Allowing the Use of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 2, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Environment Decision May Expand Construction Defect Claims
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Could a California Supreme Court decision on environmental claims have an effect on construction defect cases? Jonathan B. Sokol, a lawyer at Greenberg Glusker argues just that in a post on his firm’s blog. He notes that the California Supreme Court has held that “the ‘all sums” method of allocation applies in California” and that “an insurer cannot limit its liability to just the amount of loss that occurred in its particular policy period.” While his focus is on environmental cases, he says that “the decision could also potentially expand the scope of coverage for construction defect claims and other claims involving continuous and progressive property damage and bodily injury.
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Construction Defects Not Occurrences under Ohio Law
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Concluding the “claims of defective construction or workmanship brought by a property owners are not claims for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence’ under a commercial general liability policy,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has ruled in Westfield Insurance Co. v. Custom Agri Systems, Inc. In the underlying case, Custom Agri Systems, Inc. built a grain bin as a subcontractor to Younglove Construction, LLC. Younglove had been contracted by PSD Development, which withheld payment, claiming it had suffered damages due to defects in Custom Agri System’s work. Younglove filed a complaint against Custom Agri, which filed complaints against its subcontractors. Custom Agri also requested that its insurer, Westfield Insurance Company, defend and indemnify it. Westfield claimed that it had no such duty. The Ohio Supreme Court concurred.
The decision notes that “Custom was being sued under two general theories: defective construction and consequential damages resulting from the defective construction.” Westfield argued that none of the claims were “for ‘property damage’ caused by an ‘occurrence” and therefore none of the claims were covered under the CGL policy.” Further, Westfield argued that “even if the claims were for property damage caused by an occurrence, they were removed from coverage by an exclusion in the policy.”
The case was filed in the US District Court which issued a summary judgment for Westfield. The plaintiff appealed and Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals certified the questions to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
The court noted that “all of the claims against which Westfield is being asked to defect and indemnify Custom relate to Custom’s work itself.” And so, the court concluded that they “must decide whether Custom’s alleged defective construction of and workmanship on the steel grain bin constitute property damage caused by an ‘occurrence.’” However, the court noted that under the terms of the insurance contract, an occurrence is defined as “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions,” and the court noted that the “natural and commonly accepted meaning” of “accident” is something “unexpected, as well as unintended.”
The Ohio Supreme Court also looked at court decisions in other places, and found that in many similar cases, courts have concluded that construction defects are not occurrences.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Pfeifer argues that “if the defective construction is accidental, it constitutes an ‘occurrence’ under a CGL policy.” Justice Pfeifer characterized the majority’s definition of “accidental” as “broad, covering unexpected, unintentional happenings.”
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Construction Defect Claim Did Not Harm Homeowner, Court Rules
September 30, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has ruled in Creswell v. Estate of Howe, a case in which a woman bought a home and then sued the seller’s estate, both sets of real estate agents, and the homeowner’s association over construction defects. A district court ruled against her, granting summary judgment to the other parties.
After buying a townhome “as is,” Catherine Creswell claims to have shared a thought with her agent that the homeowners association was, in the words of her agent, “trying to hide something.” Later, Creswell found that a few days before her closing, the board had discussed problems with “roofs, siding and soundproofing of the townhomes.” The court noted that “it was clear from the documents that appellant [Creswell] received that the association had known about various construction defects for many years, some of which affected [her] unit.”
Creswell initially sued the estate, the man who negotiated the sale for his mother’s estate, the real estate companies and the agents involved, the homeowners association, and four board members. Later she sued for punitive damages, dropped a claim for interference with contractual relations, and dismissed her claims against the individual board members. The court dismissed all of Creswell’s claims awarding costs to those she sued.
The appeals court has affirmed the decision of lower court, noting that Creswell “did not provide us with any argument why the district court erred in dismissing her unjust-enrichment, breach of contract, or rescission claims against the various respondents.” Nor did she provide evidence to support her claims of “breach of duty, fraud, and violation of consumer protection statutes.”
