Unlicensed Contractors Nabbed in Sting Operation
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California State License Board charged sixteen people in the Fresno area with accepting contracting jobs without licenses. The Statewide Investigative Fraud Team of the CSLB set up a sting operation at a home in Clovis, California seeking bids on tree service, painting, and general contracting services. Those who bid for jobs at more than $500 are required under California law to be licensed. Unlicensed contractors can only work on jobs with a cost to the homeowner of less than $500 and must inform the homeowner that they are not licensed.
In addition to citing contractors for not possessing appropriate licenses, the CSLB also cited contractors for failure to carry workers compensation insurance and illegal advertising. Further, California law limits down payments to the lesser of ten percent or $1,000. Two contractors were cited for requesting excessive down payments.
One contractor, an unlicensed tree service contractor, had been cited previously in a sting operation. He failed to show up for his court date.
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Washington Supreme Court Sides with Lien Claimants in Williams v. Athletic Field
September 30, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
The Washington Supreme Court issued their opinion today on Williams v. Athletic Field, perhaps the most talked about construction law case in the past few years. I have discussed this case exhaustively here on Builders Counsel. Today we have a resolution.
In an unanimous opinion issued today, the high court sided with lien filers who followed a sample form provided in RCW 60.04.091. Additionally, the court found that a lien company - and presumably other persons - could sign the lien for the lien claimant, as an agent, without invalidating the lien.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
A Downside of Associational Standing - HOA's Claims Against Subcontractors Barred by Statute of Limitations
March 28, 2012 — Bret Cogdill, Colorado Construction Litigation
In multi-family construction defect litigation in Colorado, homeowners associations rely on associational standing to pursue claims affecting more than two units and to bring claims covering an entire development. This practice broadens an association’s case beyond what individual, aggrieved owners would otherwise bring on their own against a developer or builder-vendor. However, reliance on associational standing to combine homeowners’ defect claims into a single lawsuit has its drawbacks to homeowners.
A recent order in the case Villa Mirage Condominium Owners’ Association, Inc., v. Stetson 162, LLC, et al., in El Paso County District Court, presents an example. There, the HOA unsuccessfully sought a determination from the court that its claims against subcontractors were not barred by the statute of limitations. To do so, the HOAs attempted to apply the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”), which governs the creation and operation of HOAs, and a statute intended to apply to persons under a legal disability.
Under CCIOA, during the period of “declarant control” the developer may appoint members to the association’s executive board until sufficient homeowners have moved into the development and taken seats on the board.
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Reprinted courtesy of Bret Cogdill of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Cogdill can be contacted at cogdill@hhmrlaw.com.
Florida County Suspends Impact Fees to Spur Development
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Hernando County, just north of Tampa on Florida’s west coast, has suspended impact fees for a year, hoping to spur development. Hernando Today reports that the move drew applause from the audience at the county commissioners meeting. Many of those in attendance were builders or members of the Greater Hernando Chamber of Commerce.
Not all were convinced. Frankie Burnett, the mayor of Brooksville, told the commissioners that his city council were not convinced that this would spur development. “Development should pay its fair share, even in slow economic times.” Burnett’s letter to the board warned that “if lowering impact fees succeeded in stimulating more residential overbuilding, it would only further depress the current real estate market.”
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The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782
January 6, 2012 — Michael D. Worthing, Borton Petrini
California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 8001 in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 27822 has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.
The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.
SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED
Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.
Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)3 Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.
The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.4
This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.5
2005 AMENDMENT
The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.
What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”6 In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.
This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.
It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.
In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.
2007 AMENDMENT
The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).
Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.
Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.
It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.
Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.
2008 AMENDMENT
The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.
Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.
Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.
It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.
The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.
Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.
Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.
The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.
And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.
Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:
This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.
Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.
2011 AMENDMENT
Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.
As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.
The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.7
The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.
CONCLUSION
The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.
- California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
- All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
- Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
- The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
- As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
- Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
- Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).
Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.
Construction Case Alert: Appellate Court Confirms Engineer’s Duty to Defend Developer Arises Upon Tender of Indemnity Claim
January 27, 2010 — By
Steven M. Cvitanovic,
Haight Brown & Bonesteel, LLP, January 27, 2010
In the recent case of UDC-Universal Development, L.P. v. CH2M Hill, 2010 Cal.App.LEXIS 47 (filed January 15, 2010), the Sixth District Court of Appeal provided a stunning illustration of the far-reaching effects of the California Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Weather Shield Manufacturing Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541. In Crawford, the Court held the duty to defend under an indemnity agreement arose upon the mere tender of defense of a claim covered by the indemnity.
