noting that “Federal Courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions.”

    Performance raised its claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The judge was not persuaded by this claim, noting that the FTCA does not apply to purported breach of the General Contract. The FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity in cases of “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”

    Performance was unable to pursue its claims in the Court of Federal Claims as there was no contract between Performance and the government. However, the court noted that Performance’s inability to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims does not open up a path to the District Court. “Litigants are not guaranteed a forum in which to sue the United States.” The court further noted that “if this Court were to accept Plaintiff’s logic, non-parties to contracts, but not parties, would be free to pursue contract claims in the fora of their choosing.”

    Read the court’s decision…


    District Court’s Ruling Affirmed in TCD v American Family Mutual Insurance Co.

    May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff

    In the case, TCD, Inc. v American Family Mutual Insurance Company, the district court’s summary judgment was in favor of the defendant. In response, the Plaintiff, TCD, appealed “on the ground that the insurance company had no duty to defend TCD under a commercial general liability (CGL) insurance policy.” The appeals court affirmed the decision.

    The appeals ruling provides a brief history of the case: “This case arises out of a construction project in Frisco, Colorado. The developer, Frisco Gateway Center, LLC (Gateway), entered into a contract with TCD, the general contractor, to construct a building. TCD entered into a subcontract with Petra Roofing and Remodeling Company (Petra) to install the roof on the building. The subcontract required Petra to "indemnify, hold harmless, and defend" TCD against claims arising out of or resulting from the performance of Petra’s work on the project. The subcontract also required Petra to name TCD as an additional insured on its CGL policy in connection with Petra’s work under the subcontract.”

    Furthermore, “TCD initiated this case against Petra and the insurance company, asserting claims for declaratory judgment, breach of insurance contract, breach of contract, and negligence. The district court entered a default judgment against Petra, and both the remaining parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment on the entirety of the action, in favor of the insurance company, concluding that the counterclaims asserted by Gateway against TCD did not give rise to an obligation to defend or indemnify under the CGL policy.”

    The appeals court rejected each contention made by TCD in turn. First, “TCD contend[ed] that Gateway’s counterclaims constitute[d] an allegation of ‘property damage,’ which is covered under the CGL policy.” The appeals court disagreed. Next, “TCD argue[d] that [the court] should broaden or extend the complaint rule, also called the ‘four corners’ rule, and allow it to offer evidence outside of the counterclaims to determine the insurance company’s duty to defend in this case.” The appeals court was not persuaded by TCD’s argument.

    The judgment was affirmed. Judge Roman and Judge Miller concur.

    Read the court’s decision…


    Building Inspector Jailed for Taking Bribes

    September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff

    The LA Times reports that Raoul Germain, a city Los Angeles building inspector has been sentenced to 21 months in prison after pleading guilty to taking bribes. Germain was caught as part of an FBI sting operation in which he approved work in exchange for thousands of dollars in bribes. The Times notes that that in some cases, Germain never visited the construction sites. Germain was offered a chance to cooperate with investigators. His lawyer, Steve Cron asked the Times, “What do you think happens to someone who cooperates?”

    In addition to Germain, another city inspector has pleaded guilty to taking bribes and two more employees of the Department of Building and Safety have been fired in connection with the investigation.

    Read the full story…