The court noted that Creswell could not sue the homeowners association over the construction defects because she “failed to prove that she was damaged by the association’s nondisclosure.” The court noted that “there are no damages in this case,” as Creswell “was never assessed for any repairs, she had not paid anything out-of-pocket for repairs, and she has presented no evidence that the value of her individual unit has declined because of the alleged undisclosed construction defects.”
The court granted the other parties motion to dismiss and denied Creswell’s motion to supplement the record. Costs were awarded to the respondents.
Read the court’s decision…
Allowing The Use Of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 16, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. Id. at *1. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
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Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
“Other Insurance” and Indemnity Provisions Determine Which Insurer Must Cover
September 1, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
A policy’s “other insurance” clause and a contractual indemnity provision were at the root for determining which of two insurers had to cover for injuries at a construction site. Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 76061 (N.D. Calif. July 14, 2011).
Hathaway was the general contractor at a demolition and construction project. Hathaway was insured by Zurich. Reinhardt Roofing was the roofing subcontractor. Reinhardt was insured by Valley Forge under a policy which named Hathaway as an additional insured. The subcontract also required Reinhardt to indemnify Hathaway for acts or omissions arising from Reinhardt’s work unless Hathaway was solely negligent.
Four of Reinhardt’s workers were injured when a canopy roof on which they were working collapsed. At the time of the accident, Hathaway’s on-site supervisor was inspecting a gap in the canopy roof, but did not order Reinhardt’s workers to stop working.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Florida “get to” costs do not constitute damages because of “property damage”
August 11, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Palm Beach Grading, Inc. v. Nautilus Ins. Co., No. 10-12821 (11th Cir. July 14, 2011), claimant general contractor Palm Beach Grading (?PBG?) subcontracted with insured A-1 for construction of a sewer line for the project.  A-1 abandoned its work and PBG hired another subcontractor to complete construction of the sewer line.  The new subcontractor discovered that A-1?s work was defective requiring repair and replacement of portions of the sewer line which also required the destruction and replacement of surrounding work.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Texas “your work” exclusion
January 6, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In American Home Assurance Co. v. Cat Tech, L.L.C., No. 10-20499 (5th Cir. Oct. 5, 2011), claimant Ergon hired insured Cat Tech to perform service on a reactor at Ergon’s refinery. During a start-up of the reactor after Cat Tech had completed its work, the reactor suffered damage. Cat Tech performed additional service and repairs. However, again upon start-up of the reactor, it suffered additional damage. Ergon hired another contractor to repair the reactor. Ergon initiated arbitration proceedings against Cat Tech. Cat Tech’s CGL insurer American Home defended Cat Tech against the Ergon arbitration under a reservation of rights.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Arbitration Clause Found Ambiguous in Construction Defect Case
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals ruled on September 28 in the case of Burch v. Premier Homes. Ms. Burch bought a home after negotiating various addendums to the contract. The contract was a standard California Association of Realtors contract to which both the buyer and seller made additions. At issue in this case was paragraph 17 of the contract which included that “Buyer and Seller agree that any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.”
The seller/defendant’s Addendum 2 “included provisions relating to the arbitration of disputes that may arise.” Ms. Burch’s realtor, Lisa Morrin, told Burch that “she had never seen a proposed contractual provision that would require a home buyer to agree to arbitrate with a builder over construction defects.” Ms. Burch told Morrin that she did not want to buy the property if she would have to give up her rights under California law.
As part of Addendum 2, the buyer had to buy a warranty from the Home Buyers Warranty Corporation. The sale was held up for a while, as Ms. Burch waited for a copy of the warranty. When she received it, she took further exception to Addendum 2. Scott Warren of Premier Homes said he could not sell the property without Addendum 2. Ms. Burch told her realtor that despite the claims made by Mr. Warren that this was for her benefit, she felt it was more to the benefit of Premier Homes. Don Aberbrook of HBW agreed to the clause, contained in the final sentence of Addendum 2, being struck.