In the UDC case, CH2M Hill provided engineering and environmental planning services to developer UDC on a project that ultimately wound up in a construction defect lawsuit by the homeowners association ( HOA ). UDC tendered its defense to CH2M Hill, the tender was rejected, and UDC filed a cross-complaint for negligence, breach of contract and indemnity against CH2M Hill and others. After the HOA’s construction defect claims were settled, UDC proceeded to trial against CH2M Hill. The jury found in favor of CH2M Hill on the claims for negligence and breach of contract. At the request of the parties prior to trial, the trial court ruled on the application of the indemnity agreement in light of Crawford and, in so doing, found that the defense obligation arose upon the tender and that CH2M Hill breached that duty despite the jury finding in favor of CH2M Hill.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, noting that the defense obligation arose as soon as the defense was tendered and did not depend on the outcome of the litigation, and that the HOA’s general description of the defects along with an allegation that Doe engineers were negligent triggered the duty to defend.
Although this case did not expand the crushing impact of Crawford’s holding, it is
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North Carolina Exclusion j(6) “That Particular Part”
February 10, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dove, 714 S.E.2d 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), claimant Murphy-Brown hired insured Dove to repair a broken elevator belt in a grain elevator in Murphy-Brown’s feed mill. The elevator was inside a metal duct and, to access the broken belt, Dove had to cut out a section of the duct. After replacing the belt, Dove welded the metal section back to the duct. Immediately after Dove completed the welding, dust inside the duct ignited, causing an explosion in the elevator, resulting in property damage to the elevator and other property. Murphy-Brown sued Dove for negligence seeking damages for the repair and replacement of the elevator, repair and replacement of the other property, increased grain handling costs during the repairs, and loss of use.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Exact Dates Not Needed for Construction Defect Insurance Claim
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court in Vines-Herrin Custom Homes v Great American Lloyds Insurance Company on December 21, 2011. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes built a single-family home in Plano, Texas in 1999. They obtained a commercial general liability policy from Great American, later purchasing coverage from Mid-Continent, which the decision describes as “a sister company of Great American.”
While the home was under construction, Emil G. Cerullo sought to purchase it. At the time, it was under contract to another buyer. Two months later, Vines-Herrin told Cerullo that the deal had “fell through.” Cerullo bought the house with modifications from the original plan. Upon moving in, Cerullo began having water intrusion and other problems. “Cerullo noticed water gathering on window sills and damage to the sheetrock and baseboard.” Additional problems followed, including cracks, leaks, “and in early 2002, the ceiling and roof began to sag.”
Cerullo sued Vines-Herrin, claiming negligent construction. Vines-Herrin filed a claim seeking defense and indemnification under the insurance policies. Coverage was denied and Vines-Herrin filed suit to require coverage and also bringing claims for “breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and DTPA and insurance code violations.”
In May, 2006 Vines-Herrin stated that it had no more defense funds and went into arbitration with Cerullo. The underlying construction defect action was settled for about $2.5 million. As part of the settlement, “Cerullo became the rightful owner of all remaining claims, rights, and causes of action against” Vines-Herrin’s insurers. He then joined the coverage lawsuit.
The non-jury trial was held under the controlling law of the time which “imposed a duty to defend only if the property damage manifested or became apparent during the policy period.” The court concluded in Cerullo’s favor. During the post-judgment motions, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the manifestation rule. Under this ruling, the trial court set aside its judgment and found in favor of the insurance companies. The trial court noted that although “the Residence was covered by an uninterrupted period of insurance (which began before the Residence was constructed) and that the damages to the Residence manifested during the uninterrupted period of insurance coverage,” “Mr. Cerullo failed to allege the date when actual physical damage to the property occurred.”
The first claim by Cerullo and Vines-Herrin was that the “Final Judgment” occurred in October 2004, and that all proceedings thereafter were void. The court rejected this as the “final judgment” is not “final for the purposes of an appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Despite the use of the word “final,” the trial court’s decision did not do this.
The second issue was the application of the Texas Supreme Court case Don’s Building Supply Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance. In this case, framing rot due to defective stucco was not discovered until after the end of the policy period. The Supreme Court noted that “the key date is when injury happens, not when someone happens on it.”
The appeals court found that the trial court misapplied the Don’s Building Supply decision. Rather than an exact date, “so long as that damage occurred within the policy period, coverage was provided.” The appeals court noted that “Cerullo alleged the house was constructed in 1999 and he purchased it in May 2000.” “By April of 2001, Cerullo noticed that the windowsills in the study were showing signs of leakage and water damage.” As the court put it, “the petitions then alleged a litany of defects.”
The court noted that coverage by Great American was in effect from November 9, 1999 to November 9, 2000. In May of 2000, the house suffered “substantial flooding from a rainstorm that caused damage.” This was during the policy period. “As a matter of law, actual damages must occur no later than when they manifest.”
The court concluded that as damage manifested during the period of coverage, so must have the damage. The court ruled that “contrary to the trial court’s determination otherwise, the evidence showed Great American’s duty to indemnify was triggered, and expert testimony establishing the exact date of injury was not required to trigger the duty.”
Read the court’s decision…
Mortar Insufficient to Insure Summary Judgment in Construction Defect Case
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The US District Court of Nevada issued a summary judgment in the case of R&O Construction Company V. Rox Pro International Group, Ltd. on December 19, 2011. The case involved the installation of stone veneer at a Home Depot location (Home Depot was not involved in the case). R&O’s subcontractor, New Creation Masonry, purchased the stone veneer from Arizona Stone. Judge Larry Hicks noted that “the stone veneer failed and R&O was forced to make substantial structural repairs to the Home Depot store.”
Rox Pro asked the court for a summary judgment, which the court granted only in part. The court looked at two issues in the case, whether the installation instructions constituted a breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and whether there was a breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
Judge Hicks found that there was a breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The instructions drafted by Real Stone and distributed by Arizona Stone were not sufficient for affixing the supplied stones, according to R&O’s expert, a claim the plaintiffs dispute. “Because there is an issue of material fact concerning the installation guidelines, the court shall deny Arizona Stone’s motion for a summary judgment on this issue.”
On the other hand, the judge did not find that the instructions had any bearing as to whether R&O bought the stone, since the stone was selected by the shopping center developer. This issue was, in the view of the judge, appropriately dismissed.
Read the court’s decision…
Contractual Liability Exclusion Bars Coverage
August 2, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether coverage existed for a defectively built tennis court in light of a contractual liability exclusion. Ewing Construction Company, Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 12154 (5th Cir. June 15, 2012).
Ewing Construction Company entered a contract with the School District to construct tennis courts at a school. After completion, the School District complained that the courts were cracking and flaking, rendering them unfit for playing tennis. The School District filed suit, seeking damages for defective construction. It alleged that Ewing breached its contract and performed negligently.
Ewing tendered the underlying lawsuit to Amerisure. Amerisure denied coverage and Ewing filed suit.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Defective Shingle Claims Valid Despite Bankruptcy
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Third Circuit Court has allowed claims to go forward against Owens Corning for making allegedly defective shingles. The shingles split, leading to leaking roofs. The building products manufacturer filed for bankruptcy in 2000, which “extinguished” claims against it. The company was facing millions in liabilities over asbestos lawsuits.
The lawsuit was filed in 2009. The courts initially found the lawsuit timely, but the Third Circuit Court later applied determined the exposure stated before the bankruptcy. On appeal, the court has reversed this and is again allowing the suit to proceed.
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Homebuilding on the Rise in Nation’s Capitol
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Is the homebuilding crunch over in DC? The Washington Post has reported that while new home construction is up throughout the country, in the DC area, construction has reached levels last seen in 2006. From January to August 2012, there were more than 19,000 building permits issued in the area, nearly doubling the number issued by that point in 2011.
While building is on a quicker pace, what’s being built has changed. As compared to 2006, there are more townhomes, condos, and smaller homes being built. The article notes that 11 percent of new construction is condos, while in 2006, it was only 5 percent.