Subsequent to buying the home, Burch submitted a claim concerning construction defects. HBW denied the claim and Burch began an action against the defendants. Premier filed a motion to compel arbitration which Burch opposed.
The trial court ruled that the striking out of the arbitration clause at the end of Addendum 2 “created a conflict with respect to the parties’ intent as to the scope of arbitration.” The trial court found that “the parties’ intention was to preserve Burch’s right to make state law claims including her right to a jury trial for any non-warranty claims against the builder.”
The appeals court in their ruling looked at the standard of review and concluded that the purchase agreement was ambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was required to resolve that ambiguity. As the contract contained contradictory provisions as to whether or not arbitration was required, it was necessary for the trial court to examine these claims. The appeals court found that the evidence supported the conclusions of the trial court.
Finally, the appeals court found that “there was no valid agreement to arbitrate disputes.” The court noted that arbitration can only happen by mutual consent and “it is clear that Burch did not enter into an agreement to arbitrate any construction defect disputes she might have.”
Read the court’s decision…
Although Property Damage Arises From An Occurrence, Coverage Barred By Business Risk Exclusions
July 8, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The homeowners hired the insured to raise the structure of their home twenty-four inches above the flood zone. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58985 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011). When the insured’s crew returned from lunch one day, they found the house had fallen from hydraulic jacks being used to raise the structure a few inches at a time. There was substantial damage to the entire structure.
The homeowners sued, asserting several claims, including negligence and breach of contract. The complaint alleged the homeowners entered a contract with the insured to raise their structure while maintaining its integrity. However, the insured failed to use proper equipment, which caused the house to fall and be completely destroyed.
The insured tendered the claim to its insurer, Lafayette Insurance Company. Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed suit for a declaratory judgment. Lafayette’s subsequent motion for summary judgment contended there was no “occurrence” alleged in the underlying complaint and, even if there was, the business risk exclusions barred coverage.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Florida: No Implied Warranties for Neighborhood Improvements
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A new law in Florida ends suits from homeowners associations from suing over damages from off-site improvements on the basis of implied warranties. Rob Samouch, writing for the Naples Daily News quotes House Biill 1013: “There is no cause of action in law or equity available to a purchaser of a home or to a homeowners’ association based upon the doctrine or theory of implied warranty of fitness and merchantability or habitability for damages to off-site improvements." The off-site improvements are defined as: "The street, road, driveway, sidewalk, drainage, utilities, or any other improvement or structure that is not located on or under the lot on which a new home is constructed.”
Mr. Samouch notes that “there are no statutory warrant rights in homeowner associations of fitness and merchantability or habitability like there is for condominium associations.” He predicts that the Florida legislature will have to address this issue “once new homeowners start screaming and yelling to them about their shoddy infrastructure for which they have no legal remedy.”
The bill took effect on July 1, 2012 and applies to “all cases accruing before, pending on, or filed after July 1, 2012.”
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Contractor Underpaid Workers, Pocketed the Difference
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Property Casualty 360 reports that the owner of a construction company in California’s Bay Area has been arraigned in San Francisco Superior Court. The fifty-seven felony counts include charges of payroll theft and insurance fraud.
San Francisco District Attorney, George Gascon is quoted as saying that Doherty’s actions “hurts the honest businesses that were unable to successfully compete for these projects which the defendant was able to underbid and win as a result of this scheme.”
Frances Ann Doherty, owner of Doherty Painting & Construction has been charged with submitting false documentation as to what wages she paid her workers. It is alleged that over three years she pocketed $600,000. Additionally, she is charged with underpaying her insurer by more than $100,000 by submitting to them the fake payroll information.
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Insurer Must Cover Construction Defects Claims under Actual Injury Rule
March 1, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Texas Court of Appeals held that the insured need not prove the exact dates physical damage occurred in order to trigger defense and indemnity coverage. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes, LLC v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 10027 (Tex. Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2011).