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Avoid Gaps in Construction Defect Coverage
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The language may be standardized, but the way different states’ courts interpret it is not. That’s the problem discussed by William F. Knowles and Brendan Winslow-Nason in an article in Business Insurance. One of the major issue through the country is whether a construction defect claim and the resultant damage are an occurrence. Additionally, there are questions whether certain exclusions apply, such as “your work” or “your product” exclusions. They note that many courts “ agree that they are intended to exclude defective construction itself, while providing coverage for unintended consequences.” They further note that these are not the only insurance issues, “making it difficult for construction companies operating across state lines to ensure adequate coverage.”
Their recommendations to contractors are that they pay careful attention to where they’ve done business and “if the states have issued decisions or if there is legislation in place address the scope of coverage under additional insured endorsements.” Additionally, they suggest determining whether a contractor can negotiate a choice of law provision in their policy. The conclude that “construction companies can take proactive steps to protect themselves by identifying the applicable states’ laws, determining whether insurance is adequate under those laws, and then taking steps to resolve any gaps in their coverage.”
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Allowing The Use Of a General Verdict Form in a Construction Defect Case Could Subject Your Client to Prejudgment Interest
August 16, 2012 — Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
A recent opinion from the Colorado Court of Appeals is a cautionary tale concerning the calculation of pre-judgment interest. See Hendricks v. Allied Waste Transportation, Inc., 2012 WL 1881004 (Colo. App. 2012). The Hendricks sued Allied after one of its drivers backed into the corner of their home with an Allied garbage truck. At trial, a jury awarded the Hendricks $160,100 in damages. Although the jury was instructed on the cost of repairs, diminution in value, and non-economic damages, the parties agreed to a general verdict form that did not ask the jury to specify the types of damages awarded. Id. at *1. The Hendricks sought to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest and costs, which the trial court granted.
Allied appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by awarding the Hendricks prejudgment interest from the date their property was damaged. Id. at *7. The Colorado Court of Appeals found no error, and affirmed.
Read the full story…5
Reprinted courtesy of Heather Anderson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Ms. Anderson can be contacted at anderson@hhmrlaw.com
Louisiana Politicians Struggle on Construction Bills, Hospital Redevelopment
June 16, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Louisiana politicians are still working on a compromise in the state’s construction budget, as reported in the Times-Picayune. Rob Marrianneax, the chair of the Senate Revenue and Fiscal Affairs Committee, removed a $45 million request from Governor Bobby Jindal and added $4 million for projects that Jindal vetoed last year.
Two senators have formed competing plans to fund redevelopment construction for New Orleans’s Methodist Hospital. Mitch Landrieu, the mayor of New Orleans, hoped for $30 million dollars in state bonds. Senator Cynthia Willard-Lewis proposed an amendment that would supply $1.6 million, while Senator J.P. Morrell has an amendment that would supply $4 million.
Read the full story…
Insurer Not Entitled to Summary Judgment on Construction Defect Claims
February 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The insurer unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, contending it had no obligation to defend two related underlying construction defect cases. Amerisure Ins. Co. v. R.L.Lantana Boatyard, Ltd., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2466 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 9, 2012).
An engineering report noted design construction defects and deficiencies in visible, physical improvements at The Moorings at Lantana Condominium. In two lawsuits, The Moorings sued the developer, R.L. Lantana Boatyard ("RLLB"), and the contractor, Current Builders of Florida.
Current Builders was insured by Amerisure. RLLB was named as an additional insured under the Amerisure policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Florida Construction Defect Case Settled for $3 Million
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Runaway Beach Club Condominium Association of Kissimmee, Florida has settled its construction defect claims against the parties involved in the construction and development of the buildings. The association claimed that defective roofs and improperly installed windows had lead to leaks and associated damages. A trial date had been set, but parties involved were able to reach this settlement instead.
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Construction Firm Charged for Creating “Hail” Damage
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A Burlington County, Pennsylvania judge has sentenced a firm and its employee for insurance fraud. In the scam, representatives of Precision Builders visited homes after hailstorms and advised homeowners that they could get new roofs and sidings covered by insurance. Many of the homeowners noted that they had not noticed any hail damage.
After homeowners filed claims, employees of Precision Builders would visit the homes and damage the roofs and sidings consistent with the adjusters’ reports.
One employee of Precision Builders, Dominik Sadowski, has pleaded guilty to third-degree insurance fraud. He has been sentenced to four years probation and 100 hours of community service. Another defendant, Marcin Gradziel, is alleged to have visited and damaged properties. He has plead not guilty.
Read the full story…