In 1999, the insured built a home. He was insured under a CGL policy issued by Great American from November 9, 1998 to November 9, 2000. Thereafter, the insured held a CGL policy issued by Mid-Continent from November 9, 2000 to September 18, 2002.
After construction was completed, the insured sold the house to the buyer in May 2000. After moving in, the buyer found numerous construction defects in the home, including water entering cracks in the home, and sinking and sagging of parts of the house. The buyer sued the insured, who sought coverage under the two policies. When the insurers refused to defend the underlying suit, the insured sued for a declaratory judgment.
The underlying case went to arbitration and an award of $2.4 million was granted to the buyer. The insured assigned to the buyer his claims against the insurers.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Construction Defect Not a RICO Case, Says Court
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of North Carolina has rejected an attempt by a homeowner to restart her construction defect claim by turning it into a RICO lawsuit. Linda Sharp, the plaintiff in the case of Sharp v. Town of Kitty Hawk, attempted to amend a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and argued that her case belonged in the federal courts.
Ms. Sharp sued in November, 2010 claiming construction defects. She sued in federal court, although the court noted that as she and most of the defendants are citizens of North Carolina, the state court would have been the appropriate jurisdiction. Further, the court noted that one federal claim Sharp made was dismissed with prejudice, leaving only the state law claims. These the court dismissed without prejudice, declining to exercise jurisdiction over North Carolina law.
After the dismissal, Ms. Sharp attempted to amend her complaint after the deadline. To do so, according to the court, she would be required to obtain consent from defendants or leave of the court. She did neither.
In his opinion, Judge W. Earl Britt rejected her motion for leave to amend. He also granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. The clerk was directed to close the case.
Read the court’s decision…
Illinois Court Determines Insurer Must Defend Property Damage Caused by Faulty Workmanship
July 11, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Illinois Court of Appeals determined the insurer must defend allegations of property damage arising from faulty workmanship. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co. v. J.P. Larsen, Inc., 2011 Ill. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1443 (Ill. Ct. App. June, 20, 2011).
Larsen was a subcontractor for Weather-Tite in a condominium building. Weather-Tite installed windows on the project and hired Larsen to apply sealant to the windows. The windows subsequently leaked and caused water damage within the complex.
The homeowner’s association sued Weather-Tite for breach of express and implied warranties. Weather-Tite filed a third-party complaint against Larsen, seeking contribution and alleging that Larsen was in breach of contract by failing to add Weather-Tite as an additional insured under Larsen’s CGL policy.
Both Weather-Tite and Larsen tendered to Larsen’s insurer. Both tenders were denied because the insurer contended the complaints alleged only construction defects, and not “property damage” or an “occurrence” within the terms of the policy.
The insurer filed suit for a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted the insurer’s motion as to Weather-Tite, but granted Larsen’s cross-motion for summary judgment.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
School District Settles Construction Lawsuit
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Franklin County, Pennsylvania Public Opinion reports that an area school is coming to an end with its construction lawsuit. The school district was sued by its contractors for a combined $1.4 million, which the school district withheld when the project was not completed on schedule. Lobar Inc. claimed that the district additionally owed interest and should pay attorney fees. The school claimed that only $1.15 million was due under the contract. Under the settlement, they will be paying $1.136 million.
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California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
Read the court’s decision…
Washington Supreme Court Sides with Lien Claimants in Williams v. Athletic Field
September 30, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
The Washington Supreme Court issued their opinion today on Williams v. Athletic Field, perhaps the most talked about construction law case in the past few years. I have discussed this case exhaustively here on Builders Counsel. Today we have a resolution.
In an unanimous opinion issued today, the high court sided with lien filers who followed a sample form provided in RCW 60.04.091. Additionally, the court found that a lien company - and presumably other persons - could sign the lien for the lien claimant, as an agent, without invalidating the lien.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com